David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[AlBell]

that seems like a good explanation for why certain people tend to confuse the two, and why they don't notice the huge conceptual leap they make when they derive one from the other.

+1

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

What we have here are two (or more?) opposing groups of intelligent people, believing the other group(s) are spouting nothing much more than inane nonsense. What I would like to do is break down some of the arguments opposing mine a bit more, just in (the unlikely) case that I am the one spouting inanity after all.

That's always a good idea.

For ALL Those Who Still Think "Ought" Can Not Be Derived From An "Is":
A few questions I would like to ask you:

What is the value of keeping 'is' and 'ought' as separate concepts?

This is like asking what the value is of "keeping" the concept that if A implies B, and A is true, then B is true. Or keeping the concept that if A implies B, and B is true, that A is not necessarily true. It's a basic logical rule, and if you drop it then the consequence is that you can prove anything.

What do we get out of keeping such a distinction in place? What would we be missing, if we melded the two together?
Your answer can appeal to anything you think is important: Philosophy, science, morality, etc.

What we get is clear thinking. We hopefully sidestep the risks of having our view of what is distorted by our view of what should be, and vice versa. We get to see the world as it is, while still getting to make moral claims.

What is the DANGER of trying to derive Oughts from Ises? (correction was made here) I would like this answer to be spelled out as clearly as possible, even if that risks pretending that I am in kindergarten or something. There could be something very fundamental I am missing, here.

Suppose someone asked you "what is the DANGER of trying to derive oughts from The Bible?" or "what is the DANGER of trying to derive oughts from [whatever]?".

I don't know what your answer would be but mine would be "there's no danger as long as they get to the right conclusions using their wrong methodology, but if they get to a wrong conclusion then there's a danger they will act on it".

Most of the time it just doesn't matter because most of the time people don't steal, kill, assault or otherwise get up to mischief. However there's always the risk that someone like Harris, having anointed themselves Scientific Oracle of Deriving Oughts From Ises, will start proclaiming that torture is okay if we're torturing terrorists, or that genocide is okay if we're killing Muslims, and that this is an objective fact about the universe not a matter of opinion.

Also, if possible, perhaps you can define the word "Is" and "Ought", and (optionally) perhaps even "derive"? What contexts or levels of morality forming would these words apply to?

"Is" refers to any strictly factual claim about observable phenomena. Facts about how the atoms and energy of the universe are arranged and behave, and about what they have gotten up to in the past.

"Ought" refers to any claim about how it would be morally preferable for the universe to be. For example Harris thinks it's morally preferable for women to be happy in bikinis on the beach than for them to be unhappy in burkhas in the desert.

To "derive" an "ought" is to demonstrate that it follows necessarily from some set of specific premises.

To "derive an ought from an is" is to purport to have demonstrated that a moral ought claim follows necessarily from a set of specific premises all of which are statements about how the universe is or behaves. Anyone who claims to have done so, including Harris, has smuggled in a covert "ought" claim somewhere.

After I feel enough people have provided answers (OR, if a lot of time passes, with hardly any answers), I will write further responses to this thread. But, I am willing to give you folks some fairly good amount of time to formulate your answers if you need it.

If you try to take a toy away from a toddler because the toy belongs to someone else, it's not going to be a happy toddler. To an adult the fact that the toy belongs to a toy store, or to another child, is more important than whether or not the toddler wants the toy. To the toddler all that matters is that they like it and they want it, and how they got it is simply irrelevant to them.

Most people treat moral claims the way the toddler treats toys. They don't care whether or not the way they got to their favourite claims was legitimate, they just like them.

Philosophers treat moral claims the way an adult treats a toddler's toys: They want to make absolutely sure that the toys were obtained properly, and they realise that the degree to which the toddler likes a given toy is absolutely, completely, totally unrelated to whether or not the toddler obtained the toy legitimately.

