Can theists be rational?

If that is the case, then it doesn't change things all that much.

An atheist is irrational when he claims to "know" there is no god (or gods). Likewise, the theist is being irrational when the claims to "know" that there is a god (or gods).

In that instance, the only purely rational stance to take would be that of the agnostic, in more of a "I don't know" position.

But once you get to "belief", then it gets to a point where you are back to having rational and irrational theists and atheists.

If an atheist claims to "believe" that there is no god (or gods), then that is taking a rational approach, since no statement of fact is being made. Likewise, it is rational when a theist claims to "believe" that there is a god (or gods).

But now we start to get bogged down in semantics, when it all goes back to what I said earlier, and what I'm sure was said elsewhere in this 50-page thread:

One can be a rational atheist, just as one can be an irrational atheist. One can be a rational theist, just as one can be an irrational theist. Not all atheists are rational, and not all theists are irrational.

So you are agnostic about demons, invisible pink unicorns, Thetans, magic, sprites, Angels, reincarnation, psychic powers, and wiccan spells? We can't "know" any of these things don't exist, right? They are all unfalsifiable. Ruling one case as a delusion or falsity doesn't mean that they don't exist on some level in some way. So believing in these things is as rational as believing in god per your claim above. And I agree. Only I don't think holding any of these things to be probable or even "possible" is rational. I think it's wishful thinking and confirmation bias and it would take a hell of a lot more evidence for me to give credence to any such claims. The same with god--and for the same reasons.


__________________________

Note to Linda: God is in the windowless building because god is everywhere... you just can't tell because he's invisible. God expands and contracts to fit whatever definitions a believer needs it to fit.

Fancy that!

That is why Malerin avoids the question. He needs to avoid understanding the very salient point you are making. Even something in a windowless building has to be made of matter-- even if it's just air... or a floor... and it has to fit the dimensions of a building-- god has no such limits our boundaries--he's magic... he can be whatever the believer needs him to be. There's nothing to distinguish a belief in god from a belief in magic. They are equally irrational beliefs as far as the evidence is concerned from my perspective. And believers avoidance of the tough questions confirms this even further to me. They want their god to be more of a rational belief than a belief in magic... and yet it does not seem to be despite the endless semantic games and obfuscations on the topic.
 
What's the unanswerable question? Clearly not the one asked by the OP.


Argue? More a question of sitting back and watching the cavalcade of logical fallacies.

That's what I think. I think people want to believe that god belief is rational and that they are good or saved or have a gift for believing in such... but every argument they make to support "god" could also be used to support invisible entities they don't believe in.

A person who feels like they've been possessed could be said to have "proof" of demons in the same way that Malerin's spiritual experiences or Roma's secret super "inner knowingness" counts as evidence for "god". So how can that be a rational evidence for a god when we know that feeling "possessed" or imagining someone "possessed" is much more likely to be due to a mental disorder or delusion than any invisible haunting presence.

I just find it immensely fascinating to watch how convince themselves that what they believe is rational. Bad analogies and straw men (arguing tangential points that were never actually made) seem to be the main techniques--and then snide inferences cast at nonbelievers. It's like they think the god will appear as an image in the obfuscating smoke, mirrors, and changing definitions--

But mostly, I'm curious at the questions they avoid. I think it's telling. I can tell Roma really believes she's had a personal experience that confirms god--but to me that's like people who truly believe they've been visited by aliens. They feel so sure of their "feelings", they would never seek to test the null hypothesis... that they were mistaken. And their brain won't let them "absorb" any information which might lead them to such a question.

I always admire that about Randi... how he fools people and then teaches them how they allowed themselves to be fooled. But he has to fool them first, or else they think they are immune to the same sorts of irrationalities that humans have been indulging in for eons. If you don't break the defenses right away, they spend more and more time shoring them up.

He says that even when he tests people and they fail the test--they never ever come to the conclusion that they may have been fooling themselves. They just think their "magic" wasn't working or something.

