Chamberlain vs. Churchill

[angrysoba]

The time they gained was spent no more profitably than was Stalin's in the same and later months during the Nazi-Soviet pact. Stalin is excoriated for that, rightly. Should Chamberlain escape censure?

I thought Stalin was excoriated not so much for failing to be adequately prepared for the war, but for having a lot of his top officers purged, shot or sent to the Gulag; for not only trusting Hitler and going into a non-aggression pact with him, but also for carving up Poland with him as well and for essentially being the biggest enabler of Hitler; and for ignoring very solid intelligence which warned of an imminent invasion including the precise date of the invasion.

 

[Craig B]

I thought Stalin was excoriated not so much for failing to be adequately prepared for the war, but for having a lot of his top officers purged, shot or sent to the Gulag; for not only trusting Hitler and going into a non-aggression pact with him, but also for carving up Poland with him as well and for essentially being the biggest enabler of Hitler; and for ignoring very solid intelligence which warned of an imminent invasion including the precise date of the invasion.

He did all that indeed; but the historians of the period state that Stalin assumed he would be at war with Hitler sooner or later, and that his activities during the pact were designed to postpone this event.

That being so, one of the responsibilities Stalin assumed was to predict and prepare for an onslaught which in the long run he expected. His failure in this is one of the omissions he is held to blame for, and I think deservedly so, even though he committed the other crimes you enumerate, for which he is also rightly denounced.

 

[TubbaBlubba]

I think Hitler's only real shot at truly defeating Russia would've been completely destabilizing the region. I suspect Stalin understood this well enough to know that his first priority should be maintaining an iron grip on Soviet politics, even though his paranoia got the better of him.

 

[Rincewind]

Time was spent by the British just equipping forces. What caught them by surprise was the German advance through the Ardennes and the tactics used. What appeared to be the main German attack to the north with the bulk of their forces was a huge diversion.
It drew the French and British forces north and allowed the main attack in behind the main force.
Conventional doctrine was based on artillery. You can only advance under your guns. These take time to move and replace before they can come in to action, they are also slow to move and take up a lot of space on the roads. French and German guns relied on horses to move, Britain had mechanized the artillery in the 30s and they were more mobile but the 6" guns were still known as the 'Divisional Roadblock'.
German doctrine was to use the air force in place of tactical artillery allowing them to send their mechanized forces through country that was thought to be impassable.
Their other innovation was to concentrate their tanks and support them with infantry fighting from tracked vehicles in 'combined arm's units allowing them to advance at. High speed.
Germany had no more tanks than the allies but they were used as a weapon in their own right rather than as support for the infantry.

Guderian wrote a book 'Achtung Panzer' before the war it detailed the tactics used and how best to use armour. He based it on the tactics evolved in the 20s and 30s by the British experimental 'Armoured Force' that exercised on Salisbury Plain for several years in various War games.
Unfortunately the British ignored their own lesson.

So in that respect what could be done by Chamberlein was done, It was down to the Generals to use the equipment that the delay brought them. It was as good as and, in some areas better than the German equipment.
Unfortunately the tactics relied on the enemy doing what you wanted them to do. Attack through Belgium like they always did allowing the French and British to anchor their line on the coast to the left and the Maginot Line to the right.
It didn't allow for modern air power and the concentration of combined arm's units. What we now call the Blitzkreig.

Interesting summary.

I seem to recall reading that the French had many of their best troops in the Maginot Line, and the rest of the army wasn't particularly good.

Also, the high command matched the rest of the army...

 

[Nihilianth]

You have to understand how horrible the First World War was. Who wouldn't want to avoid a repeat of that if at all possible?

So easy to judge with 20/20 hindsight.

This was my line! Puppycow is correct: It was within one generation since the horrors of WWI. It was a stupid, idiotic, arrogant war, uselessly fought between bickering empires that just could not talk to one another.

I notice that the OP seems to be making the point of those calling the anti-war crowd of today "Chamberlains," meaning, as he rightly points out, weak and unwise.