This line of questioning where you ask "Well, where's the harm in Harris's position?" seems to me a lot like someone asking "if the toddler's having fun, does it matter whose toy it is?". The correct response is "We all know the toddler's having fun, nobody's saying otherwise, so can we please finally discuss the separate matter of whether that toddler obtained that toy by legitimate means or not?".

 

[westprog]

"Ought" refers to any claim about how it would be morally preferable for the universe to be. For example Harris thinks it's morally preferable for women to be happy in bikinis on the beach than for them to be unhappy in burkhas in the desert.

The happiness and unhappiness being assumed as a matter of course. The proven scientific certain right way to live your life happens to correspond with the personal views of a white middle-class westerner in the early part of the twenty-first century. Not only were all previous views incorrect, but all future ideas will either stay the same, or they will be wrong too. It's simply a matter of applying the methodology.

 

[Wowbagger]

Thanks for the responses, so far, everyone! I will be analyzing them over the next few days, and should be able to post my responses at some point in the middle of the week.

It also happens that I will be in the vicinity of Massimo Piggliuci, a professor of philosophy and opponent of Sam Harris' ideas, today. I will see if I can squeeze in a few minutes of asking him about his take on all this. (I can also try again, next week, though it might be for even less time.)

I theorize that a lot of our differences of opinion might be found in how we are using our words, and what we consider to be "fundamental" in these arguments. But, please wait until my full analysis is done, before commenting too much on that.

 

[Humes fork]

It also happens that I will be in the vicinity of Massimo Piggliuci, a professor of philosophy and opponent of Sam Harris' ideas, today. I will see if I can squeeze in a few minutes of asking him about his take on all this. (I can also try again, next week, though it might be for even less time.)

From what I understand (and I may be wrong), Massimo's position is not that different from Harris'. He just thinks that Harris gives science too much room at the expense of philosophy. I've read his blog from time to time, and he appears not to like very much when his co-blogger Julia Galef (and others) is rather skeptical of philosophical arguments. He appears to think that Daniel Dennett gives too much weigth to science.

 

[Wowbagger]

Unfortunately, I wasn't able to speak with Massimo, today. He was much too swamped with other people. And, I ended up having some nice discussions with others in the room, anyway (largely on different topics).

But, since this was a panel discussion about free will, I can't resist saying something on the subject, which might only be tangential to the topic of this thread:

Sam Harris seems to be of the opinion that free will is an illusion of sorts. While his position on this seems to be more sophisticated than the usual dismissals of "only an illusion", he also thinks this is important to morality.

I think I strongly disagree with Harris in this area, in two ways:
1. I am inclined to think it is NOT an illusion, (depending on how you define it).

I recently tweeted: Those who say "Free will is an illusion" are telling us nothing about free will, and a lot about the limits of their own mind.

Even if I am wrong: Even if it is an illusion, it is still instructive to learn how that illusion comes about. So, the concept still warrants study. (Again, no matter how you define it.)


2. I also think morality and justice have their roots ultimately in our evolutionary heritage. The issue of whether free will exists or not, does not seem to have a terribly significant impact on morality.

I will grant that learning the proximate details of "free will" (either: how free will came to exist OR how the illusion of free will came to be constructed) might have some small, proximate effects on how we think about morality. But, morality is largely not dependant on any of that, in practice. (Even if it claims to act on the assumption of free will in writing.)

None of that is in response to any of the other posts, in here. I still promise to get to that in a day or two or so. Sorry if that seemed like too much of a tangent.

 

[Humes fork]

I'd like to add that I don't think that anyone here denies that science can hrlp us to bring about the morally good once we have defined what that is. For example, if we decide that the Human Development Index is our yardstick, then we can use science to answer moral questions. But the choice of the HDI as the yardstick is not scientific, no matter hw much science may be influencing our choice.

