Free will and omniscience

[dafydd]

Your answer to everything is how little we know, how poor our minds are yet you seem unacquainted with what humans do know.

True. He underestimates the capabilities of mankind. He has no proof of this mystical realm that our poor minds cannot comprehend.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

Boy, you are just as slippery as a catfish in butter.

Okay then, do you agree that IF omniscience and free will can both exist that it WOULD require atemporality?

I am saying that the very nature of omniscience, noted by its definition, is atemporal, which means that all knowledge is known at all times without any ordering of that knowledge by time.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

om·ni·scient
adj \-shənt\
Definition of OMNISCIENT
1
: having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight
2
: possessed of universal or complete knowledge



We all know what the choice is after it's been made. Omniscience means you know every choice that has been made or will be made.

That is exactly true, and note that there is no indication that knowledge of a choice controls that choice.

 

[Bill Thompson 75]

"Monsieur, (a + b^n)/n =x, therefore God exists. Any answer to that!"

Yes, the answer is y=42.

 

[Brian-M]

It seems pretty simple that a response happening before the action means that the action can't be changed (ie. no free will) lest the original response be in error or be changed itself.

Actions can't be "changed". Either an action occurs or does not occur. Either you eat an apple in 2 hours, or you do not. If you do not, then it was never an action. It does not matter if you're looking at the action from before or after it occurs, it either is an actual action or it is not. The fact that you can't change the action when the action is known before it happens is no more or less an abrogation of free will than being unable to change the action when the action is known after it happens.

Put it another way, if you know with absolute certainty that I will eat an apple in 2 hours (to you it has already happened), what will happen if I eat a banana instead? If it is logically circular and absurd, well yeah. The idea of omniscience being compatible with freewill is logically circular and absurd.

Let's say that I'm sitting with you at lunch, and there's a bowl of fruit on the table, and I have no idea what you're going to eat. Then you decide to eat an apple. Is this an act of free will or not?

Next I jump into my time machine, head back two hours and peek through the window (there's a small gap in the curtain which let's me see in, but since it's dark outside nobody inside can see me watching) and wait for you and my past self arrive, knowing with absolutely certainty that you'd eat the apple.

Now I see you sit at the table and choose to eat... the apple, of course. The situation hasn't changed. There is nothing about this situation that would cause you to act differently to how I remember seeing you act. It's not just an identical situation to the one I witnessed before, it is the exact same situation I witnessed before. If you choose to eat a banana instead of an apple, I'd remember that you chose to eat the banana. I know that you eat the apple because your choice to eat the apple created the memory of you eating the apple.

It's your decision to eat the apple that creates my knowledge of you eating it; my knowledge of you eating the apple doesn't cause you to eat it.

These events are in my past, watching through the window in the past is no different than if, instead of going back in time, I simply watched a video recording of the meal.

If there were no me from the future secretly observing you, knowing what you are about to do, how would that make your actions any more free then if there were no future me?

Or even removing the time travel element altogether and returning to the real world, what possible actions can you take today that the you of tomorrow will know you didn't do? What possible actions can the you of yesterday take that the you of today knows you didn't do?

Past or future, your actions are unchangeable. But it's the you of the time when the actions are taken who gets to choose what these unchangeable actions are.

When you're dealing with the ability to know future events, things don't necessarily happen in order of causality;

Please clarify, how do you know this?

a response to an action can easily precede the action that caused it.

Easily? Again, how do come about this knowledge?

I'd have thought this sentence was self evident, but I'll try and put it in simpler terms.

When you have knowledge of events from the future (such as a newspaper from next month), you have information that exists prior to the events that created the information.

People often take actions based on abstract knowledge/information. This would also apply to knowledge of future events. For example, if I know that the plane flight I'm booked on for my holidays will appear in the headlines of next month's newspaper as a major crash with no survivors, I'll most likely choose not to take that flight.

So if I have knowledge of future events/actions then I can choose to act in response to these future events/actions prior to their occurrence. (Such as changing my holiday plans in response to the future crash of the airplane I'd otherwise have been on.)

In other words, this would be a response to an action or event that precedes the action or event that caused it. But this would mean that the response (the effect) precedes the cause... things are no longer happening in causal order.

When you're dealing with the ability to know future events, things don't necessarily happen in order of causality; a response to an action can easily precede the action that caused it.

