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Are You Conscious?

Are you concious?

  • Of course, what a stupid question

    Votes: 89 61.8%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 40 27.8%
  • No

    Votes: 15 10.4%

  • Total voters
    144
Epic fail.

Read the conversation and try again.


Aku, Pixy won't read this but here's one obvious question you could ask:

So SHRDLU is conscious when talking about blocks and unconscious if I take the slightest deviation from that? Seems to me I don't cease becoming conscious the minute you ask me about something I have no clue about nor even have any basis in language to understand.

Try using expressions pertaining to blocks (like green) and see if you can get it to recognize the general concept. You can't, it's a look up table in that regard.
 
So X = "Is conscious only when stacking blocks"?

I see you beat me to it. I predict Pixi will say our consciousness is like a synthesis of millions of SHRDLUs for all sorts of tasks. Ironically, that would be the best definition of a p-zombie I've ever read - and I hate it.
 
I see you beat me to it. I predict Pixi will say our consciousness is like a synthesis of millions of SHRDLUs for all sorts of tasks. Ironically, that would be the best definition of a p-zombie I've ever read - and I hate it.


Possibly, but I think I would be careful. I'm not sure Pixy would argue that we have that great an explanation of our consciousness.

What he has argued in the past is that examples of consciousness depend directly on one's definition of consciousness. He has defined consciousness -- unqualified -- in a particular way and has applied that definition pretty accurately as far as I can tell, but I don't always pay that much attention to these threads.

I don't think his definition of consciousness applies directly to us in all particulars, but I don't think he has ever argued that it has either.
 
Possibly, but I think I would be careful. I'm not sure Pixy would argue that we have that great an explanation of our consciousness.

What he has argued in the past is that examples of consciousness depend directly on one's definition of consciousness. He has defined consciousness -- unqualified -- in a particular way and has applied that definition pretty accurately as far as I can tell, but I don't always pay that much attention to these threads.

I don't think his definition of consciousness applies directly to us in all particulars, but I don't think he has ever argued that it has either.

Pixi's definition incorporates his conclusions and simplifications and thus can always be expected to give the "correct" answer.

Aside from that, the problem is that our consciousness and its properties are the only consciousness we really know anything about. If you have a definition of consciousness that is consistent and explains lots of stuff but you can't extrapolate it to ours I'd say you've got nothing very useful. You could call it floom and it would do as much explanatory work.
 
Pixi's definition incorporates his conclusions and simplifications and thus can always be expected to give the "correct" answer.

Not gonna comment on that -- it's up to Pixy to do so.

Aside from that, the problem is that our consciousness and its properties are the only consciousness we really know anything about. If you have a definition of consciousness that is consistent and explains lots of stuff but you can't extrapolate it to ours I'd say you've got nothing very useful. You could call it floom and it would do as much explanatory work.


Well, sure, as it applies to us. I've been engaged in several of these conversations and from what I've seen Pixy seems to defend a fairly tightly defined sense of consciousness.

That it doesn't help all that much with defining our consciousness is an entirely other thing than saying that it doesn't define consciousness at all. And, yes, our consciousness is all that we have experience of, and I do think that we need to define what the heck we are talking about. With that I agree. But, ultimately, from what I recall that has been Pixy's point all along -- that some folks really don't define what they are talking about and that he has. The definition might be '*****' as far as our consciousness is concerned, but that is different from what he often says.

Just seems to me that there are all sorts of personal attacks thrown about that just needn't be a part of the discussion -- didn't want to see you fall into that mode since you seem a very intelligent and worthwhile contributor to these discussions.

I have defended Westprog on occasion when I have seen him attacked unfairly. Granted, I'm sure he has been attacked unfairly many more times than I have been aware of, but whatever. This is all off topic anyway.
 
Are you suggesting that it is even theoretically possible for organisms such as us in our environment -- both hostile to general living and social -- to survive by means of stimulus-response? I know you are smarter than that, so what exactly is your point? You are aware of combinatorial explosion?

I'm not indicating a simple one-to-one stimulus response - more a combination of responses, such as would be found in any computer program.
 
