Automatons

[Nick227]

Nick, please, if you are going to be part of this discussion, you are going to have to try to use your memory like a big boy.

I am not a supporter of p-zombies or chinese-rooms causing a conundrum. I merely use them as examples because HPC proponents are.

Well, you seem to me to be denying the HPC, whilst still maintaining that things like experience, experiencer, and selfhood are innate properties of being, rather that the result of simple processing functions.

Thus to me you fall in the category Dan Dennett designates "Cartesian Materialists" - those who like to portray themselves as materialists but who's beliefs invariably show remnants of Cartesian thinking.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

How do you know I am not a p-zombie?

Because you are communicating. The whole notion of p-zombies assumes that consciousness is qualitatively different from data processing.

Nick

 

[westprog]

How do you know I am not a p-zombie?

I don't. It's a courtesy thing - anyone who says I'm not a zombie I'll assume isn't one.

How do you know you are not a p-zombie?

I have awareness. I am able to directly detect it.

Because of the theoretical existence of p-zombies.

It isn't that experience doesn'thave any effects in general, its just that in theory we can come up with instances where it does not have any effects and a human like you or I wouldn't be able to tell the difference.

The existence of theoretical entities which can compose symphonies and derive mathematical theories is rather less compelling than the existence of real entities which can do these things. We don't know if such beings are possible.

Westprog, look at what you are saying here. We can't tell until we produce an entity with/without experience? But the very issue is whether or not we can detect experience in another entity. So your reasoning here is very circular.

I can directly detect experience/awareness/consciousness in at least one entity. That's a phenomenon which requires explanation.

Yes. And there is hardly anyone intelligent enough to understand his argument fully that actually agrees with him. So why appeal to his authority?

I'm not appealing to his authority, I'm denying yours. The mathematical proofs that you refer to have a rather less prestigous source than Penrose. Hence if I'm allowed to doubt him then I'm allowed to doubt them.

Well, if you simulated an entire human down to the molecular level, then it would tell us as much as it is possible to learn about their internal state.

Yet, there would still be no way to tell whether that simulation were experiencing or not. Which is the entire issue in a single sentence -- how is it possible to tell when an entity is subjectively experiencing? It isn't.

The flaw is the assumption that if we can't tell whether something is happening, it isn't actually happening, or that it doesn't matter if it's happening.

 

[westprog]

Sometimes it is.

Othertimes, it is amazingly simple, and can be easily simulated, yet people still feel that the person they are talking to is human rather than just an android.

Why?

Even the simplest of conversations are amazingly difficult to simulate effectively. In forty years of trying, there's not a single program which can effectively simulate human conversation.

 

[westprog]

So, supposing you were a molecular reproduction of westprog, and exhibited all the behaviors of the real westprog -- down to particle level -- are you or are you not experiencing?

We don't know.

Or is your experience merely a simulation of the real experience that the real westprog experienced?

We don't know.

I assert that simulated experience is experience nonetheless. You seem to disagree here, but I see a problem for you -- there is no possible definition of experience you can come up with that could validate such a view.

I can write a three line program that asserts consciousness. I don't believe that that program experiences anything.

The only reason that I assume that other people have awareness is

1. They claim to have it.
2. They seem to be quite like me.
3. I have awareness.

It isn't perfect proof, but I find it persuasive.

Unless you want to say experience is identity ... but then you are also invalidating your view that experience is not identity.

I've said before - the terms we use in these discussions are not well defined. That doesn't mean that they don't refer to real phenomena.

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, you seem to me to be denying the HPC, whilst still maintaining that things like experience, experiencer, and selfhood are innate properties of being, rather that the result of simple processing functions.

Thus to me you fall in the category Dan Dennett designates "Cartesian Materialists" - those who like to portray themselves as materialists but who's beliefs invariably show remnants of Cartesian thinking.

Nick

When I say "experience is identity" I mean exactly that.

You, as a closet idealist pretending to be a materialist, interpret that statement to mean "identity, which is an innate property of being, is equivalent to human experience."

To an outside observer -- or anyone who is not insane, really -- those two statements are not even close to being equivalent. Yet you insist they are. Why?

