David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[the PC apeman]

If I get your meaning right, it would be an accurate statement.

But, it is worded in an unfair manner.

Okay, what is unfair about it?

From at Attitude #1 position, we would say the same thing about well-being.

There are objective measures related to the idea of well-being.

But what I'm looking for from you is an objective measure of well-being itself. That would be problematic if there are multiple views of what that means.

From at Attitude #1 position:
There are objective ways to measure morality, based on objective ways to measure its impact on well-being.

If there aren't objective ways to measure well-being itself, how is morality objectively measured? And morality's impact on well-being? What?

The values, in this case, can be determined by science; they have nothing to do with what I happen to value.

What? I don't understand this response at all.

If science indicated that God existed, and we were morally better off keeping His favor, then the objective answers would change, if I liked it or not.

And this is ever murkier.

That is how an Attitude #1 person would think.

Are you or Harris Attitude #1 people? Because I was asking you/your understanding of Harris' position.

I'm beginning to despair.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Also, I don't think Sam Harris even claims to have "solved" an "is/ought problem", at all.

He has explicitly claimed to have done so in his talks, which is the only reason Harris' book is interesting at all. Otherwise it's just welfare utilitarianism, because (and you still keep making me repeat this) there is absolutely nothing to Harris' claims that existing moral philosophy needs to "acknowledge" that ought-claims are brain states.

We all know ought-claims are brain states. You only think this makes a difference to the is/ought problem because you have confused yourself.

I think you are also misconstruing the message there, as well.

When asking "Does the 'is/ought distinction' also translate to an 'is/ought problem'?", here is how that might be answered (in reverse order):

Attitude #3: There is clearly a distinction, but there is no "problem" to be solved. What are you talking about?

Attitude #2: Yeah, I'll tell you what the problem is: Eugenics! Nazis! Social Darwinism! The Naturalistic Fallacy!!

Attitude #1: There is no "problem" we are trying to solve, there. We are merely thinking about those two concepts in a different way than the other attitudes. This might help us solve other things that really are problems better. But, the "problem" has nothing to do with the is/ought distinction, itself.

We're just going to keep going around in circles until you figure out that the is/ought problem actually exists.

I think that's the fundamental problem here, as demonstrated by the fact that every time you give an example you smuggle an "ought" in to your premises.

 

[Wowbagger]

Okay, what is unfair about it?

The statement was: "If we have the values we ought to have, then science can tell us what we ought to do?"

The first part, I assume, refers to science and well-being. If so, it is an accurate statement.

But, without that clarification, it sounds like Sam Harris is determining what values we ought to have, instead of science.

Another sleight of hand here. To be consistent with my rebuttal you'd have to say there are objective measures related to the vague idea of well-being.

I don't think health or well-being are necessarily vague terms. But, if you insist:

There are objective measures related to the vague idea of well-being.

What? I don't understand this response at all.

The whole idea is that those with Attitude #1 want to develop a Science of Morality, to have science determining human values. Everything from the point of view of Attitude #1 stems from that.

So, whatever the science determines is best for well-being, that is what we go with.

If there was strong evidence that God exists, for example, that would make an impact on what we should value (most likely: whatever God says). If there is no empirical evidence of God, then there is no reason to value what "God says".

What we ought to do flows from the science.

Are you or Harris Attitude #1 people? Because I was asking you/your understanding of Harris' position.

Unless I state otherwise, I am writing from the point of view of an Attitude #1 person. I am trying to sprinkle reminders of that into my writing, as well. But, sometimes I forget.

I think I am, for the most part, an actual Attitude #1 person, anyway. But, I can now see how other attitudes work. That is why my approach changed from "you're wrong" to "you're right, but here is another way to see things"

So, my aim is to try to get everyone, here, to recognize the nature of the debate, as I see it: A Clash of Attitudes Towards Is and Ought.

I suspect Sam Harris is a stronger Attitude #1 person than I am. Since this thread is "David Hume vs. Sam Harris", I suppose it would be pointless if I wasn't trying my best to apply his perspective*. But, like any assessment of someone who isn't myself: I could be wrong about about anything I say about him.

If my "Clash of Attitudes" hypothesis is correct, Mr. Harris might not even be aware of it. He might be assuming everyone in #2 and #3 are simply "morally confused", and that's the end of it.

