Free will and omniscience

[H'ethetheth]

It still seems to me that for omniscience to even be possible, all events must be immutable. It's not even a matter of the universe being deterministic or not, it's a matter of all events definitely being immutable. In a reality where omniscience is possible, 'now' might as well be the position of the needle on the record, and "Comfortably Numb" is always gonna be the last track on side three, whether you've heard it before or not. And in that context free will doesn't seem to do much for you.

Actually, I think that's precisely a matter of determinism. That's pretty much what determinism means, as far as I understand. Other than that, though, I completely agree.

 

[Lithrael]

Actually, I think that's precisely a matter of determinism.

Mostly; but people will bring up the apparently random nature of radioactive decay, etc - and while that may or may not turn out to have something predictable behind it, for omniscience to be possible, things like that must be known in advance as well. That's why I said that even if it's not a completely deterministic reality, all events must still be immutable for omniscience to exist.

 

[tsig]

That's correct. I'm claiming that Bayesian probability is an evidential probability model. It's based around the idea that our information is incomplete, and calculates probabilities based on the evidence we have.

I already gave this example: if I select a ball and put it in my pocket without looking at it, the ball is actually a certain color (that is, the actual probability of the ball being blue is either 1 or 0). But the Bayesian probability of the ball being blue may be 1/4, because the Bayesian probability is based on limited knowledge.

The problem is that people conflate Bayesian evidential probability with the actual probability of truly random events, which is something different.

I am hypothesizing the existence of a being who, because it derives its knowledge atemporally, can exist at point A where the probability of an event is less than 100% but still have full knowledge of the outcome of that event at point B where the probability is 100% (because the event has happened).

My mechanism (thanks to Bill) is atemporal causality: the reason the Oracle knows the outcome at point A is that the outcome is determined and observed at point B, which the Oracle has access to. So the cause of the Oracle's knowledge is the future event.

In this way, I am asserting that the outcome is not restricted at point A. The electron really does have an even probability of being spin-up or spin-down and will interact accordingly until the states collapse. When the states collapse at point B, the Oracle will observe this and will therefore have the knowledge of the states available at point A.

Of course, all this is secondary to the actual point about free will, but if it can be understood how I explain and resolve the paradox with random events, the extension to nondeterministic nonrandom events should be more straightforward.

IOW magic.

 

[tsig]

That is an insult that I take very personally. I absolutely do know how probability works.

I also know, as I've been pointing out for several posts, that people confuse actual probabilities of random events with evidentiary (Bayesian) probabilities attributed to limited knowledge. I also know the statistical treatment that entails.

You don't like my metaphysics; fine. That's no reason to insult my mathematical understanding. I am certainly aware of, and quite competent with, these concepts.

Atemporal vaporings.

 

[tsig]

I'm quite bummed out by the insult of my mathematical abilities above, so I think I'll take my leave of this thread for a while.

Thanks for the excellent, and clearly sincere, analysis of a lot of these points.

:

 

[Belz...]

That is an insult that I take very personally. I absolutely do know how probability works.

If you think that an outcome you know for certain has anything but a probability of 1, then you don't.

 

[Lithrael]

I'm just having fun hearing myself talk at this point but anyway..

If we're talking about an omniscient being, the idea that it could have any hopes or demands for the behaviour of anything that lives inside the constraints of this immutable reality is just plain weird. The point of view that AX is describing for his omniscient being sounds to me like someone who has already read the transcript of, I dunno, a trial, and is now watching a video of it, and is honestly hoping that the lawyer will make a better argument this time.

How can it matter what point in time your omniscient being is actually occupying? If it is omniscient, how can it view any event as anything other than a playback of history? The very concept of omniscience, as far as I can tell, renders all events historical. You can certainly wish and imagine what things would have been like if different choices had been made but you can't actually do anything about any of it. You can't expect them to make any other choice than the one they made. I suppose you can look down through history and judge people for their actions, but you certainly can't hope to change anything they did. It seems pointless to sit there waiting for the moment of a cruel action to take place and then point and say "THERE! Right there, he made a cruel choice!" and get all judgmental and say "He could have made a different choice!"

That's what this whole argument is about, right? "He could have made a different choice?" But he didn't and you always knew that. It's one thing if you're a third party wishing the Buddhas of Bamiyan were never destroyed, but if you're the one who was supposed to have kicked off all of history knowing full well it was going to happen, how do you get to complain about it? It'd be like being angry at the part of your domino set that didn't fall down the way you wanted it to even though you were the one who set them all up and flicked the first one.

