Are You Conscious?

[rocketdodger]

Time is not slowed down.

But time can be dilated. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_dilation

So, assuming you accept that the phenomenon of time dilation actually occurs, why don't you answer the question of how a person catching a ball in your time will still catch the ball when their time is dilated, without recourse to the notion of order of events?

Really, I want to hear it. Please explain why the ball is still caught without saying anything like "because the hand reaches the goal position before the ball arrives."

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm not quite sure what RD's point is, but it seems to be that in a world of general relativity, we don't need to worry about timing issues when doing design - if we just find the right place from which to view them, that will do the trick.

Um, no.

My point, westprog, is that in a world of general relativity, we don't need to worry about timing issues when doing design unless the timing issues impact the desired order of events.

To use your beloved ball example, any time to raise the arm X is sufficient as long as it is less than the time Y it takes the ball to travel to the location where it is caught. There is no magical time value t such that any other value won't work properly.

There is only a magical range of values, and they all preserve the order of events we want to occur. And, guess what -- it is the same for all known physical processes. You cannot find a single physical event, in any process, that requires an infinitessimal range. Every known event can occur within a non-infinitessimal range of times for any known system to continue behaving in exactly the same way, measured at any level of detail. Take an event E, that occurs at time t, and you can always find a nonzero period of time n such that if E occurs at t +/- n the system containing E will behave identically according to any possible measurement we could make.

As always, if you think you have a counterexample, go ahead and present it. Otherwise, you are just wrong.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Why yes. Under special relativity what is perceived by entities in a specific reference frame is that their wallclock keeps time as it always has.

For entities 'at rest' with respect to that reference frame, the moving-frame wallclock is different, but their personal wallclocks keep time as always.

If one wishes to find obfuscation, when shall we consider what physics is currently missing -- general relativity and quantum mechanics do not agree. Under which set of formulas is consciousness computable?

Of course neurons are needed for the brain to "compute" irregardless of reference frame. My initial comment '10 years' vs '10 milliseconds' assumes the same reference frame, and for entities (us) that manage in 10 msecs, the 10 year entity fails to demonstrate consciousness in any meaningful to us use of the word.

Point one -- none of this has anything to do with my initial reply to Westprog, which I will explain in more detail below.

Point two -- our frame in milliseconds wouldn't matter to any entity that processed information in 10 years. We would simply have very different ways of 'being conscious'. That we would not understand them, nor they us is irrelevant. This part of the timing issue is not relevant really.

That we need to be synced to the world to make sense of the world is obvious, but that does not mean that we could not be conscious if we processed information more slowly than we do. We would simply have different types of experiences.

The timing issue with neurons has to do with the way information is dealt with in neurons. Neurons don't just get hit with data and fire. Activated receptors open (or close depending on the type of 'activation') to allow in ions (generally sodium, but some work with chloride and others combinations of sodium and calcium, etc.). The current produced is a graded current that gradually diminishes over time and space. Each post-synaptic current (or potential -- EPSP or IPSP) moves along the cell membrane. Additional EPSPs may add to the synaptic current or IPSPs may diminish it. This is important timing-wise because if additional currents are not added to a sufficient degree, when the potential hits the axon hillock an action potential will not be generated. So, the timing of when and the spatial arrangement of where EPSPs and IPSPs occur is very important to neuron function. That is the ultimate basis for why timing is so important to all brain function.

Syncing with the world is a higher order function that only has to do with the type of experience we have of the world. We simply do not pay attention to things that happen too fast or too slow for our needs as creatures.

 

[nescafe]

The "architecture" of the brain does not change between states of consciousness and unconsciousness, nor does it cease to process information during states of unconsciousness.

That is true as far as it goes. However, understanding the architecture of the brain (how it is wired together at various levels of detail) is absolutely critical in trying to reverse engineer it, including how it creates subjective experience. Understanding how neurotransmitters work is part of that understanding, but I doubt it will be a critical part.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Aku….seeing as how you’re the one leaning into the subjective side of things I’ll direct the following somewhat bizaar question your way. Answer if you feel inclined (thanx, BTW, for the bit on computation….noted and filed).