(*As a reminder: I don't even think too highly of Sam Harris as a person, nor do I care for his writing style. But, for the sake of spreading ideas that I happen to think are valuable ones, I stick myself in here, in spite of that.)


Tonight, I hope to be able to have some time picking Massimo's brains on this topic. And, I might fire off a few e-mails to other people I know, as well. Some fresh minds might do us some good.

 

[the PC apeman]

I apologize, Wowbagger. I reread my last response and couldn't make sense of parts of it either. I then made significant changes that I neglected to identify.

 

[westprog]

The demolition of the Harris position in this discussion has been so thorough and so obvious that one might think that confusion between "is" and "ought" was something that was hardly ever seen. In fact, it's more the rule than the exception. Political and ethical debate is usually framed in terms of what will happen - and what is desired to happen is left unsaid. To specify what is desired - what people's values are - is regarded as dubious and almost fanatical.

This is not a good thing - it's a way to make things less clear.

 

[Wowbagger]

The demolition of the Harris position in this discussion has been so thorough and so obvious

So, you're gonna leave, just like that, before I get to the good part?!

 

[Wowbagger]

My Dinner with Massimo

At the end of this description, I propose another question to my opponents, that I hope will yield some fascinating answers. If you don't care about the context, you can skip to that last paragraph. But, I think you might find the encounter I describe here a bit amusing.

Tonight I participated in a dinner discussion moderated by the great Massimo Pigliucci, philosopher of science, and intellectual opponent of Sam Harris. The main topic had nothing much to do with this thread (Stephen Jay Gould's lousy NOMA thingy). However, before and after that took place, I was able to pick his brain a little on the topic of this thread.

Before that happened, I anticipated a potential problem: What if I only had one minute to engage with him? How can I present my Clash of the Attitudes idea in the quickest, most efficient manner? On my way to the dinner, I ended up drawing up a bit of a chart to summarize my assessment:

This is what the Attitudes in the columns has to say about the Attitudes in the rows:

Attitude: | #1: No Distinction/No Danger | #2: Real Distinction/Real Danger in Mixing | #3: Real Distinction/Impossible to Mix Assessing: #1 | We Mostly Agree | You are ignoring or downplaying the dangers! | You seem to be confused. You are sneaking in a covert ought. Assessing: #2 | The problem you are describing is inaccurate "ises". If their "ises" were more accurate, their "oughts" would improve. | We Mostly Agree | What you are describing is impossible.
Assessing: #3 | You seem to be confused. "Oughts" reduce to a type of "is". | What I am talking about is more important than your academic "impossibility". | We Mostly Agree

I briefly ran over each position to Massimo, and stated my hypothesis that the debate was really about two groups of people using words and ideas differently, etc. I focused on the two highlighted corners, as I realized Attitude #2 was not even worth mentioning, much.

I remember his initial reaction was "I see where you're going with this." While he seemed to agree that there could be an element of this going on, he was very clearly and distinctly an Attitude #3 person, and immediately picked out some faults with Attitude #1. (Which did not surprise me, by the way.) In short, he specifically accuses Sam Harris of making a Category Error.

More interestingly, he pointed out a specific footnote in the book where Sam seems to insult the philosophical profession:

...I am convinced that every appearance of terms like "metaethics", "deontology", "noncognitivism", "antirealism", "emotivism", etc., directly increases the amount of boredom in the universe.​

This is found on page 213 in the softcover edition and 197 in the hardcover edition, of The Moral Landscape.

This seems to imply that Harris sees no value, at all, in deeper philosophical thoughts, and I do find this mildly insulting. While I admit I would also probably be bored with most of that stuff, I would not presume it could not possibly have value to anyone else. (I know some people probably think a technical discussion about source code control solutions would be profoundly boring, even though I would probably find it interesting and potentially useful, myself.)

The best comeback I could come up with, in the limited time I had, was basically "So what?! What if someone doesn't care about category errors, or deeper philosophical concepts? What if they are simply much more interested in The Science of morality, and this general Attitude works for them?! Is there anything wrong with that?"

Unfortunately, there wasn't time for Massimo to really respond to this. But, he indicated that he would like to continue this discussion some other time.

On the ride home, I decided to take a closer look at the footnote Massimo had pointed out. Sam tries to justify his "boredom" attitude this way:

My goal, both in speaking at conferences like TED and in writing this book, is to start a conversation that a wider audience can engage with and find helpful. Few things would make this goal harder to achieve than for me to speak and write like an academic philosopher. Of course, some discussion of philosophy will be unavoidable, but my approach is to generally make an end run around many of the views and conceptual distinctions that make academic discussions of human values so inaccessible.​

This is also found on page 213 in the softcover edition and 197 in the hardcover edition, of The Moral Landscape.

