Can theists be rational?

[Ichneumonwasp]

I agree that it's simply a redundant label. But why propose a redundant label if there wasn't a thought that the totality did somehow add additional meaning?

Linda

For Spinoza I think it was a convenient label. For others I think it suggests an orientation toward the world. The label God tells us nothing about the universe, it projects something internal -- in the individual -- about his/her relationship to the universe. That is how I read Einstein's, Sagan's, and I think ultimately Martin Gardner's way of using the word. I could be wrong though.

 

[fls]

Because we think we know how they work. There's a consistent set of behaviours which we refer to as the laws of nature. If something happens in the natural world which is inconsistent with such laws, we would consider that an instance of the supernatural intervening.

It would of course be very difficult to distinguish a supernatural intervention in the natural world with some natural event operating in some heretofore unknown manner. It might be impossible to establish with certainty that some event wasn't natural. However, there would still be events occurring that were supernatural, even if they couldn't be recognised as such with absolute certainty.

Now we get to the meat of the matter. It isn't that we can a priori distinguish a set of events that have 'supernatural' as a cause. What we have is a set of events operating in some heretofore unknown manner. And there isn't anything about those events which establishes with certainty that the unknown manner is the consequence of supernatural vs. natural. Your Arthur C. Clarke quote establishes your agreement on that point.

So what you really mean by 'supernatural' is that it serves as a place-holder for events whose manner indefinitely remains capricious, not merely the manner that awaits sufficiently advanced understanding.

Linda

 

[yy2bggggs]

However, as I said, I regard probabilistic arguments specifically related to God as unconvincing, in either direction. Probability depends on ignorance.

Well, yeah. But that's actually what we're describing--our ignorance. It's still a bias towards explanation to rule out something unlikely that doesn't explain things, but prefer something more unlikely that does. It's only not a bias when the likelihood alone determines what you prefer.

The only thing I take from the fine-tuning argument is that the question remains open.

We're in agreement here.

 

[fls]

For Spinoza I think it was a convenient label. For others I think it suggests an orientation toward the world. The label God tells us nothing about the universe, it projects something internal -- in the individual -- about his/her relationship to the universe. That is how I read Einstein's, Sagan's, and I think ultimately Martin Gardner's way of using the word. I could be wrong though.

I agree. That's my reading of it as well. That it reflects an individual relationship to the universe.

That is sort of what I was getting at with the OP. From a strict sense, rationality is shorn of any individual considerations, which is why this thread isn't "can theism be rational?" Instead, we (only meant to include those who agree) recognize that within an individual, rationality may consider something internal, something in the individual. Which is why the title refers to individuals with beliefs, rather than the belief.

Linda

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I agree. That's my reading of it as well. That it reflects an individual relationship to the universe.

That is sort of what I was getting at with the OP. From a strict sense, rationality is shorn of any individual considerations, which is why this thread isn't "can theism be rational?" Instead, we (only meant to include those who agree) recognize that within an individual, rationality may consider something internal, something in the individual. Which is why the title refers to individuals with beliefs, rather than the belief.

Linda

Hmmm, I'm still not sure rationality applies in this situation. Again, maybe I'm wrong here, but I've always viewed this as an arational decision. It isn't precisely a situation in which one can speak of a rational or irrational choice.

We're ultimately presented with a central mystery -- none of us can know the nature of the universe -- so we must decide how to approach it. For me, rationality seems to apply to things inside the universe where we can use logical argument, evidence, etc. to make decisions.

There doesn't seem to be anything rational to me about my own decision about that version of God. I think it is emotional, and I rationalize it after the fact. It's just the way I feel about existence, I think.

 

[westprog]

Now we get to the meat of the matter. It isn't that we can a priori distinguish a set of events that have 'supernatural' as a cause. What we have is a set of events operating in some heretofore unknown manner. And there isn't anything about those events which establishes with certainty that the unknown manner is the consequence of supernatural vs. natural. Your Arthur C. Clarke quote establishes your agreement on that point.

So what you really mean by 'supernatural' is that it serves as a place-holder for events whose manner indefinitely remains capricious, not merely the manner that awaits sufficiently advanced understanding.

Linda

The purpose of "supernatural" is not to explain events. It's to explain the possible nature of god. In this particular sub-discussion, we're examining what the nature of the supernatural might be.

 

[Bri]

SETI is searching for empirical evidence of aliens. Sure, advocates of the fine-tuning argument would probably love for empirical evidence to be found to support their premises, but they rarely if ever search for empirical evidence to support the premises of the fine-tuning argument.