Subjectivity, as you say, is the defining feature of consciousness. That ‘matter’ is capable of information processing (to put it simplistically) is not what makes consciousness significant (it’s certainly an impressive and incomprehensibly complex system but essentially, information processing is a rudimentary operation). That matter can say ‘hallo, my name is matter and I’m pretty happy with that’ is what is significant. Thus, matter achieves identity. To what degree does ‘your’ ability to involve yourself in this equation determine it’s outcome. IOW….the question really is subjective. Not a matter of asking ‘what am I (define this subjective feature of us within a known objective vocabulary)’, but of being ‘who am I (define this subjective feature of us by its own vocabulary)’, to a degree that compels an answer (from what?....from the fact that there is one, or you would not have a question to ask).

Call it, the science of subjectivity. It is ‘subjectivity’ that we currently look for a scientific answer for. But ‘subjectivity’ is anything but scientific (conventionally speaking). It is, quite specifically, about the scientist finally putting all his/her philosophy of science on the line and making him/herself the subject of the experiment. I am the evidence, I am the process (evaluation of the evidence), I am the answer (conclusion). It is all subjective.

[Just an FYI, annnnoid, I think you're overusing the parentheticals -- makes it a bit hard to follow your line of thought with so many sentences spliced into one another O_< ]

Erm..I'm not sure exactly what your question is in all that but I'll try to address what you've said as best I can

I think part of what makes consciousness so tricky so science is that historically science has been about investigating whats "out there" -- the objective "public" domain. For lack of a better word, scientific pursuit has largely been an exercise in systematic extrospection. With consciousness the epistemic focus is inverted; instead of studying the "out there" one ends up studying the "in there"; the subjective "private" domain of our existence. I do think there is a metaphysical duality between the objective and the subjective. They are simply complementary aspects of a single reality.

As of yet, we still haven't pinned down consciousness from the outside perspective. The trick is to understand consciousness from both the "inside" and "outside", and form a working theoretical synthesis between the two frames of reference. I'm optimistic that such a synthesis is possible and that we could, in principle, use such an understanding to create artificial systems capable of supporting consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

The "architecture" of the brain does not change between states of consciousness and unconsciousness, nor does it cease to process information during states of unconsciousness.

That is true as far as it goes. However, understanding the architecture of the brain (how it is wired together at various levels of detail) is absolutely critical in trying to reverse engineer it, including how it creates subjective experience. Understanding how neurotransmitters work is part of that understanding, but I doubt it will be a critical part.

Like I said before, I'm not saying that computation is irrelevant to consciousness. The architecture of the brain most certainly serves to constrain and organize our subjective experiences in a way that is relevant to our survival as organisms, but that architecture in itself does not explain the capacity for experience.

Modeling brain architecture is all well & good for helping us understand the logistics of particular species' cognitive functions. However, if we ever want to create artificial systems that support consciousness we must understand consciousness qua consciousness. That inevitably entails understanding what biological brains are doing in terms of their physical processes. Once that hurdle is overcome we can utilize our understanding to not only create synthetic conscious entities, but also systematically specify the type and quality of their experiences. Using that knowledge we could possibly create utra-realistic VR environments as immersive as the most lucid dream, or even "upload" our own consciousness onto mediums other than our own bodies -- who knows? Its only when AI gives way to SC that ethical concerns will come to the fore.

 

[Frank Newgent]

As of yet, we still haven't pinned down consciousness from the outside perspective. The trick is to understand consciousness from both the "inside" and "outside", and form a working theoretical synthesis between the two frames of reference. I'm optimistic that such a synthesis is possible and that we could, in principle, use such an understanding to create artificial systems capable of supporting consciousness.

One possible defining of consciousness from the "outside"... autopoiesis

I asked PixyMisa about a month ago ago if that was what she was talking about.

All of it is physical processes, of course. Not of it involves anything beyond the established laws of physics or our existing knowledge of how biological systems can behave. Lots of detail, no qualia, no panentheism, no magic.