So, this is the question I now pose to the posters, here:

What if someone doesn't care about Category Errors? What if their interests are either in: Developing innovations that classic philosophers might miss, through a Science of Morality; And/Or simply bringing an important morality message to a wider audience?
Why do you think Attitude #1 would be good or bad for each of those purposes?

Discuss!

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

What if someone doesn't care about Category Errors?

Then they are irrational and the task at hand is to educate them in rational thought, not to engage with their irrational ideas.

What if their interests are either in: Developing innovations that classic philosophers might miss, through a Science of Morality

Wildly unlikely given that their "Science of Morality" is welfare utilitarianism, which already exists. But do post when it happens. I won't hold my breath.

And/Or simply bringing an important morality message to a wider audience?

It would be nice if he could do that without category errors, mistaken or fraudulent claims to have solved the is/ought problem and similar intellectual misbehaviour.

 

[the PC apeman]

What if someone doesn't care about Category Errors?

There's no point trying to engage them in rational debate.

What if their interests are either in: Developing innovations that classic philosophers might miss, through a Science of Morality;

I think it is interesting that you insert the classic modifier. It implies that the subject is still trying to exercise some variety of philosophy. But this is at odds with not caring about category errors. That problem would have to be addressed before it could be dismissed.

And/Or simply bringing an important morality message to a wider audience?

What makes it important if it is intellectually flawed?

 

[angrysoba]

Okay, I kept looking into this thread every so often to see how things are going and by now it has completely jumped the shark.

I think there were some interesting things in Sam Harris' book, probably because I was unfamiliar with those ideas.

Now I have come to the conclusion that "The Moral Landscape" is both original and good (only the original bits aren't good and the good bits aren't original )

I can't even follow Wowbagger's thought processes anymore as he seems to be advocating a form of philosophy that is to philosophy what alternative medicine is to medicine.

I know that Harris tried to make the argument, I think in the afterword of the new paperback, that given that values are merely brainstates then doesn't that collapse the distinction between is-thoughts and ought-thoughts? As far as I can work out that is the line that is now being pushed by Wowbagger with his division of "attitudes". Yet, why Wowbagger feels that it is necessary to create three different attitudes to collapse two distinct forms of proposition is-ought I don't know and I can't see any argument for it other than, just think about it my way!

This is not acceptable in philosophy because even philosophical arguments have to be justified with more than Humpty Dumpty handwaving like "What if someone didn't care about category errors?"

The fact that is-propositions and ought-propositions are made of the same stuff does not mean they can be logically derived from each other.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What if someone doesn't care about Category Errors? What if their interests are either in: Developing innovations that classic philosophers might miss, through a Science of Morality; And/Or simply bringing an important morality message to a wider audience?
Why do you think Attitude #1 would be good or bad for each of those purposes?

Discuss!

No sense in commenting onthe first or last question.

As to the second, many of us have advocated that position in this forum for years, but I don't see how this 'constitutes developing innovations that classic philosophers might miss'; in fact, I think a scientific approach to examining what works would necessarily include innovations that classic philosophers did not miss. What else is the scientist going to use as fodder for examination?


ETA:
About bringing the issue to a wider audience, what makes you think the ideas are not already there? I think almost everyone who isn't a philosopher agrees that philosophical jargon is a pain. All jargon is a pain to a non-practicioner.

 

[westprog]

So, you're gonna leave, just like that, before I get to the good part?!

I didn't say that. I'm sitting in the front row with my bag of popcorn.

 

[Dani]

What if someone doesn't care about Category Errors?

What if someone doesn't care about falsifiability? What if someone doesn't care about logic? Yeah, that's fine if we're interested in developing a (pseudo)science of auras.

What if their interests are either in: Developing innovations that classic philosophers might miss, through a Science of Morality;

What if, in order to develop innovations in any field, we address the existing arguments instead of dismissing them out of hand just because they're made by classic philosophers (an implied argumentum ad novitatem)?

