Can theists be rational?

It says on this page that Ames targetted sun-like stars.

http://www.seti.org/Page.aspx?pid=581

You mean this:

Ames would examine 1,000 Sun-like stars in a Targeted Search, capable of detecting weak or sporadic signals.​

Or maybe this:

Project Phoenix concentrated efforts on that component of the NASA SETI project known as the Targeted Search. Its strategy was to carefully examine the regions around 1,000 nearby Sun-like stars.​

That's hardly equivalent to paleontologists using compelling evidence to dig up bones where they are likely to be found, but interesting nonetheless.

So SETI scientists are interested in whether compelling evidence can be found for their premises, but fine-tuning scientists are not?

SETI is searching for empirical evidence of aliens. Sure, advocates of the fine-tuning argument would probably love for empirical evidence to be found to support their premises, but they rarely if ever search for empirical evidence to support the premises of the fine-tuning argument.

That's the clue right there. I would agree with your conclusion. Who wouldn't, after all?

You would agree that what SETI is doing isn't a scientific endeavor? Or are you objecting that my description describes what SETI is doing? If the latter, you have yet to point out how what SETI is doing differs from the description.

You are making this about whether "looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation is or isn't a scientific endeavor". Since SETI has those characteristics and I agree that SETI is a scientific endeavor, then I must agree that it is scientific to do all those horrible things, at which point you expose me for saying something ridiculous. The problem is, however, that the question isn't whether it is or isn't scientific to do those things. The 'real' question, which you are begging to be asked by presenting the above argument, is whether SETI has those characteristics.

Sure, I am of the opinion that SETI is doing exactly as I described. They are indeed looking for signs of extra terrestrial intelligence for which there is no compelling evidence for the purposes of proving the unfalsifiable hypothesis that intelligent aliens exist, which doesn't explain any known observations. If you disagree please quit playing semantic games and specify why you disagree, please. I'm not trying to trick you into admitting anything -- I'm trying to get you to clearly state your argument.

Since you have not prevailed on any of those points, your parrot-like repetition of that particular sequence is silly. Quit pretending that anyone is supporting the idea that that set of characteristics is science.

I'm glad you've at least agreed that the set of characteristics isn't science. That was like pulling teeth. Now let's discuss why you feel that SETI doesn't fit the description.

So it's not unfalsifiable, it's simply more difficult to falsify than other ideas.

No, it's practically unfalsifiable if not theoretically so -- it can't be proven false. There is no way to look in every nook and cranny of the galaxy for aliens in order to prove that there are none. Just as it would be impossible to search everywhere around Jupiter for teapots in order to prove that there are none. In the case of aliens, it's possible that they're hiding from us, in which case even searching every nook and cranny wouldn't prove there are none. SETI can keep searching for aliens forever and never disprove the hypothesis that aliens exist.

Right, but many hypotheses don't explain any observations.

So you're going to address the conditions independently after you've already agreed that together the conditions are unscientific. Seems like a straw man to me. The scientific hypotheses that don't explain observations typically explain known observations and are falsifiable.

Not only does SETI not explain any known observations, but "aliens exist" is unfalsifiable and they are searching for something for which there is no compelling evidence.

The point of making an hypothesis is to direct what particular observations you are going to gather that only this hypothesis would explain.

That's not what's meant by "explain known observations." Most scientific hypotheses that are presented without evidence are conceived because they explain an existing set of observations, but are also falsifiable so that they can be proven false by further testing.

Is that really the only reason? No spirit of exploration imbues the field? No "let's see what it looks like if I put a drop of pond water under this new observing device"? No "let's see what it looks like when I point this telescope to the sky"? No "I wonder if there are any more of these weird bones where you found this one"?

Sure, there are a lot of people who are curious about things for which there is no compelling evidence -- The Abominable Snowman, Bigfoot, The Loch Ness Monster, faeries, invisible elephants, teapots orbiting Jupiter.

Your examples concerning telescopes and observing devices is a straw man -- the hypotheses they would be tested under wouldn't be unfalsifiable. The hypothesis would be "this telescope will make large distant objects easier to view" or "this microscope will make very small objects easier to view."

Sure, people have stumbled upon bones without specifically trying to find evidence for a hypothesis, and were maybe even curious enough to continue digging in the same place for more. Sometimes weather data is collected in hopes that it will be useful later in testing hypotheses. But rarely is data collecting for the purpose of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observations.

Right, but I don't know if my hypothesis explains those observations until after I actually test my hypothesis by gathering those observations.

That would be putting the cart ahead of the horse. Scientists don't generally make up hypotheses that don't explain any known observation and then later gather the observations that would be explained by the hypotheses. A scientist typically comes up with a falsifiable hypothesis that explains an existing set of observations, and then tests the hypothesis to determine whether it's true or false.

