Are You Conscious?

[AkuManiMani]

As westprog pointed out, introspection is how we know we are conscious and the contents of our consciousness. Without introspection we wouldn't even have self-reports. Introspection just means looking "inward".

I didn't say introspection doesn't exist. I said it isn't reliable.

How so? Could you give an example of when analyzing one's own internal states is unreliable? Are you suggesting that people routinely mistake one sensation for another? In any case, if you believe introspection is unreliable why do you think self-reports are a reliable indicator of consciousness and conscious states?

In a sense, consciousness is a "thing". We don't just have consciousness, or do consciousness; we are consciousness.

That is your opinion. Mine is that we "do". It seems much more likely, to me, anyway, that consciousness is the result of processes in the [human] body, than it's some as-of-yet undetected "thing" inside the brain.

The process is the "thing" we're referring to. Where we disagree is that you think of consciousness as a function where as I think of it as a specific physical process carrying out functional capacities. For instance, a signal going down a fiber optic cable is a physical process [light] performing a function [information conveyance]. We do not say that light is information conveyance, we say that the light is functioning to convey information in this context. Likewise, consciousness is not computation, its a process which can perform the functions of computation.

Absent consciousness, we do not exist as subjects.

Philosophically, or grammatically ?

Categorically.

Regardless of whether one wants to think of consciousness as a "thing" or a "processes" we know for certain that it is physically salient and real.

Yes. But is it as real as legs ? Or as real as "running" ?

Yes.

Also, we each directly experience our own minds from the "inside" so we can atleast study the subjective aspects of consciousness; with atoms we didn't have the luxury of being able to study them before their scientific discovery. As we're already intimately familiar with the internal subjective dimension of consciousness

We think we do. But like other things introspective I suspect we'll be surprised by the answer.

How is one not intimately familiar with what they're experiencing? Do you think that scientific empirical observations [which are themselves subjective experiences] are going to render your experience of blue any less blue, or pain any less painful? If you recognize that you feel sad at a given moment there is no way that this can be falsified because the emotion itself is a -direct- empirical observation - it is an immutable fact.

As of now, all science has to go on are general behaviors and functions associated with consciousness, but we've yet to objectively pin down the physical thing in itself.

That may be because you're assuming there is such a thing. If it's a process one could not identify the "thing", only the "thing doing".

That line of reasoning does not hold water. Atoms are processes and also physically identifiable "things". For you to argue that consciousness a non-"thing" on the basis of it being a process is special pleading.

The movement of an atom is just the uncertainty of it's position, and vis versa. There is no real distinction between an atom and the movement of an atom. Atoms, and all other physical objects, are essentially fluctuating waves of potentiality; i.e. energy.

Really ? So a proton moving close to c isn't really moving ? We just don't exactly where it is ? It really didn't travel from a supernova to us ?

How do those conclusions even remotely follow from the statement I made?

 

[westprog]

What I was saying is that one can simulate and or model anything in the universe via computation but that computation itself does not physically reproduce whatever is being modeled. I think westprog's point was that it is impossible to have an arbitrarily accurate simulation of the universe.

If the universe were computable, it would be possible to take any initial state and know what all subsequent states would be. That does not appear to be the case.

 

[westprog]

This word-play is getting us nowhere.

Are you saying that a simulated calculator inside a computer doesn't really calculate ? Or just that a simulated intelligence isn't intelligent ?

No, I'm asking for a physical definition of "processing information" that applies to some specific interactions and not others. If a definition of "processing information" can be found - and I've yet to see one on this thread or its predecessors - then it might be possible to find a definition of "self-referential information processing".

 

[westprog]

wtf?

You just asked and you are saying time diliation is irrelevant?

If you are on a starship, and it takes your brain 10 years to do the same thing it takes my brain 10 milliseconds, why would I agree that you are conscious? Hmmm?