What if we first admit that invoking science doesn't mean doing science, and that the question of whether something is scientific or not is a philosophical question? What if "it's science and that other thing is just philosophy" doesn't count as an argument? What if I tell you that by claiming "it's science" you are necessarily engaging in a philosophical argument, which is what Sam Harris has been doing regarding "The Moral Landscape"? What if I tell you that his dismissive tone towards philosophy sounds awfully ironic? He's just doing philosophy, only that it's bad philosophy.

And/Or simply bringing an important morality message to a wider audience?

That would be consistent with his view that philosophy is boring. Does that view deserve an answer, though? Yeah, Homer Simpson sure will find philosophy "boring". So what? What is that, an Argumentum ad Homerum? "It's boring, ergo meh"?

In my opinion, a message cannot be important if it's wrong.

 

[Dani]

In my opinion, a message cannot be important if it's wrong.

Sorry, I meant that a message cannot be important if there already exists a message that is more accurate.

 

[memetherapy]

Out of curiosity, who involved in this discussion has actually read The Moral Landscape?

I'm asking this because there's seems to be a lot of false assumption as to what Sam's general message really is. I posted not long ago trying to distinguish Sam's position from the one his "opposition" assumes he has.

Sam isn't touching philosophy...he's side-stepping it. He makes clear there's no ONE absolute morality we'll discover...he simply insists that Hume's philosophical position isn't useful in any way, other than when philosophizing, because we all act out of personal moral intuitions/beliefs? ... He's not saying Hume is wrong...he's saying Hume's argument doesn't hold any water when trying to decide whats moral. Most often, it is used by cultural relativists as a way of ending inquiry of "immoral" actions or beliefs.

I'm aware Hume's argument undercuts my position as well...since my moral position on this matter is subjective...but so is anyone else's. No one ACTUALLY takes Hume's argument seriously when it comes to their own beliefs. Iss quickly turn into/influence Oughts in our own minds, therefore we have to come to terms with the fact that ISs are the most objective element that influence Oughts.

Read the book. He's not saying Hume is wrong...he's saying it's dishonest to act as if Hume's argument denies us a worthwhile pursuit of moral truths.

Philosophy works in absolutes...science works in probabilities. Moral thinking needs more of the latter.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Out of curiosity, who involved in this discussion has actually read The Moral Landscape?

I'm asking this because there's seems to be a lot of false assumption as to what Sam's general message really is. I posted not long ago trying to distinguish Sam's position from the one his "opposition" assumes he has.

Sam isn't touching philosophy...he's side-stepping it. He makes clear there's no ONE absolute morality we'll discover...he simply insists that Hume's philosophical position isn't useful in any way, other than when philosophizing, because we all act out of personal moral intuitions/beliefs? ... He's not saying Hume is wrong...he's saying Hume's argument doesn't hold any water when trying to decide whats moral. Most often, it is used by cultural relativists as a way of ending inquiry of "immoral" actions or beliefs.

Harris is inconsistent. Sometimes he claims outright to have solved the is/ought problem. Other times he says he hasn't solved it, then carries on merrily exactly as if he had done.

He's also exploiting the fact that cultural relativism has a deservedly bad reputation to try to smear Hume by association. The fact is that the is/ought problem is recognised by exactly the same philosophers who thoroughly demolished cultural relativism as a coherent ethical theory.

I'm aware Hume's argument undercuts my position as well...since my moral position on this matter is subjective...but so is anyone else's. No one ACTUALLY takes Hume's argument seriously when it comes to their own beliefs. Iss quickly turn into/influence Oughts in our own minds, therefore we have to come to terms with the fact that ISs are the most objective element that influence Oughts.

Speak for yourself. Some of us are quite capable of understanding that our moral views are grounded in one or more moral axioms we pulled out of thin air that do not depend on any particular facts about the universe.

Read the book. He's not saying Hume is wrong...he's saying it's dishonest to act as if Hume's argument denies us a worthwhile pursuit of moral truths.

He does say this, and he is attacking a straw man. Just one of the many ways in which Harris sucks as a philosopher and a rationalist.

Philosophy works in absolutes...science works in probabilities. Moral thinking needs more of the latter.

Oh dear. Look, you don't go to homeopaths for chemistry lessons and you don't got to Harris for education in philosophy. Both of them will lie to you to make their hogwash look good by comparison. This claim of yours is completely wrong.

However based on past experience this is the sort of wrong claim that makes Harris acolytes feel special, so it's very hard to get them to acknowledge the truth of the is-claim that in terms of what is written in black and white in the philosophical literature they are totally wrong.

