Chamberlain vs. Churchill

[jimbob]

Indeed Liddell Hart

As for your comments on artillery v tactical air power. Germany had very good artillery but until the advent of their tracked 'Self propelling guns' like the Hummel it couldn't jeep pace with the armour.

France was tied to a system of WW1 style Siege artillery, big and cumbersome to move but it was seen as the 'heart' of their forces and their advance was tide to it. Between the wars GB realised that artillery needed to be more mobile and this led to the development of the 25 pdr and it's 'quad' 4 wheel drive tracotrs, the best of which were the Chevrolet versions built in Canada. Alongside these like the Germans self propelling guns were produced in large numbers after experience in the desert showed that towed guns no matter how good the tractors would always hold up an advance. This led to the 25pdr Bishop, 105mm Priest (produced in the USA and used in the Western Desert by the Commonwealth forces and ultimately the 25pdr armed Sexton designed in Canada on the 'Ram' tank chassis which was in service well in to the 1960s. Losing a lot of the artillery at Dunkirk was, as it turns out a good thing because the new 4.5 5.5 and 7.2 inch guns that replaced all the stuff that was lost were very good weaponsand the 5.5 remained in service into the 70s.

Dad has 1940 wartime austerity edition of "The British Way in Warfare"

Interesting read

 

[catsmate]

Considering Chamberlain died from cancer in November 1940, was he perhaps in poor health in 1938/39? Could that have affected his decision?

There has been some suggestions of this, this he wasn't as mentally agile as he had been.

One of the great ironies of military history - armoured warfare as practised by the Germans in WWII was the brainchild of a Englishman.

Right back to Fuller and Plan 1919.

He did all that indeed; but the historians of the period state that Stalin assumed he would be at war with Hitler sooner or later, and that his activities during the pact were designed to postpone this event.

That being so, one of the responsibilities Stalin assumed was to predict and prepare for an onslaught which in the long run he expected. His failure in this is one of the omissions he is held to blame for, and I think deservedly so, even though he committed the other crimes you enumerate, for which he is also rightly denounced.

He vetoed Zhukov's suggestion for a pre-emptive Soviet attack in the Spring of 1941; "Report on the Plan of Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissar’s on May 15, 1941" suggested an immediate offensive using 152 divisions to destroy the estimated 100 German divisions assembling in Poland.
Stalin ignored Zhukov’s proposal, believing such an attack would have been too risky.

It has been some years since I read about Operation_Sea_Lion^WP. (The book I read would have been published in 1960 or so and is not the one that is on the first few pages of Google.)

But it is worth reading up on Sea Lion in the consideration of the topic of this thread. If an invasion had actually been attempted at the time, even with German complete control of the skies over the southern UK, the general expert consensus seems to be that the Germany would not have been able to land enough troops and supplies to do anything but make complete fools of themselves. And would have lost a lot of river barges and horses in the process.

Later, with a large production of V-2s, longer range aircraft, and a sufficient number of specialized landing craft, I suppose it might have been different.

Well except for the V2's, they were pretty pointless.
The only alternate scenarios I can see where Sealion works involve divergence years before 1940/1. Either Hitler understands the importance of naval and maritime power, or someone in the German high command develops a semi-workable plan, gets a force ashore and British morale collapses.
Neither is particularly likely, though Dudley's 'The Little Admiral' is rather good.

 

[catsmate]

Barges that were assembled in channel ports for use in Sea-Lion were regularly bombed by the RAF.
There was a large 'tabletop' Wargame fought at Sandhurst in the early 70s involving a lot of the surviving commanders from both German and British sides.
It allowed the Germans local air superiority over the Channel on the first day and the RN didn't arrive until day 2.
German plans were to land troops from barges some powered but most 'dumb' towed across. They had no provison for any armour or artillery. Transport was only motorbikes and some light cars.
They were planning on capturing an intact major port and then bringing in cargo ships which would land the main force.
In the game some headway was made, the invaders being slowed enoguh by local defences to allow the Guards Armoured Division to get in to action, by the end of the third day or thereabouts the invaders were back on the beach and surrendering. Even allowing them to get to a port didn't help as the facilities were destroyed and the approaches mined and closed with sunken 'block ships'.

When the RN arrived the main transports were massacred, all they had to defend them were some U Boats and aircraft but they were fully engaged by the RAF by the second day.

This is a good summary of what could have happened. The Germans get a force ashore but are rapidly cut-off from resupply. Plus Churchill would have authorised the use of chemical weapons on the invaders.

With an unsuccessful Dynamo, a huge blow against morale and the loss of the cadre used to rebuild the British Army you might get Britain suing for peace (as Halifax and Chamberlain favoured).

