David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[westprog]

Now let's consider that there are clubs other than Harris' Club, ie. there are people who value some other thing more than well-being (still undefined)

Even in Harris' Club, I expect that there are at least as many definitions as club members.

 

[Dani]

Oh sure, they will say "Of course values reduce to facts about brain states! No one is refuting that!"

But, their actions betray this claim of non-refutation, everytime they then go on to say "one can not derive an ought from an is!" Right there, they are assigning oughts to some other realm that ises do not belong to!

Then you're definitely making a use-mention error.

This -> can be different things at the same time, depending on our perspective. I can say that it is a yellow circumference with two dots and a curved line, and I can say that it is a smiley, which represents a smiling human face. With the second description I'm just using a higher level of abstraction, but none of these descriptions invalidates the other.

With this, I'm trying to illustrate that you can compare observations and evaluate the accuracy of our descriptions as long as you're respecting the use of the different available perspectives. Not identically, but similarly, I can say that the concept "God" exists because it arises from human brains, and at the same time say that the notion of God is logically absurd, and that the existence of God cannot be derived from any fact because it's ill-defined, self-contradictory, etc. There's nothing contradictory about both claims.

I accept that it is an early, and incomplete, (vague, if you like) hypothesis. But, I do not think the argument of Attitude #1 depends on it. Even if the brain treated oughts/values/ises/ and facts in very distinguished ways from each other: You still agree that they all reduce to brain states, anyway. And, brain states are facts.

Use-mention error, and no one is disputing this trivial fact.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

That decision would, itself, be based on facts of the matter. The values we "start" with do not pop out of some separate Realm of Values.

Of course they don't pop out of some separate realm. Who ever said or even implied that they did? And what possible relevance is that here?

The "covert ought" we are starting with is not a relevant concern to those who take brain states as more fundamental.

I'm sorry, but I have absolutely no idea what that is supposed to mean nor do I consider it in any way relevant to the discussion. How could a brain state be more fundamental when the 'ought' is a brain state? I'm afraid I have no idea what you are on about now and fear that you do, indeed, misunderstand the basic neurology or are somehow lost in the language.

We can study different folks' brain states til the cows come home and we will still be left in the same boat. We still have to decide where to start; and we have to do that even to start studying brain states in the first place.


Let's say we study the brain state of Charles Manson as he plots his next ritual murder. Charlie says we ought to kill the white man to let the black man take over; and there is a definite particular brain state there. Do we go out and kill some white people now?

That we can study the brain state of a nice lady deciding that murder is wrong tells me that we can see an fMRI light up in a pattern while someone does what I already knew they could do. That I know basically how they did it doesn't suddenly change the tables. I have to have a way of deciding which brain state to turn into an 'ought' -- the nice lady or Charlie Manson.

Couching this in terms of brain states only tells us what we already knew -- we can study human moral behavior. We've been doing that for decades now. None of that tells me that Hume was wrong.

Please read Post #233:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=7757048#post7757048

Um, OK.


ETA: OK, I read the post. I'm afraid that I do not find it useful. What is the point?


ETAETA:

Sorry, I missed part of your post above but now looked at it (I originally only looked at the 'attitudes').

1. Values reduce to a certain type of fact. This might look like only a philosophical claim, but in the business of conducting a Science of Morality, is best to assume oughts don't pop out of some other realm of existence.

The 'facts' I speak of could be the brain states that our values, morals, ethics, etc. all translate into. But, they do not necessarily have to refer to that: Strictly speaking, someone having a value or not would be a fact, even if the brain was not involved. (Not suggesting it is not involved.)

Looking at brain states doesn't help this argument, I'm afraid once again. Values have always reduced to a certain type of fact and there is nothing in the science of looking at 'brain states' that tells us anything new except how the brain does it (really only now, where in the brain it occurs).

2. There is evidence, albeit early and incomplete, that facts/values/ises/ and oughts are not treated as separate things in the brain. If this pans out, then empirical facts trump higher level concepts, when it comes to science.