There is a reason why the informal fallacy of "Godwin" exists: What happened in the past, is not at all the situation we are in here in the present. Particularly the WWII era, as it had a totally unique characteristic about it that is not likely to be repeated. Sure, you will have regional Hitler-esque strong-men. But they will not have nearly the power nor the influence to accomplish what Hitler accomplished, except in small, local areas a la ISIS. But ISIS has no chance in hell to threaten, much less invade, nations outside their scope that are not already unstable.

Whereas, as the OP has pointed out, Chamberlain did, in fact, know Germany was more than capable of invading all their neighbors, and causing trouble on the world scale. That is why Chamerblain prepared the British forces by modernizing and expanding it. At the same time, he did not have the foresight to know there was no escaping the horrors of yet another Great War. So he thought by talking to Hitler, there would be a way out of yet another foolish and bloody struggle, while at the same time being pragmatic about the possibility for war.

 

[Andy_Ross]

One of the great ironies of military history - armoured warfare as practised by the Germans in WWII was the brainchild of a Englishman.

Indeed Liddell Hart

As for your comments on artillery v tactical air power. Germany had very good artillery but until the advent of their tracked 'Self propelling guns' like the Hummel it couldn't jeep pace with the armour.

France was tied to a system of WW1 style Siege artillery, big and cumbersome to move but it was seen as the 'heart' of their forces and their advance was tide to it. Between the wars GB realised that artillery needed to be more mobile and this led to the development of the 25 pdr and it's 'quad' 4 wheel drive tracotrs, the best of which were the Chevrolet versions built in Canada. Alongside these like the Germans self propelling guns were produced in large numbers after experience in the desert showed that towed guns no matter how good the tractors would always hold up an advance. This led to the 25pdr Bishop, 105mm Priest (produced in the USA and used in the Western Desert by the Commonwealth forces and ultimately the 25pdr armed Sexton designed in Canada on the 'Ram' tank chassis which was in service well in to the 1960s. Losing a lot of the artillery at Dunkirk was, as it turns out a good thing because the new 4.5 5.5 and 7.2 inch guns that replaced all the stuff that was lost were very good weaponsand the 5.5 remained in service into the 70s.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Interesting summary.

I seem to recall reading that the French had many of their best troops in the Maginot Line, and the rest of the army wasn't particularly good.

Also, the high command matched the rest of the army...

France never expected the Maginot Line to be attacked and the Germans never planned to attack it. It was only partially manned in peace time. If war was declared it would be filled up as units were mobilised.

Most of the French army were reservists and most never even got properly mobilized before France surrenedered, they were equipped largely with old WW1 vintage weapons and equipment.
Regular Units were well equipped and trained but again most never got in to action and those that did were on the Belgian border waiting to meet what they thought was the main German attack.

 

[Rincewind]

France never expected the Maginot Line to be attacked and the Germans never planned to attack it. It was only partially manned in peace time. If war was declared it would be filled up as units were mobilised.

Most of the French army were reservists and most never even got properly mobilized before France surrenedered, they were equipped largely with old WW1 vintage weapons and equipment.
Regular Units were well equipped and trained but again most never got in to action and those that did were on the Belgian border waiting to meet what they thought was the main German attack.

Thanks for the clarification.

It's been a while since I read about it.

 

[ddt]

But, once when I was writing an essay many years back in university trying to argue this very thing I found quite a lot of scholarship that seemed to, at the very least, cloud this simple picture. From what I remember, Chamberlain was not as much of a fool as depicted, that in fact he knew full well that Hitler was not to be trusted and ordered massive rearmament of the British armed forces which were never in any state to fight against Hitler to keep him out of the Sudetenland.

It also seems that much of Chamberlain's poor reputation was in fact the work of Churchill's caricature of him in his own memoirs which were accepted following the Second World War almost as though the whole war was Chamberlain's fault in the first place. But again, this cannot be the case if Britain and France were never in any serious position to halt Hitler's advance into the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia (not to mention the fact that Poland was one of the countries that took a bite out of the latter).

It also neglects the fact that Chamberlain himself did declare war on Germany after Hitler invaded the opportunistic dictatorship of Poland alongside another menacing dictatorship of the Soviet Union.

