Automatons

[rocketdodger]

I find the whole materialist-idealist thing not so totally relevant here nowadays. I think the terms no longer fit the situation so well. Mostly idealism is dualistic when you pull it apart and, regarding materialism, we don't know what the final substance looks like anyway. There is a mathematical consistency in our shared objective reality. I find this the main point.

Nick

Yet, you have no idea what I am talking about, because you are not really a materialist. I find this the main point.

 

[Nick227]

Yet, you have no idea what I am talking about, because you are not really a materialist. I find this the main point.

Well, I was following most of it, until you said that experience is identity. Perhaps you could expand on this bit.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, I was following most of it, until you said that experience is identity. Perhaps you could expand on this bit.

Nick

It means that no matter how much you examine a human brain, all you are ever going to see is a physical process -- particles interacting, neurons firing, information flowing, etc.

Eventually we will know exactly how every human behavior arises (I mean, we have a good idea now, but we don't know the technical details involved at the neural level) and we will be able to fully simulate a human mind.

But we will never "see" subjective experience -- the minds we can examine in full, and even the ones we simulate, will be subjectively experiencing, but all we will "see", objectively, is their behavior. And the behavior of their simulated neurons, their simulated particles, whatever.

Because by definition, subjective experience is subjective. Which is what many people don't seem to understand -- the very definition of the term!

So when I say "experience is identity" I mean the feeling of "subjective experience" that humans have is merely what happens when a physical process is a physical process.

To me, you are just a process. To you, it seems like you are more than a process because you are the process, and so the substrate which supports you is invisible to you. You already seem to understand this (or so you claim).

But if we say this, then we have to allow that water molecules have subjective experience as well -- because they are a physical process that is a physical process. That doesn't mean their experience is anything like a person's, or even that their experience is anything at all beyond simple identity. So even calling it "experience" is misleading, because people tend to think of conscious entities when they think of "experience." But we have to do that in order to be consistent.

Also, if you want to say that subjective experience doesn't actually exist, that is fine too -- just think of it as "the phenomenon that most humans call subjective experience."

 

[Nick227]

It means that no matter how much you examine a human brain, all you are ever going to see is a physical process -- particles interacting, neurons firing, information flowing, etc.

Eventually we will know exactly how every human behavior arises (I mean, we have a good idea now, but we don't know the technical details involved at the neural level) and we will be able to fully simulate a human mind.

But we will never "see" subjective experience -- the minds we can examine in full, and even the ones we simulate, will be subjectively experiencing, but all we will "see", objectively, is their behavior. And the behavior of their simulated neurons, their simulated particles, whatever.

I pretty much agree. You will not see what another human being sees because what you are is actually simply data. There is actually no one seeing.

Because by definition, subjective experience is subjective. Which is what many people don't seem to understand -- the very definition of the term!

I haven't seen so many people struggle with subjectivity.

So when I say "experience is identity" I mean the feeling of "subjective experience" that humans have is merely what happens when a physical process is a physical process.

To me, you are just a process. To you, it seems like you are more than a process because you are the process, and so the substrate which supports you is invisible to you. You already seem to understand this (or so you claim).

I would more say that "you" or "I" are aspects of the process. There is no actual observer or experiencer, merely the feeling, derived from various other processes, that there should be one.

But if we say this, then we have to allow that water molecules have subjective experience as well -- because they are a physical process that is a physical process.

To do that you're going to have to show that water molecules have a sense of self. No selfhood = no experience.

If you were the only human on the planet you would no longer have "experiences" because experiences are merely the brain's packaging of data into a dualistic format for communicating to others.

That doesn't mean their experience is anything like a person's, or even that their experience is anything at all beyond simple identity. So even calling it "experience" is misleading, because people tend to think of conscious entities when they think of "experience." But we have to do that in order to be consistent.

I think if you can make a case out that water molecules process data you could say they're conscious personally, though there are a lot of interesting complications here.

Nick

 

[westprog]

No. The critical point is that you claimed Penrose is more prestigious than Godel or Tarski, because you just assumed that the "mathematical theories" I refer to (despite the fact that I explicitly said incompleteness) are woo and that I or some other non-peer-reviewed average joe came up with them. And the critical point is that you couldn't be more wrong.

