Maybe the constitutional right that was violated was freedom of religion, as belief in bigfoot seems to be as lacking in evidence as most religious beliefs.
That would be as novel a legal theory as any of the ones suggested in the complaint.
As I see it, the petition will probably as a matter of fact due to lack of evidence, and additionally fails as a matter of law on most of its claims. In form of law -- at least as I as as layman understand American law -- the prayer for relief for "infringement of constitutional rights" fails summarily for failing to state a cause of action that would justify that relief. That is, the petition seems ill-formed in that way. Normally -- as I understand the rules -- in order to ask a court for relief you need to state a cause of action that alleges the specific acts done or not done, but also identifies what law was broken. That bit's required in order to explain specifically what's wrong with the acts and thereby why the respondent should be liable for any effects. A cause of action alleging a violation of constitutional rights would have to point to the part of the Constitution that the complained-of acts violated. It's not enough just to allege that someone did something or didn't do something else.
But I don't know if a petition for a writ of mandamus is the same as a civil complaint under California (or anyone's) law. My impression is that if your filing with the court is for a writ of mandamus, then a writ of mandamus is all you should pray for in it and expect to receive from it. But I might be wrong. The filing is labeled as a petition for write of mandate (same thing as mandamus), but is written out as if it were a civil complaint. And I just don't know enough about legal procedure to know if that's how it's supposed to be done.
As far as the writ of mandamus would go, the petition seems reasonably in order. The relevant causes of action lay out elements of the California agency's mandate and directives, and alleges facts that would, if proven, support an order from the court directing the agency to make similar efforts regarding Bigfoot -- along the lines of those mission statements -- as it does for other animals and their habitat. Petitioner alleges that California has an obligation to protect its public lands and wildlife from inappropriate action by humans, and likewise to inform and protect people against the dangers present on those lands. Petitioner alleges facts treating the sensitivity of Bigfoot's environment and the supposed dangerous nature of the purport creature. Since we're not at the stage where we test the evidence, that would seem to be an appropriate pleading at this point.
But the petition goes on to claim Petitioner has been injured. Specifically she claims that California's "denial" of Bigfoot relegates her sincere and dedicated scientific efforts the realm of pseudoscience and the paranormal. I enquote "denial" because it's not clear from the petition to what degree, if any, California has denied the existence and nature of Bigfoot. Denial in this sense would seem to be an affirmative act, and the petition alleges no such affirmation. Simply not acting in a way consistent with a belief that Bigfoot exists does not rise to a high degree of malfeasance. The petition merely alleges that California "knows or should know" that Bigfoot exists. That implies California was obliged to interpret the scientific evidence in the light most favorable to Bigfoot fans.
Back the Petitioner, though. She makes a claim that sounds in defamation, but defamation is not, as I understand it, a constitutional matter. It's a matter of tort, which lives in statute and not in the Constitution. To be sure, she has a right not to be defamed. But a complaint alleging defamation would have to be brought under civil law according to state laws governing defamation, not as a matter of constitutional law. Here too I am not aware of any legal construction that makes someone liable for defamation solely via his
inaction. (Negligence, in contrast, is a tort arising from inaction toward an ordinary duty of care, but that's not where we are.) Petitioner desires a reputation as a serious scientist, and alleges that the state's inaction in endorsing her subject of study has somehow injured her by preventing her from attaining that reputation.
Um, okay.
However, I don't believe there is any case law requiring government officials to pretend they share a citizens un-evidenced religious beliefs.
Or unevidenced pseudoscientific beliefs. Or any beliefs. The state is often bound to respect beliefs, but not to endorse them. Moreover I fail to see how the state has any obligation to advance the reputation of some individual researcher by giving some sort of imprimatur. It's questionable how much that endorsement would matter anyway. The factors affecting one's reputation in a scientific community don't seem to have much to do with government endorsement.
I'm pretty sure she's going to need something more than badly underexposed video and "I know what I saw" to convince a court to do anything she wants them to do.
It reminds me a little of the Truther lawsuits, and -- way back in the 1990s -- a few lawsuits from Apollo deniers. It seems that a number of fringe claimants really are so out of touch with the objective credibility of their claims that they think they have any chance to prevail in court. Either that or they just want the publicity. It's often very amusing to see their reaction when the legal system stops them dead in their tracks.
I gather the people leading this circus plan to present a buttload of their standard evidence. It's reasonable to suppose it will be of the same low and unconvincing quality as we've already seen.
Courts are understandably reluctant to rule on questions that look like declarations of scientific validity. Rulings of law are of a different normative character than conclusions over scientific evidence. The courts don't hold, for example, that the Standard Model is the mandated view of elementary particles to the exclusion of all others. They don't suppress or fail conspicuously to endorse competing claims. Where a question of scientific holding becomes material to a legal question, I've always seen the courts defer to the relevant scientists themselves to see whether a sufficient rigor and consensus exists among them to support justiciability. It may very well come down to the court dismissing the petition on the grounds that it's not a kind of question a court can decide. And even if it doesn't dismiss, the facts are not on the Petitioner's side. All excuses aside, there is no consensus in the academic and professional zoology community that the evidence supports the reality of Bigfoot as a new, real species. Sure, you can have Meldrum talk up a storm on the stand. But at the end of the day, the fact remains that the scientific community of which Meldrum is a part has an opposing consensus. That's the fact that I think would end up weighing most in court.
Generally anyone who acts under color of law has to do so with a rational basis. Where discretion is allowed -- as it is and ought to be in some cases -- it is still subject to rational review, but only if its discretion appears irrational. Discretion among similarly rational alternatives doesn't really come under judicial scrutiny, in my experience. Since the California agency has the power to enjoin behavior, it could conceivably be forced to post signs warning people to keep out of suspected Bigfoot habitat, and to cite and fine them for violations. That's an infringement upon people's right to access public lands, and it would have to have a rational basis to hold up under scrutiny. Since the agency would be liable for the effects of such infringements, it has discretion in how to make and enforce those rules. It also has discretion in how best to manage the resources that have been appropriated for it. Petitioner wants the state to aid in her study of Bigfoot, an enterprise that would compete with all other activities consistent with the agency's mission. The agency has discretion in determining the most likely beneficial outcome from its stewardship of resources, and it would be somewhat a violation of separation of powers for a court to mandate that an agency of the executive exercise its discretion in a particular way.
I don't see this ending in a non-amusing way.