There is also the bit of irony that Chamberlain resigned after the debate on the debacle of the Norway operations, and was succeeded by the Great Naval Genius of Gallipoli.

What has always baffled me about the Munich conference, is its composition. Mussolini as a "honest broker", really? More importantly, the absence of Czechoslovakia itself, and the absence of the Soviet Union, which was CS's ally. The latter has undoubtedly contributed to Stalin's distrust of the Western Allies, and thus to his decision to conclude the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

I wonder how much of an assessment was made of the political and military situation before Munich, and the chances to stop Hitler in his tracks.

• Was the German military overestimated? During the Poland campaign, it had highly profited from Czech armor, and even then it could only put up a token defence on the paper Siegfired line. A determined French assault even then could have seriously invaded Germany.
• Would a more determined British stance against Hitler at this point have invigorated French morale?
• Was a British-French agreement with Stalin to come to aid CS at this point realistic? With the added problem that none of the countries could directly aid CS.
• What were the CS's chances? They had quite elaborate defences, a big army, but OTOH, they could not trust the Sudeten-German soldiers nor the Sudeten-German population right in the area where those defences were located.
• Beck's plans for a revolt from the Army Staff in case of war were distrusted
• What would Poland have done in case of war? Would it really have sided with Germany over a few sq.km. around Teschen? And possibly risked a Soviet assault?
• What would Hungary have done? IRL, it annexed a strip of Slovakia after Munich.

It's not easy to answer such questions without being influenced by hindsight.

 

[Andy_Ross]

At the deceleration of war neither France or Britain were in any condition to undertake any offensive operations. France hadn't mobilised and the BEF was still in the UK.
By the time they were ready so was Germany.
German strength was overestimated, for example they didn't have as many tanks as Britain and France and in fact the French Souma S35 was the best tank in the field at the time, it was better armoured, gunned and more agile than anything Germany had.
France outweighed the Germans in artillery and manpower.

 

[Gord_in_Toronto]

It has been some years since I read about Operation_Sea_Lion^WP. (The book I read would have been published in 1960 or so and is not the one that is on the first few pages of Google.)

But it is worth reading up on Sea Lion in the consideration of the topic of this thread. If an invasion had actually been attempted at the time, even with German complete control of the skies over the southern UK, the general expert consensus seems to be that the Germany would not have been able to land enough troops and supplies to do anything but make complete fools of themselves. And would have lost a lot of river barges and horses in the process.

Later, with a large production of V-2s, longer range aircraft, and a sufficient number of specialized landing craft, I suppose it might have been different.

 

[Border Reiver]

It has been some years since I read about Operation_Sea_Lion^WP. (The book I read would have been published in 1960 or so and is not the one that is on the first few pages of Google.)

But it is worth reading up on Sea Lion in the consideration of the topic of this thread. If an invasion had actually been attempted at the time, even with German complete control of the skies over the southern UK, the general expert consensus seems to be that the Germany would not have been able to land enough troops and supplies to do anything but make complete fools of themselves. And would have lost a lot of river barges and horses in the process.

Later, with a large production of V-2s, longer range aircraft, and a sufficient number of specialized landing craft, I suppose it might have been different.

Doubtful - by the time that Germany would have designed and built sufficient landing craft to get over in similar numbers to what the Allies sent over the other way the United Kingdom would still have been a non-floating aircraft carrier in danger of sinking beneath the weight of men and supplies on it.

 

[MG1962]

German strength was overestimated, for example they didn't have as many tanks as Britain and France and in fact the French Souma S35 was the best tank in the field at the time, it was better armoured, gunned and more agile than anything Germany had.
France outweighed the Germans in artillery and manpower.

Witnessed by the ferocious and successful armored counter attacks launched by De Gaulle in the last days before France surrendered. He was actually winning in his sector when the game was called.

 

[MG1962]

Doubtful - by the time that Germany would have designed and built sufficient landing craft to get over in similar numbers to what the Allies sent over the other way the United Kingdom would still have been a non-floating aircraft carrier in danger of sinking beneath the weight of men and supplies on it.

