Could the South Have Won?

[Garrette]

Holding the Union left flank almost single-handedly with such a depleted force is no small feat.

Agreed, though the danger if he had failed has been a bit overblown.

What really marks Chamberlin in my book as a great man was his sense of honor and chivalry. His honorable treatment of the surrendering ANV at Appomatox (for which he would be roundly criticized by rabid South-haters)
is the hallmark of a true warrior and gentleman.

Absolutely agreed.

 

[Giz]

I notice a theme here with your asessment of Gettysburg: It is never Lee's fault. Its was his health, it was bad intelligence, it was his commanders, blah blah blah anything to avoid saying Lee dun ****** up![/qyuote]

If you can show me how Lee was responsible for Stuart being off showboating (in direct contradiction to Lee's orders) rather than doing his job (providing accurate and timely intelligence as to Union positions and strengths), or how Lee is to blame for his health issues, or Ewell violating basic principles (as they were then understood) of warfare by not taking and holding the high ground at the end of Day 1, I might reconsider the issue.

Did Lee not have any responsibility in choosing his corps commanders? Or in communicating his orders to them, such as they were understood? Or removing them from command if necessary?

 

[Garrette]

Did Lee not have any responsibility in choosing his corps commanders? Or in communicating his orders to them, such as they were understood? Or removing them from command if necessary?

The commander bears ultimate responsibility, that is true, but adhering too closely to the principle makes real analysis impossible. It is rarely so black and white.

Let's look at the three examples given:

1. Stuart leaving Lee blind by going on a joy ride to soothe his ego. It's possible Lee could/should have foreseen this but it is not really something anyone should be blamed for not foreseeing. Stuart had been excellent in his role to that point. There was no reason to relieve him or to suspect that he would be less than excellent during the campaign.

2. Lee's health. I'm not sure this was really an issue, but if it was, it certainly isn't something to blame Lee for except perhaps if it were to the point that Lee should have stepped down. It wasn't, so he didn't, and if it was, then it was really on Davis to have him temporarily replaced, at least by the reasoning you present here.

3. Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill on day 1. This is the one for which Lee bears the most responsibility, I think, though Ewell does, too. Lee was not emphatic enough in defining the specific thing he wanted accomplished. His addition of "if practicable" to his order to Ewell gave Ewell the leeway not to carry through. In the past, such a gentlemanly wording had worked to spur action with all effort, and Ewell's performance to date since taking over Jackson's corps had indicated he would need no more than that.

But it didn't work. Ewell decided it wasn't practicable so he did not attack. One can blame Lee or one call Ewell too timid.

Or one can reasonably question whether such an attack would have been successful at all. Ewell had already lost a few thousand men in the day's fighting, and the remainder of his Corps was disorganized from the pursuit through the streets of Gettysburg. More importantly, Hancock had already begun digging in on the heights; fortifications were springing up, and there were nearly 40 cannon in place on the heights by the time Lee's order came. Had Ewell attacked, it is a reasonable possibility that rather than taking the heights he would have had the remainder of his Corps shattered.

Then, of course, is Longstreet's mishandling of the approach to his assault on the Union's left flank on the second day. I wouldn't blame Lee for that, either.


Sorry. Long-winded.

TL;DR version: Much of what went wrong really can't be laid at Lee's feet, at least not directly, and some things that were said to have gone wrong really might not have been wrong after all.

 

[kookbreaker]

I notice a theme here with your asessment of Gettysburg: It is never Lee's fault. Its was his health, it was bad intelligence, it was his commanders, blah blah blah anything to avoid saying Lee dun ****** up![/qyuote]

If you can show me how Lee was responsible for Stuart being off showboating (in direct contradiction to Lee's orders) rather than doing his job (providing accurate and timely intelligence as to Union positions and strengths),

Lee is the one who decided to keep on heading into Pennsylvania despite a lack of contact with his scouting forces.

or how Lee is to blame for his health issues,

Lee seemed to fare well enough through the rest of the war.

or Ewell violating basic principles (as they were then understood) of warfare by not taking and holding the high ground at the end of Day 1, I might reconsider the issue.

