Automatons

[rocketdodger]

A lot of scientists, from the Chalmers HPC school, I think take a similar position - It must be more complex than that! I'm not much convinced. I think consciousness is data. We are data.

Nick

wtf?

So you agree with me then? I just don't understand you Nick.

 

[Gagglegnash]

Hi

Have a go at re-writing that post without so much reference to implicit selfhood.

Nick

I already did. At no time did I reference implicit selfhood.

I referenced explicit selfhood.

 

[Nick227]

wtf?

So you agree with me then? I just don't understand you Nick.

Well, I roughly agreed with your statement on the previous page, which said "consciousness could simply be what it is like to be a certain type of complexity" but I would more say that consciousness is a certain type of complexity.

This to me is the more monistic perspective. As soon as you start putting in selves, owners, experiencers, observers or whatever you're creating a duality. Or, perhaps better, you're following the dualistic model that the brain creates from its processing.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I already did. At no time did I reference implicit selfhood.

I referenced explicit selfhood.

Well, you wrote...

"The subset of choices that we allow ourselves out of the set of all possible choices in a specific context defines our character. The specific choice me make out of that subset defines our personality. Our choices' effects on others defines us as to which part of human society we belong."

...to me that is choosing to interpret phenomena on a level of the functioning self-contained organism, with starts from the position that selfhood is a given. Personally, I'd call that implicit, but up to you. I was looking more at the level of just data, prior to the construction of selfhood.

Nick

 

[westprog]

But again, you are making this assumption that experience == human experience.

I am not making that assumption.

I'm making the assumption that experience is something that has an effect. As the thought experiment shows, water molecules are not effected by "experience".

Obviously, we can call what happens to a water molecule what we like. But the word "experience" has certain connotations which don't apply in this case.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm making the assumption that experience is something that has an effect. As the thought experiment shows, water molecules are not effected by "experience".

Obviously, we can call what happens to a water molecule what we like. But the word "experience" has certain connotations which don't apply in this case.

My argument is that experience has no effect whatsoever other than for the experiencer.

Which seems to be the agreement among philosophers, right? Hence the conundrums (seemingly) posed by chinese-rooms and p-zombies?

 

[Gagglegnash]

Hi

Well, you wrote...

"The subset of choices that we allow ourselves out of the set of all possible choices in a specific context defines our character. The specific choice me make out of that subset defines our personality. Our choices' effects on others defines us as to which part of human society we belong."

...to me that is choosing to interpret phenomena on a level of the functioning self-contained organism, with starts from the position that selfhood is a given. Personally, I'd call that implicit, but up to you. I was looking more at the level of just data, prior to the construction of selfhood.

Nick

Sorry. I'm totally a, "Digitus pulso, ergo Sum," kind of guy.

 

[westprog]

My argument is that experience has no effect whatsoever other than for the experiencer.

In the case of water molecules, experience has no effect at all, and there is no "experiencer". The water molecule is not affected by experience.

Which seems to be the agreement among philosophers, right? Hence the conundrums (seemingly) posed by chinese-rooms and p-zombies?

I think that evolutionary biologists would have a different viewpoint. If a living creature has some characteristic, then it is probably there for a reason.

 

[rocketdodger]

In the case of water molecules, experience has no effect at all, and there is no "experiencer". The water molecule is not affected by experience.

Neither are you! Hence chinese-rooms and p-zombies...

I think that evolutionary biologists would have a different viewpoint. If a living creature has some characteristic, then it is probably there for a reason.

No, they would not, because the whole point of chinese-rooms and p-zombies is that their external behavior is indistinguishable from a normal entity.

Let me ask you -- how could something with no external effects (experience) influence the mechanisms of natural selection?

It can't -- you are smart enough to know that.

What you really seem to be saying is that you think chinese-rooms and p-zombies are impossible for an entity like a human because our external behavior is dependent on our subjective experience. But we know them to be theoretically possible -- it is a mathematical fact.