No there isn't. I corrected you on this earlier and I am shocked that you would repeat something so obviously wrong. The only evidence we have is a gross estimate that facts and values concerning similar things probably involve similar areas of the brain on a very gross scale. That is in no way reliable evidence that facts and values are not treated as separate things in the brain. Once again, we couldn't speak of them as separate things if they were not treated differently by the brain.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

The "news" is that we are dealing with a "Ship of Theseus". There are (at least) two ways of looking at the is/ought distinction that are valid for different purposes.

Let's not drag in the Ship of Theseus - let's stick to one week's worth of first year philosophy at a time.

If there are two ways of looking at something that doesn't mean they aren't both simultaneously correct. You seem to think that saying "I'm looking at this differently" is a philosophical blank cheque that lets you ignore anything you don't like, as if how you look at it defines how it is.

The "news" is that, if we take brain states as fundamental, then the is/ought distinction practically disappears.

No it doesn't. I just told you this. A "moral ought-claim" is a physical thingie in a brain, and it's also a claim which can logically entail other moral ought-claims. An "is-claim" is also a physical thingie in a brain, and it's a claim which cannot logically entail moral ought-claims.

You can't alter an idea's logical characteristics by saying that it's a physical thing in a brain.

You might as well try arguing that 2+2=117 as follows: You can look at "2", "+", "=" and "117" as physical processes in the brain. We take brain states as fundamental. Therefore anything can equal anything, because it's all just brain states, and brain states are fundamental. It could be anything. It could be 293. It's all just brain states! Therefore it is 117.

(A long and frustrating argument ensues, at the end of which you end up "conceding" that 2+2=4 might be useful to mathematicians, and might be kind of sort of true, but that 2+2=117 is even truer and this amazing new insight could be a great help to aeronautical engineers).

At the risk of putting words into your mouth, your real argument seems to me to be "All moral ought-claims are brain states, all is-claims are brain states, is-claim brain-states can give rise to moral-ought-claim brain-states, therefore you can logically derive moral-ought-claims from is-claims". That last bit simply isn't true or even relevant. The brain state "2+2=" can give rise to the brain state "117" or "293" but that is utterly unrelated to the logical relationship between 2+2 and 117. Otherwise you could have gotten full marks on every maths test as a kid by saying "That answer was the product of my brain-state, thus my answer is equally correct, and in fact my answer is more useful than yours, so there".

And, this is useful for conducting a science of morality. Though, thinking the other way might be useful for something else entirely.

No. This is just wrong. The idea that moral ideas are brain states is not contested and the idea that this insight could be either news or help to anyone investigating moral ideas neurologically seems frankly bizarre. You do not have a new and useful idea, you are just stating the obvious and this is not useful.

However the idea that moral ideas are brain states has nothing to do with whether you can logically get to a moral ought-claim from is claims. The two issues are totally unrelated.

This way of thinking is probably going to seem very alien to most philosophers.

Saying that 2+2=117 is alien to mathematicians would be equally vacuous. It's not alien except in that it's obviously wrong and unhelpful.

I suspect Sam is not thinking of these issues as a "Ship of Theseus". I think he thinks that philosophers are genuinely confused about something. If this argument of mine pans out, I might be inclined to write to him about it.

No, he really doesn't. He has a philosophy degree and he's had his errors explained to him by philosophers. He's under no illusion that he's successfully confused any philosophers. What he's doing is confusing non-philosophers like yourself, and that's the extent of his achievement.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What westprog said is mostly on the spot.

In general, I would say Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way.

(Just like how historic Social Darwinists were actually wrong about Darwin's ideas. Or, how those warning of the apocalypse are wrong about the end of the world.)

The moral wrongness or rightness of an "ought" can be determined by looking at the facts of the matter, and seeing if the action takes the health and well-being of humans into consideration.

Sure, Bob may think killing Jim is in the best of such interests. But, he would be wrong, and we can prove it empirically.