 

[memetherapy]

Yes....BUT

I'd like to add that I don't think that anyone here denies that science can hrlp us to bring about the morally good once we have defined what that is. For example, if we decide that the Human Development Index is our yardstick, then we can use science to answer moral questions. But the choice of the HDI as the yardstick is not scientific, no matter hw much science may be influencing our choice.

Sure. I'm pretty sure almost anyone involved in the discussion agrees, but to different extents. Morality has so many confounding variables that it seems impossible to pin down any argument in its favor. Health is a vague concept...Happiness/Well-being is even slippier. You can, however, see how suppressing negative feedback loops can help in practice. I'm pretty sure Sam's purpose and message of the book is to explain that the philosophical argument doesn't deny us the permission to use facts to try to get a deeper and better understanding of morality. Laws, etiquette, etc can be considered applied morality. Aren't an overwhelming amount of our daily choices based around the concept of what is moral? When a moral relativist uses philosophy to halt an attack on his moral framework, he is applying that framework, which is quite ironic, considering what he argues. Sam doesn't believe in a full understanding of morality, but he tries to show how an analytic approach to the concept and application of morality is more likely to lead to (perceived) improvements in well-being. He doesn't propose anything more than what we take for granted...democracy, freedom of thought, long healthy lives...and that's the point. He's trying to show we all ignore the philosophical problems of morality at all times. We don't have a choice. We're a heuristic system and its due to a really fundamental time constraint. Moral relativism's adoption of Hume's argument is self-defeating in almost every single one of its applications and shouldn't ever stop anyone from attempting to use ISs to influence an OUGHT. We have no choice.

 

[AlBell]

Sure. I'm pretty sure almost anyone involved in the discussion agrees, but to different extents. Morality has so many confounding variables that it seems impossible to pin down any argument in its favor. Health is a vague concept...Happiness/Well-being is even slippier. You can, however, see how suppressing negative feedback loops can help in practice. I'm pretty sure Sam's purpose and message of the book is to explain that the philosophical argument doesn't deny us the permission to use facts to try to get a deeper and better understanding of morality. Laws, etiquette, etc can be considered applied morality. Aren't an overwhelming amount of our daily choices based around the concept of what is moral? When a moral relativist uses philosophy to halt an attack on his moral framework, he is applying that framework, which is quite ironic, considering what he argues. Sam doesn't believe in a full understanding of morality, but he tries to show how an analytic approach to the concept and application of morality is more likely to lead to (perceived) improvements in well-being. He doesn't propose anything more than what we take for granted...democracy, freedom of thought, long healthy lives...and that's the point. He's trying to show we all ignore the philosophical problems of morality at all times. We don't have a choice. We're a heuristic system and its due to a really fundamental time constraint. Moral relativism's adoption of Hume's argument is self-defeating in almost every single one of its applications and shouldn't ever stop anyone from attempting to use ISs to influence an OUGHT. We have no choice.

Words--Words; Many Oughts, Few Ises.

 

[Dani]

2. I also think morality and justice have their roots ultimately in our evolutionary heritage. The issue of whether free will exists or not, does not seem to have a terribly significant impact on morality.

Everything we are has its roots ultimately in our evolutionary heritage, doesn't it? That's as trivial and obvious as saying "Evolution is true". How it came about (the process) is really interesting but that it happened is self-evident and tautological once we accept Evolution. I don't see what this adds exactly.

I agree with you that free will doesn't affect morality. Not even theoretically. With or without free will, we will still send murderers to prison, and there's nothing in "he was destined to commit that crime" that prevents us from answering "he was destined to be punished by the society".

 

[Wowbagger]

Everything we are has its roots ultimately in our evolutionary heritage, doesn't it?

Well, yes. But, some form of morality and justice are present in every stage of evolution. Primitive life forms have more primitive versions of this, but the basic gist is there.

Contrast that to "the arts" or "science". Although they ultimately come out of evolution, it would be hard to claim they are present at every stage of evolution.