I think you just made that up. How would you know what areas of exploration are of interest to physicists and whether certain components are deliberately left unexplored?

What does your response have to do with my statement whatsoever?

I would agree that "looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation isn't a scientific endeavor."

...

What do you think I've been doing? I've provided numerous examples that contradict each of your claims in order to specify why I disagree.

You have either been unclear previously whether you agree that "looking for something for which there is no evidence for the purposes of proving an unfalsifiable hypothesis that doesn't explain any observation isn't a scientific endeavor" or I have misunderstood some of your comments. But we seem to have cleared that up now. So, let's discuss your examples.

See, that's my point. It doesn't even occur to me that it is necessary to agree that that set of characteristics isn't Science. It's clear that it isn't.

Since you seemed to be arguing the point (again, that might just be my misunderstanding of what you said), it wasn't all that clear to me.

Which makes it obvious that even though you were pretending that was what you were asking, you were really asking something else - the sine qua non of "begging the question".

Really? You're really going to misuse it AGAIN even after I posted the correct definition? Incredible!

That's what I was discussing all along. What did you think I was discussing?

Obviously, I thought you were arguing that the set of characteristics wasn't science, since it didn't even occur to you that it was necessary to agree that that set of characteristics isn't science.

Really? We'd never ever change our minds about the possibility regardless of how thoroughly we'd searched or how much more information we had about the rarity of the conditions that seem to lead to intelligent life?

It would be impossible to search the entire galaxy in order to prove that aliens don't exist, correct. Even if it could be proven that the conditions that gave rise to intelligent life here are rare, we could not prove that aliens don't exist (only that they're not likely to exist).

Really? If, as you say, all these conditions should be present in order for something to be considered unscientific, then doesn't the lack of one or more of the conditions mean that the thing isn't unscientific? Doesn't that mean that it is reasonable to address the conditions independently, since they can be excluded independently?

No. But you've already agreed that when taken together the description doesn't describe a scientific endeavor, so I don't know why you're arguing this point. Do you think there's no valid scientific hypothesis that isn't based on prior evidence, that is unfalsifiable, or that doesn't explain known observations?

Interesting. I gave a list where people were curious about things for which there was no compelling evidence that led to ground-breaking scientific discoveries. You replied with a list of things that are considered ridiculous. Now why would you do that?

Because it illustrates that being curious about something does not necessarily mean that you're following the scientific method. I also responded to your list.

Really?

And all this without any compelling evidence that there were any very small objects or any distant moons to view.

These were your examples, not mine. Of course there was compelling evidence that there were small and distant objects to view, which is why they weren't valid examples.

What is your yield threshold for 'compelling'? Success one time in two? ten? a hundred? a thousand?

There is no objective threshold that I know of. Compelling means that there's enough of a totality of evidence to indicate that a proposition is true.

Why wouldn't sun-like stars be more likely to have earth-like planets, etc.?

I didn't say they weren't more likely to have "Earth-like" planets than non-Sun-like stars. I said that there's no compelling evidence that the "Sun-like" stars they are looking at are likely to have aliens near them.

Really? Solvents and living organisms exist on nearly every planet? Man, am I way behind on the news.

I stand corrected. Some of those things may exist on other planets. The fact that many are not known to exist on any other planet supports the point that there isn't compelling evidence of any planets other than ours that are likely to have intelligent life.

The ones I listed. If things are as you say, we should be watching Martian TV sometime within the next century.

Your witty remarks aside, you didn't list the conditions or events by which intelligent life emerged on this planet.

I didn't, but then you didn't ask for a dissertation. If that's the sort of information you are looking for, I'd suggest you use a different source.

Like I said, we don't know the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged on this planet. If you disagree, please list them or point me to a source that specifies what they are.

How so? All it seems to do is provide an explanation after the fact in the same way that yy2bggggs' slot machine example does. When all outcomes are explained, it means that there is no explanatory power.

What outcomes are you referring to in the fine-tuning argument that are explained?

Really? What wouldn't it be able to explain?

That particular argument wouldn't explain anything but fine-tuning as far as I can tell.

Except 'aliens' wouldn't be the best explanation for 'lakes' on Jupiter.

Exactly. Who ever said they would be?

Except God would be the best explanation for seeing anything the way that we see it.

Nope. Sorry. The argument seems quite specific to fine-tuning. If you disagree, you're welcome to try to rearrange the argument to explain something else.

Why didn't you draw the line for 'natural universe' at 'those things with mass'?

I have no idea what you're talking about.