Not to mention the existence of the British Navy being able to time it's involvement for maximum disruption.

 

[Drewbot]

If Sea Lion ever got underway, the British Navy still could have come down and cleared all the German ships/barges/boats, in one sortie down through the channel.

That would have been a perfect mission for the modernizing British Navy.

Plus, it's not like Germany had anywhere to hide 1000 troops ships along the channel.

 

[MG1962]

That would have been a perfect mission for the modernizing British Navy.
Plus, it's not like Germany had anywhere to hide 1000 troops ships along the channel.

Using tactics first tried by Sir Francis Drake in 1587

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singeing_the_King_of_Spain's_Beard

 

[Drewbot]

Yes. The tactic would not have been new, but the King George V, battleships would have been.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Barges that were assembled in channel ports for use in Sea-Lion were regularly bombed by the RAF.
There was a large 'tabletop' Wargame fought at Sandhurst in the early 70s involving a lot of the surviving commanders from both German and British sides.
It allowed the Germans local air superiority over the Channel on the first day and the RN didn't arrive until day 2.
German plans were to land troops from barges some powered but most 'dumb' towed across. They had no provison for any armour or artillery. Transport was only motorbikes and some light cars.
They were planning on capturing an intact major port and then bringing in cargo ships which would land the main force.
In the game some headway was made, the invaders being slowed enoguh by local defences to allow the Guards Armoured Division to get in to action, by the end of the third day or thereabouts the invaders were back on the beach and surrendering. Even allowing them to get to a port didn't help as the facilities were destroyed and the approaches mined and closed with sunken 'block ships'.

When the RN arrived the main transports were massacred, all they had to defend them were some U Boats and aircraft but they were fully engaged by the RAF by the second day.

 

[theprestige]

Sure, I know Churchill was upfront about making sure history was kind to him by writing it but I would be interested in any historical sources which offers some revision - in the proper sense - of what I think is a lazy meme that should get as much respect from skeptics as Godwin arguments.

You should read what Churchill has to say about Chamberlain. In middle of writing himself kindly into the history books, Churchill does the same for his predecessor.

Then there's this eulogy, which Churchill gave on the occasion of Chamberlain's passing:

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/neville-chamberlain

For the record, I think Chamberlain screwed the pooch in epic fashion regarding Nazi Germany. I only wish that some of those who similarly oppose forceful confrontation of evil regimes today displayed the noble and heroic qualities that Winston Churchill saw so clearly in Neville Chamberlain.

ETA: I find this passage especially relevant, and moving:

It fell to Neville Chamberlain in one of the supreme crises of the world to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were these wishes in which he was frustrated? What was that faith that was abused? They were surely among the most noble and benevolent instincts of the human heart-the love of peace, the toil for peace, the strife for peace, the pursuit of peace, even at great peril, and certainly to the utter disdain of popularity or clamour. Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. [...] Herr Hitler protests with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain's tomb?​

 

[Gord_in_Toronto]

You should read what Churchill has to say about Chamberlain. In middle of writing himself kindly into the history books, Churchill does the same for his predecessor.

Then there's this eulogy, which Churchill gave on the occasion of Chamberlain's passing:

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/neville-chamberlain

For the record, I think Chamberlain screwed the pooch in epic fashion regarding Nazi Germany. I only wish that some of those who similarly oppose forceful confrontation of evil regimes today displayed the noble and heroic qualities that Winston Churchill saw so clearly in Neville Chamberlain.

ETA: I find this passage especially relevant, and moving:

It fell to Neville Chamberlain in one of the supreme crises of the world to be contradicted by events, to be disappointed in his hopes, and to be deceived and cheated by a wicked man. But what were these hopes in which he was disappointed? What were these wishes in which he was frustrated? What was that faith that was abused? They were surely among the most noble and benevolent instincts of the human heart-the love of peace, the toil for peace, the strife for peace, the pursuit of peace, even at great peril, and certainly to the utter disdain of popularity or clamour. Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. [...] Herr Hitler protests with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain's tomb?​

I tend to agree with Churchill.

Who better than to make the call on history?