 

[Craig B]

He vetoed Zhukov's suggestion for a pre-emptive Soviet attack in the Spring of 1941; "Report on the Plan of Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissar’s on May 15, 1941" suggested an immediate offensive using 152 divisions to destroy the estimated 100 German divisions assembling in Poland.
Stalin ignored Zhukov’s proposal, believing such an attack would have been too risky.

Perhaps he was right, and moreover it might have been politically inopportune from Stalin's POV. But the main criticism is that he neglected defensive measures and refused to permit units even to prepare for the eventuality of an attack. He appeased the Nazis even to the extent of not firing on German aircraft on reconnaissance missions. His neglect, or incompetence, or misapprehension - whatever it may have been - is stupefying in its totality and its dire effect.

 

[catsmate]

Perhaps he was right, and moreover it might have been politically inopportune from Stalin's POV. But the main criticism is that he neglected defensive measures and refused to permit units even to prepare for the eventuality of an attack. He appeased the Nazis even to the extent of not firing on German aircraft on reconnaissance missions. His neglect, or incompetence, or misapprehension - whatever it may have been - is stupefying in its totality and its dire effect.

I'm rather dubious that Zhukov'S Whirlwind would have worked. But yes Stalin was grossly negligent and overconfident regards the prospect of a German attack.

 

[Andy_Ross]

If Russia had attacked I think the war would have had a very different outcome.

 

[MG1962]

Perhaps he was right, and moreover it might have been politically inopportune from Stalin's POV. But the main criticism is that he neglected defensive measures and refused to permit units even to prepare for the eventuality of an attack. He appeased the Nazis even to the extent of not firing on German aircraft on reconnaissance missions. His neglect, or incompetence, or misapprehension - whatever it may have been - is stupefying in its totality and its dire effect.

Based on results in Finland what makes you think he should have acted any other way?

 

[dudalb]

I'm rather dubious that Zhukov'S Whirlwind would have worked. But yes Stalin was grossly negligent and overconfident regards the prospect of a German attack.

This. I have very low opinion of Uncle Joe but he was right in that Whirlwind in 1941 would have been way too risky.
Not that Uncle Joe did not do his best to wreck the Russian Army in June 1941 with a series of idiotic decisions of his own....

 

[jimbob]

This. I have very low opinion of Uncle Joe but he was right in that Whirlwind in 1941 would have been way too risky.
Not that Uncle Joe did not do his best to wreck the Russian Army in June 1941 with a series of idiotic decisions of his own....

Would the Soviet Army been in any worse position than they were immediately after Barbarossa started?

 

[catsmate]

Would the Soviet Army been in any worse position than they were immediately after Barbarossa started?

I think t
he Germans would react far faster and more capably to Whirlwind than the Soviets did to Barbarossa and the Russians would have been bled badly. I think Zhukov's plan was ambitious and marginal for the Soviet army of 1941.

 

[Craig B]

Based on results in Finland what makes you think he should have acted any other way?

Yes, these revisionist theories that Joe Stalin was about to unleash the Bolshevik hordes on Europe, and poor Adolf forestalled him in the nick of time, have always seemed implausible to me, given the poor showing against Finland. (But, let us admit, a better performance record against Japan.)

 

[Segnosaur]

If Russia had attacked I think the war would have had a very different outcome.

I wonder if Russia had attacked whether they would have ended up as allies of the U.S./Britain.

They did receive a "free pass" over their initial alliance with Germany. But if Russia initiated the conflict with germany, would it have scared the western powers enough to just let the 2 countries fight it out on their own.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Germany would have destroyed the Russian forces that attacked them, they would be fighting with all the advantages they gave up when they advanced in to Russia.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

Germany would have destroyed the Russian forces that attacked them, they would be fighting with all the advantages they gave up when they advanced in to Russia.

Then, Russia would have built more stuff and sent more forces.

 

[Segnosaur]

Germany would have destroyed the Russian forces that attacked them, they would be fighting with all the advantages they gave up when they advanced in to Russia.

Quite possible. (Although its possible that the massive amount of resources that Russia had would have eventually worn down the germans.)

The question is, how would the U.S./U.K. have responded? Would they engage in lend-lease with the Russians, under the theory that they were fighting the germans, and they were being "attacked" by them? Or would they just let the 2 of them fight it out, thinking either "its all your fault", or "holy crap, Russia is extremely aggressive. Maybe we shouldn't help just in case they decide to take all of europe".

 

[jimbob]

Germany would have destroyed the Russian forces that attacked them, they would be fighting with all the advantages they gave up when they advanced in to Russia.

But would the Russian units have been any worse off? Would it have given the rest of Russia more time?