Are you not describing autopoiesis?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis

 

[Frank Newgent]

If anyone finds this interesting the authors give a further oriention here...

http://www.enolagaia.com/Tutorial1.html#Background

 

[AkuManiMani]

As of yet, we still haven't pinned down consciousness from the outside perspective. The trick is to understand consciousness from both the "inside" and "outside", and form a working theoretical synthesis between the two frames of reference. I'm optimistic that such a synthesis is possible and that we could, in principle, use such an understanding to create artificial systems capable of supporting consciousness.

One possible defining of consciousness from the "outside"... autopoiesis

I asked PixyMisa about a month ago ago if that was what she was talking about.

All of it is physical processes, of course. Not of it involves anything beyond the established laws of physics or our existing knowledge of how biological systems can behave. Lots of detail, no qualia, no panentheism, no magic.

Are you not describing autopoiesis?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis

Hmm...Autopoiesis. Self-Making.

Pixy's pathological fear of unknowns notwithstanding, I think that pretty much describes any living system. With human consciousness atleast, this extends to creative capacities concerning manipulation of one's external environment. The inherent creativity of autopoiesis and consciousness lead me to suspect that the two processes are intimately related -- if not one & the same. IMO, to be conscious necessarily implies that one is alive.

 

[westprog]

Um, no.

My point, westprog, is that in a world of general relativity, we don't need to worry about timing issues when doing design unless the timing issues impact the desired order of events.

To use your beloved ball example, any time to raise the arm X is sufficient as long as it is less than the time Y it takes the ball to travel to the location where it is caught. There is no magical time value t such that any other value won't work properly.

There is only a magical range of values, and they all preserve the order of events we want to occur. And, guess what -- it is the same for all known physical processes. You cannot find a single physical event, in any process, that requires an infinitessimal range. Every known event can occur within a non-infinitessimal range of times for any known system to continue behaving in exactly the same way, measured at any level of detail. Take an event E, that occurs at time t, and you can always find a nonzero period of time n such that if E occurs at t +/- n the system containing E will behave identically according to any possible measurement we could make.

As always, if you think you have a counterexample, go ahead and present it. Otherwise, you are just wrong.

This is a veritable haystack of straw. This infinitesimal precision which you are debunking is not, and never has been, a feature of real-time processing. I have never claimed that such a thing is necessary. Time dependence remains.

Whether a given Turing machine would or would not be fast enough to carry out any particular operations is not the point. The point is that the Turing model does not allow for time dependence, and hence is a poor way to model processes that are time dependent.

And general relativity continues to be an irrelevance.

 

[westprog]

But time can be dilated. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_dilation

So, assuming you accept that the phenomenon of time dilation actually occurs, why don't you answer the question of how a person catching a ball in your time will still catch the ball when their time is dilated, without recourse to the notion of order of events?

Really, I want to hear it. Please explain why the ball is still caught without saying anything like "because the hand reaches the goal position before the ball arrives."

Why does time dependence imply that events can change their order? How can you have "before" without time dependence?

The issue is how a Turing machine can perform the functions that a brain does.

 

[westprog]

Point one -- none of this has anything to do with my initial reply to Westprog, which I will explain in more detail below.

Point two -- our frame in milliseconds wouldn't matter to any entity that processed information in 10 years. We would simply have very different ways of 'being conscious'. That we would not understand them, nor they us is irrelevant. This part of the timing issue is not relevant really.

That we need to be synced to the world to make sense of the world is obvious, but that does not mean that we could not be conscious if we processed information more slowly than we do. We would simply have different types of experiences.

The timing issue with neurons has to do with the way information is dealt with in neurons. Neurons don't just get hit with data and fire. Activated receptors open (or close depending on the type of 'activation') to allow in ions (generally sodium, but some work with chloride and others combinations of sodium and calcium, etc.). The current produced is a graded current that gradually diminishes over time and space. Each post-synaptic current (or potential -- EPSP or IPSP) moves along the cell membrane. Additional EPSPs may add to the synaptic current or IPSPs may diminish it. This is important timing-wise because if additional currents are not added to a sufficient degree, when the potential hits the axon hillock an action potential will not be generated. So, the timing of when and the spatial arrangement of where EPSPs and IPSPs occur is very important to neuron function. That is the ultimate basis for why timing is so important to all brain function.