Does this sentence make sense to you now?

 

[SumDood]

So your point is that they didn't use the word "atemporal" and it would take to much effort too read the definitions to know if it means that or not and so I'm just going to claim that it doesn't mean that, right?

No, i'm saying that none of the definitions on the sites you listed say anything that equates omniscience with atemporalness. You are making that jump.

Omniscience is defined as knowing everything. So, if the OB exists at any time, say even today, it knows everything, not just things from the past or future, but from all time. Therefore, the knowledge that the OB has is not constrained by time, and therefore, the knowledge is accurately described as atemporal.

Nobody is positing that omniscience is possible.

Is my knowledge of the past, present and future constrained by time? If not, can I say my knowledge is atemporal and therefore I am atemporal?

 

[Tricky]

I am saying that the very nature of omniscience, noted by its definition, is atemporal, which means that all knowledge is known at all times without any ordering of that knowledge by time.

Well good then. We agree that omniscience (as you describe it) requires atemporality.

The next step to showing that omniscience exists, would be to show that atemporality exists. Are you interested in doing this? From your earlier comments, I'd say no. It seems to me that you are most interested in making a hypothetical statement about omniscience. Well, that's interesting, but not any more interesting, and whole lot less entertaining, than making a hypothetical statement as to why Harry Potter needs a wand to do magic.

You can make any sort of logical statement if you don't require that your premises be defensible. It works well in fiction. But apart from entertainment value, why should it have any bearing on reality? Why would anyone defend omniscience or atemporality other than as an exercise in fictional scenarios? If you think they are real, then defend them. If this is just a "thought exercise", then admit that you don't really accept them.

 

[Tricky]

When you have knowledge of events from the future (such as a newspaper from next month), you have information that exists prior to the events that created the information.

And do you believe this is possible?

 

[Brian-M]

And do you believe this is possible?

No. But that's hardly the point. An omniscient being is even less possible by a multitude of orders of magnitude, and nobody has a problem discussing it's hypothetical implications.

(An omniscient being will not only know what's in next month's newspaper, it will also know what's in every newspaper ever, and that doesn't even begin to touch on the full extent of it's future knowledge)

 

[tsig]

That is exactly true, and note that there is no indication that knowledge of a choice controls that choice.

So omniscience doesn't mean that your choice is known before it was made?

 

[Tony]

Actions can't be "changed".

My point exactly! They CAN'T be changed. No matter what, you have no choice—no free will—to act in way other than has already been known. Even if this omniscient being tells you what you're going to do, you cannot choose to do something different.

Let's say that I'm sitting with you at lunch, and there's a bowl of fruit on the table, and I have no idea what you're going to eat. Then you decide to eat an apple. Is this an act of free will or not?

Next I jump into my time machine, head back two hours and peek through the window (there's a small gap in the curtain which let's me see in, but since it's dark outside nobody inside can see me watching) and wait for you and my past self arrive, knowing with absolutely certainty that you'd eat the apple.

Now I see you sit at the table and choose to eat... the apple, of course. The situation hasn't changed. There is nothing about this situation that would cause you to act differently to how I remember seeing you act. It's not just an identical situation to the one I witnessed before, it is the exact same situation I witnessed before. If you choose to eat a banana instead of an apple, I'd remember that you chose to eat the banana. I know that you eat the apple because your choice to eat the apple created the memory of you eating the apple.

This is rank speculation. You have no idea what can happen if you go back in time. For all you know, you've jumped back in time to a parallel universe where I chose to eat something else.

This also doesn't address the fact that jumping back in time doesn't render you omniscient. You would know a single thing about me. You still would have no idea what choices I would make for the rest of my life. So no, this doesn't really qualify as omniscience.

If there were no me from the future secretly observing you, knowing what you are about to do, how would that make your actions any more free then if there were no future me?

Would I be able to choose a different action if you told me what I was going to do?

Or even removing the time travel element altogether and returning to the real world, what possible actions can you take today that the you of tomorrow will know you didn't do? What possible actions can the you of yesterday take that the you of today knows you didn't do?

Past or future, your actions are unchangeable. But it's the you of the time when the actions are taken who gets to choose what these unchangeable actions are.

This isn't omniscience.

I'd have thought this sentence was self evident, but I'll try and put it in simpler terms.

When you have knowledge of events from the future (such as a newspaper from next month), you have information that exists prior to the events that created the information.