 

[rocketdodger]

Because you are communicating. The whole notion of p-zombies assumes that consciousness is qualitatively different from data processing.

Nick

Uh, the whole notion of p-zombies assumes that they can mimic all external behavior perfectly.

Which means communication has nothing to do with it...

 

[rocketdodger]

I have awareness. I am able to directly detect it.

How do you know your awareness is not just a simulation of actual awareness?

I can directly detect experience/awareness/consciousness in at least one entity. That's a phenomenon which requires explanation.

It has been explained -- for over 20 years. You just refuse to accept it.

I'm not appealing to his authority, I'm denying yours. The mathematical proofs that you refer to have a rather less prestigous source than Penrose. Hence if I'm allowed to doubt him then I'm allowed to doubt them.

Yes.

Penrose is a more prestigious source than Godel and Tarski.

Never mind that nobody of importance supports Penrose's philosophical conclusions, and that Penrose himself relied on the work of Godel and Tarski to reach those conclusions (which, remember, nobody of importance agrees with).

*shakes head*

The flaw is the assumption that if we can't tell whether something is happening, it isn't actually happening, or that it doesn't matter if it's happening.

If anyone ever doubted that you were a dualist, this statement should convince them.

 

[rocketdodger]

We don't know.

No, we do. If you are a simulation, but you are experiencing, then you are experiencing. You are not "fake" experiencing. The fact that you dodge a question like this is clear evidence that you are dualist.

 

[Nick227]

When I say "experience is identity" I mean exactly that.

You're saying the two words have identical meanings? Or what exactly?

Nick

 

[Nick227]

Uh, the whole notion of p-zombies assumes that they can mimic all external behavior perfectly.

Which means communication has nothing to do with it...

The original notion of p-zombies was as you describe. However, to my mind, a Strong AI refutation of p-zombies points out that p-zombies cannot possibly exist. Consciousness is processing. Thus, if you are communicating you cannot possibly be a p-zombie. Perhaps one could say that rocks are p-zombies.

As I see it the issue arises because the body also has "unconscious" processing. Thus the assumption tends to arise that there is a self which is aware of certain internal processes of the body but not of others. To my mind, this and many other similar issues and thought experiments only arise because of this assumed innate presence of self.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

You, as a closet idealist pretending to be a materialist, interpret that statement to mean "identity, which is an innate property of being, is equivalent to human experience."

I find the whole materialist-idealist thing not so totally relevant here nowadays. I think the terms no longer fit the situation so well. Mostly idealism is dualistic when you pull it apart and, regarding materialism, we don't know what the final substance looks like anyway. There is a mathematical consistency in our shared objective reality. I find this the main point.

Nick

 

[westprog]

How do you know your awareness is not just a simulation of actual awareness?

There can't be a simulation of awareness - because it would be indistinguishable from awareness. It's impossible to have awareness simulated without being aware.

That is quite a different matter from the third party detection of awareness.

It has been explained -- for over 20 years. You just refuse to accept it.

Indeed I do, for good reason. But I'm far from alone in that.

Yes.

Penrose is a more prestigious source than Godel and Tarski.

Never mind that nobody of importance supports Penrose's philosophical conclusions, and that Penrose himself relied on the work of Godel and Tarski to reach those conclusions (which, remember, nobody of importance agrees with).

*shakes head*

Mathematician bases his work on work done by other mathematicians shock horror!

The critical point here, of course, is that Godel and Tarski didn't write papers on consciousness. Penrose has.

Penrose doesn't consider that's he's working in the field of philosophy. He's doing work in Physics and Mathematics. In that field, he may well have people "of importance" disagreeing with him, but most physicists and mathematicians have not concerned themselves with the area of consciousness in any way.

I wonder how one becomes a "person of importance" in this field? Such that one can demand acquiescence from the unimportant people?

If anyone ever doubted that you were a dualist, this statement should convince them.

I presume that will lower my ranking on the Importance Scale.

 

[westprog]

No, we do. If you are a simulation, but you are experiencing, then you are experiencing. You are not "fake" experiencing. The fact that you dodge a question like this is clear evidence that you are dualist.

