Free will and omniscience

Actually Belz is defining omniscience as all-knowing, which is exactly what it means. You and AvalonXQ are redefining omniscience in a way that allows for free will, which is pretty convenient, too, but dishonest.
We are minimizing the definition to what it is commonly held to be.
That would be "knowing", but not "controlling".
The definition, without adding inventive, necessary-to-the argument caveats, does not disallow free will.
 
That is half the point I was trying to illustrate. This discussion is about free will and it's relation to omniscience; if the passenger in your car can omnisciently predict, with certainty, your 'free' choice of turn ahead of time, his free will is thereby constrained - he can't let you know ahead of time; this would not be just an act of his own restraint, it would be some kind of cosmic censorship that would prevent him acting. On the other hand, if the passenger is free to tell you, with certainty, what you will do, then it is clear that your free will must be not just constrained, but overridden - you must and will make the predicted turn - even against your will, by some sort of cosmic coercion.

It seems to me that omniscience and free will, if they existed, would therefore be incompatible.
Cosmic coercion is not an aspect of omniscience, therefore your conclusion is not sound.
 
Those definitions are equivalent, Bill. You said omniscience is knowing everything. I say omniscience is knowing everything.
This is a lie of omission. You included:
"Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change."
If you don't see how that makes the definitions not equivalent then that would go a long way to explaining why your conclusions are erroneous.

And yes, that include things that have yet to transpire since they are "things". How can an omniscient being not know that ? And if he knows, how can you choose otherwise ?
Here is the argument at its most fundamental.
1) If an omniscient being knows a thing because that thing happened, then the omniscient being did not control or restrain or cause or determine that thing.
2) If the thing was a choice from among multiple options then that choice was one of free will.
3) The common definition of omniscience does not negate either 1) or 2).
QED: Free will and omniscience are not incompatible.
 
Here is the argument at its most fundamental.
1) If an omniscient being knows a thing because that thing happened, then the omniscient being did not control or restrain or cause or determine that thing.
2) If the thing was a choice from among multiple options then that choice was one of free will.
3) The common definition of omniscience does not negate either 1) or 2).
QED: Free will and omniscience are not incompatible.
And here is the error at it's most fundamental. "Happened" is past tense. You cannot include as "knowing" things that you only know after they happen.

Again, you're invoking time travel. That is impossible in this universe. It violates the laws of phyisics. Any argument you make which requires time travel is, ipso facto, wrong.
 
And here is the error at it's most fundamental. "Happened" is past tense. You cannot include as "knowing" things that you only know after they happen.

Again, you're invoking time travel. That is impossible in this universe. It violates the laws of phyisics. Any argument you make which requires time travel is, ipso facto, wrong.
Where did you get the goofy idea that omniscience only applies after the fact or that it involves time travel.

If you are going to intelligently participate in a dialogue about omniscience then you have to understand that it is equivalent to a thought experiment, not a physics lab experiment.
Can you do that?
 
If you think that an outcome you know for certain has anything but a probability of 1, then you don't.

Something that has already occurred has a probability of 1, but I'm not sure anything is certain for us mere mortals.
 
Where did you get the goofy idea that omniscience only applies after the fact or that it involves time travel.
From your goofy explanation. Figure it out, Bill. If the Omniscient being only knew it AFTER it happened, as signified by the use of the past tense, then he wasn't omniscient BEFORE it happened.

If you are going to intelligently participate in a dialogue about omniscience then you have to understand that it is equivalent to a thought experiment, not a physics lab experiment. Can you do that?
Much better than you, it appears.

Now if you're just preparing to write a science fiction novel, then hell, invoke all the time travel you want, but at least ADMIT that this is what you are doing so that people will know not to take you seriously.

I asked you before, but you refused to answer, Mister Intelligent, "Does your defense of the compatiblility of omniscience and free will require atemporality?"

Because if it does, that is time travel, and if it does not, you cannot justify it logically.
 
Then that's all that's needed to disprove free will.
No it's not. Free will isn't only what comes out of a choice, it's what goes in to it as well.

It can't be, if that knowledge is in existence in this universe prior to the choice being made. So either free will does not exist, or God cannot intervene in the universe. Not a nice choice...
Or the third obvious option, that god knows because that's the choice that was made.

No it doesn't. It doesn't make any assumptions at all about the source of the knowledge; it's perfectly general as to how the knowledge arose.
Try to make your argument built with assumption that "if god knows it, then god acquired the knowledge from the action that created it".

