Could the South Have Won?

[kookbreaker]

Suppose the South had followed up its surprise victory at Bull Run/Manassas with an immediate invasion of Washington DC?

That would have taken more gumption and more discipline than the Confederate army could likely manage. Pursuit of a fleeing enemy takes a lot of command and control as well as soldiers who can handle such activity. Neither army nor its leaders was capable of that. The victory was as much a surprise the the Confederacy as it was the Union.

In addition a lot of volunteers were pouring into DC. Even these untrained people could fight from early defenses. McClellan also was in charge just six days after the fight and an attack on D.C. Would have nullified his shortcomings

The Confederacy just didn't have the manpower to take it.

Of interest:

http://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/civil-war-sealion-the-capture-of-washington-d-c.68277/

 

[Loss Leader]

the idea that the South had a snowball's chance of getting any of the great European powers on their side is wishful thinking practically on a deus ex machina level.

I tend to disagree. Almost all trade with the US (including the slave trade) went through "northern" cities - most notably New York and New Orleans. The South could have offered France lower prices on cotton and tobacco if it could have controlled a sufficiently large port. Even with smaller ports, if the South had lowballed its prices for a couple years, it probably could have gotten France interested in at least providing some naval cover.

But I do agree that getting either England or France to care one way or another would have required quite a great deal of effort. They had all their attention focused East. Neither ever appreciated the actual wealth that the US represented until well into WWI.

 

[Foolmewunz]

Yes, but what if he hadn't been relieved and had scored a victory against Sherman? Atlanta might have stayed in the South's hands until the election.

I think you're missing the thrust of his argument: Johnston was going to get caught up eventually, and lose. And if it wasn't Johnston, it was going to be another general. By the beginning of '64 Lincoln finally had the generals who would execute his own horrifying end game. Grant, Sheridan, Meade and Sherman. No more Mr. Nice Guy. No more leaving the field honorably. It was the end game and it really started back on July 3, Gettysburg and July 4, Vicksburg. Arguably, while Gettysburg demoralized them, Vicksburg may have been more significant - finalizing the Union's control of the Mississippi, cutting the Confederacy in half, gravely limiting their ability to run the blockade, and preventing Texas from running horses back east.


Once Sheridan secured the Shenandoah he turned Early's army into a non-factor. Not only was he unable to harass D.C., but he couldn't stop the logistics chain from the North, which was more significant. Any reinforcement of Johnston's positions were going to come from existing rebel strengths, and those were only in North Carolina and Virginia... and the holding pattern around Atlanta. As Grant showed in Vicksburg, a well-defended and defendable position, you can actually starve 'em out.

Oh, and Johnston was a far better field marshal than defender. Arguably he won First Bull Run, not Beauregard, and it wasn't by defense, it was through strategic offense. Plus, Johnston got routed out of Mississippi. He wasn't there at Vicksburg at the end and tried to defend positions to allow the Confederates to get in behind Grant's forces, but couldn't do it. Entrenched or not, he wasn't going to fight a set piece against Sherman. Any sort of win in the large battles would cost him more troops than they could afford. He was hoping for a slip-up where he could catch Sherman re-positioning and have an overwhelming balance in his favor.

 

[Foolmewunz]

I tend to disagree. Almost all trade with the US (including the slave trade) went through "northern" cities - most notably New York and New Orleans. The South could have offered France lower prices on cotton and tobacco if it could have controlled a sufficiently large port. Even with smaller ports, if the South had lowballed its prices for a couple years, it probably could have gotten France interested in at least providing some naval cover.

But I do agree that getting either England or France to care one way or another would have required quite a great deal of effort. They had all their attention focused East. Neither ever appreciated the actual wealth that the US represented until well into WWI.

I don't understand. At what point are you imagining the south being able to ship enough discounted cotton to entice French interest. They were having enough trouble finding blockade runners to get just enough material out to buy arms and ammunition. They didn't have the sizes of ships necessary to trade cotton in sufficient volume that France would've cozied up to them.

 

[ddt]

The South could only win if the North for some reason developed a political weakness or for some unknown reason Britain or France came to her aid.

Didn't France already have their hands full with their little adventure in Mexico?

 

[Garrette]

Okay but invoking foreign intervention stacks the deck even further against the South. Diplomacy doesn't happen in a vacuum and the disparage between the quality and effectiveness of Northern and Southern diplomacy is as disparate as everything else except the ability to subjugate an entire race into picking your cotton, and the North refused several offer to settle the war via "Subjugating Cotton Picking Contest."

Much like the myth of the Brilliant Southern General (in reality neither side in the Civil War represented anything resembling a peak in military strategy. It was a classic case of fighting a war with this era's weapons and last era's strategy, which historically always leads to a heartbreakingly large bodycount) the idea that the South had a snowball's chance of getting any of the great European powers on their side is wishful thinking practically on a deus ex machina level. England could get all the cotton they wanted from India and contrary to popular belief you really can't get France to do anything just by saying it will piss of England. The South had nothing to bargain with diplomatically, even without having to offset the unpopularity of slavery so invoking some 11th hour diplomatic miracle is as fanciful as saying the South could have won if the Ghost Army from Return of the King showed up and won the war for them.