There are far to many hypotheticals in the question for it to be useful as a guide to what might really happen. We can't produce molecularly identical copies of people.

What we can do is to look at other people. Can we directly detect their awareness? No. Do we assume that they have awareness similar to our own? Probably we think they do. The problem remains exactly the same with a molecularly identical copy. Until we know the precise nature of consciousness, rather than confidently assert it for twenty years, we can't claim that it does or does not exist in any particular case except for the one where it is directly accessible.

 

[westprog]

You're saying the two words have identical meanings? Or what exactly?

It's quite possible to claim that experience is identity, or experience is data, or experience is processing, or experience is the Gift Of The Holy Spirit. Such claims remain assertions unless they are soundly backed up. (And saying "Godel!" isn't evidence).

 

[Nick227]

It's quite possible to claim that experience is identity, or experience is data, or experience is processing, or experience is the Gift Of The Holy Spirit. Such claims remain assertions unless they are soundly backed up. (And saying "Godel!" isn't evidence).

I still don't see how experience is identity.

I mean, if I say that consciousness is the same as data this to me is at least a coherent assertion. It can be followed, whether or not it is true or substantiable.

Nick

 

[westprog]

I still don't see how experience is identity.

I mean, if I say that consciousness is the same as data this to me is at least a coherent assertion. It can be followed, whether or not it is true or substantiable.

Nick

There is indeed a distinction between arguments that we think are wrong, and arguments that simply don't make sense. "Not even wrong" is the expression I think Pauli used.

A wrong theory would be one that makes predictions that turn out not to be born out by subsequent observations. A foolish wrong theory, such as creationism, would be one that is falsified by observations that have already been made. But if a theory makes no predictions, and provides a mere dead end to further investigation, what use is it? A good theory demands experiments to confirm or refute it - for example, the Higgs boson. If experiment confirms the theory, that will be wonderful. If it falsifies it, that will be even better. It's been a strong criticism of string theory that it can't in practice be verified - but at least it can be verified or refuted in theory, even if the resources to do so are impracticable.

 

[rocketdodger]

There is indeed a distinction between arguments that we think are wrong, and arguments that simply don't make sense. "Not even wrong" is the expression I think Pauli used.

A wrong theory would be one that makes predictions that turn out not to be born out by subsequent observations. A foolish wrong theory, such as creationism, would be one that is falsified by observations that have already been made. But if a theory makes no predictions, and provides a mere dead end to further investigation, what use is it? A good theory demands experiments to confirm or refute it - for example, the Higgs boson. If experiment confirms the theory, that will be wonderful. If it falsifies it, that will be even better. It's been a strong criticism of string theory that it can't in practice be verified - but at least it can be verified or refuted in theory, even if the resources to do so are impracticable.

This is all so much nonsense.

Only a dualist would find the computational model of consciousness to be a "dead end to further investigation."

If a theory asserts X is not what one wants X to be, one might think it is a dead end. But that doesn't seem very scientific to me. If all the experimental evidence confirms the theory ...

I mean, you might as well spin around endlessly looking for that pink elephant hovering behind you Westprog. There is always the possibility that it is there! Spin!

 

[rocketdodger]

It's quite possible to claim that experience is identity, or experience is data, or experience is processing, or experience is the Gift Of The Holy Spirit. Such claims remain assertions unless they are soundly backed up. (And saying "Godel!" isn't evidence).

Clearly, all the experimental evidence to date -- not to mention the very laws of mathematics -- aren't enough to "soundly" back up a theory.

At least, not when that theory asserts something a delusional human doesn't want it to assert.

 

[rocketdodger]

The critical point here, of course, is that Godel and Tarski didn't write papers on consciousness. Penrose has.

No. The critical point is that you claimed Penrose is more prestigious than Godel or Tarski, because you just assumed that the "mathematical theories" I refer to (despite the fact that I explicitly said incompleteness) are woo and that I or some other non-peer-reviewed average joe came up with them. And the critical point is that you couldn't be more wrong.

I wonder how one becomes a "person of importance" in this field? Such that one can demand acquiescence from the unimportant people?

How about simply knowing what one is talking about? As in, not making fallacious errors in one's arguments?