Could the South Have Won?

The above are all good points... but one of the big unknowables in counterfactuals is the knock-on effects.

i.e. many Union forces (thinking of the Army of the Potomac in particular) had serious issues with maintaining morale in 1864. What happens if a peace platform wins the election? Offensive operations could grind to a halt, or worse, as troops refuse to fight on in a "lost" war.

Assuming that the election result doesn't impact military operations until after the administration changes is a big assumption.

That's a good point. There is always the possibility that the army simply gives up. Nonetheless, even without an Atlanta victory, Lincoln probably still wins and McClellan is not anti-war. He ran a very inconsistent campaign were he supported the war on one hand and tried to parrot the party line on the other. It was very well known by everyone that McClellan was for continuing the war and it is entirely possible that his election, if it happened, might not even be seen as an anti-war win by the army, merely as a desire for a change in strategy and leadership.

I still think that the Confederacy never really came that close at Atlanta.
 
Yeah, I just don't see it. Sherman's Army was just too big and while Sherman wasn't a perfect tactician he wasn't a dundering blunderer either. To win the Confederates needed to not just beat but *destroy* and army twice its size, and much better equipped. That requires more than just a few tactical errors, that needs a 'Let's retreat the army over this frozen lake' kinds of mistakes.
 
I think you're missing the thrust of his argument: Johnston was going to get caught up eventually, and lose. And if it wasn't Johnston, it was going to be another general.


No southern general could have saved the deep south after Vicksburg. The Mississippi river was the war.
 
What about The Trent Affair (1861)? Could it have brought Britain into the war on the CSA's side, and turned the tide of history?
 
What about The Trent Affair (1861)? Could it have brought Britain into the war on the CSA's side, and turned the tide of history?

If the Union had someone in the presidency that was more like Jeff Davis and less like Lincoln then it might have blown up to that. As it was it was very unlikely to come to that.
 
What about The Trent Affair (1861)? Could it have brought Britain into the war on the CSA's side, and turned the tide of history?

Something like the Trent Affair could have easily blown up into a war between Britain and the US, especially if the British had been looking for one. The real danger was the affront to British pride and sovereignty, which angered not only the Crown but the British people. As it was, since Great Britain and France simply weren't looking to fight in North America, once the diplomats were released and Captain Wilkes actions condemned, the incident was basically closed.

As said by kookbreaker, had someone with a different personality been President, the outcome could have been disastrous for the Union, especially since the issue could have galvanized the British public. That's a nasty recipe that could have forced Britain into a conflict even if the Crown didn't necessarily want one.
 
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They were not equivalent in size. At the final battle of Atlanta the two forces that actually fought were roughly equivalent in size, but Sherman had almost 110,000 men under his command involved in the campaign plus additionally forces in middle Tennessee versus the Army of Tennessee at about 55,000. This puts them nearly 2 to 1 odds.

Let's say Johnston wins a battle and slows Sherman enough that Atlanta falls after the November 9 election, what happens?

First, Lincoln was very probably still going to win. Many war Democrats were actually siding with Lincoln and removing their opposition to him in order to ensure that a war President stayed, even if Republican.

Secondly, a Lincoln loss doesn't end the war automatically. Lincoln would still be President until March of 1865, meaning that Johnston would have to hold out until then in order for McClellan to have any chance of yielding, which McClellan didn't want to do anyways. He is a war Democrat as pointed out above.

Now assuming that Atlanta falls after Lincoln is defeated, it's fall would still signal that the war was going in the Union's favor. It would still turn public opinion. At the same time, by March Grant is pounding on Richmond's door. At that point, McClellan, who doesn't want to end the war anyways, would keep fighting. In fact, arguably, it would be politically impossible to end the war at that point.

Lee surrenders on April 9th, only one month after the March 4th inauguration. Maybe Sherman doesn't make his march to the sea quite as quickly, or perhaps not at all in the above scenario. Nonetheless, Lee can't hold out against Grant any longer than he does and Petersburg is still the endgame of the war.

There is no reasonable scenario whereby Johnston wins such a massive victory against Sherman as to hold Atlanta for months and months. Maybe, theoretically, he could have held until after November 9, but even that is unlikely.

In order to hold out all the way until peace is made, he would have to inflict massive casualties on Sherman and not take massive casualties in return, because even a 2 to 1 swap destroys him. Additionally, Sherman wasn't an idiot. He knew he needed a victory in Atlanta to help ensure a Lincoln victory, and he was going to get it one way or another.