Quite possible. (Although its possible that the massive amount of resources that Russia had would have eventually worn down the germans.)

The question is, how would the U.S./U.K. have responded? Would they engage in lend-lease with the Russians, under the theory that they were fighting the germans, and they were being "attacked" by them? Or would they just let the 2 of them fight it out, thinking either "its all your fault", or "holy crap, Russia is extremely aggressive. Maybe we shouldn't help just in case they decide to take all of europe".

That wasn't something I had thought about, and I think that as the UK was warning Russia about German intentions, they would still have supported Russia, but it is interesting.

 

[Pacal]

Actually it is true that Chamberlain was unfairly made the scapegoat for a policy that very large numbers of people in British society in general and among the political class, media etc., supported for a long time.

however revisionism can only go so far. Chamberlain took Hitler at his word that Germanys aims were limited to gaining control of German areas of Europe, such has Austria and the Sudetenland. Chamberlain pursued rearmament reluctantly.

The argument that the one year delay enabled the British to better prepare for war ignores that the documents show that Chamberlain was aiming at peace not at gaining to time to better prepare for a possible war. Further the one year delay enabled the Germans to seize all of Czechoslovakia, with its excellent munitions / armament industries and the extensive armaments of the Czech army. Also the Munich agreement opened up large areas of Eastern Europe to German political and economic influence while reducing French and British influence. Further in Germany itself that one year delay enabled Germany to massively build up further their forces.

In late 1938 Germany was poorly prepared for war, much worst than in Sept. 1939. The fortifications in the west were incomplete. Further some German generals were absolutely terrified about the prospect of war and were plotting a coup against Hitler. They apparently contacted the British who ignored them and instead Chamberlain made his deal with Hitler. Hitler wanted a war with Czechoslovakia and only agreed to Chamberlain's mediation because of the pressure of his Generals who felt war at that time was unwinnable and extremely risky.

After Munich Chamberlain was unduly optimistic about the prospects for peace but was forced to go along with the rising sentiment of deep distrust of Hitler emerging in Britain. In fact Chamberlain continued to explore "appeasement" options like giving Germany some of the Portuguese overseas empire! Probably the sea change in British attitudes was the occupation of rump Czechoslovakia in March of 1939 which made I clear Hitler was no mere reviser of the Treaty of Versailles but aiming at European Hegemony and possibly World and had to be stopped.

Hence the guarantees to Poland and other countries. Chamberlain's attitude when Poland was actually invaded was to hem and haw and seek a way of NOT declaring war on Germany. Chamberlain's Cabinet basically revolted and forced him to declare war.

The bottom line is that it is probable the Germany and Hitler benefited much more from the one year delay in terms of increasing military power than either Britain or France and that war in the fall of 1938 was probably a better bet for them than in the fall of 1939.

In fact I don't see in all this a argument about the wickedness of "appeasement" but instead the standard lesson of the un-wisdom of refusing to face reality.

 

[Pacal]

He vetoed Zhukov's suggestion for a pre-emptive Soviet attack in the Spring of 1941; "Report on the Plan of Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissar’s on May 15, 1941" suggested an immediate offensive using 152 divisions to destroy the estimated 100 German divisions assembling in Poland.
Stalin ignored Zhukov’s proposal, believing such an attack would have been too risky.

Also Russian forces in May of 1941were in no position to launch any sort of attack and were in fact in the middle of general revamping due to belated efforts to deal with the effects of purges and deal with all the systemic issues revealed by the war with Finland. At a minimum even if Stalin had accepted the plan it would have taken months to plan and assemble / organize the forces for such an attack. There is simply no way that the Russian army given the condition it was in May 1941 could possibly have attacked before the opening date of Barbarossa. Further given the condition of the Russian armies such an attack would probably have been a military disaster.

 

[angrysoba]

Also Russian forces in May of 1941were in no position to launch any sort of attack and were in fact in the middle of general revamping due to belated efforts to deal with the effects of purges and deal with all the systemic issues revealed by the war with Finland. At a minimum even if Stalin had accepted the plan it would have taken months to plan and assemble / organize the forces for such an attack. There is simply no way that the Russian army given the condition it was in May 1941 could possibly have attacked before the opening date of Barbarossa. Further given the condition of the Russian armies such an attack would probably have been a military disaster.

And at this stage, I think they were still worried about being attacked in the East by the Japanese army.

 

[Pacal]

And at this stage, I think they were still worried about being attacked in the East by the Japanese army.

Actually the chances of Japan attacking had been sharply diminished by Russia and Japan signing a Non-Aggression pact on April 13 1941 and also the Soviet's were aware of Japanese plans to attack the European colonial Empires in Asia along with the Japanese possibly moving against the USA.