Empirical Evidence vs Reason

How did you conclude you had empirical evidence? By 'reason', perhaps?

Ladies and gentlemen, that's the kind of thinking that builds rockets to the moon.
 
It is just evidence. It has no more "purpose" than the undiscovered fossils which may someday link major taxonomic groups.
Evidence of what? The nothing that you make it out to be? See, it's entirely meaningless. Or, if it was presented as evidence of "something," how would you know what to do with it?
 
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Logic and math are not based on empirical evidence. But alone they don't tell us anything about the world.
Yes, exactly.

As Einstein put it, "Insofar as the expressions of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain, and insofar as they are certain they do not refer to reality."

(The rest of the referenced page unfortunately displays quite a misunderstanding of relativity. But I assume the author got the quote right, at least, as I've seen it elsewhere.)
 
Example A:
1. Start with emperical evidence
2. Apply reason
3. Formulate conclusion
3. Support conclusion with 1 and 2
This is where knowledge comes from. It is made of win and good.

Example A, if done properly, works. It is built from the foundation up. It will collapse if you skip a step. It can easily go beyond what was already known, which is why it is called "learning."

Example A in action: Geometric proofs, science, philosophy, Pulitzer prize winning essays, everyday rational thought.

As an aside, I don't see how geometric proofs involve empirical evidence.

At any rate, some knowledge is independent of empirical evidence, as Kant pointed out in The Critique of Pure Reason (people with no stomach for this sort of writing should feel free to skip ahead):

Experience is, beyond all doubt, the first product to which our understanding gives rise, in working up the raw material of sensible impressions. Experience is therefore our first instruction, and in its progress is so inexhaustible in new information, that in the interconnected lives of all future generations there will never be any lack of new knowledge that can be thus ingathered. Nevertheless, it is by no means the sole field to which our understanding is confined.

For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) supplies from itself. If our faculty of knowledge makes any such addition, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material, until with long practice of attention we have become skilled in separating it.

This, then, is a question which at least calls for closer examination, and does not allow of any off-hand answer: whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori, and distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.

Experience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality; and reason, which is so insistent upon this kind of knowledge, is therefore more stimulated by it than satisfied. Such universal modes of knowledge, which at the same time possess the character of inner necessity, must in themselves, independently of experience, be clear and certain. They are therefore entitled knowledge a priori; whereas, on the other hand, that which is borrowed solely from experience is, as we say, known only a posteriori, or empirically.

Now we find, what is especially noteworthy, that even into our experiences there enter modes of knowledge which must have their origin a priori, and which perhaps serve only to give coherence to our sense-representations. For if we eliminate from our experiences everything which belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and certain judgments derived from them, which must have arisen completely a priori, independently of experience, inasmuch as they enable us to say, or at least lead us to believe that we can say, in regard to the objects which appear to the senses, more than mere experience would teach - giving to assertions true universality and strict necessity, such as mere empirical knowledge cannot supply.

...

In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience.

...

What we here require is a criterion by which to distinguish with certainty between pure and empirical knowledge. Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. First, then, if we have a proposition which in being thought is thought as necessary, it is an a priori judgment; and if, besides, it is not derived from any proposition except one which also has the validity of a necessary judgment, it is an absolutely a priori judgment. Secondly, experience never confers on its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality, through induction. We can properly only say, therefore, that so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, then, a judgment is thought with strict universality, that is, in such manner that no exception is allowed as possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is only an arbitrary extension of a validity holding in most cases to one which holds in all, for instance, in the proposition, 'all bodies are heavy'.

When ... strict universality is essential to a judgment, this indicates a special source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of a priori knowledge. Necessity and strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one another. But since in the employment of these criteria the contingency of judgments is sometimes more easily shown than their empirical limitation, or, as sometimes also happens, their unlimited universality can be more convincingly proved than their necessity, it is advisable to use the two criteria separately, each by itself being infallible.

Now it is easy to show that there actually are in human knowledge judgments which are necessary and in the strictest sense universal, and which are therefore pure a priori judgments. If an example from the sciences be desired, we have only to look to any of the propositions of mathematics; if we seek an example from the understanding in its quite ordinary employment, the proposition, "every alteration must have a cause", will serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the very concept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule, that the concept would be altogether lost if we attempted to derive it, as Hume has done, from a repeated association of that which happens with that which precedes, and from a custom of connecting representations, a custom originating in this repeated association, and constituting therefore a merely subjective necessity.