What you've done here - and you've been doing it consistently - is to compare Penrose's interpretation of Godel, and some other unnamed persons interpretation - presumably Hofstadter, but since you don't say, we don't know. Then you characterise this as Penrose vs. Godel. Clearly this is entirely fallacious. To assume in advance that Hofstadter (or some other unnamed person) is the true prophet of Godel, and that Penrose, professor of mathematics at Oxford, is the apostate, is obviously to beg the question.

It might be that Hofstadter is right, or that Penrose is right. Since Godel was writing not about biology, but formal mathematical systems, it is extremely plausible that each of them is applying the theory of incompleteness in a way that isn't valid. However, Godel, as far as I know, said nothing about the application of his meta-mathematical theory to consciousness. Certainly it is quite a stretch to merely refer to Godel and to leave it as read that it is then assured that consciousness cannot be investigated and that it is purely computational.

How about simply knowing what one is talking about? As in, not making fallacious errors in one's arguments?

Yeah.

 

[westprog]

This is all so much nonsense.

Only a dualist would find the computational model of consciousness to be a "dead end to further investigation."

I'm not the one assuming that because consciousness is viewable by only one person that it cannot be investigated. It's already common practice to carry out operations on the brain with the patient conscious, and to rely on his subjective experience as a guide to surgery. That's a possible approach which would allow the physical basis of subjective experience to be scientifically investigated. There's simply no reason to rule it out as inherently impossible.

 

[Nick227]

I'm not the one assuming that because consciousness is viewable by only one person that it cannot be investigated. It's already common practice to carry out operations on the brain with the patient conscious, and to rely on his subjective experience as a guide to surgery. That's a possible approach which would allow the physical basis of subjective experience to be scientifically investigated. There's simply no reason to rule it out as inherently impossible.

True. There is heterophenomenology.

Of course, RD might claim that the observer is "still not actually experiencing it," which is actually still a Cartesian position to take. Not that that usually stops him.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Because by definition, subjective experience is subjective. Which is what many people don't seem to understand -- the very definition of the term!

So when I say "experience is identity" I mean the feeling of "subjective experience" that humans have is merely what happens when a physical process is a physical process.

To me, you are just a process. To you, it seems like you are more than a process because you are the process, and so the substrate which supports you is invisible to you. You already seem to understand this (or so you claim).

I would more say that "you" or "I" are aspects of the process. There is no actual observer or experiencer, merely the feeling, derived from various other processes, that there should be one.

I find this exchange curious because I think, yet again, that the confusion her is language-based rather than that of actual meaning (I took the liberty to underlined what I think is important).

Nick, I think you might be caught within your own “duality radar” here. If you read what RD is saying completely from a third person perspective (i.e. apply the meaning in the first underlining to the second one), it’s pretty clear that the intentions is not to prescribe dualistic ownership, but rather to describe it – explaining why we seem to have this intuitive predisposition to treat subjective experience as something other than a state of “being” the system. And no, the term ‘being’ is not problematic in the dualistic sense here because it refers to RD’s “…what happens when a physical process is a physical process.” The term ‘you’ is meant to describe the system referred to, not ‘ownership’ of the system. At least this is how I understand the message (I might be wrong of course, thus RD can surely correct me).

But if we say this, then we have to allow that water molecules have subjective experience as well -- because they are a physical process that is a physical process. That doesn't mean their experience is anything like a person's, or even that their experience is anything at all beyond simple identity. So even calling it "experience" is misleading, because people tend to think of conscious entities when they think of "experience." But we have to do that in order to be consistent.

Also, if you want to say that subjective experience doesn't actually exist, that is fine too -- just think of it as "the phenomenon that most humans call subjective experience."

To do that you're going to have to show that water molecules have a sense of self. No selfhood = no experience.

If you were the only human on the planet you would no longer have "experiences" because experiences are merely the brain's packaging of data into a dualistic format for communicating to others.