Thank goodness, air travel, computers, technology, and medicine, aren't as unreliable as god and other "mystical entities and powers".
 
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That's what I think. I think people want to believe that god belief is rational and that they are good or saved or have a gift for believing in such... but every argument they make to support "god" could also be used to support invisible entities they don't believe in.

But you are looking at something else.

You are now saying that the belief is irrational because the argument is irrational.

In a similar vein:

Let's say I believe that men are born with certain natural rights (life, liberty, and property). Let's also say that I attempt to make an argument explaining why.

Now, if the argument I make is irrational, does that make the belief itself irrational?

I always admire that about Randi... how he fools people and then teaches them how they allowed themselves to be fooled. But he has to fool them first, or else they think they are immune to the same sorts of irrationalities that humans have been indulging in for eons. If you don't break the defenses right away, they spend more and more time shoring them up.

He says that even when he tests people and they fail the test--they never ever come to the conclusion that they may have been fooling themselves. They just think their "magic" wasn't working or something.

Thank goodness, air travel, computers, technology, and medicine, aren't as unreliable as god and other "mystical entities and powers".

So let me pose an earlier question:

Who is more rational:

E.O. Wilson or Martin Gardner?

ETA:

Do you see either of them as irrational?
 
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My point was that I don't think it's unreasonable to assume that a being that is able to set all of the constants wouldn't be governed by those constants (i.e. wouldn't be constrained by the natural universe).

-Bri

You don't think that it's unreasonable to think that an invisible guy found himself existing and so decided to make constants so that one day some funny looking primates could evolve on some nondescripts space debris and invent language and magically come to know him so they could "believe in" him?

I do. I think that's a mighty humanoid diety--petty to the extreme--and very anthropomorphic and egomaniacal. How did he come to have these mental traits without a brain or matter or time? We don't have any reason to imagine such a thing could exist any more than we can posit sound in a vacuum. It's a non-sequitur. Magic. A story that falls apart the more you look at it... something that you need to keep making further and further excuses and explanations for so it doesn't fall apart into incoherent nonsense.

For what reason would an entity decide to create "constants". It seems so backwards in accordance to what we understand about evolution. How does a nonphysical entity interact with or affect a material world if he has no material properties whatsoever? The more you delve into such an entity, the more it seems to rely on "magic" or "beyond human understanding". So why do you "believe in" something that is beyond human understanding? Why do you think you've understood it or explained away the problems with this conjecture?
 
But you are looking at something else.

You are now saying that the belief is irrational because the argument is irrational.

In a similar vein:

Let's say I believe that men are born with certain natural rights (life, liberty, and property). Let's also say that I attempt to make an argument explaining why.

Now, if the argument I make is irrational, does that make the belief itself irrational?



So let me pose an earlier question:

Who is more rational:

E.O. Wilson or Martin Gardner?

In regards to what and as measured by what? I don't care who you or I think is more rational. I'm interested in whether there is a more rational basis to believe in god than to believe in demons or other invisible entities (Thetans, souls, angels, sprites, sun-movers etc.) It appears that there is not.

I don't think most people really know what they believe-- I think they just like the idea or feel safer "believing" or saying they believe in some god. But I think believing is a luxury they allow themselves by never examining what it means to "believe" or what exactly they believe or why they believe in some invisible entities but not others.

I feel like you jumped in this thread without reading it at all, and I have no interest in what people believe in-- I'm interested in how they rationalize belief in whatever invisible forms of consciousness they believe in. I'm agnostic about god as I am about magic and fairies. I know that I can't prove there is no such thing, but that sure doesn't warrant my belief that there IS. I'm not "on the fence" about any supernatural beings or forces. I just dismiss them all until or unless there is evidence that there IS something supernatural. And it's as rational to do this with gods as it is to do it with demons.