Yeah, and that is all that you can say -- that Bob is just wrong. It was all that Kant could say to criticism of his categorical imperative and all that anyone can say in any 'objective' morality.

Once again, who decided that the health and well-being of humans is the end-all and be-all of what we 'ought' to do? Someone decided that, right? It is not something that is clearly evident; it was a decision. You continue to show us what we are trying to tell you by each and every one of your examples. Please take a step back and listen to what several different people are trying to tell you.


Sam Harris decides that human flourishing is the most important moral precept and that it is self-evident. If it were so self-evident why did Aristotle write the Nichomachean ethics? He could have just said -- well, it's self-evident.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If one considers that brain states are more fundamental, and that the higher-level conception of thought is just an abstract from that, the thinker will have no problem melding the two concepts of "is" and "ought".

I guess I should have spent more time on this post. This is simply wrong. I've mentioned this above, but it bears repeating, and I think in this way:

The brain is all we have; it is what we are, how we think, how we use language, etc. If our brains treated 'is' and 'ought' as the same concept, then we wouldn't have this conversation. We wouldn't have two different words, 'is' and 'ought'; and we wouldn't even be able to think about the issue we are currently discussing. Any line of thought that leads you to the belief or conclusion that the brain treats these concepts or words as identical or that collapses the distinction between the two is necessarily wrong. And I mean necessarily wrong in the strong, philosophical, sense.

 

[Wowbagger]

Perhaps the Harris attitude would be more meaningful, if I could develop some examples of the sorts of innovations one would get out of it, that the other attitudes would likely miss out on.

I will put my mind towards that direction, but I must warn you that it could take another week before I can write them up in a compelling manner.

 

[Wowbagger]

Do I understand Harris correctly? I think this part is only minimally controversial.

On first glance, it looks like you are getting there.

It occurs to me that this discussion might be going to the wrong audience, here. Perhaps Sam's message is more for those who would find all that controversial.

Now let's consider that there are clubs other than Harris' Club, ie. there are people who value some other thing more than well-being (still undefined) but they do value science just as much as Harris' Club members, okay? Given the way the world objectively works such a Club X can also use science as a tool to evaluate possible actions in light of their two values. Is an act that maximizes the satisfation of those values objectively morally right also, ie. something they ought to do?

The trick, here, is finding examples of something other than well-being of humans to work with. I will offer three, to illustrate where my answer of "no" comes from.

Club X1 values the Favor of God over all else. Assuming God does not actually exist in any empirical form, this would seem to contradict the value of Science that you say Club X1 would also have. So, objectively, we can say Club X1 is a failure. Of course, if they did prove God existed, that would be a different story; and we would have to assess if it is really worth keeping His favor over feeding our own families, if that was a choice we had to make.

Club X2 values the "well-being" of an Inanimate Metal Rod above all else. As long as the Rod remains in a chamber where it can not be damaged or rusted, it does not matter what else happens to humans. We can prove, empirically, that The Rod exists, to all challengers, and all humans must serve in its preservation, above all other concerns.
I think it is fair to say that this is objectively silly.

Club X3 values Absolute Relativism and/or Anarchy! This, objectively, wouldn't even last very long. Social order would emerge, sooner or later, from the chaos, (assuming some humans survive the throng long enough). Then, you're back to classic well-being, again.

Any other examples of Clubs you want me to comment on?

Is it fair to summarize Harris' position as If we have the values we ought to have, then science can tell us what we ought to do?

It's really awful wording, but I get your meaning.

There are objective ways? Plural? Do these multiple objective measures all act as the same value to be maximized? I don't think so. We could, in theory, have 7 billion different conceptions of well-being on this planet right now. Isn't this problematic for Harris? I hope he doesn't resolve it by an appeal to the majority as many do.

There is more than one objective way to measure health.

How would you respond, if I said this?
"We could, in theory, have 7 billion different conceptions of health on this planet right now. Isn't this problematic for medical science? I hope medical centers don't resolve it by an appeal to the majority as many do."

If an argument requires a premise please include it or it will not be considered. This sort of after-the-fact patching up of an argument isn't persuasive.