Syncing with the world is a higher order function that only has to do with the type of experience we have of the world. We simply do not pay attention to things that happen too fast or too slow for our needs as creatures.

I'm not claiming that consciousness needs to operate at any particular rate. It might be that certain consciousnesses could operate at a much slower or faster rate.

However, I do claim that a conscious being that interacts with its environment must have a consciousness that is timed in order that its interaction makes sense. Events must happen in succession, without too great or small an interval in the subjective experience. I don't claim that it would be impossible for something to have a much slower consciousness, but it would have to interact in different ways.

This implies that human consciousness is time dependent, and that any model of consciousness should take this into account. In particular, the model of consciousness that allows three different "conscious" programs to run at different speeds and have the same experience is, I consider, unlikely.

 

[Belz...]

I suppose one has to take your word for it, in the absence of justificatory explanation.

Would you mind answering my questions ? It would go a long way toward actually, you know, having a conversation.

 

[Belz...]

Speak for yourself. When I dream I'm usually cognizant of the fact that its a dream and I'm often able to influence events in the dream. In any case, the contents of a dream are still reportable experiences.

It happens to me fairly regularily as well. But that's besides the point. Most people, most of the time, can't tell if they're dreaming. They can't tell if they're hallucinating. They can't tell if they're delusional. How reliable is introspection, then ?

Sounds like a fairly serious condition. I've never had such a problem. Could you possibly cite some examples?

Have you never felt hunger after a physical effort you've made not long after eating ? You're getting a wrong sensation, obviously. Of course, I could also name a ton of optical illusions where your brain makes things up.

What is a more reliable indicator of consciousness than the subject's own conscious experience?

Aku, if reports were reliable, then all I'd have to do is program a computer to say "I am conscious". Obviously this isn't enough.

Describing consciousness in computational terms is not sufficient to understand consciousness in itself, just as describing light in terms of information conveyance is not sufficient to understand it for what it is. My point here is to emphasize that consciousness must be primarily understood in physical terms before we are able to implement it in our technology. Again, consciousness is not a computational function or a kind of computational function, but a physical processes that has said functional capacities.

Then may I ask how you know that this is the case, and not the reverse ?

By "subject" I mean a being that has subjective experiences -- i.e. they are conscious.

Ok. The problem is, this sounds fairly circular. How do you know if something has subjective experiences ? How do you know that a pocket calculator doesn't have a modicrum of experience ?

It makes no sense to speak of something being "as real as" X or "as real as" Y because there aren't degrees of reality. Something is either real or it is not.

But that's the point. "Running" exists in the same way that "legs" exist. But both aren't the same. Why would you think that consciousness is a thing more like "legs" than like "running" ?

When I use the term "subjective" I'm not merely referring to matters of opinion and interpretation but -all- conscious experiences -- including the repeatable observations made by scientists in controlled conditions. Empirical observations -are- subjective experiences.

Only from a solipsist point of view.

All subjective experiences, including emotions, are by definition, what a subject is aware of at any given time. To claim that a person does not know what they're feeling is like saying they're not aware of what they're aware of. Its an oxymoron.

Not at all. As I said bove, people are routinely wrong about what they perceive.

So how did you get from that statement that a proton moving at relativistic speeds is not moving?

Sigh. If an atom's movement is just about uncertainty, then an atom covering 300,000 km in a second isn't really moving. That implies that distances don't really exist. Those are your words, not mine.

 

[Dancing David]

Maybe they are, but the universe has uncaused events, and it is non-deterministic, according to our best current knowledge.

Really, name an uncaused event ? QM doesn't count BTW, it could be causal or not be causal, it is unknown.

 

[Dancing David]

Sounds like a fairly serious condition. I've never had such a problem. Could you possibly cite some examples?

Really? I am sure you have...

Synesthesia^WP

 

[Dancing David]

I'm not claiming that consciousness needs to operate at any particular rate. It might be that certain consciousnesses could operate at a much slower or faster rate.