I think you are having trouble telling a fact from everything else. "God exists" would be a factual statement. It's either true or false. It is not like your examples... though I've heard a lot of apologists confuse mottos and such with facts--in fact, your argument must work with on a lot of people because I hear the same faulty logic over and over. Science and rationality is not about mottos, semantics, opinions, notions, parables, beliefs, and ideals-- it's about facts--the stuff that is true independent of what humans think or believe. The earth is a sphere--that was true even before there were humans. DNA carries the genetic code. That was true even before we understood as much.

People who believe in god seem to treat "god exists" as just such a fact. They don't treat it as a motto or an opinion or a myth. And yet, there is nothing to distinguish it from such. Liberty and whatever other rights you might believe in --are not said to be responsible for creating the universe or answering prayers or doing whatever it is you assign to your god. Yes, I think your belief in god is on par with your belief in your rights--but I'm sure you don't. I'm sure the god you are agnostic about isn't an "ideal" or "human notion" or existent only in the minds of humans like "liberty" etc. But yes, I think gods do exist only in the minds of humans just like those things you listed.

And I think it's irrational to think it exists elsewhere and "creates" and "plans" and "cares". Your semantic games oft used by apologists might work to sway you into thinking that a belief in gods is more rational and noble than a belief in demons or magic--but it does not sway me. I think I used to use such apologetics with myself in the days when I was trying to keep a belief in "souls" alive-- but now I see that it's just... lame.

This thread was about whether there is a rational reason for believing in god. You want to believe that there is. You want to believe that a belief in god is more rational than a belief in demons or reincarnation or astrology. But you have nothing to support this notion. You believe in the possibility of god for the same sorts of reasons people believe in the possibility of those things--and those are not rational reasons in my book. Those are evidence of how very easy people fool themselves when they want to believe something or have come to believe something.

Suffering happens--is that proof of demons? How is a god belief more rational than belief in demons? Is it? I don't think it is. I don't see how a belief in god could be considered more rational than belief in demons or Satan. And I will hold that opinion until or unless someone can show evidence or reason as to why god belief should be considered more rational. Sure, god belief might make people feel better--but is it more "rational"?
 
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Almost everything? Can you give an example of a logically possible impossible thing?
It's logically possible that I don't exist. I do not understand why it's so important to you that I can do this though.
That latter definition goes to the heart of claim of whether belief in God is rational or irrational. Going by this definition, it's going to depend on the person whether the subjective spiritual experiences people have are evidence for God or just delusions. You can rationally go either way on it.
I disagree. Rationality is about sound judgment. Just because a person can subjectively believe whatever the hell they want to, doesn't mean it's rational to subjectively believe whatever the hell you want to.

It sounds nice and politically correct to say it's all subjective, but at some point, you have to have someone left to call irrational. Otherwise, well, people might get the impression that they can believe whatever they want to believe, instread of being biased in ways I want them to be biased in, and we can't have that.
For the FT argument, we have God is possible, God may or may not be though of as probable. To avoid bias, an agnostic value should be used.
But... Malerin... I've already explained this to you.

I am biased! Avoid bias you say? Why would I want to do such a thing? Could you please explain to me the particular problem you have with being biased?
Again, this will depend on the person.
In the same way that reality and truth depend on the person, yes. But so long as you are in my reality, we have a problem.
For me, God is credible and believable. If someone thinks God is unbelievable, they should either have evidence or a good reason to support their view.
For me, reality is credible and believable, and fantasy comes a priori. If someone thinks a God actually exists, they should be able to demonstrate that they obtained their belief from reality somehow--how else are you going to avoid fooling yourself, or are you under the impression that fooling yourself isn't a problem to worry about?

Defaulting into a belief that an infinitely complex mind with powers never observed to be had by any other entity, or even said entity, simply because you have a mind, is not getting beliefs from reality. It's not impossible said being exists, but it's an absolutely terrible epistemic approach to just start out believing something this different from you exists, simply because you have a mind.