You realize that is a Lee apologist myth, right? There never was a 'Ahhh, threw dohwn mah sawhd' moment. For one thing, the ridges and hills were defended just fine by Union troops, and Ewell's troops were exhausted

http://www.historynet.com/did-lt-gen-richard-ewell-lose-the-battle-of-gettysburg.htm

After 5 p.m., just prior to Smith’s arrival with Ewell’s proposal to charge Cemetery Hill and long after the Union retreat had started, Lee sent an aide, Colonel Walter Taylor, to Ewell with instructions to challenge the Federals. ‘The enemy is retreating … in great confusion,’ Lee said in his message. ‘You only need to press those people to gain possession of the heights … .Do this if possible.’

Lee’s order seemed to assume that it would be relatively easy for Ewell to dislodge the Federals from their post atop Cemetery Hill. After the Civil War, apologists for Lee ignored the fact that the Union position was virtually impregnable, and they used this order as proof that Lee was not responsible for the Southern defeat at Gettysburg. Ewell was to blame because he had failed to pursue the defeated Northern army, allowing them to entrench on the critical high ground.

When Taylor found Ewell in Gettysburg and presented the message, Ewell made no comment. He may have been dumbfounded by Lee’s apparent assumption that the enemy could be easily pushed off Cemetery Hill; more likely, he knew that the note was meaningless. He could not move until he received Lee’s response to his plea for reinforcements. Years later, Taylor would claim that Ewell’s silence meant that he had agreed to charge Cemetery Hill, another attempt to clear Lee by discrediting Ewell.

Its a Lee apologist myth.

 

[RobRoy]

Its a Lee apologist myth.

I haven't heard of this before, and grant out I'm not a Civil War buff by any stretch. I'm curious what are the reasons for apologizing for Lee?

 

[kookbreaker]

I haven't heard of this before, and grant out I'm not a Civil War buff by any stretch. I'm curious what are the reasons for apologizing for Lee?

Lee was a decent commander, and was beloved by his troops. His successes tended to happen because his opponent was incompetent or being on the defensive. His victory record as a result meant that people tended to lionize him as a masterful hero whose skills were second to no other General in history.

So, in the aftermath of the war the idea that he could have done anything wrong would tarnish their hero became an abomination. So the idea that he made such blunders not taking the high ground on day one of Gettysburg (which really could not be done) or ordering Pickett's charge (just plain dumb) could not have been his fault, or were a decision brought on by the failures of others. Lee apologists would blame other officers: Longstreet and Ewell were favorite targets. The Lee apologists had free reign until people started looking at the facts more closely and found that sometimes heroes have feet of clay.

 

[RobRoy]

Lee was a decent commander, [snip]

Ahh, very good. Thank you. That was what I thought, but I wondered if there were darker or more sinister reasons for the defense. I appreciate you taking the time and offering a well-reasoned response.

 

[Garrette]

Lee was a decent commander, and was beloved by his troops. His successes tended to happen because his opponent was incompetent or being on the defensive. His victory record as a result meant that people tended to lionize him as a masterful hero whose skills were second to no other General in history.

So, in the aftermath of the war the idea that he could have done anything wrong would tarnish their hero became an abomination. So the idea that he made such blunders not taking the high ground on day one of Gettysburg (which really could not be done) or ordering Pickett's charge (just plain dumb) could not have been his fault, or were a decision brought on by the failures of others. Lee apologists would blame other officers: Longstreet and Ewell were favorite targets. The Lee apologists had free reign until people started looking at the facts more closely and found that sometimes heroes have feet of clay.

My only real nitpick is with the highlighted portion. To the degree that his opponents were incompetent, Lee exploited it because he knew it. His greatest strength was in reading his opponents. Meade was his one real mistake in that regard. Note that the second part of the highlighted portion (being on the defensive) came about because he knew who he was facing, and he knew that Grant wouldn't be cowed by a tactical set back or an agressive maneuver, hence Lee stayed defensive. And to give him credit, he played the defensive very well, generally staying a step ahead of Grant in the race to be outflanked. Grant played it well, too, generally (even he admitted his huge error at Cold Harbor), and nearly broke through Lee's lines on a few occasions before the final collapse at Petersburg. For an interesting microcosm of this battle of relative titans, read about The Battle of North Anna.