But you weren't talking about searching for undiscovered dinosaur bones. You were talking about compelling evidence. And you specifically excluded 'searching in likely locations for something that we already know exists in other locations' as an example of searching on the basis of compelling evidence.

What do you mean? A scientist usually has compelling evidence that bones are likely to be found where they are about to search for them. There is no compelling evidence that aliens are likely to exist anywhere. Searching "sun-like stars" is not equivalent to searching for dinosaur bones -- there is no compelling evidence that aliens will likely be found near other sun-like stars.

There you go again, begging the question.

Again with begging the question? That is NOT begging the question. I've already provided a definition of begging the question after you stated an incorrect definition.

In my opinion, SETI fits the description. If you disagree, please argue your point rather than accusing me of unrelated fallacies.

Then you must have some experience with writing up a research proposal. Do you not include a section titled "Background Research" that is intended to provide a base for your hypothesis - one that persuades others that your research proposal is likely to yield useful results, but also demonstrates an information gap it is necessary to fill for further progress in the field?

Of course. All of my hypotheses have been based on compelling prior research. Not "aliens exist" though -- there is no compelling prior research to support the existence of aliens. And I generally state how I intend to test the hypothesis, and how it might be proven false. Again, no falsifiability with "aliens exist." And I might even specify what known observations my hypothesis might explain if found to be correct. Again, "aliens exist" isn't particularly useful for explaining known observations.

I suspect it's much more than that. A bit pie-in-the-sky, I agree, but don't you think there's also the idea of some sort of exchange of information or contact? If we find something, wouldn't it be that much better to do so under conditions where that was remotely feasible?

I can't say for certain, but the page you cited didn't state that as a reason they were searching near those particular stars. If that's the reason, I would think that SETI might want to concentrate their resources on finding some evidence of aliens before attempting to talk to them.

The point here is that unlike paleontologists digging up bones, SETI isn't really looking at specific planets where evidence indicates that aliens are likely to be found (they really wouldn't know where they are likely to be found since they don't know the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged here).

You think it doesn't? Intelligence wasn't a product of evolution? Abiogenesis didn't require an energy source?

I asked what conditions or events occurred on this planet by which intelligent life emerged. Your list didn't answer the question. All of those things exist on nearly every planet, but we know that not all planets have intelligent life. So what conditions/events led to the emergence of intelligent life on this planet?

You didn't ask me for the latter. But are you serious? None of those things has anything to do with our presence here?

They are topics which have to do with our presence here, but they are not the conditions or events by which intelligent life emerged. For example, "energy source" is a pretty general topic, and you didn't specify the energy source(s) required for intelligent life to emerge, the amounts of energy, the events that would be required to produce that energy, the types of energy that would prohibit intelligent life, etc.

It simply inserts a supernatural explanation which provides no explanatory power.

No, it does provide explanatory power. In fact, the argument is that it provides the best explanation for the observation that the universe is fine-tuned. Certainly you can disagree with the premises of the argument as well as the conclusion, but you can't really say that the argument provides no explanatory power.

That's not even remotely close. Aliens would have explanatory power.

Of course they would. An argument for aliens based on buildings on Jupiter would be that aliens provide the best explanation of the buildings (not the only possible explanation, but arguably the best explanation). The fine-tuning argument argues that a god would be the best explanation of a fine-tuned universe (again, not the only possible explanation, but arguably the best explanation).

But gravity governs the movement of bodies with mass. Why not define the universe as everything that has mass so that everything else, like forces, would be not part of the universe and therefore supernatural?

What does that have to do with whether it's reasonable to assume that a being that can set the universal constants wouldn't be limited to the natural universe? One of the "rules" that applies to the natural universe is that the constants can't be changed. So if you're able to set the constants, it makes sense that you can't be subject to the rules that apply to the natural universe.

-Bri
 
The topic seems a bit ambivalent on this point. If it's referring to the belief, shouldn't it say "Can theism be rational?"

It might seem excessive to claim that anyone with any kind of theistic belief is inherently an irrational person, but that is indeed what some people seem to think.


Yes, probably. Or, "Is belief in theism rational?"

I'm still a little on the fence about it but generally feel that the word (rational) does not apply to belief in theism, as I suggested in an earlier post to you.
 
It's logically possible that I don't exist.

That's a logical contradiction: A necessary condition for making propositions is existence. If you don't exist, you cannot make claims about your non-existence. [/quote]



Regardless, this particular reply seems to betray your lack of reading ability, as all throughout you were saying something that had absolutely nothing to do with what I posted. It's nothing but a giant combination of tu quoque, straw man, and red herring all blended together in a mess--my best rebuttal is simply to ask you to reread the post you think you replied to.