 

[Dave Rogers]

I'm not talking about Bayes' Theorem; I'm talking about Bayesian probabilities --

Bayes' Theorem is the mathematical expression by which Bayesian probabilities are derived. Mathematically speaking, they're the same thing. I suppose I shouldn't be surprised you didn't know that either.

Dave

 

[GeeMack]

I'm not planning on providing any evidence for it. I'm here in this thread to demonstrate that the concepts are consistent; not that they're real.

In simplest terms, you have failed.

 

[GeeMack]

I'm quite bummed out by the insult of my mathematical abilities above, so I think I'll take my leave of this thread for a while.

Looks like a clumsy way to acknowledge that you are unable to support your position. The feigned indignation is unnecessary. But at least you seem to be aware that you've failed, so that's good.

Thanks for the excellent, and clearly sincere, analysis of a lot of these points.

You're welcome.

 

[Tricky]

I'm not planning on providing any evidence for it. I'm here in this thread to demonstrate that the concepts are consistent; not that they're real.

They are consistant IF, and only if, you are in a place where atemporality exists. In other words, somewhere other than our universe.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

You may want to note that the logical formalism Myriad posted and that I extended is also atemporal; at no time is the ordering of knowledge considered. And, as Myriad pointed out, you've misunderstood it in your critique; the essence of choice is that both A and not-A are possible choices, whereas the essence of omniscience is that either A or not-A is known with certainty to be the only choice that can be or have been made. These two positions are not compatible.
Dave

The logical argument that you presented is correct for what it concludes, however, you are misconstruing what that conclusion is.
It is true that whatever choice is made then no other choice is made.
It is true that if god knows the choice, then that choice is certain, and no other choice is made.
However, free will means that the knowledge that god has and the knowledge that is certain is knowledge that is created by the action of the person making the choice.
Your argument does not address that idea.
Your logical construct for god's knowing a thing is not valid.
Your argument builds its construct on the implicit assumption that "if god knows it, then god is the source of it". This is not a part of any common definition of omniscience, which is merely "god knows it."
Also, it is a logical mistake to use your conclusion as a assumption to the argument.
To prove your point you need a logical construct the represents the source of the knowledge and then you must prove that god is the source, otherwise your argument fails.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

What ? Isn't that exactly what I said, in fewer words ? How can you rant against my definition, then ?

Here is your defitnotion;
"Mine: Omniscience means the being in question knows everything that has, is, or will happen. In other words, an omniscient being existing at the creation of the universe knows every event that will happen until its end. "Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change."

You appear to define omniscience as precluding free will. That seems a little too convenient.
I can accept your definition if you meant that omniscience means that god knows whatever is chosen.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Your missing the point. This god knows every detail of the universe from beginning to end (which is silly enough if you stop and think about it but I digress).
The fact that this god already knows the outcome means that the person this god created came with a predetermined set of choices from cradle to grave.

No, it does not mean that. It means that god is aware of the choice. If you are arguing determination that is another issue altogether and extends omniscience to include omnipotence.

This god already knows the outcome of the right or left decision so by default the person he creates will already come with a predetermined choice when approaching the intersection.

I can choose to plead ignorance to the speed limit but that doesn't mean the speed limit doesn't apply to me. If there is an omniscient god who knows the outcome of everything, even if I am ignorant of the outcome myself, that doesn't mean that outcome doesn't apply to me.

In this scenario your free will is only a mirage, you can THINK that you are free to do what you wish but your god created YOU with a predetermined chain of events you will accomplish in your life.

Your claim that "god created YOU with a predetermined chain of events you will accomplish in your life" describes omnipotence, not omniscience.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

I'm just having fun hearing myself talk at this point but anyway..

If we're talking about an omniscient being, the idea that it could have any hopes or demands for the behaviour of anything that lives inside the constraints of this immutable reality is just plain weird. The point of view that AX is describing for his omniscient being sounds to me like someone who has already read the transcript of, I dunno, a trial, and is now watching a video of it, and is honestly hoping that the lawyer will make a better argument this time.

