Chamberlain vs. Churchill

[angrysoba]

Actually the chances of Japan attacking had been sharply diminished by Russia and Japan signing a Non-Aggression pact on April 13 1941 and also the Soviet's were aware of Japanese plans to attack the European colonial Empires in Asia along with the Japanese possibly moving against the USA.

They learnt this from Richard Sorge, IIRC, but are we not talking about a possible Soviet attack on Germany prior to this? From what I understand, Zhukov was still posted in Siberia in case Japan attacked and yet they still needed his troops to repel Germany.

 

[Craig B]

They learnt this from Richard Sorge, IIRC, but are we not talking about a possible Soviet attack on Germany prior to this? From what I understand, Zhukov was still posted in Siberia in case Japan attacked and yet they still needed his troops to repel Germany.

I think you're right. The troops were sent into action against the Germans in front of Moscow in the first week of December, having been rushed west in the previous few days. Up to that time S seems to have believed in the possibility of an attack, perhaps hurriedly decided upon by the Japanese to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the USSR. It will be recalled that the Japanese were still wary of Soviet fighting power following the defeat they had suffered at Soviet hands in September 1939 at Kalkhin Gol.

 

[MG1962]

I think you're right. The troops were sent into action against the Germans in front of Moscow in the first week of December, having been rushed west in the previous few days. Up to that time S seems to have believed in the possibility of an attack, perhaps hurriedly decided upon by the Japanese to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the USSR. It will be recalled that the Japanese were still wary of Soviet fighting power following the defeat they had suffered at Soviet hands in September 1939 at Kalkhin Gol.

I think that is exactly what was going through Stalin's mind. He would be aware of the Tripartite Pact that Japan had signed, so he would never be 100% sure which way Japan would jump in honoring its treaty obligations

 

[Ranillon]

I think that is exactly what was going through Stalin's mind. He would be aware of the Tripartite Pact that Japan had signed, so he would never be 100% sure which way Japan would jump in honoring its treaty obligations

The Pact did not require another member to go to war if the first member was the one who attacked and started the war. Therefore, Japan was under no obligation to go to Hitler's aid when he invaded the USSR. Likewise, Hitler had no obligation to declare war on the US when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.

What isn't commonly known is that the Japanese got and received assurances that if they did go to war with the US Hitler would do the same. Mind you, Der Fuhrer didn't know precisely when and how (or, technically, whether they would) the Japanese would attack so the bombing of Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him. However, the Germans were chomping at the bit to go to war with the US due to its interference in the Battle of the Atlantic where the US was already a belligerent in all but name. The German Navy had thus been advocating for war with the US for some time. The Japanese attack just proved a good excuse to do so. It also gave Hitler the false impression that gaining such a powerful naval fleet on his side - the lack of a proper navy being the one "big" weakness he saw in Germany's armed forces - "guaranteed" the Axis couldn't lose.

Of course, declaring war against the US was in fact the final nail in the coffin which only guaranteed that the Axis would lose. However, at the time it was the German assurance of assistance that was the final factor in convincing the Japanese Empire to go to war. Previously, they had planned on doing so only after the US had left the Philippines in 1946, but in the face of the apparent sure victory of Nazi Germany in Russia the Japanese government wanted to strike when the situation seemed ideal (and before the US oil embargo forced Japan into a humiliating back down).

Ironically, if it had just waited another two weeks after the Russian counterattack in front of Moscow that practically broke the back of the German forces (yes, for a while there it was that serious) they might have pulled back from the brink. Probably not, however, since launching a war against the vast economic superiority of the US was in any scenario tantamount to an act of national suicide (basically, if you want to know the moment Japan lost WW2 it was when the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbor).

 

[Ranillon]

I think you're right. The troops were sent into action against the Germans in front of Moscow in the first week of December, having been rushed west in the previous few days. Up to that time S seems to have believed in the possibility of an attack, perhaps hurriedly decided upon by the Japanese to take advantage of the perceived weakness of the USSR. It will be recalled that the Japanese were still wary of Soviet fighting power following the defeat they had suffered at Soviet hands in September 1939 at Kalkhin Gol.

The Japanese army in fact did want to strike at the USSR, in part to recover from the loss of face it had suffered in those disastrous border skirmishes in the years before (and to partake in the apparent Nazi victory over the Russians). However - and ironically - when war became the policy of the Japanese government it was the anti-war Navy that convinced the Japanese leaders to go south to where the oil and resources it needed were to be found. That in turn necessitated a strike against the US as otherwise the still US controlled Philippines would be left ideally located to interdict Japanese traffic between the home islands and its conquests in the south Pacific. And, if you are going to take on the US - which the Navy knew would be able to massively out build Japan in any long war - then the thinking was that its fleet had to be taken out in hopes that such a shattering defeat would shame the US into a negotiated peace.

Of course, the attack on Pearl Harbor had precisely the opposite effect by guaranteeing that the Pacific War would be one fought to the finish - and as long as the US was willing to pay the price for victory there was zero chance of it losing. That is why Japan lost the war on day one - its "day of infamy" attack started an attritional war with an adversary that boasted an economy ultimately TEN TIMES its own.

 

[Fast Eddie B]

William Shirer's* "Berlin Diary" gives a glimpse into the situation as seen by a foreign correspondent - in real time, as it were.

Recommended.


*The author of "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", also a worthwhile read.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

Indeed Liddell Hart

Liddell-Hart was a self-aggrandising humbug. His contribution to Guderian's theories was negligible but inveigled his way into the English language edition of Guderian's book in return for the patronage of publication.

Indeed, reading the book, one is struck by the utter incongruity of a lone and single paragraph referencing BLH apropos of nothing.

in fact the French Souma S35 was the best tank in the field at the time

That's a bold assertion.

As with many tanks that look amazing on paper, the S35 had some fairly major drawbacks.

Apart from the fact that many were not equipped with radio, it was also massively expensive and time consuming to produce, mechanically unreliable, an absolute pig to maintain when it did go wrong, and the commander had to operate a single person turret with the added handicap of a hatchless cupola.

 

[MG1962]

What isn't commonly known is that the Japanese got and received assurances that if they did go to war with the US Hitler would do the same. Mind you, Der Fuhrer didn't know precisely when and how (or, technically, whether they would) the Japanese would attack so the bombing of Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him.

That door swung both ways. The Japanese were seriously miffed they had to learn about Barbarossa in the newspapers