 

[simonxlong]

My only real nitpick is with the highlighted portion. To the degree that his opponents were incompetent, Lee exploited it because he knew it. His greatest strength was in reading his opponents. Meade was his one real mistake in that regard. Note that the second part of the highlighted portion (being on the defensive) came about because he knew who he was facing, and he knew that Grant wouldn't be cowed by a tactical set back or an agressive maneuver, hence Lee stayed defensive. And to give him credit, he played the defensive very well, generally staying a step ahead of Grant in the race to be outflanked. Grant played it well, too, generally (even he admitted his huge error at Cold Harbor), and nearly broke through Lee's lines on a few occasions before the final collapse at Petersburg. For an interesting microcosm of this battle of relative titans, read about The Battle of North Anna.

Grant was tenacious. He understood better than any prior commander of the Army of the Potomac that he needed to attack, and then attack again. Previously, the war in Virigina had pretty much involved battles followed by a respite, giving the Confederates and Lee time to regroup. Grant changed this, as he fought then followed up by fighting again. Grant really understood how to make use of his vast weight of men and materials.

It's also important to understand that other major factors started plaguing Lee after Gettysburg as well. Large portions of the Confederacy were being brought under Union control, Vicksburg had split the Confederacy in half, supplies were dwindling, and Sherman was threatening Georgia. As these problems became more and more severe, Lee suffered from the fact that what men were left weren't coming to help the Army of Northern Virginia. Additionally, desertion became a larger and larger problem for Lee as Sherman threatened to wreck much of the South, and men deserted to go home and help their families among other reasons.

All of these factors, and others, conspired to insure that Lee would never be able to effectively move on the offensive again.

 

[Garrette]

Agreed.

 

[pipelineaudio]

You got that war all wrong. Ya' see, there never was a South Vietnamese people who were US allies - just a bunch of petty generals and Dictators the US put in power. The entire country of Vietnam - North and South - were of a single mind and they hated the Americans.

Here's a map of the Tet Offensive: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/ba/TetMap.jpg

Now, when you realize the Southern-Vietnamese support the Vietcong needed to simultaneously launch so many strikes, then you get the idea: the entire country was anti-US. In reality, there was no North Vietnam, and there was no South Vietnam - there was just Vietnam.

Wow, the level of totally wrong is frightening. Its true that a lot of rural people never really put together the facts that the vietcong were really the useful idiots of the north, and public sentiment for ho chi minh was high, but the hatred for the vietcong, and by extension, the north for funding them was beyond words. I think we've romanticized and sanitized the war to a great degree, but the level of absolute terrorism, which unlike muslim terrorism, actually had a real day to day effect on a large amount of the population was dehumanizing

 

[Fudbucker]

I think you're missing the thrust of his argument: Johnston was going to get caught up eventually, and lose. And if it wasn't Johnston, it was going to be another general. By the beginning of '64 Lincoln finally had the generals who would execute his own horrifying end game. Grant, Sheridan, Meade and Sherman. No more Mr. Nice Guy. No more leaving the field honorably. It was the end game and it really started back on July 3, Gettysburg and July 4, Vicksburg. Arguably, while Gettysburg demoralized them, Vicksburg may have been more significant - finalizing the Union's control of the Mississippi, cutting the Confederacy in half, gravely limiting their ability to run the blockade, and preventing Texas from running horses back east.

I think you can make the argument that Johnston was a better general than Hood. And there remains the possibility that Johnston, if not even a very good general, still could have whupped Sherman badly. It's possible. For every Vicksberg, there are a few Cold Harbors. Sherman could have lost to Johnston.

So my point is, could the South have won IF Johnston scored a victory over Sherman, and kept Atlanta out of the Union's hands untill after November? I think that was the best chance, because without an Atlanta victory, I think there's a good chance McClellan wins, and negotiates some kind of peace.

Once Sheridan secured the Shenandoah he turned Early's army into a non-factor. Not only was he unable to harass D.C., but he couldn't stop the logistics chain from the North, which was more significant. Any reinforcement of Johnston's positions were going to come from existing rebel strengths, and those were only in North Carolina and Virginia... and the holding pattern around Atlanta. As Grant showed in Vicksburg, a well-defended and defendable position, you can actually starve 'em out.

Oh, and Johnston was a far better field marshal than defender. Arguably he won First Bull Run, not Beauregard, and it wasn't by defense, it was through strategic offense. Plus, Johnston got routed out of Mississippi. He wasn't there at Vicksburg at the end and tried to defend positions to allow the Confederates to get in behind Grant's forces, but couldn't do it. Entrenched or not, he wasn't going to fight a set piece against Sherman. Any sort of win in the large battles would cost him more troops than they could afford. He was hoping for a slip-up where he could catch Sherman re-positioning and have an overwhelming balance in his favor.