However, I do claim that a conscious being that interacts with its environment must have a consciousness that is timed in order that its interaction makes sense. Events must happen in succession, without too great or small an interval in the subjective experience. I don't claim that it would be impossible for something to have a much slower consciousness, but it would have to interact in different ways.

This implies that human consciousness is time dependent, and that any model of consciousness should take this into account. In particular, the model of consciousness that allows three different "conscious" programs to run at different speeds and have the same experience is, I consider, unlikely.

Out of all your arguments from your personal opinion, this one is more interesting than most.
First you agree to the point, then you make an unsupported personal opinion and then you reassert the point in disagreement that you just agreed to.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Really? I am sure you have...

Synesthesia^WP

I asked for an example of a condition in which a person mistakes one sensation for another, not for a condition in which one sensation takes the place of another

 

[AkuManiMani]

Speak for yourself. When I dream I'm usually cognizant of the fact that its a dream and I'm often able to influence events in the dream. In any case, the contents of a dream are still reportable experiences.

It happens to me fairly regularily as well. But that's besides the point. Most people, most of the time, can't tell if they're dreaming. They can't tell if they're hallucinating. They can't tell if they're delusional. How reliable is introspection, then ?

Let me ask you: If those same delusional people were conducting scientific research would you consider their work reliable?

Sounds like a fairly serious condition. I've never had such a problem. Could you possibly cite some examples?

Have you never felt hunger after a physical effort you've made not long after eating ? You're getting a wrong sensation, obviously. Of course, I could also name a ton of optical illusions where your brain makes things up.

Whether or not you think your sensation of hunger is an appropriate response it's still a real sensation and is part of the contents of your awareness. Even in the case of illusions the subject is still experiencing the illusion regardless of whether or not it accurately reflects whats going on outside of their minds.

What is a more reliable indicator of consciousness than the subject's own conscious experience?

Aku, if reports were reliable, then all I'd have to do is program a computer to say "I am conscious". Obviously this isn't enough.

I'm not talking about self reports. I'm talking about introspection. A conscious person is tacitly aware of the contents of their mind and can directly access them. Being conscious is, for the conscious subject, proof positive that they are conscious regardless of whether or not they can report it to others. Your argument basically amounts to claiming that consciousness cannot be observed even by entities experiencing it directly.

Describing consciousness in computational terms is not sufficient to understand consciousness in itself, just as describing light in terms of information conveyance is not sufficient to understand it for what it is. My point here is to emphasize that consciousness must be primarily understood in physical terms before we are able to implement it in our technology. Again, consciousness is not a computational function or a kind of computational function, but a physical processes that has said functional capacities.

Then may I ask how you know that this is the case, and not the reverse ?

In the same way that I know a car is not a kind of driving but a device that performs the function of driving, that light is not information transference but an entity that can be used to transfer information, or that photosynthesis is not energy collection but a process which functions to collect energy. Physical phenomena are not functions but processes that can carry out functions; in the same token, computation is not a physical phenomenon but a function carried out by physical phenomena.

By "subject" I mean a being that has subjective experiences -- i.e. they are conscious.

Ok. The problem is, this sounds fairly circular. How do you know if something has subjective experiences ? How do you know that a pocket calculator doesn't have a modicrum of experience ?

Just as I don't know if all things "have a modicrum of experience" and that panpsychism is true. However, being as how I know that I am not always conscious, even while my brain/body continue to process information, I think its safe to assume that subjective experience is not a universal property of all systems or even computational artifiacts.

It makes no sense to speak of something being "as real as" X or "as real as" Y because there aren't degrees of reality. Something is either real or it is not.

But that's the point. "Running" exists in the same way that "legs" exist. But both aren't the same. Why would you think that consciousness is a thing more like "legs" than like "running" ?

I'd say that consciousness is something like "legs" [LOL! ] and experiences are akin to "running"

When I use the term "subjective" I'm not merely referring to matters of opinion and interpretation but -all- conscious experiences -- including the repeatable observations made by scientists in controlled conditions. Empirical observations -are- subjective experiences.