But that brings us back to my argument -- if the entire set of external behaviors of a given human being can be simulated (and it can, since human life is finite) then the only conclusion one can possibly reach using your reasoning is that subjective experience is trivially nothing more than identity -- otherwise, how could all external behavior be simulated and be dependent on subjective experience?

 

[Gagglegnash]

Hi

What's that logical fallacy where you base your conclusions on things that aren't in evidence?

If we had some ham, then we could have ham and eggs... if we had some eggs.

"The entire set of external behaviors," isn't a closed set.

It's not simulating existing behaviors that'll show all us heathens, it's the origination of a new, functional and useful behavior to a new stimulus, desire, or need.

Ever since the first hominid tied the first rock to a stick so he could hit some other hominid with it and still stay beyond reach, Homo Takeyourpickulum has been developing new behaviors.

....

...or was it that time when Heather Takeyourpickulum showed up with breasts and won, "Miss Congeniality," at the, "All-Troglodite Most Desirable Mate," contest... I forget.

 

[Robin]

In fact I would have thought that subjectivity and 'self' were the very point of a mind - allowing the organism to navigate and survive in it's environment.

It would be either:

Yes, dogs do have a concept of self or:

No, dogs do have a concept of self

 

[rocketdodger]

"The entire set of external behaviors," isn't a closed set.

Wrong. The set of possible external behaviors that a human may exhibit is open. The set of actual external behaviors is closed.

It's not simulating existing behaviors that'll show all us heathens, it's the origination of a new, functional and useful behavior to a new stimulus, desire, or need.

Nonsense. Hardly any humans exhibit that behavior on a normal basis either -- so why require it of machines? Or are you saying that less intelligent people are not really human, or somehow less human? When you are just chatting with your friend, rather than originating new behavior, are you no longer human?

 

[Nick227]

My argument is that experience has no effect whatsoever other than for the experiencer.

Which seems to be the agreement among philosophers, right? Hence the conundrums (seemingly) posed by chinese-rooms and p-zombies?

"seemingly" being the operative word here. Whilst your first statement is true, imo, it only applies on the level of the organism being considered as an implicit whole. Not all philosophers take the same perspective. Strong AI theorists, like Daniel Dennett, overcome those conundrums.

Nick

 

[westprog]

Neither are you! Hence chinese-rooms and p-zombies...



No, they would not, because the whole point of chinese-rooms and p-zombies is that their external behavior is indistinguishable from a normal entity.

And one can see the p-zombies where?

Let me ask you -- how could something with no external effects (experience) influence the mechanisms of natural selection?

And how do we know that experience has no external effects? How do we establish any such thing?

It is possible that experience is a mere accidental side effect of being human. It's possible that it is an inevitable essential element of being human. It might be an essential element. Until we can produce an entity which does not have awarenes, we can't tell.

It can't -- you are smart enough to know that.

What you really seem to be saying is that you think chinese-rooms and p-zombies are impossible for an entity like a human because our external behavior is dependent on our subjective experience. But we know them to be theoretically possible -- it is a mathematical fact.

Penrose, for a start, has claimed to have mathematically proven that human awareness is not compatible with computational processes. Whether or not his reasoning is sound, his mathematical pedigree is without peer in this field.

But that brings us back to my argument -- if the entire set of external behaviors of a given human being can be simulated (and it can, since human life is finite) then the only conclusion one can possibly reach using your reasoning is that subjective experience is trivially nothing more than identity -- otherwise, how could all external behavior be simulated and be dependent on subjective experience?

If the external behaviours of a single human being were to be perfectly simulated, what would that tell us about internal states? About as much as the simulation of a windup grandfather clock by a battery powered imitation.

 

[westprog]

Hi

What's that logical fallacy where you base your conclusions on things that aren't in evidence?

If we had some ham, then we could have ham and eggs... if we had some eggs.

"The entire set of external behaviors," isn't a closed set.