No, because the source of the knowledge is not a part of the argument, and doesn't need to be.
Dave
The source of the knowledge is fundamental to the argument.
You succeed only if you deny that.
If the choice is generated by the chooser then free will is not negated by god's knowledge of it.
 
From your goofy explanation. Figure it out, Bill. If the Omniscient being only knew it AFTER it happened, as signified by the use of the past tense, then he wasn't omniscient BEFORE it happened.
Where did you get the goofy idea that an omniscient being only knows something AFTER it happened?

Much better than you, it appears.
Now if you're just preparing to write a science fiction novel, then hell, invoke all the time travel you want, but at least ADMIT that this is what you are doing so that people will know not to take you seriously.
I asked you before, but you refused to answer, Mister Intelligent, "Does your defense of the compatiblility of omniscience and free will require atemporality?"
Because if it does, that is time travel, and if it does not, you cannot justify it logically.
Okay, I will say that my argument is based upon the atemporality of omniscient knowledge. This has nothing to do with time travel, because an omniscient being does not travel in time to acquire knowledge, it has all knowledge at any time, by definition.
 
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The logical argument that you presented is correct for what it concludes, however, you are misconstruing what that conclusion is.
It is true that whatever choice is made then no other choice is made.
It is true that if god knows the choice, then that choice is certain, and no other choice is made.
However, free will means that the knowledge that god has and the knowledge that is certain is knowledge that is created by the action of the person making the choice.Your argument does not address that idea.
Your logical construct for god's knowing a thing is not valid.
Your argument builds its construct on the implicit assumption that "if god knows it, then god is the source of it". This is not a part of any common definition of omniscience, which is merely "god knows it."
Also, it is a logical mistake to use your conclusion as a assumption to the argument.
To prove your point you need a logical construct the represents the source of the knowledge and then you must prove that god is the source, otherwise your argument fails.

You make the argument for free will very plainly. If the omniscient being looks at everything like it is history, then it is clear that that view of history is what determines the OB's knowledge. Certainly, an historical choice cannot be made differently after it has been made, but the knowledge comes from the choice made as you point out, and knowledge doesn't restrict the options up until that choice is made.

This is a lie of omission. You included:
"Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change."
If you don't see how that makes the definitions not equivalent then that would go a long way to explaining why your conclusions are erroneous.


Here is the argument at its most fundamental.
1) If an omniscient being knows a thing because that thing happened, then the omniscient being did not control or restrain or cause or determine that thing.
2) If the thing was a choice from among multiple options then that choice was one of free will.
3) The common definition of omniscience does not negate either 1) or 2).
QED: Free will and omniscience are not incompatible.

Where did you get the goofy idea that omniscience only applies after the fact or that it involves time travel.

If you are going to intelligently participate in a dialogue about omniscience then you have to understand that it is equivalent to a thought experiment, not a physics lab experiment.
Can you do that?

He probably got the idea that omniscience only applies after the fact because that's what you keep saying.
 
He probably got the idea that omniscience only applies after the fact because that's what you keep saying.

Could you quote where I said "only applies after the fact"?

If you have been following this debate intelligently then this is a falsehood.
If you have been following this debate unintelligently, then reread this sentence starting at the second word.
If you have not been following this debate then this irrelevance is expected.
 
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Cosmic coercion is not an aspect of omniscience, therefore your conclusion is not sound.
Cosmic coercion is one solution to the paradox, cosmic restraint is the other. Which is it to be?

If an entity can know which way you'll turn before you make the turn, either the entity must be constrained from telling you, or you must make the predicted turn, willing or not. If neither was the case, you'd be free to turn the other way and demonstrate the prediction was incorrect and the entity not omnisciently prescient.

If you'd care to argue the point rather than simply assert it incorrect, things might progress.
 
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Okay, I will say that my argument is based upon the atemporality of omniscient knowledge. This has nothing to do with time travel, because an omniscient being does not travel in time to acquire knowledge, it has all knowledge at any time, by definition.

Well that's good then. Good luck with your science fiction novel, because being "outside of time" is in fact time travel. If you see things before they occur, you must travel through time to do so. Or are these some new goofy definitions you're coming up with?
 
That is half the point I was trying to illustrate. This discussion is about free will and it's relation to omniscience; if the passenger in your car can omnisciently predict, with certainty, your 'free' choice of turn ahead of time, his free will is thereby constrained - he can't let you know ahead of time; this would not be just an act of his own restraint, it would be some kind of cosmic censorship that would prevent him acting. On the other hand, if the passenger is free to tell you, with certainty, what you will do, then it is clear that your free will must be not just constrained, but overridden - you must and will make the predicted turn - even against your will, by some sort of cosmic coercion.

