Drone strikes possible on American soil - Holder

How many people railing against these drones being used here in the US are the same people who supported shooting down an aircraft on 9/11?
 
Anyone following McChrystal on drones lately?

A few quotes:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...liance-on-drones-as-strikes-hit-Pakistan.html

"What scares me about drone strikes is how they are perceived around the world," he said. "The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes... is much greater than the average American appreciates.
"They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who've never seen one or seen the effects of one."​

http://www.politico.com/blogs/media...-covert-fix-for-a-complex-problem-157126.html

Gideon Rose: “It seems like the methods you pioneered in Iraq have been embraced by the U.S. government and the American public as a general approach to managing smallscale irregular warfare, and doing so in a way short of putting lots of boots on the ground or walking away entirely. Some would argue that this is the true legacy of Stan McChrystal—the creation of an approach to counterterrorism that is halfway between war and peace, at such a low cost and with such a light footprint that it’s politically viable for the long term in a way that war and disengagement are not. Do you disagree?”

Stanley McChrystal: “I question its universal validity. If you go back to the British tactics on the North-West Frontier, the “butcher and bolt” tactics, where they would burn an area and punish the people and say, “Don’t do that anymore,” and simultaneously offer a stipend to the leader while saying, “If you will remain friendly for a period of time, we’ll pay you”—that approach worked for a fair amount of time. It managed problems on their periphery. But it certainly didn’t solve the problems. The tactics that we developed do work, but they don’t produce decisive effects absent other, complementary activities. We did an awful lot of capturing and killing in Iraq for several years before it started to have a real effect, and that came only when we were partnered with an effective counterinsurgency approach. Just the strike part of it can never do more than keep an enemy at bay. And although to the United States, a drone strike seems to have very little risk and very little pain, at the receiving end, it feels like war. Americans have got to understand that. If we were to use our technological capabilities carelessly—I don’t think we do, but there’s always the danger that you will—then we should not be upset when someone responds with their equivalent, which is a suicide bomb in Central Park, because that’s what they can respond with.”​
I think his extended Foreign Affairs article is behind a paywall, but if not and someone has an URL feel free to share it...

I think all the legal debates really do ignore the fundamental strategic question in favour of an obsessive focus on tactics. Stanley McChrystal I think offers an important corrective often missing in the pretty poor attempts in the media guage the effectiveness of the program. HIgh value targets should be counted in the "pro" column, Stanley warns about some pretty serious "cons".

I think the rollback of American influence in South America should be a lesson that sometimes what may seem like short-term gains from covert-ops and proxy forces enjoined to your cause can be eclipsed in the long-term by the reaction to those forces. Iran is another example that comes to mind.

Are drones creating similar conditions that would lead to something similar happening in the Middle East? I would say that there are signs that they are... Best put a leash on these sooner rather than later!
 
You might be interested in the just-published The Thistle and the Drone, by Akbar Ahmed (currently an author and the Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies at American University in Washington, D.C. and the First Distinguished Chair of Middle East and Islamic Studies at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, but formerly the Political Agent for Waziristan, the Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan that's been the area most subjected to US drone strikes).
 
How many people railing against these drones being used here in the US are the same people who supported shooting down an aircraft on 9/11?

I suppose to an extent I am. I would have understood why such a hypothetical shoot down would be done.

However...

That was not the intent or context of the question. An airliner shoot down should be a straight black or white question. Either you know that the airplane is hijacked (based at a minimum on its current flight profile) or you do not (same criteria).

Sen Pauls question on the Senate floor was pointed at asking if the US govt. current policy of targeting US citizens on foreign soil would or could ever be applied to US soil. Keep in mind that the target that was being used an an example was not an "Active combatant" at the time he was killed. He was a "Bad guy" for sure in my opinion and I don't think that it's a bad thing that he is dead however the way that it was done and the way that the means were justified begged the question being asked by someone. I would have been just as happy if say, Sen Feinstien had asked it.

Holders first answer wasn't all that specific on that point. His first answer stuck me as a legal boilerplate type answer that allowed for some wriggle room on the part of the govt. and the question needed a black or white type of answer that didn't allow for any wriggling.
 
Interesting new report from McClatchy on drone strikes:

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/09/188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-others.html

Commentary here:

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics...m-obama-misled-us-about-the-drone-war/274839/

It appears McClatchy also brought to light just one small example of how innocents killed are turned in to militants (from 2nd link):

The McClatchy report concludes with another example of a drone strike gone wrong:

Consider one attack on Feb. 18, 2010.

Information, according to one U.S. intelligence account, indicated that Badruddin Haqqani, the then-No. 2 leader of the Haqqani network, would be at a relative's funeral that day in North Waziristan. Watching the video feed from a drone high above the mourners, CIA operators in the United States identified a man they believed could be Badruddin Haqqani from the deference and numerous greetings he received. The man also supervised a private family viewing of the body.

Yet despite a targeting process that the administration says meets "the highest possible standards," it wasn't Badruddin Haqqani who died when one of the drone's missiles ripped apart the target's car after he'd left the funeral.

It was his younger brother, Mohammad.

Friends later told reporters that Mohammad Haqqani was a religious student in his 20s uninvolved in terrorism; the U.S. intelligence report called him an active member -- but not a leader -- of the Haqqani network. At least one other unidentified occupant of his vehicle perished, according to the report.

​

In its drone-strike database, the New America Foundation scores that drone strike as having killed three to four "militants," zero unknown persons, and zero civilians. I've argued that the New America data very likely undercounts the number of civilians that are killed in drone strikes.

There has long been evidence indicating the Obama Administration was misleading the country about the nature of its drone war in Pakistan. This latest report only confirms the suspicions that critics of the program have articulated. And there is reason to believe that even it understates the magnitude of executive branch deception.​
 

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