I was going by Battle of Atlanta forces, which were roughly similar (if Wiki is right about it). I guess Sherman had a lot more guys to draw upon. It then becomes highly unlikely Sherman would have been defeated in such a way to stall him for months. A high-casualty battle seems like the worst outcome.
 
I was going by Battle of Atlanta forces, which were roughly similar (if Wiki is right about it). I guess Sherman had a lot more guys to draw upon. It then becomes highly unlikely Sherman would have been defeated in such a way to stall him for months. A high-casualty battle seems like the worst outcome.

I think that Sherman's use of forces in Atlanta is pretty typical of his practices.

First, they weren't certain that there was no hope of relief for the Confederates. There were still very active armies in Virginia, and the encirclement was not complete, so always a chance that divisions or an entire army might not be inside that containment area. Turns out there was no such threat on the way, but Sherman was not a rambunctious marauder as often made out (usually in the pro-confederacy revisionist histories). He was methodical and systematic... just a tad brutal for the local sensitivities. He was going to take Atlanta, but he wasn't going to get blindsided doing so. Sheridan had rolled up the cavalries of both Early and Stuart but they didn't know how much of Stuart's force had been absorbed and how much might be off in the back woods of the Carolinas under someone else.

Secondly, he may not have thought he would take Atlanta so easily. Had it been needed, he would've called on more of his forces but the Confederates were running on empty. They actually lost more men defending Atlanta than the Union lost attacking (wouldn't call it a siege per se). If the battle had gone like most assaults on major positions and he'd lost double or triple his men, he was more than prepared to settle into a Grant-like siege if he had to.

ETA for fans of Gone With the Wind. The Confederate forces burned Atlanta. Sorta on purpose.
 
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I think the only real chance the south had was to do what the Americans did in the Revolutionary war,The Irish in the Irish War of Indepedence,and the North Vietnamese/VC in Vietnam....make the price of victory so high that the other side would decide it was not worth it and give up. All you needed to do was keep military forces in the field long enough for the other side to just get digusted and give up. In the summer of 1864,it looked as if that strategy had a chance to work.....the stalemates before Richmond and Atlanta were giving the North a bad case of war weariness,and the Reelection of Lincoln seemed to be in real,real,doubt. But then Sherman Took Atlanta, and the outlook changed;the war was being won after all. The relection of Lincoln ended any chance of a Confederate victory of any kind.
 
What about The Trent Affair (1861)? Could it have brought Britain into the war on the CSA's side, and turned the tide of history?

Probably not, despite it's AltHist popularity. Neither side was eager to start such a war (Britain was facing a financial panic and was worried about French intentions), diplomacy was glacially slow due to the lack of Transatlantic telegraphy and Seward and Prince Albert both worked to calm matters.

The Chesapeake Affair, with it's blatant violation of British sovereignty, was actually (IMO) more likely to spark a conflict.
 
Probably not, despite it's AltHist popularity. Neither side was eager to start such a war (Britain was facing a financial panic and was worried about French intentions), diplomacy was glacially slow due to the lack of Transatlantic telegraphy and Seward and Prince Albert both worked to calm matters.

The Chesapeake Affair, with it's blatant violation of British sovereignty, was actually (IMO) more likely to spark a conflict.

WHat was that? The only Chesapeake I know of was before the war of 1812 and was the exact opposite of a violation of British sovereignty.
 
If the South had had a different president, it might have won. Jefferson Davis made one mind-bogglingly dumb decision after another. If he had accepted the European offer for a much larger loan just after the Confederacy was formed, Europe would have had too much of a financial stake in the Confederacy not to recognize it and not to help it more. But Jefferson Davis declined the huge loan that was offered and opted for a much smaller one.

And, yes, Davis's decision to relieve Johnston was bad enough, but to replace him with John Bell Hood, when Lee clearly warned him that Hood was not suited to command so large a force, was a blunder of staggering proportions.

Or, going back a few years, if Davis had not cut off food to the federal garrison on Fort Sumter, Lincoln would not have been forced to make a decision on the fort so soon. Davis compounded his error by rashly deciding to bombard Fort Sumter after he was notified that Lincoln was going to resupply the garrison's food supply, which gave the Radical Republicans all the excuse they needed to scream for blood.
 
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If the South had had a different president, it might have won. Jefferson Davis made one mind-bogglingly dumb decision after another. If he had accepted the European offer for a much larger loan just after the Confederacy was formed, Europe would have had too much of a financial stake in the Confederacy not to recognize it and not to help it more. But Jefferson Davis declined the huge loan that was offered and opted for a much smaller one.