Even without appealing to such examples, it is possible to show that pure a priori principles are indispensable for the possibility of experience, and so to prove their existence a priori. For whence could experience derive its certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds, were always themselves empirical, and therefore contingent? Such rules could hardly be regarded as first principles. At present, however, we may be content to have established the fact that our faculty of knowledge does have a pure employment, and to have shown what are the criteria of such an employment.


For our purposes, it's sufficient to note that reality is composed of both necessary aspects and contingent aspects, and that empirical science can only yield knowledge of the latter (and perhaps not all of those). We shouldn't assume that knowledge of the former - i.e., pure knowledge - is not knowledge of reality.
 
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We shouldn't assume that knowledge of the former - i.e., pure knowledge - is not knowledge of reality.

I assume that "pure knowledge" is "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience".

I call that speculation. Technically you are correct. But any connection to reality would be just coincidental.
 
It's true that this is a religion and philosphy subforum. But when you claim that some deity is necessery or responsible for our existence then you are mixing it with science. And you should be prepared to defend your statements scientifically. If we accept any wild claim regardles of any science at all, we might as well change the subforum to fiction/fantasy.



I agree with both of you. Logic and math are not based on empirical evidence. But alone they don't tell us anything about the world. I could make mathematically and logically correct equations and arguments but without some empirical evidence they would be pure speculation.

I would add that this entire argument started with a discussion (where the h is codeblue anyhoo?) about Intelligent Design. By its very nature, ID will call in both religion and science. Iacchus had started by claiming that the universe "had" to have a blueprint/design/plan/script/whatever and it devolved (ironically) from there.
 
I assume that "pure knowledge" is "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience".

I call that speculation. Technically you are correct. But any connection to reality would be just coincidental.

One way of looking at pure knowledge is "knowledge of things that are necessarily true", as opposed to "knowledge of things that are contingently true". When you suggest that any connection between pure knowledge and reality is "just coincidental", it implies that what is necessarily true is only contingently true. That seems necessarily false.
 
One way of looking at pure knowledge is "knowledge of things that are necessarily true", as opposed to "knowledge of things that are contingently true". When you suggest that any connection between pure knowledge and reality is "just coincidental", it implies that what is necessarily true is only contingently true. That seems necessarily false.

"knowledge of things that are necessarily true" <--- What does that mean?

I'm not exactly sure of your meaning. But if you mean that pure knowledge (as "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience") which describes reality only by coincidence is not pure knowledge, then I would have to say there is no pure knowledge.

But if "knowledge of things that are necessarily true" is different from "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience" I'll have to wait for clarification before I can comment.
 
"knowledge of things that are necessarily true" <--- What does that mean?


There is a long-standing tradition in philosophical epistemology of distinguishing between so-called "necessary" and "contingent" truths. As with every philosophical concept, there are a few different ways to define the distinction, but the general idea is that a "necessary truth" is one that is true by virtue of the inherent meaning of the words and the fundamental way that the world is put together, while a "contingent truth" is something that is true merely by accident.

For example, it is a necessary truth that all spinsters are unmarried, because the word "spinster" means "unmarried woman." It's also a necessary truth that if all A are B, and all B are C, then all A are C, by the basic structure of logic itself. In no "possible world" can the converse hold.

On the other hand, it's a contingent truth that my coffee cup is empty right now. As a matter of fact, by the time you read this message, it may no longer be empty. If the world had been slightly different, it might be full right now, but I decided to respond to this post before refilling it.

The general idea is that "necessary truths" can be established by pure thought and reason from the comfort of your armchair, since they are true of all possible states of the world. It is a necessary truth that for Julius Caesar to invade Britain, he must have crossed water, as a simple glance at the map hanging on my wall will confirm. On the other hand, there are a thousand different points where he might have landed, and to determine which one will require work -- either drugery in the library reading the historical accounts, or a lot of navvy-style digging to see if I can find archeological traces of the invasion beach.

Because necessary truths are by definition true, they are in fact connected to reality. That's not a coincidence. That was more or less ceo_esq's point. The problem is that necessary truths are by definition true, but they're also by definition pretty uninformative, because they are tautological.
 
Because necessary truths are by definition true, they are in fact connected to reality. That's not a coincidence. That was more or less ceo_esq's point. The problem is that necessary truths are by definition true, but they're also by definition pretty uninformative, because they are tautological.
That's a fair explanation of what I was getting at. However, I would dispute that necessary truths are "pretty uninformative", if by that you mean either that they are obvious or that resorting to them is unhelpful. First of all, not all necessary truths are obvious (which is why, for example, a complex logical or mathematical proof is often required to ascertain them). Second, necessary truths are rather useful to the extent that human beings would be in a confusing, problematic, and probably hopeless position if those things were merely contingently true or false, and we had either to refrain from relying on them or else try to determine them empirically.
 