You can accuse me of bias all day long. I don't pretend I'm not biased--I openly proclaim that I am. But you're going to have a hell of a time convincing me that my bias is wrong, and that yours is rational. My bias is specifically designed to filter for reality based conclusions...

...which is what sound conclusions are, right?

Your bias works in the complete opposite direction. Yours is designed to justify the "rationality" of people who believe things because they seem reasonable to them; you're filtering for belief that arises solely in the mind.

...which is where fantasy comes from, right?
And whether we're at probable or not will depend on the metaphysical views of whatever person you're asking.
Sure would. But not all metaphysics is equal; not all metaphysics is rational.
You can't prove an idealist or materialist wrong, and one is likely to think God is very probable while the other will think God is very improbable.
"Can't prove my view wrong" isn't quite a defining trait of rationality. You seem to think that your burden of establishing rationality is simply that you get to believe something.
Then just go with God as powerful supernatural being.
I'm sorry, but I find it hard to take seriously that you are proposing that a fairy in a jar would count as God.
There is no evidence against that, just as there is no evidence against the claim carbon-based E.T. life exists (as opposed to E.T. life exists).
I'm sorry, but did you straight out commit to argumentum ad ignorantiam?
Evidence can't be post hoc. A hypothesis or theory about the evidence can be post hoc (which I think is what you're trying to say). My claim is that certain subjective experiences are evidence for God. These experiences themselves can't be post hoc, because that would mean they happened after they happened.
Post hoc in the sense that you reach your conclusion, then you form your evidence after the fact. This is a belief-centric system. I prefer doubt centric. Again, the theory is that the information which leads to belief come somewhere from the real world.
Post hoc itself simply means "after the event".
No wonder they call it post hoc!
Every prosecutor in the world tries to convict with post hoc theories. What, you think people are arrested before they commit crimes? A crime is comitted, a theory is developed that best explains the evidence. In the same way, a person has an experience that they believe is best explained by God.
But the prosecutor has to put the suspect at the scene of the crime. Imagine how the court case would go if the judge doesn't even know for sure that the suspect even exists!
God is an extrapolation from what we know exists (mind). Matter can't even be called an extrapolation. There is zero evidence that external objects made of some physical substance exist. There is sense data, but that sense data is consistent with non-materialistic models of reality, and therefore, can't be considered to be evidence for the existence of physical objects. Anyway, that is the gist of the argument Hypnosi and I were making.
Okay, let's get this straight. You're claiming that because you have a mind, it's much more rational to posit an infinite transcendent mind with capabilities heretofore unobserved in the natural world, than it is to suppose that the keyboard you are typing on has substance. And you're using this to try to argue that you are rational.

Let me phrase this very carefully, and kindly... it's... not exactly convincing.
I started off agreeing with you, but now I'm not so sure. Suppose we think other universes actually exist (a rational belief). Do we know anything at all about these universes?
The answer is, tautologically, yes. It's virtually one of your givens. You told me this was a rational belief in the parenthetical. Therefore, simply by supposing that this belief is rational, we would certainly know something at all about these universes.
We don't even know what kinds of physical laws they have. Is it possible there's a force we can't even conceive that exists in these other universes? Is it possible that some don't have gravity at all?
It would depend on what "(a rational reason)" we have for believing that other universes exist.
But let's assume that God requires a greater degree of extrapolation. "God exists", as a theory, has an advantage over "E.T. life exists". "God exists" has greater explanatory power than "aliens exist". "Aliens exist" explains nothing because there is no evidence to be explained. "God exists" explains a number of interesting phenemena:
Veridical NDE accounts
Subjective spiritual experiences
Anecdotal supernatural experiences
Children's accounts of living past lives
(I would normally include the precise life-permitting values of the physical constants, but that is the argument in question, so it's off limits for now).
Let me show you how this really works.
Prior behavior of slot machine|I played and...|...because...
Hit recently|lost|machine already payed off
Hit recently|won|machine was hot
Didn't hit recently|lost|Having a bad day
Didn't hit recently|won|Having a good day
Didn't hit in a long time|lost|machine was unlucky
Didn't hit in a long time|won|machine was due
Now, that has explanatory power. It explains why I won, or lost, given a machine that hit recently, didn't hit recently, or didn't hit in a long time. And you can take that to the casinos.