Because the only issue that matters when considering the rate of processing is in the frame of reference where the action is taking place. The time scale that counts is the wall-clock time. What external observers see doesn't matter, because if they time it against the clock within the frame of reference where the action happens, then they always get the same result.

Since we are considering the eye-brain-nerve-hand-ball interaction, then since it all happens in the same frame of reference, it will always look the same provided we measure it in the frame of reference in which it takes place.

However, this is irrelevant to the issue of Turing machines. Does the definition of Turing machines include reference to General Relativity? I don't need to check Wikipaedia for that one. There is simply nothing in the TM definition which allows for interaction with the world. The TM machine and the tape form a closed deterministic system. There is no live reacting to events.

If the brain worked in a three-tier way where the data from the senses was assembled into blocks, and then processed, and then instructions issued to via the nervous systems to the muscles, then it might be possible to fudge things. But the brain and nervous system aren't seperated like that.

 

[westprog]

The insight gained is this:

The only values consistent across different reference frames are relative values between measurements taken in the same reference frame.

This is sort of the fundamental idea behind ... "relativity," ... hence the name...

And since I know you need more help, here:

This means that the "time" it takes a ball to reach the catcher's hand is different depending on which reference frame the process is observed from. This means that there is nothing absolutely special about any given "time" value. The only important observation is whether or not the hand reaches the proper location BEFORE the ball arrives. And this notion of BEFORE is time independent, since the order of events in a reference frame is always the same, regardless of the frame from which they are observed

This is so contrary to our intuitive view that one thinks it must be right. But it isn't. Time measurements within the frame of reference where the catching the ball event take place continue to be valid. To understand what is going on within the frame of reference, we can refer to the clock-on-the-wall. There are a number of different clocks-on-the-wall in physics. In the case of particles, we note that particles moving at speed decay at a different rate to those at rest. Does that mean that physicists discard all their observations on radioactive half-life? No, they allow for the velocity and consider the frame of reference of the particle itself.

 

[westprog]

Of course neurons are needed for the brain to "compute" irregardless of reference frame. My initial comment '10 years' vs '10 milliseconds' assumes the same reference frame, and for entities (us) that manage in 10 msecs, the 10 year entity fails to demonstrate consciousness in any meaningful to us use of the word.

If the brain were just doing computation, then it might be possible to ignore timing issues - since the same "result" would be produced no matter how long it took. However, the brain isn't doing just computation, and the computational aspects of the brain are not seperate from the interaction with the world around it.

 

[AlBell]

Of course neurons are needed for the brain to "compute" irregardless of reference frame. My initial comment '10 years' vs '10 milliseconds' assumes the same reference frame, and for entities (us) that manage in 10 msecs, the 10 year entity fails to demonstrate consciousness in any meaningful to us use of the word.

If the brain were just doing computation, then it might be possible to ignore timing issues - since the same "result" would be produced no matter how long it took. However, the brain isn't doing just computation, and the computational aspects of the brain are not seperate from the interaction with the world around it.

We are more in agreement than not, but I don't agree that one can ever ignore timing issues. If consciousness is being generated by "computation" it needs to be occurring such that it's apparent to us at our wallclock time; as you say, not separate from the (input/output) interactions with the world around it.

 

[Dancing David]

If the universe were computable, it would be possible to take any initial state and know what all subsequent states would be. That does not appear to be the case.

Causal and determined are seperate concepts.

 

[Belz...]

How so? Could you give an example of when analyzing one's own internal states is unreliable?

Most of the time, you can't even tell that you're dreaming, for one.

Are you suggesting that people routinely mistake one sensation for another?

It happens.

In any case, if you believe introspection is unreliable why do you think self-reports are a reliable indicator of consciousness and conscious states?

I don't.

The process is the "thing" we're referring to. Where we disagree is that you think of consciousness as a function where as I think of it as a specific physical process carrying out functional capacities. For instance, a signal going down a fiber optic cable is a physical process [light] performing a function [information conveyance]. We do not say that light is information conveyance, we say that the light is functioning to convey information in this context. Likewise, consciousness is not computation, its a process which can perform the functions of computation.