You claim evidence is post hoc, and I have the lack of reading ability? Whatever. :rolleyes: Pointless to argue with you.
 
We can observe the interaction. We cannot observe the God. The part where you said God was supernatural.

Like I said, we can observe the interaction. We don't observe gravity directly either, as Herzblut has been explaining -- we observe the effects of gravity.

That said, I'm not certain that we couldn't observe a supernatural god directly, although we might not be able to observe every aspect of the god. Presumably a supernatural god that can interact with the natural world could appear before you, could touch you, could talk to you -- all of which you could observe directly.

-Bri
 
The reason is that guesses in the absence of clues are rarely, if ever, right.

Let's be clear, this is what you said. Then you asked me to make a guess about what's in a dark building. I guessed it's not Jupiter, which I am almost certainly right about.

Care to refine your claim?
 
That's a logical contradiction: A necessary condition for making propositions is existence.
If you don't exist, you cannot make claims about your non-existence.
That's a metaphysical claim.
You claim evidence is post hoc,
The term evidence is always used in conjunction with a claim that it supports. What's your favorite reference? A dictionary? evidencedict. Encyclopedia? evidenceWP

and I have the lack of reading ability?
Tu quoque logical fallacy?
Whatever. :rolleyes: Pointless to argue with you.
That's one way out.
 
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First, this thread does not concern the issue of whether or not prople are rational or irrational in other arenas of their lives, but only theistic belief. Second, more to the point with Wilson and Gardner, neither are/were theists properly speaking. This thread does not concern any belief in any god but specifically belief in a personal creator God. That is generally how theism is defined. So, another way of framing it would be to say, is it rational to believe in a personal creator God?

It was foolish of me to use Gardner as an example in the OP, then. :)

Rational/irrational does not apply properly to diesm/fideism or belief in Spinoza's God -- those beliefs are largely decisions in the face of no evidence and a central mystery. They are responses or orientations to the world and are not similar to belief in a personal creator God.

I think that this discussion can be about both. I understand the difference between the two, but I suspect the reason for choosing either of them is similar. From a strictly naturalist perspective, Spinoza's God is also irrational simply because it's an unnecessary layer of explanation. So in both cases, 'something' is taken into consideration, in addition to rationality, by the individual.

Linda
 
Ah! Yet the supernatural can still impact upon natural events - its just that science can not allow that causality. Imagine Zeus causes a ligthning bolt to blast some sinner now. The causality is supernatural, the lightning bolt manifests (and is natural as any lightning bolt - its origin is supernatural, it by definition is natural ) and the sinner gets fried. Yet to speculate on the cause of the lightning bolt being Zeus is precluded by the ground rules of science - by the methodological naturalism.

I asked this question earlier, but it either got missed, or I missed the reply :).

This definition of natural would seem to imply that if the stars were rearranged in the sky to spell out, "Hello, I'm Zeus, I did this", then this would count as natural and science would not be able to speculate that Zeus was responsible.
 
Like I said, we can observe the interaction. We don't observe gravity directly either, as Herzblut has been explaining -- we observe the effects of gravity.

That said, I'm not certain that we couldn't observe a supernatural god directly, although we might not be able to observe every aspect of the god. Presumably a supernatural god that can interact with the natural world could appear before you, could touch you, could talk to you -- all of which you could observe directly.

-Bri

I suppose it depends on just what human beings are. If human beings are designed to be able to directly experience god, in addition to their placement in the material world, then they'll be able to do so. In that sense, human beings would be a little bit supernatural as well. But it's fairly obvious that any such ability is not an ever-present, because human beings don't experience god all the time.
 
I asked this question earlier, but it either got missed, or I missed the reply :).

This definition of natural would seem to imply that if the stars were rearranged in the sky to spell out, "Hello, I'm Zeus, I did this", then this would count as natural and science would not be able to speculate that Zeus was responsible.

The implication I got from the probabilistic argument was that since this arrangement was no more unlikely than any other arrangement, it wouldn't signify anything at all, and could safely be ignored. And if I think any different, it was because I didn't understand mathematics.
 
And you're satisfied with that as a proof? You regard that as the last word on the matter?

No. You haven't been paying attention, have you ? It's proof beyond reasonable doubt. 100% certainty is of no interest to me.

Personally I think that as an argument, that has numerous obvious holes in it. (left as an exercise to the class).

Oh, no. By all means, explain those "obvious" holes. Let's see what you've got.

Does supporting such an argument indicate that someone is not rational?

We shall soon see.
 
That's a logical contradiction: A necessary condition for making propositions is existence. If you don't exist, you cannot make claims about your non-existence. .