Slip-up's happen. If Johnston had been command, it's possible he would have won a decent victory. Both armies would roughly equivalent in size. Johnston could have won. We know how it went with Hood.

 

[kookbreaker]

Is now a good time to point out that Mclellan was not in favor of peace? He was very much a War Democrat. His veep (not chosen by him) was a peace Democrat but the position didn't exactly carry much weight.

 

[Fudbucker]

Is now a good time to point out that Mclellan was not in favor of peace? He was very much a War Democrat. His veep (not chosen by him) was a peace Democrat but the position didn't exactly carry much weight.

Mclellan, I believe, might have decided to fight on. That was HIS army, that he rebuilt after Bull Run. It's hard to think he would just remove them from the board and let the South slip away.

But, McClellan could not stand to see his men die. I think he was deeply moved by the horrors of war and it manifested as a bizzare form of over-cautious behavior to avoid actual fighting. THAT McClellan might have gone for a peace deal, if the South was forced to make major concessions.

 

[Jules Galen]

I've read the secret Longstreet Diaries and they are not flattering when it comes to Lee....not at all. You see, Longstreet and Sherman were lovers, and this sometimes confused the sensibilities of Lee. For example, then Picket came to Longstreet's tent to verify whether or not he should charge, Lee was already there in the passionate throes with Longstreet. The story has it...as Picket waited outside for orders, Longstreet mounted Lee and shared with him his munificent manhood, and Lee shouted "Charge" in the heat of manly passion - and Picket, who was standing outside the tent, "ordered" his troops to "Charge". As a result, the Civil War was lost for the South.

Think about that.


Or...maybe it is bunk. Nevertheless, it would be consistent with people who spent a lifetime enslaving other Human Beings.

 

[simonxlong]

I think you can make the argument that Johnston was a better general than Hood. And there remains the possibility that Johnston, if not even a very good general, still could have whupped Sherman badly. It's possible. For every Vicksberg, there are a few Cold Harbors. Sherman could have lost to Johnston.

So my point is, could the South have won IF Johnston scored a victory over Sherman, and kept Atlanta out of the Union's hands untill after November? I think that was the best chance, because without an Atlanta victory, I think there's a good chance McClellan wins, and negotiates some kind of peace.


Slip-up's happen. If Johnston had been command, it's possible he would have won a decent victory. Both armies would roughly equivalent in size. Johnston could have won. We know how it went with Hood.

They were not equivalent in size. At the final battle of Atlanta the two forces that actually fought were roughly equivalent in size, but Sherman had almost 110,000 men under his command involved in the campaign plus additionally forces in middle Tennessee versus the Army of Tennessee at about 55,000. This puts them nearly 2 to 1 odds.

Let's say Johnston wins a battle and slows Sherman enough that Atlanta falls after the November 9 election, what happens?

First, Lincoln was very probably still going to win. Many war Democrats were actually siding with Lincoln and removing their opposition to him in order to ensure that a war President stayed, even if Republican.

Secondly, a Lincoln loss doesn't end the war automatically. Lincoln would still be President until March of 1865, meaning that Johnston would have to hold out until then in order for McClellan to have any chance of yielding, which McClellan didn't want to do anyways. He is a war Democrat as pointed out above.

Now assuming that Atlanta falls after Lincoln is defeated, it's fall would still signal that the war was going in the Union's favor. It would still turn public opinion. At the same time, by March Grant is pounding on Richmond's door. At that point, McClellan, who doesn't want to end the war anyways, would keep fighting. In fact, arguably, it would be politically impossible to end the war at that point.

Lee surrenders on April 9th, only one month after the March 4th inauguration. Maybe Sherman doesn't make his march to the sea quite as quickly, or perhaps not at all in the above scenario. Nonetheless, Lee can't hold out against Grant any longer than he does and Petersburg is still the endgame of the war.

There is no reasonable scenario whereby Johnston wins such a massive victory against Sherman as to hold Atlanta for months and months. Maybe, theoretically, he could have held until after November 9, but even that is unlikely.

In order to hold out all the way until peace is made, he would have to inflict massive casualties on Sherman and not take massive casualties in return, because even a 2 to 1 swap destroys him. Additionally, Sherman wasn't an idiot. He knew he needed a victory in Atlanta to help ensure a Lincoln victory, and he was going to get it one way or another.