I am of the opinion that Grant is sorely underappreciated as a strategist and, to a lesser extent, tactician. Not a Great Captain, certainly, but he could see through to the nub of the thing and then go after it.

One could argue for Jackson as a great tactician and operational level general, too. In the same vein, one could argue for Mosby and possibly Forrest.

I also hate to leave Thomas out of any such discussion. Again, perhaps not a Great Captain, but a man of exceptional competence both in strategic insight and ability to lead.

On the one hand it is intriguing to argue about the great generals; on the other hand, I find it more satisfying to argue about the true heroes -- those with no particularly great talent but a desire to do right even at great personal cost. My leading candidate in this regard is Union General Samuel Curtis who was the victor at two of the three battles West of the Mississippi that are frequently called "The Gettysburg of the West." Granted, in one of them he held a phenomenal numerical advantage, but he had the smarts not to blow it, and at Pea Ridge, by rights he should have lost.

 

[ChristianProgressive]

Prior to July 1863, the South had a decent chance of winning. The war was very unpopular in the North. There were draft riots in major cities in the North. Sections of Congress were in revolt. Desertion was becoming a significant issue.

Then came the little town called Gettysburg. A combination of very poor intelligence, Lee's poor health, and a critical bad call by the one of the field commanders on the Confederate side led the Confederates being drawn into a meeting engagement that bled the ANV badly and broke their momentum.

The South never recovered from that but still managed to hold on for two more years.

 

[Rincewind]

I am of the opinion that Grant is sorely underappreciated as a strategist and, to a lesser extent, tactician. Not a Great Captain, certainly, but he could see through to the nub of the thing and then go after it.

One could argue for Jackson as a great tactician and operational level general, too. In the same vein, one could argue for Mosby and possibly Forrest.

I also hate to leave Thomas out of any such discussion. Again, perhaps not a Great Captain, but a man of exceptional competence both in strategic insight and ability to lead.

On the one hand it is intriguing to argue about the great generals; on the other hand, I find it more satisfying to argue about the true heroes -- those with no particularly great talent but a desire to do right even at great personal cost. My leading candidate in this regard is Union General Samuel Curtis who was the victor at two of the three battles West of the Mississippi that are frequently called "The Gettysburg of the West." Granted, in one of them he held a phenomenal numerical advantage, but he had the smarts not to blow it, and at Pea Ridge, by rights he should have lost.

I would suggest Chamberlain at Gettysburg as a hero - though, of course he was only a colonel.

 

[Garrette]

I would suggest Chamberlain at Gettysburg as a hero - though, of course he was only a colonel.

For just Little Round Top? Maybe, but no more so than dozens of others there (1st Minnesota, anyone?). For his entire career and outlook, then definitely yes.

 

[kookbreaker]

Prior to July 1863, the South had a decent chance of winning. The war was very unpopular in the North. There were draft riots in major cities in the North. Sections of Congress were in revolt. Desertion was becoming a significant issue.

Much of the 'unpopular in the North' is a bit of neo-Confederate rewriting of history. Some locations, especially where there were textile factories, the war was unpopular, but in other areas people supported the war. Draft riots were happening but it wasn't much more than an overheated Nativitst riots from years before (with new targets).

The South, meanwhile, had almost entire sections of the Confederacy in near revolt. Other areas had be be seized and kept by force.

Desertion in war is always an issue.

Then came the little town called Gettysburg. A combination of very poor intelligence, Lee's poor health, and a critical bad call by the one of the field commanders on the Confederate side led the Confederates being drawn into a meeting engagement that bled the ANV badly and broke their momentum.

I notice a theme here with your asessment of Gettysburg: It is never Lee's fault. Its was his health, it was bad intelligence, it was his commanders, blah blah blah anything to avoid saying Lee dun ****** up!

The South never recovered from that but still managed to hold on for two more years.

Which is what happens when they fight a defensive war where the weapons heavily favor defense.

 

[Garrette]

Much of the 'unpopular in the North' is a bit of neo-Confederate rewriting of history. Some locations, especially where there were textile factories, the war was unpopular, but in other areas people supported the war. Draft riots were happening but it wasn't much more than an overheated Nativitst riots from years before (with new targets).

The South, meanwhile, had almost entire sections of the Confederacy in near revolt. Other areas had be be seized and kept by force.

Desertion in war is always an issue.



I notice a theme here with your asessment of Gettysburg: It is never Lee's fault. Its was his health, it was bad intelligence, it was his commanders, blah blah blah anything to avoid saying Lee dun ****** up!



Which is what happens when they fight a defensive war where the weapons heavily favor defense.

And not just then. How long did Germany hang on after Stalingrad or Japan after Midway?

 

[Spektator]

WRT the original question: Robert Toombs of Georgia, an ardent secessionist, later the first Secretary of State of the Confederacy, later still a soldier in the Confederate Army, was told at the outbreak of war that, given the North's industrial capacity, the South had no chance. He confidently predicted, "Doesn't matter. We can beat the Yankees with cornstalks!"