People often take actions based on abstract knowledge/information. This would also apply to knowledge of future events. For example, if I know that the plane flight I'm booked on for my holidays will appear in the headlines of next month's newspaper as a major crash with no survivors, I'll most likely choose not to take that flight.

So if I have knowledge of future events/actions then I can choose to act in response to these future events/actions prior to their occurrence. (Such as changing my holiday plans in response to the future crash of the airplane I'd otherwise have been on.)

In other words, this would be a response to an action or event that precedes the action or event that caused it. But this would mean that the response (the effect) precedes the cause... things are no longer happening in causal order.



Does this sentence make sense to you now?

Not really. You're still pretending to know things which you could possibly not know. Have you ever had a newspaper from the future to be able to test whether everything written in the paper turned out to happen? Does having a newspaper from the future endow you with omniscience?

You seem to be simultaneously arguing for the existence of fate AND free will. If the future is written, as it would be in your future newspaper, can it be changed?

 

[Tricky]

And do you believe this is possible?

No. But that's hardly the point. An omniscient being is even less possible by a multitude of orders of magnitude, and nobody has a problem discussing it's hypothetical implications.

Yet many people believe it is true that there is a real, omniscient being, yet few believe that Harry Potter is real. So it's a point. Why do people believe one impossible being, but not another? History and indoctrination. Nothing to do with "possibility".

I understand what you are saying. I'm not criticizing your comments, but just discussing them. [/quote]

 

[Brian-M]

My point exactly! They CAN'T be changed. No matter what, you have no choice—no free will—to act in way other than has already been known.

An my point is that this is true regardless of whether or not an omniscient entity exists, therefore the the matter of whether or not an omniscient entity exists has nothing to do with free will.

(Determinism is more relevant than omniscience.)

Even if this omniscient being tells you what you're going to do, you cannot choose to do something different.

Woah there!

Having an omniscient being that interacts with the universe is a slightly different kettle of fish than simply having an omniscient being. Such a being would have to take into account the effect of it's own actions on the outcome.

An omniscient being might know that you'd normally eat an apple if it did not interfere, but would also know that you'd deliberately choose to eat a banana instead if it tells you that you're going to eat an apple.

This is rank speculation. You have no idea what can happen if you go back in time. For all you know, you've jumped back in time to a parallel universe where I chose to eat something else.

This is my hypothetical, and in my hypothetical I go back to the past of the same timeline, and take deliberate care not to create a paradox by altering the situation.

(Because if I did create a paradox in the example, this could spark an entirely different pointless debate that would be better off in a different thread.)

This also doesn't address the fact that jumping back in time doesn't render you omniscient. You would know a single thing about me. You still would have no idea what choices I would make for the rest of my life. So no, this doesn't really qualify as omniscience.

You're missing the point. The supposed incompatibility between omniscience and free will stems from the claim that an omniscient being would know what you're going to do long before you decide to do it.

In the instance of you deciding to eat an apple instead of a banana, only the knowledge of which you'll choose to eat is relevant. In this situation a time traveler who knows what you will eat in advance is in the same position as an omniscient entity who knows what you will eat in advance. It's the same thing as far as your free will to eat an apple or banana is concerned.

Would I be able to choose a different action if you told me what I was going to do?

If I told you that you were going to eat the apple this would change the conditions upon which your decision to eat the apple was based. So yes, you could choose to eat the banana instead of the apple if you wanted.

But my (truthfully) telling you what this future outcome will be would cause a paradox if it changes it. Exactly how time-travel paradoxes could be resolved is a matter of much speculation and a subject of many a work of science fiction.

This isn't omniscience.

No, it's determinism. The underlying basis of omniscience.

Not really. You're still pretending to know things which you could possibly not know. Have you ever had a newspaper from the future to be able to test whether everything written in the paper turned out to happen?

Is this supposed to be a joke? The hypothetical situation here is that you have accurate foreknowledge of future events. It doesn't matter if this foreknowledge comes from a newspaper brought back in time from the future, or from omniscience, or from an exact reproduction of a future newspaper, created by an omniscient entity without need of time travel.

Does having a newspaper from the future endow you with omniscience?

No, it endows you with partial prescience. Prescience is the subset of omniscience underpinning the debate on this thread. An otherwise omniscient entity that lacked prescience would be wholly irrelevant to the free-will/omniscience debate.