I tried to replace your Premise #1, but you said it was already covered by one of the others.

Then you're definitely making a use-mention error.

I am not so sure about that. We could be looking at two forms of "use", here.

But, even so: I do not think it would be an "error" if it was useful in some way.

Perhaps this is really a matter of reductionism? I suppose there could be a Super Harris who would say: "Why stop at brain states? Brains are ultimately made up of atoms. Let us see if we can understand morality from an atomic point of view!!"
Granted, this might be less useful than the brain-state level. Daniel Dennett would call this "Greedy Reductionism", but if this thought is correct, I hope it sheds some light on what is going on, here.

But, I will think about this, some more. Don't quote me on the Super Harris thing, too much, yet.

Of course they don't pop out of some separate realm. Who ever said or even implied that they did? And what possible relevance is that here?

To someone with Attitude #1, they would have the mistaken belief that it looks like you are trying to do just that.

The only evidence we have is a gross estimate that facts and values concerning similar things probably involve similar areas of the brain on a very gross scale.

That is why I used phrases such as "albeit early and incomplete" and "if this pans out".

If there are two ways of looking at something that doesn't mean they aren't both simultaneously correct. You seem to think that saying "I'm looking at this differently" is a philosophical blank cheque that lets you ignore anything you don't like, as if how you look at it defines how it is.

That is not it at all. There are two ways of looking at something, each one being useful for separate purposes.

Perhaps this will be clearer, once I get some good examples up.

You might as well try arguing that 2+2=117 as follows: You can look at "2", "+", "=" and "117" as physical processes in the brain. We take brain states as fundamental. Therefore anything can equal anything, because it's all just brain states, and brain states are fundamental. It could be anything. It could be 293. It's all just brain states! Therefore it is 117.

You are missing some ingredients, here. Most importantly: objectivity.

We can objectively say that 2+2 does NOT equal 117, no matter what anyone's brain states are.

We can also objectively say it is wrong to "roast your family members and eat them for dinner", even if someone's brain states would have them think otherwise.

The point of mentioning that Values reduce to brain states, is NOT to claim any old brain states can be valid values. That is preposterous! And, you are incorrect in how you put words in my mouth. You were missing the WHOLE IDEA of turning this into an objective practice!

The point of mentioning that Values reduce to brain states is to demonstrate HOW moral values are determined. When discussing HOW moral values are determined, the is/ought distinction ceases to be useful, here.

Again, more clarity might come after I can communicate some examples of this.

Yeah, and that is all that you can say -- that Bob is just wrong. It was all that Kant could say to criticism of his categorical imperative and all that anyone can say in any 'objective' morality.

Once again, who decided that the health and well-being of humans is the end-all and be-all of what we 'ought' to do? Someone decided that, right? It is not something that is clearly evident; it was a decision. You continue to show us what we are trying to tell you by each and every one of your examples. Please take a step back and listen to what several different people are trying to tell you.


Sam Harris decides that human flourishing is the most important moral precept and that it is self-evident. If it were so self-evident why did Aristotle write the Nichomachean ethics? He could have just said -- well, it's self-evident.

This sounds, oddly, like you are late to the party. All of this was covered to death, already! But, if you require a summary, here it is:

No, I am not saying "Bob is just wrong". I am saying there are empirical, scientific reasons why Bob is likely wrong. I explain why, several times in this thread.

If you think there is an alternative to "well-being" that makes sense, then name it! If you think this is a trivial point to make, then stop acting like pointing out its triviality is somehow an argument against my points!



I will make one new point, that is only tangentially related to this discussion:

Sometimes the exercise of writing down self-evident concepts serves a few purposes: Codification, in case some madman tries to refute it; and the act of reading them gives more of the brain the opportunity to transform based on them. Believe it or not, the brain has a hard time processing the existence of certain "self-evident" concepts, unless it is fed into them the right way. No "self-evident" ideas are perfectly self-evident .