Only from a solipsist point of view.

Oy...Thats not solipsism, Belz. Solipsism is the view that only the solipsist is real and that all observed and observable phenomena [including other people] are just figments of the solipsist's fantastical dream.

I'm not saying that observed objects are figments of imagination, I'm saying that observations are subjective experiences produced by stimuli. When scientists observe an empirical result the object of their observation is very real, but they are aware of it's reality via their subjective experiences of it. Do you understand what I'm saying?

All subjective experiences, including emotions, are by definition, what a subject is aware of at any given time. To claim that a person does not know what they're feeling is like saying they're not aware of what they're aware of. Its an oxymoron.

Not at all. As I said bove, people are routinely wrong about what they perceive.

Unless an person is lying they cannot be wrong about what they perceive, they can only misinterpret their perceptions. For instance, if a small child is shown a hologram of a pink elephant they may believe that what they're seeing is a real elephant when that they're really perceiving is the illusion of an elephant. However, their perception of the illusion is very real.

Back to your earlier example, a person can feel the sensation of hunger even tho their body is not really in need of food ATM. However, it is still an objective fact that the person feels hungry.

So how did you get from that statement that a proton moving at relativistic speeds is not moving?

Sigh. If an atom's movement is just about uncertainty, then an atom covering 300,000 km in a second isn't really moving. That implies that distances don't really exist. Those are your words, not mine.

Those aren't my words; thats your confused misinterpretation of what was actually said. I said that the movement of particles is the uncertainty of their position. We know from the findings of QM that position/momentum are conjugate variables of particles. In this case, that means that the more certainty there is about one variable [say, position] the more uncertain the value of the other [momentum], and vis versa. That does NOT imply that there aren't spacial distances or that particles do not move. If you're going to argue against a point I'm making could you atleast make sure you understand whats actually being said first? -_-"

 

[Belz...]

Let me ask you: If those same delusional people were conducting scientific research would you consider their work reliable?

The only way to remove said bias is by averaging it with observation from several independent sources. I.e. science.

Whether or not you think your sensation of hunger is an appropriate response it's still a real sensation and is part of the contents of your awareness.

That wasn't your question. You asked an example of people being wrong abuot their experiences.

I'm not talking about self reports. I'm talking about introspection.

Er...

Being conscious is, for the conscious subject, proof positive that they are conscious regardless of whether or not they can report it to others.

Uh-huh. But that's irrelevant, because no matter how convinced YOU are about you being conscious, it doesn't mean I get to believe you. You need something everyone can verify.

Your argument basically amounts to claiming that consciousness cannot be observed even by entities experiencing it directly.

In the same way that I know a car is not a kind of driving but a device that performs the function of driving

Except you already know that a car is a thing. Since no one here has ever been able to define consciousness as anything but a function, it's a little surprising to read you say you "know" that consciousness is a thing like a car or like legs.

However, being as how I know that I am not always conscious, even while my brain/body continue to process information, I think its safe to assume that subjective experience is not a universal property of all systems or even computational artifiacts.

No one says it is. But how would you go about determining what's conscious and what isn't ? You mentionned self-reporting, but we already know it isn't a reliable source.

I'd say that consciousness is something like "legs" [LOL! ] and experiences are akin to "running"

Unless experiences and consciousness are one and the same.

Oy...Thats not solipsism, Belz. Solipsism is the view that only the solipsist is real and that all observed and observable phenomena [including other people] are just figments of the solipsist's fantastical dream.

Solipsism denies the possibility of knowledge by saying that nothing is certain, except the experience itself. Your statement that "observations are subjective experiences produced by stimuli. When scientists observe an empirical result the object of their observation is very real, but they are aware of it's reality via their subjective experiences of it.", that's irrelevant, because the whole point of science is to negate bias resulting from this obvious fact.

If you're going to argue against a point I'm making could you atleast make sure you understand whats actually being said first? -_-"

You might want to make your point clear, then. If the movement of particles is a matter of uncertainty only, then it follows that there are no distances for the particles to cover, because things actually DO move from one point to another.