I have written up a draft of my next stage of responses, but I want to sleep on them a little more, before I post them. And, no not because they are "fluff enough to be used as pillows", wiseguy!

 

[westprog]

I hate it when I do that. I corrected my post. Thanks!

Actually, it's what happens when people claim to derive their oughts from is's - they do, in fact, derive their is's from oughts. That's one reason why the two should be kept conceptually separate.

In the social sciences, discoveries which seem to point towards the wrong "ought" are likely to be dismissed, on that basis.

 

[Wowbagger]

A Catalog of Thought

I am sure most of us are familiar with the Ship of Theseus: If one replaces all the planks of wood in a boat, is it still the same boat? Etc., etc. The answer, of course, depends on what you are doing with that boat or its parts. There is no one answer that will apply to equally well to everyone.

In a similar way, I can see from the answers in this thread, that there are different answers to the is/ought distinction; and the "correct one" may depend on what you are doing with those words.

If one considers that brain states are more fundamental, and that the higher-level conception of thought is just an abstract from that, the thinker will have no problem melding the two concepts of "is" and "ought".

If, however, one thinks of the taxonomy of ideas as more fundamental, and that brain states are simply not "evolutionarily optimized" for dealing with clear and proper thought; the thinker will believe the is/ought distinction is much more important.

One of these attitudes is probably more useful for conducting a Science of Morality than the other. My money is on the first one: where the two concepts are ultimately distinguishable. And, I will elaborate on why I feel that way a little later.

The other attitude, where the distinction is more fundamental, might still be useful in some other ways, perhaps in philosophy, or in some other aspect of the social sciences... even if I can't figure out what those uses would be, myself.

But, it might even be more complicated than that! Based on what I have read, both on this thread and in some other places, I sense there could be an entire catalog of attitudes towards "is and ought thoughts". Not all of these match what David Hume meant with those words, put let's put that aside, for now, for the sake of clarifying the nature of what different people have been arguing. Some are more useful for some purposes, than others, and vice-versa.

The question "What is the danger of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'?" can be answered with the following attitudes:

Attitude #1: "There is no real danger." This comes in roughly two forms:
1A: "There is ultimately no distinction between the two words. Every time we try to divide them, the distinction is only temporary, and they go right back to being the same thing again, by the end of the argument." This could appeal to brain states, but does not necessarily have to.
1B: "There might be an important distinction, but there is still no danger in deriving one from the other, anyway." This could be merely for academic purposes, but not necessarily.

Attitude #2: "Not only is there an important difference, but there could be a real danger when we derive an ought from an is!"
There is probably a wide spectrum of variations on this. But, for simplicity, I will only outline the two tail ends of it:
2A: "The danger is nothing more significant than muddled or confused thinking, which isn't good, but usually won't kill anyone."
2B: "The danger could be devastating! Social Darwinism, eugenics, etc. are all historic examples of how deadly this can be!"
Citing the Naturalistic Fallacy would also fall somewhere under Attitude 2.

I wish to add, here, that 2B is probably the most useless answer in this catalog. If the thoughts of historic Social Darwinists actually reflected reality, in other words: if their "ises" were more accurate, the danger would not be present. Yes, having bad information is a genuine risk. But, this is true no matter which Attitude (1, 2, or 3) you take!

Attitude #3: "It is not even possible to derive an is from an ought! They are two completely different concepts!" You might as well ask "What is the danger in deriving baseball scores from the Dow Jones Industrial Average?" The question doesn't even make any sense! Any time you think you might be deriving an 'ought' from an 'is', you are actually sneaking in a covert 'ought' before the 'is'!


What is Important for Scientific Purposes?
While Attitude 3 might be important for many of you on this Forum, for some reason; I believe Attitude #1 is more important for the Science of Morality. The reasons fall into two categories:

1. Values reduce to a certain type of fact. This might look like only a philosophical claim, but in the business of conducting a Science of Morality, is best to assume oughts don't pop out of some other realm of existence.