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Perhaps the Harris attitude would be more meaningful, if I could develop some examples of the sorts of innovations one would get out of it, that the other attitudes would likely miss out on.

I will put my mind towards that direction, but I must warn you that it could take another week before I can write them up in a compelling manner.

It's not going to happen.

Harris's claim to have solved the is/ought problem is wrong and will remain wrong.

Harris's flourishing-based utilitarianism is going to remain instrumentally indistinguishable from the existing welfare utilitarianism. Any neurological results which help implement Harris-utilitarianism will be equally applicable to the pre-existing welfare utilitarianism.

That's the extent of Harris' philosophical contribution.

There's absolutely nowhere for any "innovation" to be.

I guarantee you any "innovation" you can point to or make up is going to be exactly as useful to welfare utilitarians trying to bring about welfare-positive outcomes as it will be to Harris-utilitarians trying to bring about Harris-positive outcomes.

I imagine what we'll end up seeing is some uninteresting "innovation" bundled with a straw man utilitarianism which is too stupid to see how awesome Harris is, because you're getting all of your philosophy from Harris which is still exactly like going to homeopaths for your chemistry instruction.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Perhaps the Harris attitude would be more meaningful, if I could develop some examples of the sorts of innovations one would get out of it, that the other attitudes would likely miss out on.

I will put my mind towards that direction, but I must warn you that it could take another week before I can write them up in a compelling manner.

That's all fine, but it still wouldn't change the basic nature of the argument.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This sounds, oddly, like you are late to the party. All of this was covered to death, already! But, if you require a summary, here it is:

No, I am not saying "Bob is just wrong". I am saying there are empirical, scientific reasons why Bob is likely wrong. I explain why, several times in this thread.

If you think there is an alternative to "well-being" that makes sense, then name it! If you think this is a trivial point to make, then stop acting like pointing out its triviality is somehow an argument against my points!

I know what you argument is. I think you need to take a step back, because once you make the statement -- 'provide something other than 'well-being' that makes sense' -- you have demonstrated that you do not understand what we are trying to say to you.

There is simply nothing intrinsic to human well-being that makes it the right goal. Someone decided that it was the right goal. That decision is the beginning of the process. You can't use science to arrive at that original decision -- the decision must already be made in order to do the science in the first place.

No one is arguing that human well-being isn't a great place to start. But you have to realize that starting there is already a value judgment and what you are trying to explain is value judgments. We are trying to tell you that you can't explain value judgments scientifically without already making one at the outset.

I really don't understand why that is a problem for you, why you won't accept that simple fact. Science can do wondrous things after the initial value judgment, all the stuff you want it to do; but it can't start the process in the first place. We can examine it after the fact, but that is only a description; and we can then question if it was the right place to start.

I will make one new point, that is only tangentially related to this discussion:

Sometimes the exercise of writing down self-evident concepts serves a few purposes: Codification, in case some madman tries to refute it; and the act of reading them gives more of the brain the opportunity to transform based on them. Believe it or not, the brain has a hard time processing the existence of certain "self-evident" concepts, unless it is fed into them the right way. No "self-evident" ideas are perfectly self-evident .

Self evident ideas are entirely self evident. We don't discuss them as being self evident, they just are; heck we don't discuss them. They are not complex ideas. They are more like "ooh, I'm out of bed." Philosophers have frequently tried to palm off their starting point as self-evident so they can preserve 'objective truth' (by sneaking in an 'objective' self-evident beginning). In other words, they try to found their theory on bedrock, but it's a sham. The history of philosophy has taught us to beware of claims of bedrock. The shortest distance between two points is a straight line, right? That tells us something about the world, right? Unless, of course, we are speaking of actual space-time in the vicinity of a white dwarf star, right? Former self-evident 'fact about the world used to prove the existence of God -- any three points where not all are in a straight line results in a triangle, where the sum of the angles always equals 180 degrees. Is that a self-evident fact about the world? Does God therefore exist?