You seem to be simultaneously arguing for the existence of fate AND free will. If the future is written, as it would be in your future newspaper, can it be changed?

Not fate, determinism. I personally believe that the two are not incompatible, but that opinion is also irrelevant here.

I'm not arguing with you over whether or not free will exists (which is a slightly different matter), I'm arguing that the presence (or absence) of omniscience/prescience does not effect the existence (or nonexistence) of free will in a deterministic universe.

 

[Tricky]

Problem is, Brian, even observing the system affects system. So you can't (in a physical system) have a being that observes but has no effect. If you want to have a non-physical being, you'll have to posit a supernatural system. Good luck with proving that.

 

[Dave Rogers]

I would agree that -P(-n) -> C, but I would not agree that the inverse is true.

It seems to me that if an outcome is certain, then the negation of that outcome is by definition impossible. I don't see any other way of interpreting the concept of certainty.

Dave

 

[Dave Rogers]

I am saying that the very nature of omniscience, noted by its definition, is atemporal, which means that all knowledge is known at all times without any ordering of that knowledge by time.

You may want to note that the logical formalism Myriad posted and that I extended is also atemporal; at no time is the ordering of knowledge considered. And, as Myriad pointed out, you've misunderstood it in your critique; the essence of choice is that both A and not-A are possible choices, whereas the essence of omniscience is that either A or not-A is known with certainty to be the only choice that can be or have been made. These two positions are not compatible.

Dave

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Problem is, Brian, even observing the system affects system. So you can't (in a physical system) have a being that observes but has no effect. If you want to have a non-physical being, you'll have to posit a supernatural system. Good luck with proving that.

You can if you have a time machine. Picture this: we entangle a particle, then measure its state, causing the superposition to collapse. Now, I get in my time machine, go back thirty minutes, and bet you $100 that I know what the particle will collapse to. We observe it with the same observation, and it collapses to the same state it already had last time around. One observation, one collapse event.

Of course, this assumes a very great deal of time travel to reach anything we might label "omniscience," and any time travel by our current understanding of physics is only slightly less improbable than a magically omniscient force. So it's fairly unlikely.

There is another option. That there is some facet of the universe we haven't discovered yet which makes even quantum effects perfectly predictable. While this allows for an infinite-knowledge oracle without time travel shenanigans, it also renders the argument moot since it means the universe is even more deterministic than determinists would argue. We would all be objects in orbit, unable to even consider deviating from our current path.

 

[tsig]

You can if you have a time machine. Picture this: we entangle a particle, then measure its state, causing the superposition to collapse. Now, I get in my time machine, go back thirty minutes, and bet you $100 that I know what the particle will collapse to. We observe it with the same observation, and it collapses to the same state it already had last time around. One observation, one collapse event.

Of course, this assumes a very great deal of time travel to reach anything we might label "omniscience," and any time travel by our current understanding of physics is only slightly less improbable than a magically omniscient force. So it's fairly unlikely.

There is another option. That there is some facet of the universe we haven't discovered yet which makes even quantum effects perfectly predictable. While this allows for an infinite-knowledge oracle without time travel shenanigans, it also renders the argument moot since it means the universe is even more deterministic than determinists would argue. We would all be objects in orbit, unable to even consider deviating from our current path.

So it's OWIMW*?

*omniscience works in mysterious ways.

 

[Dave Rogers]

Problem is, Brian, even observing the system affects system. So you can't (in a physical system) have a being that observes but has no effect. If you want to have a non-physical being, you'll have to posit a supernatural system. Good luck with proving that.

You can if you have a time machine.

Can I just make one rather important observation here?

There's no such thing as a time machine.

Obvious, yes, but: We're discussing free will and causality here, and time machines violate causality. If we try to understand causality by thought experiments predicated on the nonexistence of causality - which is effectively what anyone is doing the moment they posit the existence of a time machine - then any conclusions we reach must invariably be invalid, because they're based on a contradiction.

So anyone whose thought experiment involves a time machine should probably not be doing that particular thought experiment.

Dave

 

[Tricky]

Can I just make one rather important observation here?

There's no such thing as a time machine.

Zackley! Which is why I'm asking defenders of the possibility of free-will and coexistant omniscience if their defense posits atemporality, because if so, they would need to show that "timeless" things can exist. So far, no straight answers.