 

[Earthborn]

Out of curiosity, who involved in this discussion has actually read The Moral Landscape?

I haven't. And since the main defender of the book in this thread has said that it is very badly written, I don't think I will.

Sam isn't touching philosophy...he's side-stepping it.

He can't side-step what is surrounding him, and he knows it:

Although Harris's book discusses the challenges that a science of morality must face, he also mentions that his scientific argument is unavoidably philosophical

Emphasis mine.

he simply insists that Hume's philosophical position isn't useful in any way, other than when philosophizing, because we all act out of personal moral intuitions/beliefs?

The position is useful in understanding what one shouldn't waste one's time on.

... He's not saying Hume is wrong...he's saying Hume's argument doesn't hold any water when trying to decide whats moral.

That's the whole point of the argument, isn't it? It doesn't help you to determine what IS moral, because questions of morality don't involve IS or IS NOT.

Most often, it is used by cultural relativists as a way of ending inquiry of "immoral" actions or beliefs.

I have no idea what you mean with this. Perhaps you can give an example.

Read the book. He's not saying Hume is wrong...he's saying it's dishonest to act as if Hume's argument denies us a worthwhile pursuit of moral truths.

Is it "dishonest" to point out the simple truth, that there are no moral "truths" ?

Philosophy works in absolutes...

Not necessarily.

science works in probabilities. Moral thinking needs more of the latter.

Science works more with quantisation and margins of error. Unless Harris comes up with a way to determine "morality" in a numerical way that is acceptable to everyone, and can show how far removed it is from the "real morality" his moral science is going absolutely no where.

 

[memetherapy]

...

Speak for yourself. Some of us are quite capable of understanding that our moral views are grounded in one or more moral axioms we pulled out of thin air that do not depend on any particular facts about the universe.

That's where I think you're either being dishonest or simply not getting it? It's one thing to be able to consciously understand that your moral views aren't fully grounded...it's a whole other thing to practice what you believe...and I highly doubt you avoid calculating the probable consequences of your actions on others. I assume you bypass Hume's argument when deliberating what to do. When you use a consistent mathematical system, do you fret over the fact that the system is incomplete? Do the primary axioms scream to you for an explanation?

To make the analogy complete...Sam isn't denying Godel's proof, he's insisting it's not a worthy argument to disprove the usefulness of basic math concepts like 1 + 1 = 2.

Hume's argument holds as well, but we take facts for granted everywhere...in every facet of our understanding of reality.

Oh dear. Look, you don't go to homeopaths for chemistry lessons and you don't got to Harris for education in philosophy. Both of them will lie to you to make their hogwash look good by comparison. This claim of yours is completely wrong.

However based on past experience this is the sort of wrong claim that makes Harris acolytes feel special, so it's very hard to get them to acknowledge the truth of the is-claim that in terms of what is written in black and white in the philosophical literature they are totally wrong.

Comparing Sam Harris to Homeopaths...nice. Homeopaths' beliefs contradict everything we know about how chemistry works. Sam is simply asserting that Hume's argument is being misused. It's halting moral progress. Some people (like you, me and Sam) keep it in mind...but a lot of people (like you and moral relativists) use it to counter the inclusion of FACTS(seemingly defendable facts...of course) in a moral debate, forgetting all the while that we all arrive at OUGHTS in our minds that drive our actions.

 

[the PC apeman]

...Sam is simply asserting that Hume's argument is being misused. It's halting moral progress. ...

Moral progress? How does Harris define (or measure) that?

 

[Wowbagger]

Out of curiosity, who involved in this discussion has actually read The Moral Landscape?

I read it. Twice, now.

I think Sam's verbiage is going to seem inconsistent to those trained in philosophy, and with a stricter Hume-like attitude. But, that might only be a symptom of his awful writing ability.

With some effort, I think it could be possible to "translate" what Harris is saying into the language of "Hume" and vice-versa. And, I am willing to bet both would agree almost all of the time, on almost every point, once we do so! It's just language and POV that is getting in the way.

For example: Sam is using the word "ought" in different ways: Most of the time as a synonym for "behavior", but sometimes in the sense Hume intended.
The Hume definition of "ought" would probably more consistently be reworded as "initial values" in the language of Harris. (Harris does not think one can derrive initial values from facts.)

Does anyone disagree with my assessment, here? (Regardless of whether you think it's a good idea for Harris to do this in his book, or not.)