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Thanks for the good explanation drkitten. It was informative and simple.

I understand now that ceo_esq meant that "knowledge of things that are necessarily true" is different from "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience". And the former is not coincidental with reality because of its definition. Unlike the latter.
 
I understand now that ceo_esq meant that "knowledge of things that are necessarily true" is different from "knowledge absolutely independent of all experience".

Well, you've misunderstood something, because knowledge absolutely independent of all experience is knowledge of things that are necessarily true.
 
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Well, you've misunderstood something, because knowledge absolutely independent of all experience is knowledge of things that are necessarily true.

Oh. Well, then there seems to be some misunderstanding. Probably with the phrase "absolutely independent of all experience".

Best way to explain my understanding of the phrase would be with an example. I'll take this from drkitten's post: "It is a necessary truth that for Julius Caesar to invade Britain, he must have crossed water, as a simple glance at the map hanging on my wall will confirm."

I understood it this way. That simple glance would be experience and then the knowledge of Caesar to cross the water would not be independent of experience. You would also have to know what the blue are on the map represents.

I think this clears up things quite a bit.
 
I understood it this way. That simple glance would be experience and then the knowledge of Caesar to cross the water would not be independent of experience. You would also have to know what the blue are on the map represents.

That example might represent what Kant would call a priori knowledge that nonetheless has an admixture of something empirical in it. It is still a priori, though; it doesn't posit the actual existence of any contingently true empirical phenomena: If there was a Caesar, and if he invaded an a country entirely surrounded by water, then the process would necessarily involve crossing water.

A "purer" example of an a priori truth would be more along these lines: A thing cannot simultaneously possess a property and not possess that property.

Consider this one: If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal. A true understanding of what a man is, what mortality is, or who Socrates is, requires experience. However, the truth expressed in the statement relates only to the relationship among those things. It is a truth that is independent of the actual qualities of men, mortality, or Socrates; it is, indeed, independent of whether such things as men, mortality, and Socrates actually exist. In short, it is absolutely independent of experience.
 
That example might represent what Kant would call a priori knowledge that nonetheless has an admixture of something empirical in it. It is still a priori, though; it doesn't posit the actual existence of any contingently true empirical phenomena: If there was a Caesar, and if he invaded an a country entirely surrounded by water, then the process would necessarily involve crossing water.

I see what you mean. If we didn't know what Caesar and water were then the connection to Caesar and water in reality would have been purely coincidental. I originally thought you meant we could "guess reality" (that Caesar and water are real things) and it wouldn't be a coincidence. My mistake. Though in my defence I would have to say I've seen pretty "out there" theories on these forums and thought this was just one of those.

I see logic merely as a tool to examine and categorise reality. Without prior experience logical constructs as "If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal." are meaningles in relation to reality (though internally correct). That statement would make sense (in terms of reality) only if we would know what mortality, Socrates and men are. But I guess that wasn't debated here.
 
Mathematics is based on axioms. Now, I'm no expert on math, but it seems to me that while everything in math works if those axioms are true, in order to apply it's conclusions to the real world we first have to assertain that those axioms are in fact true.
And that requires evidence.
While pure reason is a great tool, I can't think of anything of value that can be drawn from it without evidence that it's conclusions actually do apply to the world we live in.

Maybe I'm mistaken.

Also, to Iacchus, your arguments don't seem to be simply from pure reason, but rather just from assertion.
Nor are you claiming them to be without any evidence- you often suggest that this evidence comes in the form of dreams - this means that those conclusions are not evident to just anyone, but only someone else who has access to this evidence. And since the only person who has access to your dreams is you, I don't see how they are relevant to discussion on this forum.

Finally evidence must be weighed - for instance if there is an equally valid, more likely, hypothesis for why you had those dreams, then you should at least concider it. Just because the evidence isn't contradicted by a hypothesis doesn't mean it supports it any more than it supports any other hypothesis.

eta: okay I feel dumb. I wrote this without reading what had been posted since I was on yesterday. It looks like everyone has already moved on...
 
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Also, to Iacchus, your arguments don't seem to be simply from pure reason, but rather just from assertion.
Nor are you claiming them to be without any evidence- you often suggest that this evidence comes in the form of dreams - this means that those conclusions are not evident to just anyone, but only someone else who has access to this evidence. And since the only person who has access to your dreams is you, I don't see how they are relevant to discussion on this forum.
Hey! That's good. You've found a way for Iacchus to combat his problem with reality.

Because the axioms and evidence that Iacchus presents are only in imaginary states, such as dreams, they can only be considered operative in those states.

So is the stuff you spout true, Iacchus? In your dreams.
 

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