Why? What if I simply don't feel like agreeing with the idea of rules and instead consider the universe the set of all observable events and their influences?

Why not just define "natural universe" as everything including the supernatural? In that case, sure a god could be part of the "natural universe," but what we usually mean by the natural universe would only be a part of the "natural universe" according to your definition.

That would simply be one of the influences on observable events and therefore part of the universe.

The point is that it doesn't matter how you want to define things. A being who is able to set the constants of the universe probably wouldn't be governed by the rules that are defined by the constants being as they are.

-Bri

 

[fls]

Hmmm, I'm still not sure rationality applies in this situation. Again, maybe I'm wrong here, but I've always viewed this as an arational decision.

I used the term 'non-rational' earlier.

It isn't precisely a situation in which one can speak of a rational or irrational choice.

We're ultimately presented with a central mystery -- none of us can know the nature of the universe -- so we must decide how to approach it. For me, rationality seems to apply to things inside the universe where we can use logical argument, evidence, etc. to make decisions.

There doesn't seem to be anything rational to me about my own decision about that version of God. I think it is emotional, and I rationalize it after the fact. It's just the way I feel about existence, I think.

I was thinking that an idea could be logically coherent and empirically grounded taking individual preferences/perspectives into account. Even though our own decision-making may really be an emotional response, one can use it as a piece of information within a larger, rational framework.

Linda

 

[Lord Emsworth]

I'm not quite sure I understand your question.

Take a set of universal constants, any set of universal constants different from those that there are now. Those different constants are explained just as well by a/the God hypothesis (Goddidit) as are the current constants. Or are they not? Why or why not?

The argument is based on evidence that the universe is fine-tuned (that with any significant differences in the universal constants life couldn't exist). The fine-tuning argument suggests that the probability of fine-tuning (that the universe supports life) would be higher if a god exists than with any other explanation.

That is about the fine tuning argument. My response was about the explanatory power of that which is called God.

This would be similar to concluding that the likelihood of a building existing on Jupiter would be higher if an alien existed on Jupiter than with any other explanation.

So, I'm not sure that "somehow" there is a building on Jupiter explains the existence of the building better than aliens.

-Bri

I am approaching from a different direction.

"Somehow" explains the existence of a building on Jupiter just as well as it explains the existence of a pile of rocks on Mars. It works all the time but doesn't impart any kind of meaning apart from the assertion of an explanation. No details, no specifics are given.

Likewise, God explains the existence of tuned for life constants just as well as tuned for whatever constants. It works for any possible the set of constants equally well. In fact it works all the time, for anything. But it doesn't say anything much below superficial letters "g", "o", "d". Unless, of course, you are willing to shed some light and redeem the God hypothesis from its meaninglessness.

 

[westprog]

Take a set of universal constants, any set of universal constants different from those that there are now. Those different constants are explained just as well by a/the God hypothesis (Goddidit) as are the current constants. Or are they not? Why or why not?

All the values for the constants are equally likely - but out of all the possible combinations, a very unusual - and significant - set of values emerged. If there really could have been any combination of values, why among all the possible universes which would have been just clouds of hydrogen, would this one have been chosen?

If you look at each of the sets of values individually, then they are all equally likely. If you look at the possible types of universe, then this one is staggeringly unlikely.

 

[Belz...]

If we accept that the god in question is effectively omnipotent, then it will clearly be possible for him to intervene in the natural world and not be detected.

Well, I suppose that depends on what "omnipotent" means, then. Can an omnipotent being bend the laws of logic ? Of physics ?

Assuming the answers are respecively "no" and "yes", such a God would have to cover his tracks with a series of alterations that would be detectable, even if only in principle. Of course, if the answer to the first question is "yes", then anything is possible and any discussion about god is meaningless.

Saying that he would be undetectable does not mean that he would not be effecting the natural world in any way.

Of course, the problem with your whole line of argument here is that I talked about beings that interract with the natural world. I was not talking about omnipotence, since we've already established, as many have done before, that omnipotence is logically incoherent.

Operating at the level of quantum randomness, for example, god could direct the universe in any way he wanted without even breaching the laws of nature.

And that wouldn't leave traces ?

The problem with arguing omnipotence for any debate is that it allows you to explain anything away, and reach any conclusion you see fit. This means that the omnipotence argument actually makes no explanation at all.

The fact that something is unobserved does not mean that it is necessarily unobservable.

You are correct. I never said otherwise. My point is that something that cannot, in principle, be observed, cannot, in principle, interract with the physical world, and vice-versa. Omnipotence is the only way out, but since it makes no sense, it can easily be dismissed.