The 'facts' I speak of could be the brain states that our values, morals, ethics, etc. all translate into. But, they do not necessarily have to refer to that: Strictly speaking, someone having a value or not would be a fact, even if the brain was not involved. (Not suggesting it is not involved.)

2. There is evidence, albeit early and incomplete, that facts/values/ises/ and oughts are not treated as separate things in the brain. If this pans out, then empirical facts trump higher level concepts, when it comes to science.

This is a bit like the relationship between math and physics: Math might be considered 'more fundamental' than physics, to many of us here. And that is all well and good, for most things. But, empirical results from physics experiments trumps what might be expected from the math. Physicists would be irresponsible sticking with mathematics that do not reflect reality, no matter how 'beautiful' the equations seem to be. (Though, it is rare for 'very beautiful equations' to be wrong, it does happen on occasion.)

While the higher-order concepts of 'is' and 'ought' might give us some rough rules of thumb, for what we value, it seems that relying on them would needlessly limit what we can investigate in the roots of what we value.

The science of morality would continue to blow open the door to incredibly non-intuitive findings into what we value, and why we value it, etc. I provided the Peak/End Rule as an early, pre-fMRI example.

But, there is more fMRI-related stuff coming down the pipeline regarding religious belief. An example of early evidence seems to show that the brain treats factual statements, such as "The sun is a star." and beliefs such as "cruelty is wrong." as equally important. I suspect more stuff like this would render David Hume's writing more and more outdated.

Even when the examples are a little more intuitive, but still controversial: Such as stem cell research or corporal punishment in school children, a good Science of Morality would show us why one side is simply wrong about the topic, empirically.


In the next post, I will respond to specific replies. Some of my responses will repeat or elaborate on the above points.

 

[Wowbagger]

Now, with that said, 'oughts' actually are 'ises' from one way of looking at things. They can be studied.

I think that is close to what I was trying to say, I think.

That input when it comes to morality, as Hume reminded, is desire/emotion/motivation.

Which, in a sense, are also ises... Right?

The danger of deriving an ought from an is arises from observing an is, such as some people take property from others, and concluding that that is how things ought to be.

That sounds like a problem of obtaining inaccurate or poor quality ises, not a general problem with deriving an ought from an is.

It's not so much the value of it as the truth of it. They are two different concepts, as can easily be demonstrated. Watch:

Premise 1: Bob has a lot of money.
Premise 2: Jim is broke and starving.
Conclusion: Bob ought to give some money to Jim.

Can you spot the missing premise? The conclusion doesn't follow from the given premises. You need another one: The value premise.

The missing premise is also an Is. Watch:

Premise 1: Bob has a lot of money.
Premise 2: Jim is broke and starving.
Premise 3: Bob has a inclination to help Jim out.
Conclusion: Bob will give some money to Jim.

Premise 3 could come from a lot of different sources: Evolutionary imperative to be altruistic towards other members of the species; a moral that was emphasized through culture or religion; an appreciation for the economics of utility value of money; selfish exploitation (for example, perhaps Jim is a slave on Bob's plantation); etc.

Values don't come from some a vacuum, or from some alternative Realm of Values. They are also constructed of Ises.

It is a logical fallacy to derive ought from is, and this is good to know whenever you watch or participate in a debate or a discussion.

I accept that the Naturalistic Fallacy (Something is natural, therefore it is good.) is a fallacy. But, it is no fallacy to state that the more accurate your facts are, the more accurate your oughts will be.

Consider Social Darwinism. The Social Darwinists tried to go from "is" (natural selection in nature) to "ought" (therefore, society should operate around this principle).