It's not simulating existing behaviors that'll show all us heathens, it's the origination of a new, functional and useful behavior to a new stimulus, desire, or need.

It's easy to imagine a clever robot being created that would reproduce the life of some person exactly - or at least so exactly that no difference would be detected. Such a machine would have no internal states - and no capacity to do anything but slavishly imitate. Reproduction of behaviour is a trivial trick.

(At least in principle. In practice, it might take some doing).

 

[westprog]

When you are just chatting with your friend, rather than originating new behavior, are you no longer human?

Chatting with a friend is originating new behaviour. It's an amazingly complex activity. It's so fundamental as an example of the astonishing flexibility and power of the human mind that it was chosen by Turing as the key test of consciousness/intelligence/awarenss. And no p-zombie/program/robot has come anywhere near duplicating human conversation.

 

[rocketdodger]

Chatting with a friend is originating new behaviour. It's an amazingly complex activity. It's so fundamental as an example of the astonishing flexibility and power of the human mind that it was chosen by Turing as the key test of consciousness/intelligence/awarenss. And no p-zombie/program/robot has come anywhere near duplicating human conversation.

Sometimes it is.

Othertimes, it is amazingly simple, and can be easily simulated, yet people still feel that the person they are talking to is human rather than just an android.

Why?

 

[rocketdodger]

And one can see the p-zombies where?

How do you know I am not a p-zombie?

How do you know you are not a p-zombie?

And how do we know that experience has no external effects? How do we establish any such thing?

Because of the theoretical existence of p-zombies.

It isn't that experience doesn'thave any effects in general, its just that in theory we can come up with instances where it does not have any effects and a human like you or I wouldn't be able to tell the difference.

It is possible that experience is a mere accidental side effect of being human. It's possible that it is an inevitable essential element of being human. It might be an essential element. Until we can produce an entity which does not have awarenes, we can't tell.

Wesprog, look at what you are saying here. We can't tell until we produce an entity with/without experience? But the very issue is whether or not we can detect experience in another entity. So your reasoning here is very circular.

Penrose, for a start, has claimed to have mathematically proven that human awareness is not compatible with computational processes. Whether or not his reasoning is sound, his mathematical pedigree is without peer in this field.

Yes. And there is hardly anyone intelligent enough to understand his argument fully that actually agrees with him. So why appeal to his authority?

If the external behaviours of a single human being were to be perfectly simulated, what would that tell us about internal states?

Well, if you simulated an entire human down to the molecular level, then it would tell us as much as it is possible to learn about their internal state.

Yet, there would still be no way to tell whether that simulation were experiencing or not. Which is the entire issue in a single sentence -- how is it possible to tell when an entity is subjectively experiencing? It isn't.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's easy to imagine a clever robot being created that would reproduce the life of some person exactly - or at least so exactly that no difference would be detected. Such a machine would have no internal states - and no capacity to do anything but slavishly imitate. Reproduction of behaviour is a trivial trick.

So, supposing you were a molecular reproduction of westprog, and exhibited all the behaviors of the real westprog -- down to particle level -- are you or are you not experiencing?

Or is your experience merely a simulation of the real experience that the real westprog experienced?

I assert that simulated experience is experience nonetheless. You seem to disagree here, but I see a problem for you -- there is no possible definition of experience you can come up with that could validate such a view.

Unless you want to say experience is identity ... but then you are also invalidating your view that experience is not identity.

 

[rocketdodger]

"seemingly" being the operative word here. Whilst your first statement is true, imo, it only applies on the level of the organism being considered as an implicit whole. Not all philosophers take the same perspective. Strong AI theorists, like Daniel Dennett, overcome those conundrums.

Nick

Nick, please, if you are going to be part of this discussion, you are going to have to try to use your memory like a big boy.

I am not a supporter of p-zombies or chinese-rooms causing a conundrum. I merely use them as examples because HPC proponents are.