Something can be unobserved and still have an effect. If the effect is designed to not be observed, then it won't be.

Sounds a little convoluted, to me. If the effect cannot be observed in principle then it is not an effect.

The flaw in the argument - and in all such arguments - is in using the rules of science to disprove the possibility of a subjective, arbitrary element to the world.

The flaw in yours is to assume that just because you can imagine something, makes it possible.

 

[fls]

The purpose of "supernatural" is not to explain events. It's to explain the possible nature of god. In this particular sub-discussion, we're examining what the nature of the supernatural might be.

Without reference to any events or activities, why would that be of any interest to us?

Linda

 

[fls]

What does your response have to do with my statement whatsoever?

You said that those interested in fine-tuning weren't interested in it as a scientific endeavour.

Really? You're really going to misuse it AGAIN even after I posted the correct definition? Incredible!

I am simply curious as to whether or not it is possible to show you how this is a lovely example.

Obviously, I thought you were arguing that the set of characteristics wasn't science, since it didn't even occur to you that it was necessary to agree that that set of characteristics isn't science.

So when I listed the evidence that suggested the possibility of extra-terrestrial life, talked about ways in which the hypothesis was falsifiable, and mentioned the sort of observations that extra-terrestrial life explained, I meant that as a red-herring, since you were really of the opinion that I was talking about something else (i.e. the set of characteristics that aren't science)?

It would be impossible to search the entire galaxy in order to prove that aliens don't exist, correct. Even if it could be proven that the conditions that gave rise to intelligent life here are rare, we could not prove that aliens don't exist (only that they're not likely to exist).

Do you think that we'd consider it less likely that intelligent aliens exist based on that information - i.e. would that information change our minds?

No.

Really? If you say that a set necessarily has these three characteristics and someone shows you that a thing doesn't have one of the characteristics, you're still willing to say that the thing is a member of the set?

But you've already agreed that when taken together the description doesn't describe a scientific endeavor, so I don't know why you're arguing this point.

Maybe that should be a clue that that isn't the point I'm arguing.

Do you think there's no valid scientific hypothesis that isn't based on prior evidence, that is unfalsifiable, or that doesn't explain known observations?

I'm sorry. I can't parse that sentence.

Because it illustrates that being curious about something does not necessarily mean that you're following the scientific method.

Well, that's a given. But my point was only that being curious about something could be scientific. A list of things that aren't scientific doesn't really have anything to say about the matter.

I also responded to your list.

These were your examples, not mine. Of course there was compelling evidence that there were small and distant objects to view, which is why they weren't valid examples.

Really? We had compelling evidence that there were moons orbiting Jupiter before they were first observed through a telescope? We had compelling evidence that there were microscopic organisms in pond water before we observed them through a microscope?

There is no objective threshold that I know of. Compelling means that there's enough of a totality of evidence to indicate that a proposition is true.

So you are saying that when a paleontologist picks a site to dig for bones, they almost always find bones there?

Does that mean that you consider most drug research unscientific, since it turns out that most substances are ineffective (i.e. the proposition being tested is almost always false)?

I didn't say they weren't more likely to have "Earth-like" planets than non-Sun-like stars. I said that there's no compelling evidence that the "Sun-like" stars they are looking at are likely to have aliens near them.

What's your threshold for "likely"? Greater than 50%?

I stand corrected. Some of those things may exist on other planets. The fact that many are not known to exist on any other planet supports the point that there isn't compelling evidence of any planets other than ours that are likely to have intelligent life.

So now you agree that some of these things may be conditions for life, since their absence makes life less likely?

Your witty remarks aside, you didn't list the conditions or events by which intelligent life emerged on this planet.

Intelligence isn't a result of evolution?

Like I said, we don't know the conditions and events by which intelligent life emerged on this planet. If you disagree, please list them or point me to a source that specifies what they are.

I don't believe that you are unaware that there is a vast amount of research on abiogenesis, evolution, and cosmology.

What outcomes are you referring to in the fine-tuning argument that are explained?

It would explain any collection of constants in which we would happen to find ourselves.

That particular argument wouldn't explain anything but fine-tuning as far as I can tell.

Many sets of constants would be fine-tuned. But what I was really thinking was that the form of the argument would explain anything. A Sun-Mover would explain the movement of the sun, a Lightning-Former would explain the formation of lightning, etc.

Exactly. Who ever said they would be?

Nobody would. What sort of things would nobody say were the work of God?