Not sure I follow you. We seem to be saying the same thing, now.

Categorically.

Again, not sure I follow you. Grammatically speaking, a rock can be a subject. What do you mean by "subject" ?

Yes.

Please stop playing around. Is it as real as legs or as real as running ? It's a multiple-choice question.

Do you think that scientific empirical observations [which are themselves subjective experiences] are going to render your experience of blue any less blue, or pain any less painful?

Empirical observations are not merely subjective when they can be repeated. Thus the experience of "pain" can be explained in terms more concrete.

If you recognize that you feel sad at a given moment there is no way that this can be falsified because the emotion itself is a -direct- empirical observation - it is an immutable fact.

Really ? I could be wrong about being sad.

That line of reasoning does not hold water. Atoms are processes and also physically identifiable "things".

Dammit, Aku, I had adressed this before. Sure enough, atoms are behaviours, but are you able, at all, to notice a difference between legs and running ?

How do those conclusions even remotely follow from the statement I made?

You said the movement of an atom was due to uncertainty about its location, remember ? Geez, that was two posts ago.

 

[Belz...]

No

So is a simulated calculator a calculator ?

Is a simulated computer a computer ?

Is a simulated intelligence intelligent ?

Is a simulated consciousness conscious ?

I'm asking for a physical definition of "processing information" that applies to some specific interactions and not others. If a definition of "processing information" can be found - and I've yet to see one on this thread or its predecessors - then it might be possible to find a definition of "self-referential information processing".

Nuh-huh. Self-referential information processing works even if "information processing" includes all things.

 

[rocketdodger]

Because the only issue that matters when considering the rate of processing is in the frame of reference where the action is taking place. The time scale that counts is the wall-clock time.

This is a completely arbitrary choice. There is nothing in physics -- nothing -- that says we should consider something from one frame versus another.

It is just as valid for me to consider the neural activity of a human on a starship from my own frame of reference (Earth) as it is to do so from their frame of reference (starship).

What external observers see doesn't matter, because if they time it against the clock within the frame of reference where the action happens, then they always get the same result.

Yes -- because the order of events is always the same, regardless of the frame you consider the events from.

Since we are considering the eye-brain-nerve-hand-ball interaction, then since it all happens in the same frame of reference, it will always look the same provided we measure it in the frame of reference in which it takes place.

Nope.

It always looks the same regardless of the frame you measure it in.

So that is the problem for you -- it looks the same, but your precious "time" values are all different, depending on the frame the process is considered from.

Why is that, westprog? How can it look the same, and behave exactly the same, yet have different time values?

 

[rocketdodger]

This is so contrary to our intuitive view that one thinks it must be right. But it isn't. Time measurements within the frame of reference where the catching the ball event take place continue to be valid. To understand what is going on within the frame of reference, we can refer to the clock-on-the-wall.

Um, you don't need to.

It is pretty clear to anyone with a brain that if you see a person catching a ball, and go back and slow the scene down a million times, the person will still catch the ball -- it will just happen much slower.

There are a number of different clocks-on-the-wall in physics. In the case of particles, we note that particles moving at speed decay at a different rate to those at rest. Does that mean that physicists discard all their observations on radioactive half-life? No, they allow for the velocity and consider the frame of reference of the particle itself.

So you obviously agree that the person on the spaceship is conscious, despite the fact that their brain processes have a rate millions of times slower than ours, because in their own frame of reference things are moving along normally.

The question is, why is this acceptable, while such a slow-down in our own reference frame is not?

Granted, if the frame is the same, it means that the relative rate of particle behavior is much higher for the slowed down brain. But I don't think you are talking about that, so lets just ignore it and assume that there is a magical device that slows time, as in, every single rate that can possibly be measured.

Do you think that a person magically slowed down millions of times, using such a device, would no longer be conscious?