The historic Social Darwinists you are referring to got natural selection wrong! They were working off a premise of "Ultimate Fitness" (one or a few ideologies are the best for filling all niches) whereas the science of natural selection (even back then) purports a "relative fitness" (some ideologies can be more successful in some niches than others). We know, today, that Darwinistic ideas really do apply to sociology and politics, but also: We NOW know that there are multiple successful and useful strategies one could develop in those fields, and that needless destruction of one would damage the others. (This may be an oversimplification, but hopefully, it will still prove my point.)

If historic Social Darwinists got their facts right about natural selection (natural selection as it really is in nature, not their distorted view of nature), their oughts would have been different, and they would have been more successful at fueling better well-being for all.

Alternatively: If the Universe worked differently, so that Social Darwinists' ideas really were accurate in their historic form (that is: Nature measured success against an ultimate scale), then their ideas would also have been successful. And, they would think we were horrible people for suggesting otherwise.

The only fallacy is that they didn't get their "ises" right.

Equality between the genders is not a scientific theory, it's a value-concept. Likewise, global warming is not a value, it's a scientific theory.

It depends on what you are doing with the data. What you wrote might work for your purposes.

However: Values reduce to facts about brains. The existence or not of a value-concept is also a fact about the people making the decisions on what to do.

(Also remember that one could also say the following: There is a scientific theory that equality between genders would benefit the well-being of both genders in the long run; Likewise taking action based on the science of global warming would be in the best interest of our well-being in the long run.)

Science tells you how to part the atom. It doesn't tell you if you should use that ability for nuclear ower or nuclear bombs.

In this example, I suspect the decision is heavy enough that no one would try making it without considering the consequences scientifically, unless they were a mad man.

The science of splitting the atom is physics. But, the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons would also be based on science, albeit a different one, probably in the social sciences.

You are probably better off sticking with more primitive decisions, where emotions can make a more direct impact. Though, of course, I would then try to argue that those emotions are also facts about the brains taking the action.

That seems like a good explanation for why certain people tend to confuse the two, and why they don't notice the huge conceptual leap they make when they derive one from the other.

It depends on what you think is fundamental. If you are using brain states as fundamental, then the opposite is almost true: It would be a conceptual leap to think they were significantly different. (See my previous post.)

What makes civilizations thrive or fail? Who agrees on this?

At the time, I think I was referring to opportunities for circles of altruism to expand or contract, depending on perceived facts about the intention of individuals, and various things related to that.

But, none of that is not important, right now. So, perhaps I should make an alternative statement about the opening post:

"But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice.

Today, we know vice and virtue are, in fact, matters of fact, that can be determined through various forms of brain monitoring and neuroimaging. The science is not perfect, yet. But, they improve over time.

It comes not from the action itself, but the feelings that action provokes inside of you.

Those feelings inside you are also facts.

Those who view this without any feeling in all (or virtually all) circumstances are called 'sociopaths' and we lock them up or fry them because they frighten us! A feeling of revulsion arises within!

We can identify what is going on in sociopaths, empirically. The fact that they lack feelings for others is also a fact.

What would those be, and how does the Peak-end heuristic apply?

I was offering the Peak/End Rule as an example of non-intuitive findings in the realm of values. I did not mean to imply that it applied to that part of the quote.

The quote says feelings lie in yourself. However: The fact that we can discover non-intuitive ideas about what is best to value proves there are other good sources for developing values, than merely looking inside yourself.

You mean other people telling you how they feel about it?

By demonstrating that what they currently feel about it is empirically wrong.

An example:
If someone wants the most productivity from their students, but believes corporal punishment is an effective way to beat that productivity out of them; we can demonstrate that their feelings about such punishment is wrong: Much better productivity can be achieved without it.
(Or, perversely, if they value the act of corporal punishment, then their feelings about wanting productivity from their students is wrong. What they really desire, in that case, are a bunch of students who will also be inclined to beat other people, perhaps including their oppressors!)

This is like asking what the value is of "keeping" the concept that if A implies B, and A is true, then B is true. Or keeping the concept that if A implies B, and B is true, that A is not necessarily true. It's a basic logical rule, and if you drop it then the consequence is that you can prove anything.