 

[Rincewind]

It wasn't meant to be a correction or clarification, really; sorry if it came across as harsh.

Chamberlain was a fascinating man and one worthy of much admiration, and his actions at Gettysburg are rightly told and retold. It is just that the value of what he did -- while great -- has been overstated through the years. More importantly, it has overshadowed the equally gallant and valuable things performed by others there.

I'm a Chamberlain fan. Visiting the site of his actions at Gettysburg is a highlight of all my battlefield tours; what struck me most is that the area his actions covered is much smaller than I imagined it to be. But my point is that others had equally valorous and significant actions there and yet get little acclaim compared to Chamberlain. For most of them, this is fitting as the remainder of their lives were not so admirable, perhaps, but in the narrow context of Gettysburg, they got short shrift.

Buford is my personal hero from Gettysburg as are all the men of the 1st Minnesota. Even George A. Custer performed valiant and valuable service in the cavalry fight east of the main battle.

From the other side of the field, the 26th North Carolina performed as valiantly as perhaps any unit on any field given their grievous losses.

No problems - I didn't view it as either a criticism or harsh! I had Chamberlain in mind when I posted.

As you mention, there were heroes aplenty on both sides at Gettysburg - and the other battles too.

His actions at Appomattox were also mentioned by Ken Burns - he was a fine gentleman.

 

[Tolls]

Lee was a decent commander... His victory record as a result meant that people tended to lionize him as a masterful hero whose skills were second to no other General in history.

Quite similar to Bonapartists, who tend to try and negate his mistakes in 1815, funnily enough by playing up his piles.

 

[kookbreaker]

Quite similar to Bonapartists, who tend to try and negate his mistakes in 1815, funnily enough by playing up his piles.

Indeed. While there is no doubt that Napolean's health did cause problems on the Waterloo battlefield there were also multiple crucial errors he made proior to and during the battle that had nothing to do with his health. But to Bonapartists their version of Longstreet is Marshal Ney.

 

[Giz]

They were not equivalent in size. At the final battle of Atlanta the two forces that actually fought were roughly equivalent in size, but Sherman had almost 110,000 men under his command involved in the campaign plus additionally forces in middle Tennessee versus the Army of Tennessee at about 55,000. This puts them nearly 2 to 1 odds.

Let's say Johnston wins a battle and slows Sherman enough that Atlanta falls after the November 9 election, what happens?

First, Lincoln was very probably still going to win. Many war Democrats were actually siding with Lincoln and removing their opposition to him in order to ensure that a war President stayed, even if Republican.

Secondly, a Lincoln loss doesn't end the war automatically. Lincoln would still be President until March of 1865, meaning that Johnston would have to hold out until then in order for McClellan to have any chance of yielding, which McClellan didn't want to do anyways. He is a war Democrat as pointed out above.

Now assuming that Atlanta falls after Lincoln is defeated, it's fall would still signal that the war was going in the Union's favor. It would still turn public opinion. At the same time, by March Grant is pounding on Richmond's door. At that point, McClellan, who doesn't want to end the war anyways, would keep fighting. In fact, arguably, it would be politically impossible to end the war at that point.

Lee surrenders on April 9th, only one month after the March 4th inauguration. Maybe Sherman doesn't make his march to the sea quite as quickly, or perhaps not at all in the above scenario. Nonetheless, Lee can't hold out against Grant any longer than he does and Petersburg is still the endgame of the war.

There is no reasonable scenario whereby Johnston wins such a massive victory against Sherman as to hold Atlanta for months and months. Maybe, theoretically, he could have held until after November 9, but even that is unlikely.

In order to hold out all the way until peace is made, he would have to inflict massive casualties on Sherman and not take massive casualties in return, because even a 2 to 1 swap destroys him. Additionally, Sherman wasn't an idiot. He knew he needed a victory in Atlanta to help ensure a Lincoln victory, and he was going to get it one way or another.

The above are all good points... but one of the big unknowables in counterfactuals is the knock-on effects.

i.e. many Union forces (thinking of the Army of the Potomac in particular) had serious issues with maintaining morale in 1864. What happens if a peace platform wins the election? Offensive operations could grind to a halt, or worse, as troops refuse to fight on in a "lost" war.

Assuming that the election result doesn't impact military operations until after the administration changes is a big assumption.