Again, Nick, if by ‘experience’ you mean some kind of anthropomorphic evaluation of events happening, you could be correct. But that’s not what RD is portraying experience to mean (thus he says it could be misleading if not understood correctly). This is a semantic difference which is clouding the issue at hands. It’s clear that you disagree with RD’s definition/use of the term, and hence things get pretty sour when your argument about what he should “show” in order to prove his case is based on this sort of confusion.

 

[Nick227]

Nick, I think you might be caught within your own “duality radar” here. If you read what RD is saying completely from a third person perspective (i.e. apply the meaning in the first underlining to the second one), it’s pretty clear that the intentions is not to prescribe dualistic ownership, but rather to describe it – explaining why we seem to have this intuitive predisposition to treat subjective experience as something other than a state of “being” the system. And no, the term ‘being’ is not problematic in the dualistic sense here because it refers to RD’s “…what happens when a physical process is a physical process.” The term ‘you’ is meant to describe the system referred to, not ‘ownership’ of the system. At least this is how I understand the message (I might be wrong of course, thus RD can surely correct me).

Hi Lupus,

I appreciate that there is a confusion in the terminology here. For me personally, the word "experience" is so laden in dualistic associations that I don't think it is useful in these types of discussion except with clear agreement.

I certainly agree with your interpretation of RD's post, in that I'm in agreement with what you're saying above (from "- explaining why...). I also feel I appreciate the intent that RD has behind his statement "…what happens when a physical process is a physical process...” and also agree that myself and him are essentially talking about the same thing here.

Where I have problems is in equating this reflection (that we are predisposed towards regarding subjectivity as something other our state of "being the system") to his statement "Experience is identity." I agree with the reflection, but I don't see how his statement equates to it, or actually how it really makes sense. Can you help me out here?

"I" and "experience" are concepts that reinforce each other, but "identity" is not the same as "I."

It concerns me that he uses the term "experience" so freely and without, to my mind, adequate awareness of the inevitably dualistic associations.

Again, Nick, if by ‘experience’ you mean some kind of anthropomorphic evaluation of events happening, you could be correct. But that’s not what RD is portraying experience to mean (thus he says it could be misleading if not understood correctly). This is a semantic difference which is clouding the issue at hands. It’s clear that you disagree with RD’s definition/use of the term, and hence things get pretty sour when your argument about what he should “show” in order to prove his case is based on this sort of confusion.

I think he's basically persisting in a Cartesian viewpoint, yes. This is my judgement based on how he writes. I regard experiences as purely the result of thinking, thinking aimed at social communication. Thus to me it is nonsense to state that a water molecule is experiencing. I would say that to experience you need specifically an "I." This requires thinking and thus a certain level of neuroanatomy which water molecules clearly don't possess. If he said that the water molecule was "conscious" this to me would be a different thing. I think to be conscious you only need to process. This raises a couple of complex issues around whether very simple systems could be said to process, and whether this "processing" is merely the result of a human desire to regard them as processors, but otherwise seems fairly straightforward.

Nick

 

[westprog]

Hi Lupus,

I appreciate that there is a confusion in the terminology here. For me personally, the word "experience" is so laden in dualistic associations that I don't think it is useful in these types of discussion except with clear agreement.

I think this is the key point. If we use "experience" to mean that things happen to a water molecule, then that's an acceptable use, but it means nothing different from behaviour. If it means that the water molecule "experiences" the world in any sense, then I take strong issue with that claim, since I don't see any evidence of any such thing. As far as we know, a water molecule doesn't experience the world in any meaningful way.

If this has the implication that the awareness I have as a human being is an aggregation of the experience of all the bits that make me up, then I don't think that that has been established. How does the experience of a water molecule, which doesn't affect behaviour, combine into the experience of a human being, whose awareness does affect behaviour?

On the other hand, I don't think that Nick's contention that awareness and consciousness are just data processing is supported either.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Where I have problems is in equating this reflection (that we are predisposed towards regarding subjectivity as something other our state of "being the system") to his statement "Experience is identity." I agree with the reflection, but I don't see how his statement equates to it, or actually how it really makes sense. Can you help me out here?