It seems to me that omniscience and free will, if they existed, would therefore be incompatible.

I don't think that omniscience is the constraint on the omniscient passenger's free will in this case, but rather the stipulation that the passenger isn't going to knowingly give a wrong prediction (ie, lie), which has nothing to do with omniscience.

If you remove this stipulation and allow him to say whatever he wants, the passenger is free to tell you what you would have done with complete certainty, knowing that a different outcome will now occur. (And of course, being omniscient, he knows every detail of how the universe will be different because of this.)
 
Could you quote where I said "only applies after the fact"?


You said the omniscient being acquires its knowledge "because the choice was made"... past tense... meaning after the fact. Or are you dishonestly redefining "after" or "was" or some other common terms to support your otherwise unsupportable position?

No it's not. Free will isn't only what comes out of a choice, it's what goes in to it as well.

Or the third obvious option, that god knows because that's the choice that was made.

Try to make your argument built with assumption that "if god knows it, then god acquired the knowledge from the action that created it".

You see, your persistent ingenuous and dishonest attempt to deny that is an empty argument.

If you have been following this debate intelligently then this is a falsehood.
If you have been following this debate unintelligently, then reread this sentence starting at the second word.
If you have not been following this debate then this irrelevance is expected.


We have all been following the discussion, even tsig. It seems you either don't remember what you've written, you're making up crap as you go along, or you're lying to support your position. Maybe some of each. Kind of like AvalonXQ's failed strategy. You might want to take note: You're failing with it, too.
 
You said the omniscient being acquires its knowledge "because the choice was made"... past tense... meaning after the fact. Or are you dishonestly redefining "after" or "was" or some other common terms to support your otherwise unsupportable position?


You see, your persistent ingenuous and dishonest attempt to deny that is an empty argument.




We have all been following the discussion, even tsig. It seems you either don't remember what you've written, you're making up crap as you go along, or you're lying to support your position. Maybe some of each. Kind of like AvalonXQ's failed strategy. You might want to take note: You're failing with it, too.

Thanks.

Guess he didn't read his posts I quoted or he's taking refuge in semantics because he didn't say those exact words.


It seems to be a common defense tactic to claim that the other poster has not read the whole thread.

Just for the record I have never made a comment without reading everything written before that comment.
 
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This is a lie of omission. You included:
"Knowing", of course, precludes the possibility that any of those events will change."
If you don't see how that makes the definitions not equivalent then that would go a long way to explaining why your conclusions are erroneous.

Wow, seriously. That's not part of the definition, Bill. It's a conclusion based on the definition. Please pay attention.

1) If an omniscient being knows a thing because that thing happened, then the omniscient being did not control or restrain or cause or determine that thing.

Irrelevant.

2) If the thing was a choice from among multiple options then that choice was one of free will.

Non sequitur.

3) The common definition of omniscience does not negate either 1) or 2).
QED: Free will and omniscience are not incompatible.

Of course they do. Either that, or you are using a very weird definition of "knowledge". If I KNOW you will eat a tuna sandwitch tonight, then you will. You can't eat anything else. Otherwise I don't know it. If I know everything, ever, you can't choose anything but what I know you will choose, which makes the concept of free will meaningless.
 
Something that has already occurred has a probability of 1, but I'm not sure anything is certain for us mere mortals.

Irrelevant. Assuming there's an omniscient being (which is impossible, by the way, just like free will, so this discussion is entirely academic), then the probability of every event is 1 to start with.
 
They are consistant IF, and only if, you are in a place where atemporality exists. In other words, somewhere other than our universe.

Sorry, but I really don't see how that's true. Avalon has tried to make that case, but if you could point out what argument in that direction convinced you, I'd appreciate it.
 
Sorry, but I really don't see how that's true. Avalon has tried to make that case, but if you could point out what argument in that direction convinced you, I'd appreciate it.
It's been pounded on before, but I'll recap.

1) To have 100%, inerrant knowledge of the outcome of a free-will choice, the omniscient being must know in advance what decision will be made.

2) If that choice is truly free-will, then for the OB to "know" in advance, the OB must exist atemporally, i.e. able to be anywhen in time. (Which amounts to time travel.)

3) If that choice is 100%, inerrant knowledge without atemporality, then that choice is not a free-will choice. It is predestined, i.e. the chooser cannot make any other choice without proving the OB to be not omniscient.

And both Avalon and Bill have agreed that this atemporality must exist in order to make free-will and omniscience compatible. Avalon has even accepted the term "magic" to describe it.
 

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