It might be useful in many applications, to think of the deriving oughts from ises as a fallacy . Though, there is another way to think of this that would be useful for different applications: Such as studying how humans actually develop their values from their perception of facts.

"Ought" refers to any claim about how it would be morally preferable for the universe to be. For example Harris thinks it's morally preferable for women to be happy in bikinis on the beach than for them to be unhappy in burkhas in the desert.

In some contexts, though not all, it might be useful to think of an Ought as a type of is: Whether the person has an Ought in their thoughts, or not, is also an Is.

To "derive an ought from an is" is to purport to have demonstrated that a moral ought claim follows necessarily from a set of specific premises all of which are statements about how the universe is or behaves. Anyone who claims to have done so, including Harris, has smuggled in a covert "ought" claim somewhere.

From one point of view, you would be correct. Science can not tell us that we ought to have smuggled in those oughts.

Form another point of view, this is not considered cheating if we consider:
A. This does not impact the fact that, at the end of the moral decision making process, one has decided to take an action (an ought) based on their perception of their facts (an is).
B. Oughts reduce to a type of Is. Those primarily being facts about the brain.
C. The human mind's decision making process might not be processing the two concepts as two different concepts. If this is true, then whether you like it or not, this is relevant to the study of human morality formulation.

Most people treat moral claims the way the toddler treats toys. They don't care whether or not the way they got to their favourite claims was legitimate, they just like them.

Philosophers treat moral claims the way an adult treats a toddler's toys:
(snip)

I like this analogy! Though, the legitimacy of how one got their ideas must be measured against what they were doing with those ideas.

Someone might want to study what it is about "most people" that make them treat moral claims "like a toddler treats toys". This requires the researcher to crawl into the mind of the average non-philosopher person. What they find there, could offer ways to improve thinking about morals, that apply to ALL parties: Philosophers and non-philosophers alike.

Philosophers might think one way about "toddler's toys", but they are less likely to discover counterintuitive facts about how and why they think that way, thus are less likely to make innovative discoveries, than science would, if it worked another way.

This line of questioning where you ask "Well, where's the harm in Harris's position?" seems to me a lot like someone asking "if the toddler's having fun, does it matter whose toy it is?". The correct response is "We all know the toddler's having fun, nobody's saying otherwise, so can we please finally discuss the separate matter of whether that toddler obtained that toy by legitimate means or not?".

I suspect (though, I could be wrong) that Harris' position would more accurately be put this way:

"If a toddler is having fun, what is it about their brain that makes the proper owner of the toy irrelevant to their wanting to keep it?"

Perhaps picking on toddlers is not fair, since mental development is a factor. So, for clarity, I offer another example using an adult mind:

"If a television evangelist buys a private jet, funded by stealing money from his followers, what is it about his brain that makes the livelihood of all those people less relevant than his ability to spread the word of God from five star hotel suites around the world?"

Actually, it's what happens when people claim to derive their oughts from is's - they do, in fact, derive their is's from oughts. That's one reason why the two should be kept conceptually separate.

In this sense: One could, conceivably, derive an 'ought' from an 'is', without committing a fallacy, as long as their 'ises' are accurate ones. I could see how deriving an 'is' from an 'ought' would be a case of delusion.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Jesus everloving Christ on a pogo stick, Wowbagger, absolutely nobody is contesting the claim that beliefs, moral and otherwise, are physical brain states. This conversation is not going to anywhere until you stop pretending that this is news to somebody.

Nobody ever, at any stage, in any way, even hinted at the claim that "moral ought claims" are not things that happen in people's brains which are made up of atoms and energy and such going about their lawful business.