Should you happen to not be impressed, you may see why I'm not impressed. It explains things, sure. It explains everything, sure. It would explain everything anyway. There's nothing it can't explain. And if I go even further, I could reinforce said system of belief--every time my theory explains a result, I grow more confident in it.

Also, the actual probability of a claim depends on the supporting evidence, not on how much it explains. Your bias towards explanations is based on your answers based approach.
I'm not claiming that "God exists" explains these completely, or is the only theory on the table, but it is a competing theory to the naturalistic accounts. "Aliens exist" is pure spculation which explains nothing. Yet the belief in alien life is rational, but the belief in God is irrational?
What it explains is irrelevant. Where the belief comes from is everything. True beliefs tend to come from reality. False beliefs tend to come from lax epistemologies.

Answers are easy--they are for the lazy. Truth is hard--it is a product of much discipline and sweat.

Well, stuff that has zero evidential value probably isn't evidence for the proposition at all, but yes. Some evidence certainly is stronger than other evidence.
Good.
Well, not really. Weak evidence is weak evidence. There is not enough evidence by which you can provide a probability for aliens or gods, certainly not a probability greater than 50% (by which you could say that one is likely).
Horrid. Why do you keep wanting to peg me on a thing I've never said?



Why? We don't know the conditions and events by which we exist, so how is there a high degree of plausibility that intelligence could exist elsewhere as opposed to a low degree of plausibility?
...
I never argued that it was improbable, so that's a straw man. I also don't think there is sufficient evidence to argue that the existence of a god is improbable.
Uhm... you are aware that "improbable" means "not plausible", are you not?

The fact that there's no compelling evidence of a god doesn't mean you can conclude that it's unlikely that one exists.
There is no hyperbole so grand as to describe how extreme of an entity we're talking about "possibly" existing with no compelling evidence that said entity actually exists, so, sorry. I damned well can conclude that it's unlikely that such an extremely grand elephant not in the room doesn't exist.
There's no compelling evidence by which you can conclude either way. The same with aliens, by the way.
Don't care!

The fact is, though, it's a hell of a lot more plausible to think that there's an intelligent alien not from this planet, than it is that there's an intelligent alien mind not of this universe that is transcendent and has heretofore unobserved super powers.
I don't see a difference in quality of evidence between aliens and gods.
Can we say conjunction fallacy then?

Yet atheists get away with underspecifing all the time. What kind of universes exist, what kind of alien life exists?
It has zilch to do with being an atheist, and hell yeah, proponents of extra terrestrial life, or any other thing argued to be held rationally, have the same problem.

Regardless, this particular reply seems to betray your lack of reading ability, as all throughout you were saying something that had absolutely nothing to do with what I posted. It's nothing but a giant combination of tu quoque, straw man, and red herring all blended together in a mess--my best rebuttal is simply to ask you to reread the post you think you replied to.
 
We can observe the interaction. We cannot observe the God. The part where you said God was supernatural.

Linda

If God can interact with the world, then we can see him via the interaction. A talking pillar of fire, for example. We cannot see the entirety of a supernatural being, as we exist in the natural universe. But we can't see the entirety of a peanut.

God is not an extra-natural being.
 
If God can interact with the world, then we can see him via the interaction. A talking pillar of fire, for example. We cannot see the entirety of a supernatural being, as we exist in the natural universe. But we can't see the entirety of a peanut.

God is not an extra-natural being.

I'm not the one claiming it is. Others are claiming God is extra-natural, but then go on to refer to God using a naturalistic methodology. It doesn't make sense.