Here's another new point -- the basic lesson of biology is diversity. That includes 'normal' and 'madman'. You have no way to judge a madman insane without already deciding ahead of time what constitutes normalcy and madness. No amount of neural science is going to change that fact.

Human nature is diverse. That is a fact. Human values differ markedly between individuals and between societies. Ethics is the means by which we bridge human differences.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

That is not it at all. There are two ways of looking at something, each one being useful for separate purposes.

I understand that this is your claim, but you don't understand that it is simply wrong. If one way of looking at a given mass is that is is exactly 1000kg at rest with regard to the observer, you can't look at it "for separate purposes" and say it weighs 1g. "For separate purposes" is not a philosophical blank cheque that lets you ignore established truths.

You are missing some ingredients, here. Most importantly: objectivity.

We can objectively say that 2+2 does NOT equal 117, no matter what anyone's brain states are.

We can also objectively say it is wrong to "roast your family members and eat them for dinner", even if someone's brain states would have them think otherwise.

You're assuming what you need to prove here. You haven't proven yet that you can objectively say that it is wrong to roast your family members and eat them for dinner. That's what you have to establish, you can't sneak it in as a premise.

You are aware that circular arguments and begging the question are bad, right?

The point of mentioning that Values reduce to brain states, is NOT to claim any old brain states can be valid values. That is preposterous!

If brain states that correspond to moral ought-claims can be wrong/invalid, then Harris hasn't solved the is/ought problem at all, because we then need some moral ought-claim in order to distinguish the right/valid brain states from the wrong/invalid brain states.

You can try doing so by pointing to some other brain-state, like happiness or something, and anointing it the source of moral authority but this leads to an infinite regress. Why is the happiness-brain state the validator of moral ought-claims? It has to be because it corresponds to some kind of facts about the universe held to be morally desirable. But why are those facts about the universe the source of moral desirability? Why, because they give rise to certain brain-states, and they are good brain-states...

It's like a cup and ball routine with two cups and no balls, where you try to convince the audience that there is a ball in there somewhere by switching the two cups back and forth forever.

And, you are incorrect in how you put words in my mouth. You were missing the WHOLE IDEA of turning this into an objective practice!

There is a philosophical joke which goes like this:

"Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis that p is false, on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so- called "counterexamples" depend on construing my thesis that p in a way that it was obviously not intended -- for I intended my thesis to have no counterexamples. Therefore p."

The WHOLE IDEA, deriving a moral ought-claim from factual is-claims, is impossible. It doesn't matter if that was the WHOLE IDEA, it's still impossible. Someone saying it is impossible has not missed the WHOLE IDEA, they are telling you that the WHOLE IDEA doesn't work.

The point of mentioning that Values reduce to brain states is to demonstrate HOW moral values are determined. When discussing HOW moral values are determined, the is/ought distinction ceases to be useful, here.

Once again we have a truism followed by nonsense.

We all know moral ought-claims are events in the brain. You keep saying this as if it might become new, original, clever or relevant through sheer repetition. Everybody here already knows that moral ought-claims in our brains arise through physical processes. If you ever have any urge to say anything which in any way resembles this claim ever again in this thread, for all our sakes control yourself and just don't do it. You are only confusing yourself by doing so.

Saying that this means that "the is/ought distinction ceases to be useful" is nonsense. It remains exactly as it was before. Introducing a claim which is obvious, trivial and already known to every stakeholder cannot magically transform a useful distinction to a non-useful one.

 

[Wowbagger]

Most of these responses and critiques do seem perfectly reasonable and valid, to me, from the point of view of Attitude #3 (It is impossible to derive an ought from an is, even if you "wanted to").

But, most of you are not addressing the idea that there could be more than one attitude one could take on this subject; that there is more than one way to think about "ises" and "oughts". And, valid points could still be made from them.

It is instructive to look at the current nature of this debate: At the end of most of my examples, everyone goes "YES! THAT'S OBVIOUS!! NO ONE IS REFUTING THAT!!", but you have problems with HOW I got there, saying it was "not valid!" or "bad philosophy!" or "You snuck in a covert ought, so it doesn't count".