Well, I’m not sure I completely agree with what I’m writing (I haven’t had time to really think about it), but maybe something like this:

From a materialistic point of view, subjective experience is an illusion in the sense that, from a third person perspective it will not show up on the radar even thou everything is accounted for in its totality. Which is precisely because subjective experience is merely the material state of the system, being translated to as if seen/experienced from a first person perspective (note the ‘as if’ here).

So, from a third person perspective (as I suggested could be a good choice here), “experience is identity” could perhaps be translated as: “the material state of a system is being represented over there.” Only the ‘material state’ is observer independent whereas ‘being represented’ and ‘over there’ are observer relative, which consequently makes the notions of experience (‘being represented) and identity (‘over there’) as 1:st person categories understandable, but not so without each other.

 

[Nick227]

I think this is the key point. If we use "experience" to mean that things happen to a water molecule, then that's an acceptable use, but it means nothing different from behaviour.

But why should one use the word in this manner? To say "the water molecule behaves in such-and-such a way" is one thing, to say that the water molecule "experiences" is completely another and I see no good reason for doing it.

On the other hand, I don't think that Nick's contention that awareness and consciousness are just data processing is supported either.

Well, I haven't really mentioned "awareness" yet, which to be honest is too much for me to deal with yet! As to whether consciousness is simply data processing, I submit that this explanation does deal with a lot of otherwise sticky issues around the whole debate. In what way do you feel it isn't supported?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

From a materialistic point of view, subjective experience is an illusion in the sense that, from a third person perspective it will not show up on the radar even thou everything is accounted for in its totality. Which is precisely because subjective experience is merely the material state of the system, being translated to as if seen/experienced from a first person perspective (note the ‘as if’ here).

I don't know that I can quite follow, or perhaps agree, with your first sentence above.

As I see it, subjective experience is not an illusion in the sense that what is seen is what is there. It is rather that the framework into which the mind translates "what is there" utilises conceptual categories which cannot themselves be substantiated. This is as you say in the second sentence.

So, from a third person perspective (as I suggested could be a good choice here), “experience is identity” could perhaps be translated as: “the material state of a system is being represented over there.” Only the ‘material state’ is observer independent whereas ‘being represented’ and ‘over there’ are observer relative, which consequently makes the notions of experience (‘being represented) and identity (‘over there’) as 1:st person categories understandable, but not so without each other.

Sounds promising, though the word "observer" raises issues for me. Can't say I can think of a better one though. I'm also not much convinced that this was what RD meant, but maybe he'll let us know.

Nick

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

I don't know that I can quite follow, or perhaps agree, with your first sentence above.

As I see it, subjective experience is not an illusion in the sense that what is seen is what is there. It is rather that the framework into which the mind translates "what is there" utilises conceptual categories which cannot themselves be substantiated. This is as you say in the second sentence.

Well that was a bit of sloppy writing by me, I must admit... more like 'illusion' in the sense of "free floating subjectivity/qualia" of some sort. Thus it’s not actually what it might be believed to be. A bit of a straw man still, aimed at naive dualists, but I'm sure you'll get the gist of it.

 

[rocketdodger]

What you've done here - and you've been doing it consistently - is to compare Penrose's interpretation of Godel, and some other unnamed persons interpretation - presumably Hofstadter, but since you don't say, we don't know. Then you characterise this as Penrose vs. Godel. Clearly this is entirely fallacious. To assume in advance that Hofstadter (or some other unnamed person) is the true prophet of Godel, and that Penrose, professor of mathematics at Oxford, is the apostate, is obviously to beg the question.

Yes I definitely fall on the side of Hofstadter and those that have followed him.

But that is irrelevant to the fact that Penrose's conclusion is simply the result of a fallacy. An error in logic.

If you don't believe me (but I suspect you do) simply google lucas + penrose + fallacy. Hell, if you just google lucas + penrose, something like half the links are to articles criticising the thesis/theory/whatever-one-should-call-it.

So it is not simply Penrose's "interpretation" versus Hofstadter's "interpretation", it is Penrose's "interpretation" versus the accepted standards for logical argument.