Linda
 
I'm not the one claiming it is. Others are claiming God is extra-natural, but then go on to refer to God using a naturalistic methodology. It doesn't make sense.

Linda

Perhaps that kind of description of god doesn't make sense, but the answer is to use a different description. If god is capable of creating the universe, why would he be unable to interact with it? Why would he seal himself off from it? A god that can create can clearly change what he has created.
 
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Irrevocable proof? When I hear the words "irrevocable proof" on a philosophy forum I reach for my scepticism.

In other words you don't understand why it's proof, and you think that pointing out absolute statements provides you with a reason to maintain your own opinion.

So, he goes:

If something (a god or otherwise) is supernatural, but observable in some way, then it should be detectable because of the effects it has on the natural world. When that thing (a god or otherwise) is defined as undetectable, then it cannot affect the natural world, is onobservable and is therefore in the realm of the imaginary.
 
In other words you don't understand why it's proof, and you think that pointing out absolute statements provides you with a reason to maintain your own opinion.

So, he goes:

If something (a god or otherwise) is supernatural, but observable in some way, then it should be detectable because of the effects it has on the natural world. When that thing (a god or otherwise) is defined as undetectable, then it cannot affect the natural world, is onobservable and is therefore in the realm of the imaginary.

And you're satisfied with that as a proof? You regard that as the last word on the matter?

Personally I think that as an argument, that has numerous obvious holes in it. (left as an exercise to the class). Does supporting such an argument indicate that someone is not rational?
 
Now, if the argument I make is irrational, does that make the belief itself irrational?

Not if there is a rational argument and you just haven't used it. But what if there is no rational argument?



So let me pose an earlier question:

Who is more rational:

E.O. Wilson or Martin Gardner?

ETA:

Do you see either of them as irrational?



First, this thread does not concern the issue of whether or not prople are rational or irrational in other arenas of their lives, but only theistic belief. Second, more to the point with Wilson and Gardner, neither are/were theists properly speaking. This thread does not concern any belief in any god but specifically belief in a personal creator God. That is generally how theism is defined. So, another way of framing it would be to say, is it rational to believe in a personal creator God?

Rational/irrational does not apply properly to diesm/fideism or belief in Spinoza's God -- those beliefs are largely decisions in the face of no evidence and a central mystery. They are responses or orientations to the world and are not similar to belief in a personal creator God.
 
Perhaps that kind of description of god doesn't makes sense, but the answer is to use a different description. If god is capable of creating the universe, why would he be unable to interact with it? Why would he seal himself off from it? A god that can create can clearly change what he has created.

I agree. I don't think anyone is really claiming that God has sealed itself off from the universe. That's why reference is made to natural events when talking about God. But then that removes the reason for thinking that God is different and not subject to investigation, which also removes the reason for thinking that God exists.

Linda
 
Wrong.

Wrong.

Right.

Wrong.

Right.

Wrong.

Wrong.

Yes.

Er, quite. Would you care to substantiate your assertions? :) As you can see all you gave me as a response was alist of one word assertiosn without supporting argument or evidence!

You're hopelessly confused about the distinction between evidence and theory.


On the contrary, it being one of my academic specialties I'm under the impression I understand them very well indeed, which is why I often end up arguing with people about it here. Would you care to inform me how I am wrong? :)

cj x
 
Causality and natural law are simply a consequence of reference to natural events, not an assumption.

Nope, they are an assumption. David Hume for example was intensely sceptical about causal relationships, as i'm sure you know,and question the very nature of our understanding of causality. For any given event we assume a) causality and b) that natural law applies. We can not demonstrate either in many cases.