If it helps you grasp this idea, think of moral ought claims as a special subset of is claims (ignoring for a moment the philosophical question of whether logical and mathematical "truths" are still true if nobody is thinking them). You cannot create a logical argument for the truth one of those special moral ought claims from any set of is-claims which consists exclusively of is-claims which are not members of that set. There's no way to get in to that set from outside that set using logical moves.

That's the problem Harris claims to have solved, but which he has at best obfuscated.

 

[Paul2]

Premise 1: Bob has a lot of money.
Premise 2: Jim is broke and starving.
Conclusion: Bob ought to give some money to Jim.
Can you spot the missing premise? The conclusion doesn't follow from the given premises. You need another one: The value premise.

The missing premise is also an Is. Watch:

Premise 1: Bob has a lot of money.
Premise 2: Jim is broke and starving.
Premise 3: Bob has a inclination to help Jim out.
Conclusion: Bob will give some money to Jim.

My emphases.

Nice sleight of hand (sleight of word?), but you switched ought for is (will).

 

[Wowbagger]

Jesus everloving Christ on a pogo stick, Wowbagger, absolutely nobody is contesting the claim that beliefs, moral and otherwise, are physical brain states. This conversation is not going to anywhere until you stop pretending that this is news to somebody.

The "news" is that we are dealing with a "Ship of Theseus". There are (at least) two ways of looking at the is/ought distinction that are valid for different purposes.

The "news" is that, if we take brain states as fundamental, then the is/ought distinction practically disappears. And, this is useful for conducting a science of morality. Though, thinking the other way might be useful for something else entirely.

This way of thinking is probably going to seem very alien to most philosophers.

I am sure most philosophers' stances would seem very alien to Sam Harris.

But, who is right? They both are, but for different purposes. THAT is the news.

You cannot create a logical argument for the truth one of those special moral ought claims from any set of is-claims which consists exclusively of is-claims which are not members of that set. There's no way to get in to that set from outside that set using logical moves.

Ontologically, this is correct.

Physically, and empirically, it might not be relevant or useful.

That's the problem Harris claims to have solved, but which he has at best obfuscated.

I suspect Sam is not thinking of these issues as a "Ship of Theseus". I think he thinks that philosophers are genuinely confused about something. If this argument of mine pans out, I might be inclined to write to him about it.

Nice sleight of hand (sleight of word?), but you switched ought for is (will).

I was trying to emphasize that once you get to the conclusion, the "ought" disappears into a fact of the matter.

But, if you prefer, we can restore the wording by adding another premise:

Premise 1: Bob has a lot of money.
Premise 2: Jim is broke and starving.
Premise 3: Bob has a inclination to help Jim out*.
Premise 4: In philosophical terms, this inclination is thought of as an "ought".
Conclusion: Bob ought to give some money to Jim.

* Remember: Premise 3 could come from a lot of different sources, all of which are also facts of the matter.

 

[the PC apeman]

Premise 1: Bob is proficient in ending lives.
Premise 2: Jim is alive.
Premise 3: Bob has an inclination to end Jim's life.
Premise 4: In philosophical terms, this inclination is thought of as an "ought".
Conclusion: Bob ought to kill Jim.

 

[westprog]

Premise 1: Bob is proficient in ending lives.
Premise 2: Jim is alive.
Premise 3: Bob has an inclination to end Jim's life.
Premise 4: In philosophical terms, this inclination is thought of as an "ought".
Conclusion: Bob ought to kill Jim.

The getaround for this otherwise entirely accurate characterisation of the is=ought concept is that Bob has some kind of objectively determined mental disorder which can be readily distinguished from healthy Bob's wish to give Jim money. I don't believe that such a distinction actually exists - but it seems to be a matter of faith that it somehow is.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think that is close to what I was trying to say, I think.

Which, in a sense, are also ises... Right?

That 'oughts' are in a sense or can be treated as 'ises' is not in any way controversial. That fact does not imply that one can derive an ought from an is outside of a word game that one might play while ignoring the concept being expressed and equivocating over the use of the words in play.