Certainly it is quite a stretch to merely refer to Godel and to leave it as read that it is then assured that consciousness cannot be investigated ... snip ...

Surely -- That is probably why I never suggested anything of the sort.

I merely asserted that the subjective nature of consciousness cannot be investigated at all by a third party, and cannot be investigated fully by yourself. Hence, it cannot be investigated fully.

You, because you are looking for any slight way to invalidate the computational model, grasp onto this and come back with a strawman claiming the computational model asserts that consciousness cannot be investigated at all. Which is of course utter nonsense.

 

[rocketdodger]

It’s clear that you disagree with RD’s definition/use of the term, and hence things get pretty sour when your argument about what he should “show” in order to prove his case is based on this sort of confusion.

What makes me sour is the way Nick seems to ignore or purposefully misunderstand what I say, in order to post the replies he wants to make rather than the ones he should. Kind of like a political candidate.

For the record, you understand me perfectly lupus. So why not others?

 

[rocketdodger]

I think this is the key point. If we use "experience" to mean that things happen to a water molecule, then that's an acceptable use, but it means nothing different from behaviour.

... snip ...

How does the experience of a water molecule, which doesn't affect behaviour, combine into the experience of a human being, whose awareness does affect behaviour

Because humans simply have more complex behavior, including behaviors that affect behavior. What is so difficult about that?

You are hung up on this idea that subjective experience is somehow different from behavior. Yet, in the entire history of this argument, nobody has ever been able to argue why except "well, it just feels different.. so it must be..."

 

[westprog]

But why should one use the word in this manner? To say "the water molecule behaves in such-and-such a way" is one thing, to say that the water molecule "experiences" is completely another and I see no good reason for doing it.

I can't see what it even means, seperated from a discussion of consciousness. Perhaps Mr Wolf will explain it to me.

Well, I haven't really mentioned "awareness" yet, which to be honest is too much for me to deal with yet! As to whether consciousness is simply data processing, I submit that this explanation does deal with a lot of otherwise sticky issues around the whole debate. In what way do you feel it isn't supported?

It's not supported by enough evidence. We have computational devices that don't exhibit consciousness, and we've human beings, which are not necessarily computational devices. We don't know if human thought is computational in nature.

I think it's quite possible that the only reason that computation is associated with consciousness is that computers in the early days were referred to as giant brains.

 

[westprog]

Because humans simply have more complex behavior, including behaviors that affect behavior. What is so difficult about that?

Summing up zero millions of times adds up to zero. If a water molecule exhibits no "experience effects", then why should a more complex thing do so?

We know a little bit about consciousness. We know it's not, in practice, divisible and recombinable. As experienced, each person has just one consciousness. Why assume that it is a combination of the experience of the bits?

We don't assume that the individual bits of a car have the same capacity as a car. We don't look at the wheels and assume that they must have an MPG rating, or look at the seats and try to calculate the horsepower. We assume that there are certain things that only apply to the car as a whole. Human beings are not fractal - they are not made of tiny human beings. Why assume that "experience" is something that continues to exist at a small scale, or that can be chopped up and subdivided? Why assume that it relates to other things at all, when it gives no evidence of doing so?

You are hung up on this idea that subjective experience is somehow different from behavior. Yet, in the entire history of this argument, nobody has ever been able to argue why except "well, it just feels different.. so it must be..."

If it's subjective, then it's different. Behaviour is objective. I think that explains why. How is it possible to claim that something that is subjective is the same thing as something which isn't?

 

[Nick227]

What makes me sour is the way Nick seems to ignore or purposefully misunderstand what I say, in order to post the replies he wants to make rather than the ones he should. Kind of like a political candidate.

I am not purposely misunderstanding you, RD. I happen to think you are completely a "Cartesian materialist," to use the term coined by Daniel Dennett. You like to project yourself as a materialist but your thinking reveals strong Cartesian elements. This I would evidence by pointing out your constant referrals to "experience" - an inherently Cartesian and dualistic term, and your apparent belief that the issues with selfhood are straightforward and intuitive when pretty much every commentator or researcher agrees they are anything but, see here Blackmore, Dennett, Ramachandran for a start.

Nick