After the war someone asked him about this. He reportedly responded, "I stand by what I said. We could have beat them with cornstalks. Trouble was, they wouldn't fight that way."

No. The South had no chance of victory.

 

[Loss Leader]

Then came the little town called Gettysburg. A combination of very poor intelligence, Lee's poor health, and a critical bad call by the one of the field commanders on the Confederate side led the Confederates being drawn into a meeting engagement that bled the ANV badly and broke their momentum. The South never recovered from that but still managed to hold on for two more years.

I consider the turning point to be Antietem. Gettysburg was just Antietiem Part II. It was this one day battle that removed 12,000 southern troops, stopped Lee from entering Maryland, and set up the eventual clash at Gettysburg.

Once again, Lee had no business being north of Virginia. His campaign to harass the North was an abject failure both militarily and politically.

I don't understand. At what point are you imagining the south being able to ship enough discounted cotton to entice French interest. They were having enough trouble finding blockade runners to get just enough material out to buy arms and ammunition. They didn't have the sizes of ships necessary to trade cotton in sufficient volume that France would've cozied up to them.

I agree with you. The CSA needed complete control over good ports and a strong Navy to break the US blockade. If they could have gotten France interested in lending its navy, it might have had a chance. But there's no real indication that France ever took them seriously enough to risk taking sides.

 

[Belz...]

WTF?

Just another case of a poster conflating a descriptive statement with a moral value judgment. Nothing to worry about.

 

[Belz...]

No. The raw numbers were just too stacked against the South from the beginning. Unless the South somehow managed to convince the North to face them in a winner take all cotton picking contest the war was over

 

[Rincewind]

For just Little Round Top? Maybe, but no more so than dozens of others there (1st Minnesota, anyone?). For his entire career and outlook, then definitely yes.

Actually, I have recently rerun the Ken Burns DVD set "The American Civil War", and Chamberlain kinda stuck in short-term memory. So - thank you for the clarification!

 

[Garrette]

Actually, I have recently rerun the Ken Burns DVD set "The American Civil War", and Chamberlain kinda stuck in short-term memory. So - thank you for the clarification!

It wasn't meant to be a correction or clarification, really; sorry if it came across as harsh.

Chamberlain was a fascinating man and one worthy of much admiration, and his actions at Gettysburg are rightly told and retold. It is just that the value of what he did -- while great -- has been overstated through the years. More importantly, it has overshadowed the equally gallant and valuable things performed by others there.

I'm a Chamberlain fan. Visiting the site of his actions at Gettysburg is a highlight of all my battlefield tours; what struck me most is that the area his actions covered is much smaller than I imagined it to be. But my point is that others had equally valorous and significant actions there and yet get little acclaim compared to Chamberlain. For most of them, this is fitting as the remainder of their lives were not so admirable, perhaps, but in the narrow context of Gettysburg, they got short shrift.

Buford is my personal hero from Gettysburg as are all the men of the 1st Minnesota. Even George A. Custer performed valiant and valuable service in the cavalry fight east of the main battle.

From the other side of the field, the 26th North Carolina performed as valiantly as perhaps any unit on any field given their grievous losses.

 

[ChristianProgressive]

I notice a theme here with your asessment of Gettysburg: It is never Lee's fault. Its was his health, it was bad intelligence, it was his commanders, blah blah blah anything to avoid saying Lee dun ****** up![/qyuote]

If you can show me how Lee was responsible for Stuart being off showboating (in direct contradiction to Lee's orders) rather than doing his job (providing accurate and timely intelligence as to Union positions and strengths), or how Lee is to blame for his health issues, or Ewell violating basic principles (as they were then understood) of warfare by not taking and holding the high ground at the end of Day 1, I might reconsider the issue.

 

[ChristianProgressive]

I consider the turning point to be Antietem. Gettysburg was just Antietiem Part II. It was this one day battle that removed 12,000 southern troops, stopped Lee from entering Maryland, and set up the eventual clash at Gettysburg.

Once again, Lee had no business being north of Virginia. His campaign to harass the North was an abject failure both militarily and politically.

Lee did achieve one of his primary objectives: to draw the Army of the Potomac out of Virginia.

 

[ChristianProgressive]

It wasn't meant to be a correction or clarification, really; sorry if it came across as harsh.

Chamberlain was a fascinating man and one worthy of much admiration, and his actions at Gettysburg are rightly told and retold. It is just that the value of what he did -- while great -- has been overstated through the years. More importantly, it has overshadowed the equally gallant and valuable things performed by others there.

Holding the Union left flank almost single-handedly with such a depleted force is no small feat.

What really marks Chamberlin in my book as a great man was his sense of honor and chivalry. His honorable treatment of the surrendering ANV at Appomatox (for which he would be roundly criticized by rabid South-haters)
is the hallmark of a true warrior and gentleman.

Buford is my personal hero from Gettysburg as are all the men of the 1st Minnesota.

That is a fair point. Buford pretty much saw the battle as it would unfold early on Day 1 and set himself the task of making sure it would happen to the ANV and not the AOP.