Or is your opposition due entirely to the particle behavior? Are you suggesting that even though the relative firing rates within a neural network are the same, if the period of particle oscillations is changed somehow the network ceases to be conscious?

 

[westprog]

Causal and determined are seperate concepts.

Maybe they are, but the universe has uncaused events, and it is non-deterministic, according to our best current knowledge.

 

[westprog]

So is a simulated calculator a calculator ?

Is a simulated computer a computer ?

Is a simulated intelligence intelligent ?

Is a simulated consciousness conscious ?

Nuh-huh. Self-referential information processing works even if "information processing" includes all things.

I suppose one has to take your word for it, in the absence of justificatory explanation.

 

[westprog]

Um, you don't need to.

It is pretty clear to anyone with a brain that if you see a person catching a ball, and go back and slow the scene down a million times, the person will still catch the ball -- it will just happen much slower.



So you obviously agree that the person on the spaceship is conscious, despite the fact that their brain processes have a rate millions of times slower than ours, because in their own frame of reference things are moving along normally.

The question is, why is this acceptable, while such a slow-down in our own reference frame is not?

Granted, if the frame is the same, it means that the relative rate of particle behavior is much higher for the slowed down brain. But I don't think you are talking about that, so lets just ignore it and assume that there is a magical device that slows time, as in, every single rate that can possibly be measured.

Do you think that a person magically slowed down millions of times, using such a device, would no longer be conscious?

Or is your opposition due entirely to the particle behavior? Are you suggesting that even though the relative firing rates within a neural network are the same, if the period of particle oscillations is changed somehow the network ceases to be conscious?

Time is not slowed down.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Is a simulated computer a computer ?

Is a simulated intelligence intelligent ?

Is a simulated consciousness conscious ?

Is a simulated blood-alcohol content of 0.5 percent drunk?

Is the forgery of a signed Matisse forgery by Elmyr de Hory an authentic forgery?

Was the 1998 remake of the movie "Psycho" psycho?

Is simulated meaningful employment just sitting at a computer in your mother's basement?

 

[AlBell]

So is a simulated calculator a calculator ?

Is a simulated computer a computer ?

Is a simulated intelligence intelligent ?

Is a simulated consciousness conscious ?

Nuh-huh. Self-referential information processing works even if "information processing" includes all things.

I suppose one has to take your word for it, in the absence of justificatory explanation.

You must agree it sounds more sciency than 'god did it'.

 

[AkuManiMani]

How so? Could you give an example of when analyzing one's own internal states is unreliable?

Most of the time, you can't even tell that you're dreaming, for one.

Speak for yourself. When I dream I'm usually cognizant of the fact that its a dream and I'm often able to influence events in the dream. In any case, the contents of a dream are still reportable experiences.

Are you suggesting that people routinely mistake one sensation for another?

It happens.

Sounds like a fairly serious condition. I've never had such a problem. Could you possibly cite some examples?

In any case, if you believe introspection is unreliable why do you think self-reports are a reliable indicator of consciousness and conscious states?

I don't.

What is a more reliable indicator of consciousness than the subject's own conscious experience?

The process is the "thing" we're referring to. Where we disagree is that you think of consciousness as a function where as I think of it as a specific physical process carrying out functional capacities. For instance, a signal going down a fiber optic cable is a physical process [light] performing a function [information conveyance]. We do not say that light is information conveyance, we say that the light is functioning to convey information in this context. Likewise, consciousness is not computation, its a process which can perform the functions of computation.

Not sure I follow you. We seem to be saying the same thing, now.

I'm distinguishing the physical process [consciousness] from the abstract function [computation]. Describing consciousness in computational terms is not sufficient to understand consciousness in itself, just as describing light in terms of information conveyance is not sufficient to understand it for what it is. My point here is to emphasize that consciousness must be primarily understood in physical terms before we are able to implement it in our technology. Again, consciousness is not a computational function or a kind of computational function, but a physical processes that has said functional capacities.

Categorically.