Firstly, causality is far more difficult than most people realize. We assume a chain of A ------> B -------> C. This might work well for particles, but it breaks down when we deal with real life examples, when multiple causality and synergistic causality, retrocausality, probabilistic causality and other types of causation crop up all the time. becomes the norm. It fails in our QM models. I think causality is a useful concept, but it is not by any means as obvious as 20th century minds seem to think - it was not obvious historically, and it is not obvious now in some science.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality_(physics)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_causation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessary_and_sufficient_conditions
From Hume we have assumed that causality applies, but this is in fact not deducible, insteaed being an inductive Best Inferred Explanation. We actually now know that causality doe snot appear to function in certain QM relations - at least in the sense we are used to - we can only model it is terms of probablistic causality to the best of my understanding.

Natural laws are again an assumption: see my discussion of Induction and Cosmological Uniformity. There is no reason to assume natural law is homogenous, or that the universe is. In fact we know that laws do change under extreme conditions - breaking symmetry - and that is how our current laws arose - but we can not rule out the possibility they may act differently elsewhere, or here. In fact laws are probalistic accoding to science - gravity will almost always work - but in theory we do not know it always will. That is not deducible - back to induction. Sure this gets silly, but it is why we have to assume Cosmological Uniformity. Without it our science disappears in to "best guess based on our experience" territory.

Methodologic naturalism merely relies upon reference to natural events.

Yes, exactly, and as I say, in doing so precludes any supernatural causality or arbitrary alteration in laws. :) Hence the fact that to use it to argue against these is a circular argument.

The rest of what you discuss - causality, exceptions, reproducibility, the laws of physics, standard operating procedures, etc. - are not assumptions of naturalism; they are observations from naturalism.

Not sure I follow?

Which means that the proposed lack of these characteristics is irrelevant when considering whether or not the supernatural is amenable to scientific inquiry. If you wish to make 'supernatural' not amenable to scientific inquiry, then what you need to say is that the supernatural does not make reference to natural events. In which case, you all need to stop making reference to natural events when talking about the supernatural.

Ah! Yet the supernatural can still impact upon natural events - its just that science can not allow that causality. Imagine Zeus causes a ligthning bolt to blast some sinner now. The causality is supernatural, the lightning bolt manifests (and is natural as any lightning bolt - its origin is supernatural, it by definition is natural ) and the sinner gets fried. Yet to speculate on the cause of the lightning bolt being Zeus is precluded by the ground rules of science - by the methodological naturalism.

Ot take the CFT argument. We can say "this seems to require an intelligent designer" if you want, and draw upon the scientific evidence - but as soon as we propose a God as Creator, we automatically leave sceicne, as this is an illegitmate violation of ontological naturalism. So the ground rules of science mean we explain things in terms of natural causality, regardles of whether or not that is the best explanation - because it is assumed ot be the best explanation. Thats fine, and sensible, but we can not then use it against theology, for obvious reasons - it is a circular argument.

(Not a lot on this I can find - short essay on Scientific Naturalism by Davis and Collins in Ferngren Science & Religion: A Historical Introduction (2002), though most philosophy of scienc books discuss it in passing. will psoit some more references later as it appears ot be controversial for some reason here.)

cj x
 
I agree. I don't think anyone is really claiming that God has sealed itself off from the universe. That's why reference is made to natural events when talking about God. But then that removes the reason for thinking that God is different and not subject to investigation, which also removes the reason for thinking that God exists.

Linda

If god is supernatural, then god is different, and operates outside the rules of nature. It is not possible to investigate the extra-natural elements of god. However, it's possible to see any manifestation of god in the natural universe, which can be entirely concealed, made obvious, or left ambivalent - depending on what god wants. Any knowledge of god must be imperfect. That does not mean that god cannot be manifest at all.
 
First, this thread does not concern the issue of whether or not prople are rational or irrational in other arenas of their lives, but only theistic belief.

The topic seems a bit ambivalent on this point. If it's referring to the belief, shouldn't it say "Can theism be rational?"

It might seem excessive to claim that anyone with any kind of theistic belief is inherently an irrational person, but that is indeed what some people seem to think.
 

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