How can it matter what point in time your omniscient being is actually occupying? If it is omniscient, how can it view any event as anything other than a playback of history? The very concept of omniscience, as far as I can tell, renders all events historical. You can certainly wish and imagine what things would have been like if different choices had been made but you can't actually do anything about any of it. You can't expect them to make any other choice than the one they made. I suppose you can look down through history and judge people for their actions, but you certainly can't hope to change anything they did. It seems pointless to sit there waiting for the moment of a cruel action to take place and then point and say "THERE! Right there, he made a cruel choice!" and get all judgmental and say "He could have made a different choice!"

That's what this whole argument is about, right? "He could have made a different choice?" But he didn't and you always knew that. It's one thing if you're a third party wishing the Buddhas of Bamiyan were never destroyed, but if you're the one who was supposed to have kicked off all of history knowing full well it was going to happen, how do you get to complain about it? It'd be like being angry at the part of your domino set that didn't fall down the way you wanted it to even though you were the one who set them all up and flicked the first one.

You make the argument for free will very plainly. If the omniscient being looks at everything like it is history, then it is clear that that view of history is what determines the OB's knowledge. Certainly, an historical choice cannot be made differently after it has been made, but the knowledge comes from the choice made as you point out, and knowledge doesn't restrict the options up until that choice is made.

 

[Dave Rogers]

The logical argument that you presented is correct for what it concludes, however, you are misconstruing what that conclusion is.
It is true that whatever choice is made then no other choice is made.
It is true that if god knows the choice, then that choice is certain, and no other choice is made.

Then that's all that's needed to disprove free will.

However, free will means that the knowledge that god has and the knowledge that is certain is knowledge that is created by the action of the person making the choice.

It can't be, if that knowledge is in existence in this universe prior to the choice being made. So either free will does not exist, or God cannot intervene in the universe. Not a nice choice...

Your argument builds its construct on the implicit assumption that "if god knows it, then god is the source of it".

No it doesn't. It doesn't make any assumptions at all about the source of the knowledge; it's perfectly general as to how the knowledge arose.

To prove your point you need a logical construct the represents the source of the knowledge and then you must prove that god is the source, otherwise your argument fails.

No, because the source of the knowledge is not a part of the argument, and doesn't need to be.

Dave

 

[GeeMack]

Here is your defitnotion;
"Mine: Omniscience means the being in question knows everything that has, is, or will happen. In other words, an omniscient being existing at the creation of the universe knows every event that will happen until its end. "Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change."

You appear to define omniscience as precluding free will. That seems a little too convenient.

Actually Belz is defining omniscience as all-knowing, which is exactly what it means. You and AvalonXQ are redefining omniscience in a way that allows for free will, which is pretty convenient, too, but dishonest.

 

[dlorde]

You've missed my point. In some cases he can't tell you in advance without "lying" because telling you would change the outcome to other than what he tells you (a self-defeating prophecy), making what would have been a true statement into a lie.

That is half the point I was trying to illustrate. This discussion is about free will and it's relation to omniscience; if the passenger in your car can omnisciently predict, with certainty, your 'free' choice of turn ahead of time, his free will is thereby constrained - he can't let you know ahead of time; this would not be just an act of his own restraint, it would be some kind of cosmic censorship that would prevent him acting. On the other hand, if the passenger is free to tell you, with certainty, what you will do, then it is clear that your free will must be not just constrained, but overridden - you must and will make the predicted turn - even against your will, by some sort of cosmic coercion.

It seems to me that omniscience and free will, if they existed, would therefore be incompatible.

 

[Belz...]

If we're talking about an omniscient being, the idea that it could have any hopes or demands for the behaviour of anything that lives inside the constraints of this immutable reality is just plain weird. The point of view that AX is describing for his omniscient being sounds to me like someone who has already read the transcript of, I dunno, a trial, and is now watching a video of it, and is honestly hoping that the lawyer will make a better argument this time.

How can it matter what point in time your omniscient being is actually occupying? If it is omniscient, how can it view any event as anything other than a playback of history? The very concept of omniscience, as far as I can tell, renders all events historical.

That's what we're trying to explain to him.

 

[Belz...]

Here is your defitnotion;
"Mine: Omniscience means the being in question knows everything that has, is, or will happen. In other words, an omniscient being existing at the creation of the universe knows every event that will happen until its end. "Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change."

You appear to define omniscience as precluding free will. That seems a little too convenient.
I can accept your definition if you meant that omniscience means that god knows whatever is chosen.

Those definitions are equivalent, Bill. You said omniscience is knowing everything. I say omniscience is knowing everything. And yes, that include things that have yet to transpire since they are "things". How can an omniscient being not know that ? And if he knows, how can you choose otherwise ?