And, yes, Davis's decision to relieve Johnston was bad enough, but to replace him with John Bell Hood, when Lee clearly warned him that Hood was not suited to command so large a force, was a blunder of staggering proportions.

Or, going back a few years, if Davis had not cut off food to the federal garrison on Fort Sumter, Lincoln would not have been forced to make a decision on the fort so soon. Davis compounded his error by rashly deciding to bombard Fort Sumter after he was notified that Lincoln was going to resupply the garrison's food supply, which gave the Radical Republicans all the excuse they needed to scream for blood.

Most of this qualifies as "Could the South Have Prevented the War". All this stuff was the prelude to the War. Once there was a war, the Confederacy was going to lose. You could just as well say that forward-thinking southerners could've realized that they might get two or three more decades out of a slave-based economy and that instead of fighting for equal number of new slave states and free states they just start gearing up for the future and let slavery die of natural causes.
 
It was theirs for the taking, quite easily. In a way, they'd already won; they just needed to not do something horribly stupid to throw it all away. They had the ball at about the 20 and an 8-point lead with just a few minutes left, so all they needed to do was kneel a couple of times to run the clock down and then kick an easy field goal to make it an 11-point lead with only enough time left for a single attempted last-minute drive by the Patriots. Instead they tried passing plays as if they really needed a touchdown or even another first down, which was the only way they could possibly get pushed backward from field goal range.

That's two Superbowl wins in a row the Patriots didn't earn but were just given by opponents playing stupidly. But the last time, it was more West than South (still a bird of prey though).
 
If the South had had a different president, it might have won. Jefferson Davis made one mind-bogglingly dumb decision after another.


This is at best highly debatable. As Bruce Catton put it,

Davis had done the best he could do in an impossible job, and if it is easy to show where he made grievous mistakes, it is difficult to show that any other man, given the materials available, could have done much better. He had courage, integrity, tenacity, [and] devotion to his cause . . .​

If he had accepted the European offer for a much larger loan just after the Confederacy was formed, Europe would have had too much of a financial stake in the Confederacy not to recognize it and not to help it more. But Jefferson Davis declined the huge loan that was offered and opted for a much smaller one.


No. The European Union didn't exist in 1861, and no European power offered to loan money to the Confederacy at any time during the war. Rather,

The Confederacy floated two small loans in Europe during the American Civil War: cotton bonds in London and unbacked, high-risk “junk bonds” in Amsterdam. These two loans accounted for less than one percent of Confederate military expenditures during the war. Funds from the two loans were used to build ships in Europe, purchase supplies, and finance overseas operations (Gentry, 1970). Weidenmier (2002b) also argues that the South floated the cotton bonds for political gain. The Confederacy believed the war debt could open the way for sovereign recognition or aid from England or France. [source]​

Further, these two bond issues didn't occur until 1863. The one grain of truth in your statement is that the cotton bonds (aka Erlanger bonds) were wildly oversubscribed, due to the fact that cotton prices in Europe had skyrocketed due to the Federal blockade.

And, yes, Davis's decision to relieve Johnston was bad enough, but to replace him with John Bell Hood, when Lee clearly warned him that Hood was not suited to command so large a force, was a blunder of staggering proportions.


Lee did not "clearly warn" Davis that Hood was unsuited to command.

Bragg reported that Johnston deserved to be fired and Hood emerged as the best candidate to replace him. Davis mulled his options and asked Robert E. Lee for advice. Lee provided a less than enthusiastic endorsement of Hood, as he wrote: “Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battle field, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him.” [bolding mine][source]​

Additionally, while it is easy to criticize Davis's decision in hindsight, the situation he faced at the time was both desperate and complicated. See Miller, John Bell Hood and the Fight for Civil War Memory, pp. 118-121.

Or, going back a few years, if Davis had not cut off food to the federal garrison on Fort Sumter, Lincoln would not have been forced to make a decision on the fort so soon.


The food had been "cut off" more than a month before Davis was inaugurated, when South Carolina state forces opened fire on an unarmed civilian ship, the Star of the West, charted to resupply the fort. Additionally, Lincoln had previously announced his decision in his inaugural address, namely, that he intended to "hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government."

Davis compounded his error by rashly deciding to bombard Fort Sumter after he was notified that Lincoln was going to resupply the garrison's food supply, which gave the Radical Republicans all the excuse they needed to scream for blood.


Davis's decision, though likely a mistake, was supported by most of his cabinet. Further, many in Congress were already calling the Star of the West incident an act of war. And if you believe that Lincoln chose to attempt to put down the rebellion by force only or primarily because of pressure from Radical Republicans, then, frankly, you don't know very much about Lincoln.
 

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