Again, not sure I follow you. Grammatically speaking, a rock can be a subject. What do you mean by "subject" ?

By "subject" I mean a being that has subjective experiences -- i.e. they are conscious. A "subject" is an observer, an "object" is what is observed, and experience is the observation. Absent consciousness, there is no subject and therefore no experience of objects.

So, in answer to your question, a rock cannot be a subject unless it can be conscious.

Yes.

Please stop playing around. Is it as real as legs or as real as running ? It's a multiple-choice question.

It makes no sense to speak of something being "as real as" X or "as real as" Y because there aren't degrees of reality. Something is either real or it is not.

Do you think that scientific empirical observations [which are themselves subjective experiences] are going to render your experience of blue any less blue, or pain any less painful?

Empirical observations are not merely subjective when they can be repeated. Thus the experience of "pain" can be explained in terms more concrete.

When I use the term "subjective" I'm not merely referring to matters of opinion and interpretation but -all- conscious experiences -- including the repeatable observations made by scientists in controlled conditions. Empirical observations -are- subjective experiences.

If you recognize that you feel sad at a given moment there is no way that this can be falsified because the emotion itself is a -direct- empirical observation - it is an immutable fact.

Really ? I could be wrong about being sad.

All subjective experiences, including emotions, are by definition, what a subject is aware of at any given time. To claim that a person does not know what they're feeling is like saying they're not aware of what they're aware of. Its an oxymoron.

That line of reasoning does not hold water. Atoms are processes and also physically identifiable "things".

Dammit, Aku, I had adressed this before. Sure enough, atoms are behaviours, but are you able, at all, to notice a difference between legs and running ?

Duh. Running is a "legs derived" process in much the same way that an atom is a "fields derived" process.

How do those conclusions even remotely follow from the statement I made?

You said the movement of an atom was due to uncertainty about its location, remember ? Geez, that was two posts ago.

So how did you get from that statement that a proton moving at relativistic speeds is not moving? Really, Belz, the conclusions you were drawing from the statement were complete non sequiturs =/

 

[westprog]

We are more in agreement than not, but I don't agree that one can ever ignore timing issues. If consciousness is being generated by "computation" it needs to be occurring such that it's apparent to us at our wallclock time; as you say, not separate from the (input/output) interactions with the world around it.

Timing doesn't effect the accuracy of a computation, but it certainly effects the interaction of a device with the outside world.

I'm not quite sure what RD's point is, but it seems to be that in a world of general relativity, we don't need to worry about timing issues when doing design - if we just find the right place from which to view them, that will do the trick.

 

[annnnoid]

Ok D.D…..on subjectivity.

If you want to describe subjective experience, you have to describe your own. Why? Obviously, because you have no access to any other. If you describe another consciousness, you are, by definition, becoming objective. You are not experiencing their subjective experience, only their reports….and even if you were sitting in front of Salvador Dali, the reports would give you barely a fraction of the information necessary to know what their subjective experience is.

So…if you want to ‘know’ subjective experience…only place to go is you. Subjective experience is, by definition, subjective…meaning your experience….NOT someone else’s. If it is someone else’s, it is no longer subjective. It is the issue of subjectivity that is the issue. How does ‘subjectivity’ occur, why, etc. etc. We don’t know. We don’t even know how to describe its existence, but it obviously exists, or else you would not. It is the most defining feature of the most unique phenomenon in the universe, consciousness (the biggest unanswered question in science, as Dawkins puts it).

…as for why it exists…it serves no obvious evolutionary purpose (…matter ‘likes’ to be able to say ‘yee-haw…I’m me’…..??????). I figure the answer is out there (since subjectivity obviously does exist) but the form in which the answer exists is fundamentally unfamiliar (which may also explain why we have such difficulty understanding subjectivity…and maybe why many people think it’s trivial [I think if I were a subjectivity, I wouldn’t want to be though of as trivial]).

…as for most of the rest of your post I’m not going to bother.