Uh, no. Let's re-phrase it, shall we ? It would be logically possible for him not to exist. But it is impossible because he DOES exist.
 
The implication I got from the probabilistic argument was that since this arrangement was no more unlikely than any other arrangement, it wouldn't signify anything at all, and could safely be ignored. And if I think any different, it was because I didn't understand mathematics.

Hmm, I didn't read that particular debate. Was your example finding the arrangement of stars already in place, or seeing the stars moved to spell out the words? The former I can see the argument from the probabilistic view, the latter, not so much.
 
Yes, probably. Or, "Is belief in theism rational?"

I'm still a little on the fence about it but generally feel that the word (rational) does not apply to belief in theism, as I suggested in an earlier post to you.

I''m still picking around the edges of it - but I think we're probably not in huge disagreement, except possibly about dualism in some kind of way I can't remember just now.
 
No, it does provide explanatory power. In fact, the argument is that it provides the best explanation for the observation that the universe is fine-tuned. Certainly you can disagree with the premises of the argument as well as the conclusion, but you can't really say that the argument provides no explanatory power.

Doesn't God 'explain' the actual set of constants (the one that is claimed to be fine tuned) just as well as any set of universal constants (they'd just be as fine tuned as the acutal one)?

I think that "God" is about as good an explanation, and has a similar explanatory power, as "Somehow" does.
 
I think that this discussion can be about both. I understand the difference between the two, but I suspect the reason for choosing either of them is similar. From a strictly naturalist perspective, Spinoza's God is also irrational simply because it's an unnecessary layer of explanation. So in both cases, 'something' is taken into consideration, in addition to rationality, by the individual.

Linda


Hmm, I don't see Spinoza's God as an extra layer. It's more of a definition of the totality of all that is. I don't have any problem with folks who don't define Being that way, but it really just comes down to a decision about what word to use. There are no extra qualities thrown onto that "God".
 
Hmm, I didn't read that particular debate. Was your example finding the arrangement of stars already in place, or seeing the stars moved to spell out the words? The former I can see the argument from the probabilistic view, the latter, not so much.

It was the former - and I think the arrangement of stars was my interpretation of the probabilistic theory.

Given that it is normally possible to decompose any set of results into blocks of approximately equal probability, one should never be surprised by anything, and that nothing can be improbable, because everything is.
 
Doesn't God 'explain' the actual set of constants (the one that is claimed to be fine tuned) just as well as any set of universal constants (they'd just be as fine tuned as the acutal one)?

I think that "God" is about as good an explanation, and has a similar explanatory power, as "Somehow" does.

If you just look at the constants, and ignore the possible universes produced, then you can say that one set of constants is as likely as any other. The unlikelihood arises from the fact* that the universe produced by one particular set of constants is unique, and most of the others look quite similar.

*If it is a fact. Assumed for the probabilistic argument.
 
In other words you don't understand why it's proof, and you think that pointing out absolute statements provides you with a reason to maintain your own opinion.

So, he goes:

If something (a god or otherwise) is supernatural, but observable in some way, then it should be detectable because of the effects it has on the natural world. When that thing (a god or otherwise) is defined as undetectable, then it cannot affect the natural world, is onobservable and is therefore in the realm of the imaginary.

No. You haven't been paying attention, have you ? It's proof beyond reasonable doubt. 100% certainty is of no interest to me.



Oh, no. By all means, explain those "obvious" holes. Let's see what you've got.



We shall soon see.

It's been dealt with by Bri and CJ. I've explained it myself. Do we need to go through it again?

I didn't get where I am today by not letting CJ explain things for me.
 
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If you just look at the constants, and ignore the possible universes produced, then you can say that one set of constants is as likely as any other. The unlikelihood arises from the fact* that the universe produced by one particular set of constants is unique, and most of the others look quite similar.

*If it is a fact. Assumed for the probabilistic argument.
Ah... I didn't object before because you were entirely correct. It is, in fact, an issue with probability, and at some point there's a probability, however extremely small it may be, that you can actually hit to conclude there's a god.

But in terms of the fine tuning argument, you can imagine two major theories, worst case (and we don't really know it's even this worst case scenario). G would be that God created everything and favored life, and C would be that it arose by chance.

The relevant factor isn't how small P(C) is, but rather, how big P(C) is in comparison to P(G). P(C) can be pretty damned small, but if it is, what reason have we to suspect P(G) is bigger than P(C)? God is much more special than 200 pound slabs of thinking ape.

The fine tuning argument requires you to think of P(G) and P(C) separately, and ignore the relative priors. Effectively, it's what is described here as the probabilistic fallacy of "Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes".
 

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