If Attitude #1 is soooo wrong, and soooo invalid, why does it end up with conclusions that most of you generally agree were not in refute?!

I ask all of you, once again: Is the Ship of Theseus still the same ship?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Most of these responses and critiques do seem perfectly reasonable and valid, to me, from the point of view of Attitude #3 (It is impossible to derive an ought from an is, even if you "wanted to").

At least we're being consistent then.

But, most of you are not addressing the idea that there could be more than one attitude one could take on this subject; that there is more than one way to think about "ises" and "oughts". And, valid points could still be made from them.

Suppose I said "I can square the circle!".

Then when you ask me to prove it I show you my proof, which involves assuming that pi is 3.2.

You say "Look, we all know exactly what we're referring to when we talk about 'squaring the circle', and you haven't 'squared the circle'. You've just done some pseudo-mathematical buggering about from a provably false assumption and made it look to yourself as if you 'squared the circle'".

I say "You are not addressing the idea that there could be more than one attitude to take on this subject: there is more than one way to think about pi and circles and squares, and valid points might still be made from my work!".

You shake your head and walk away, and five minutes later you hear me telling someone "Guess what? I can square the circle!".

...

This scenario parallels what you are doing with precision. You are tackling a well-known, clearly defined and very specific problem. The problem is not only insoluble but it has been proven to be insoluble. You claim to have a solution but it's obvious from the outside that you've just confused yourself. Yet you will not let go of the idea that you've solved an insoluble problem.

It is instructive to look at the current nature of this debate: At the end of most of my examples, everyone goes "YES! THAT'S OBVIOUS!! NO ONE IS REFUTING THAT!!", but you have problems with HOW I got there, saying it was "not valid!" or "bad philosophy!" or "You snuck in a covert ought, so it doesn't count".

If Attitude #1 is soooo wrong, and soooo invalid, why does it end up with conclusions that most of you generally agree were not in refute?!

Harris "solved the is/ought problem" and concluded that the moral values he had anyway were just by coincidence the One True Scientific Morality... isn't that exactly what we'd expect if he was just making up a post hoc justification for his existing beliefs?

If he'd come up with some moral prescription nobody had ever thought of before and then proved that it actually worked to make society better then maybe that would be interesting. He hasn't done that though.

I ask all of you, once again: Is the Ship of Theseus still the same ship?

Please stop. What you are doing to introductory moral philosophy is bad enough.

 

[Wowbagger]

concluded that the moral values he had anyway were just by coincidence the One True Scientific Morality

What is this "One True Scientific Morality" you speak of?! The very title of Harris' book was "The Moral Landscape", implying multiple peaks and valleys.

I suspect you are not fully understanding our position, when you say stuff like that.

 

[Wowbagger]

Harris "solved the is/ought problem"

Also, I don't think Sam Harris even claims to have "solved" an "is/ought problem", at all. I think you are also misconstruing the message there, as well.

When asking "Does the 'is/ought distinction' also translate to an 'is/ought problem'?", here is how that might be answered (in reverse order):

Attitude #3: There is clearly a distinction, but there is no "problem" to be solved. What are you talking about?

Attitude #2: Yeah, I'll tell you what the problem is: Eugenics! Nazis! Social Darwinism! The Naturalistic Fallacy!!

Attitude #1: There is no "problem" we are trying to solve, there. We are merely thinking about those two concepts in a different way than the other attitudes. This might help us solve other things that really are problems better. But, the "problem" has nothing to do with the is/ought distinction, itself.




ETA: What I wrote there is actually the "Wowbagger Version" of Attitude #1. It is possible that Sam Harris does not realize he is thinking about these things in a different way. His version might look like this, which is much less diplomatic:

Attitude #1B: We have to value science and well-being from the getgo, so he "problem" has nothing to do with the is/ought distinction, itself. But, we are acknowledging that 'oughts' reduce to a type of 'is'. The other Attitudes are a reflection of philosophical confusion. And, my attitude might help us solve other things that really are problems better.