Originally Posted by nescafe
Originally Posted by AkuManiMani

A-So in your view, subjective experiences have little relevance to whats actually happening in the brain?

N-I never said that. They are, of course, intimately correlated. What I have said is that there are reasons to think that we can, in principle, build something that has subjective experiences without having to simulate, emulate, or create a biological brain.

A-You just said that qualia have little relevance to what the brain actually does. "Qualia" is simply a term for subjective experiences. Until they are physically identified and scientifically understood we cannot design consciousness into any artificial system.

(....sorry, haven't got the hang of the quote thingy yet)

My impression is that the conflict rests upon this point. Nescafe and the coffee mugs figure you just build ‘something’ (applying current paradigms) and see if it says hi (a rather vague and ethically dubious approach [ethics…what’s that?....oh, that’s just something that subjective realities do]…but I don’t recall ethics ever being taught [or even mentioned] when I stumbled through engineering, so I guess it doesn’t matter).

IOW, we’ll find out if it’s conscious after the fact…even though we don’t really know what it is that we’re trying to build in the first place…..something that resembles every feature of human consciousness except it’s most defining one: subjective experience (even that seems a very distant proposition at the moment, though some would like to think not).

I guess, from a purely scientific POV there’s nothing wrong with that (but since there is no purely scientific POV there are substantial questions to consider). Like I finally got Pixy to admit….just don’t pretend you’re instantiating human consciousness. Call it fooz or something. Maybe it’ll say hi, maybe it’ll die, or maybe it’ll take over the world and call itself Stewie.

Maybe that’s part of the problem….actually it quite obviously is. Subjectivity is the most defining feature of consciousness (besides the fact that consciousness even exists in the first place) and it is so hard to define. As any good advertising dude will tell you, if you want folks to NOITCE something you’ve got to make it noticeable. The word ‘qualia’ just plan sucks. It’s feeble, it’s quiet, it’s plain, it’s scientific….all it says is “ I’m an irrelevant little piece of nothing’ (so it gets ignored). Now, how about we use this word to mean subjective experience: Blork fragz tittle pop! (I think Douglas Adams would have liked it, better than 42). Now that says something….it may be that we still have no clue what the word actually means…but at least you can’t ignore the word. And then, if Nescafe and Pixy build their ‘consciousness’ you can turn around and say….’yo dude, it has no BFTP….it just sucks as a consciousness’.

….but I digress…obviously

Belz…you say introspection is not reliable. In relation to what? What activity does it not perform reliably?

Aku….seeing as how you’re the one leaning into the subjective side of things I’ll direct the following somewhat bizaar question your way. Answer if you feel inclined (thanx, BTW, for the bit on computation….noted and filed).

Subjectivity, as you say, is the defining feature of consciousness. That ‘matter’ is capable of information processing (to put it simplistically) is not what makes consciousness significant (it’s certainly an impressive and incomprehensibly complex system but essentially, information processing is a rudimentary operation). That matter can say ‘hallo, my name is matter and I’m pretty happy with that’ is what is significant. Thus, matter achieves identity. To what degree does ‘your’ ability to involve yourself in this equation determine it’s outcome. IOW….the question really is subjective. Not a matter of asking ‘what am I (define this subjective feature of us within a known objective vocabulary)’, but of being ‘who am I (define this subjective feature of us by its own vocabulary)’, to a degree that compels an answer (from what?....from the fact that there is one, or you would not have a question to ask).

Call it, the science of subjectivity. It is ‘subjectivity’ that we currently look for a scientific answer for. But ‘subjectivity’ is anything but scientific (conventionally speaking). It is, quite specifically, about the scientist finally putting all his/her philosophy of science on the line and making him/herself the subject of the experiment. I am the evidence, I am the process (evaluation of the evidence), I am the answer (conclusion). It is all subjective.

Does not the answer very quickly veer into that realm known as ‘religion’ (I’ll just leave that undefined for now…which is probably appropriate).

….how about the thoughtiness of thought?....as a candidate for qualia king?