Nope. Sorry. The argument seems quite specific to fine-tuning. If you disagree, you're welcome to try to rearrange the argument to explain something else.

That can't be true. God has been an explanation for all kinds of stuff for a lot longer than the idea of fine-tuning has been around.

I have no idea what you're talking about.

I'm asking why you didn't choose some other arbitrary point at which to draw your supernatural/natural line.

Why not just define "natural universe" as everything including the supernatural? In that case, sure a god could be part of the "natural universe," but what we usually mean by the natural universe would only be a part of the "natural universe" according to your definition.

The set of observable events and their influences is methodological naturalism. If you think that includes God then you would agree that God would be knowable through scientific inquiry rather than unknowable?

The point is that it doesn't matter how you want to define things. A being who is able to set the constants of the universe probably wouldn't be governed by the rules that are defined by the constants being as they are.

-Bri

I agree. But I don't see how that isn't included under events (the constants) and their influences (whatever it is that constrains them).

Linda

 

[Herzblut]

Even going on what you meant to say (that I can only sense the orientation of a my head in relation to a large mass like the Earth when I'm relatively close to the surface of that large mass). . .
So? That's where humans evolved. I can also only see within a certain range of wavelengths and I can't hear at all in the vacuum of space. Does it follow that we can only detect sound by "observing" tiny changes in air pressure but are unable to directly perceive sound?

In space there is no sound signal to be perceived, but there is gravity. Which the crew of the ISS don't "sense". Because humans don't have any native sense for gravity, if humans could "directly sense gravity", the ISS crew could do so as well. But they cannot, which disproves the assertion. Yawn...

There is nothing analogous about the existence of gravity and the existence of God.

Gravity is a natural phenomenon, like radioactivity. But that says nothing about our senses for these. I don't get your point.

 

[Malerin]

The term evidence is always used in conjunction with a claim that it supports. What's your favorite reference? A dictionary? evidence^dict. Encyclopedia? evidence^WP

But you weren't referring to the claim. Let me refresh your memory. I said:

There is evidence that God does exist, though it is usually very subjective.

To which you replied:

And post hoc.

Now, it is a trivial point, but you clearly were calling the subjective evidence I mentioned post hoc. Your use of "and" can only be read as an addendum to my quote: "There is evidence that God does exist, though it is usually very subjective, and post hoc.". Which, of course, makes no sense. A theory can be post hoc, but not the evidence itself. If you're going to question someone's comprehension skills, you should at least avoid such common errors.

That's one way out.

After 50 pages, do you really think we're going to change each other's minds? Time to move on.

 

[Malerin]

Okay.

You are placed in front of a brick wall that extends as far as you can see in all four directions. What is on the other side?

Linda

A non-unicorn

 

[Macoy]

How old is it?

 

[Lord Emsworth]

All the values for the constants are equally likely - but out of all the possible combinations, a very unusual - and significant - set of values emerged. If there really could have been any combination of values, why among all the possible universes which would have been just clouds of hydrogen, would this one have been chosen?

Close. I wanted to know why among all the possible universes would this one have been chosen?

Goddidit is a good explanation for a unique set of constants that results in a specific cloud of hydrogen, I think.

Goddidit is a even good explanation for a unique set of constants that normally would results in a specific cloud of hydrogen but somehow results in a life supporting universe. Goddidit somehow.

Goddidit is a even good explanation for a unique set of constants that normally would result in a life supporting universe but somehow results in a specific cloud of hydrogen. Goddidit somehow.

*Shrugs*

If you look at each of the sets of values individually, then they are all equally likely. If you look at the possible types of universe, then this one is staggeringly unlikely.

How incredibly fortunate that we have the right type of God apparantly.

 

[Tubbythin]

All the values for the constants are equally likely

This is a rather bold assertion imo.

If you look at each of the sets of values individually, then they are all equally likely. If you look at the possible types of universe, then this one is staggeringly unlikely.

Of course its staggeringly unlikely. If you seemingly arbitrarily decide that all the constants are independent and each could have taken any random real number then the probability of any universe goes to 0.
For starters you need to talk about ranges of values which include the constants we have. But what ranges?
Then...
How do you define big changes and small changes?
Do we just vary one constant at a time or can we do several?
Can we have extra dimensions (spatial and/or temporal)?
Can we add extra forces and corresponding constants?
Are we sure these alternative Universes could not support intelligent life or are we biased by our view of the world and lack of imagination?
etc...
Without answers to the above can we really make any meaningful statement about FT?

 

[Paulhoff]

Fined tuned, right........



Paul