 

[AlBell]

What is this "One True Scientific Morality" you speak of?! The very title of Harris' book was "The Moral Landscape", implying multiple peaks and valleys.

I suspect you are not fully understanding our position, when you say stuff like that.

I suspect you and Harris don't understand our position.

Here: http://ca.news.yahoo.com/strangers-spot-kindness-gene-study-201420401.html

People in the study were tested beforehand and found to have GG, AG or AA genotypes for the rs53576 DNA sequence of the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene.

People who have two copies of the G allele are generally judged as more empathetic, trusting and loving.

Once you decide you 'ought' to have only people with the G allele, in a generation you can kill those who don't, and well-being may then be self-evident for that (your) group.

Which "ises" get you to that "ought"?

 

[Wowbagger]

Once you decide you 'ought' to have only people with the G allele, in a generation you can kill those who don't, and well-being may then be self-evident for that (your) group.

First of all, I don't think Sam Harris would have any truck with killing people who lack the G allele. I realize you probably already knew that. But, I figured I should emphasize it, anyway.

Just because those with the G allele are generally more empathatic, doesn't mean those without it can't be sufficiently empathetic human beings. There are multiple pathways to empathy, with various factors involved: Of which the G allele is only one.

Those are the facts that would prevent genocide of non-G-alleles. In this case, there is unlikely going to be any science that would demonstrate otherwise (That the G-allele really is the "one true indicator of empathy").

But, there could be other places where morality could vary. The best examples would be in the justice system of various societies: The punishment for one crime might be worse in one place, than another, because that crime would have worse effects on one society, than the other.

Which "ises" get you to that "ought"?

If someone was motivated to kill off all the non-G-allele humans, another "is" would have to be introduced. Perhaps their view of how genetics works is distorted, so that those with "bad genes" deserve to die, so that those with "superior genes" shall live. They would be ignorant of the science I wrote about, or disagree with it for some reason. Either way, their "ought" did not pop out of nowhere, even if it was based on distorted reality.

That would be from an Attitude #1 point of view.

 

[the PC apeman]

The trick, here, is finding examples of something other than well-being of humans to work with.

No. We can easily assume that 1) not everyone values well-being the most and 2) not everyone who claims well-being the most defines well-being in the same way. ETA: What your 'no' examples fail to do is say why an act that maximizes the satisfaction of their values is not objectively morally right also, ie. something they ought to do. You seem to measure their values against the ones you hold rather than answering the intent of the question.

It's really awful wording, but I get your meaning.

This doesn't answer my question.

There is more than one objective way to measure health.

How would you respond, if I said this?
"We could, in theory, have 7 billion different conceptions of health on this planet right now. Isn't this problematic for medical science? I hope medical centers don't resolve it by an appeal to the majority as many do."

We have been here before. It is not problematic for science because science makes no claim of an objective state of health. There are many objective measures related to the vague idea of health. However, health itself is a sorites term like heap of sand: There is no objective heapness. If Harris claims an objective morality then your health parallel is not apt.

 

[Wowbagger]

This doesn't answer my question.

If I get your meaning right, it would be an accurate statement.

But, it is worded in an unfair manner.

It is not problematic for science because science makes no claim of an objective state of health. There are many objective measures related to the vague idea of health.

From at Attitude #1 position, we would say the same thing about well-being.

There are objective measures related to the idea of well-being.

If Harris claims an objective morality then your health parallel is not apt.

From at Attitude #1 position:
There are objective ways to measure morality, based on objective ways to measure its impact on well-being.

ETA: What your 'no' examples fail to do is say why an act that maximizes the satisfaction of their values is not objectively morally right also, ie. something they ought to do. You seem to measure their values against the ones you hold rather than answering the intent of the question.

The values, in this case, can be determined by science; they have nothing to do with what I happen to value.

If science indicated that God existed, and we were morally better off keeping His favor, then the objective answers would change, if I liked it or not.

That is how an Attitude #1 person would think.