FedUpWithFaith said:
Epic fail.

Read the conversation and try again.


Aku, Pixy won't read this but here's one obvious question you could ask:

So SHRDLU is conscious when talking about blocks and unconscious if I take the slightest deviation from that? Seems to me I don't cease becoming conscious the minute you ask me about something I have no clue about nor even have any basis in language to understand.

Try using expressions pertaining to blocks (like green) and see if you can get it to recognize the general concept. You can't, it's a look up table in that regard.

Reposted in hopes of getting past "Ignore" :)
 
I'm going to ask you a simple rhetorical question:

Do you exist?


Sure.

Good. Do your perceptions exist?

Ichneumonwasp said:
What difference does that make? Many processes are "objects-in-and-of-themselves" by the argument you have provided. Including things that are clearly not true. What purpose does that serve?

Just keep answering the questions as best you can. I'm goin' somwhere w/ this ;)
 

Indeed, it was the most hilarious example of fail since...well...since, I tried to have a human discussion with another program called PixyMisa. Good times.


Reminds me of the dialogue trees I've seen in RPGs I've played. I suppose they'd display the same kind of error messages as SHRDLU if I were able to deviate beyond their syntactical bounds.
 
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Well, sure, as it applies to us. I've been engaged in several of these conversations and from what I've seen Pixy seems to defend a fairly tightly defined sense of consciousness.

Yes he does, I'll give him that. If you read my posts you'll see I agree with most of his conclusions, it's how he gets them and then transforms them to higher forms of knowledge that bug me.

But I've belabored that point enough. The next big problem I have with Pixi is he actually thinks he's explained consciousness with his definition, at least to his satisfaction. At least enough to say some cars are conscious. That's a huge claim his definition supports that his explanations don't.

Pixi's definition is that consciousness is self-referential computation. So
let me ask you this, how much more does this really tell us about consciousness than this definition:

Consciousness is computation.

Not much, all Pixi has done is is slightly qualify computation and since most computations of any complexity utilize some form of self-referentialism (This is the whole raison d'etre of Turing's breakthrough and the nature of recursion that led to digital computers) there really isn't much difference.

With my simplfied definition anything computed is conscious - an even more ridiculous claim.

If and when we do discover everything there is to know about what qualifies computation to be conscious, I'd bet everything I have that toasters and "smart" cars won't meet them.
 
I would say that Kant's 'veil of perception' is an integral part of objective reality.
I can agree with that but it still doesn't contradict me. You and I may be saying similar things from different perpectives. I could take the position of an idealist and semantically transform all my explanation to fit that perspective, it wouldn't invalidate what I've said.

No, it doesn't invalidate your point. In fact, I've pointed out the very same things in earlier discussions about "materialism vs idealism". But, regardless of whatever '-ism' one wants to ascribe to, we still have the problem of finding the equivalence relation between "matter" stuff and "mind" stuff. Its an outstanding philosophical and scientific question.

Sure, our perceptions serve as representations an impressions of external objects. Of course, our mental image of a tree is not identical to the observed tree. What I'm saying is that qualia -- subjective experiences -- are objects in-and-of-themselves.

Agreed. But so are illusions objects in-and-of-themselves. So are abstractions. Please keep in mind I'm not using the word "illusion" in the conventional sense. I know that it connotes something that isn't really real so I'm between a rock and hard place. This whole thing started when I was trying to help another poster clarify a "useful fiction" remark. Qualia feel real to us because they are the only form of reality we really know (like the Matrix is to its inhabitants who haven't taken the blue pill yet - or was it the red one?). The irony and paradox is that external reality, what we commonly refer to as objective reality, must all be inferred from that by us (our subjective reality). That is how Kant would interpret it I think. UE is a Kant expert so I'd love him to chime in.

I think the simplest way to convey what I'm getting at is this:

I think that, in principle, it should be possible to scientifically identify consciousness as an object in entities external to ourselves.
 
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Yes he does, I'll give him that. If you read my posts you'll see I agree with most of his conclusions, it's how he gets them and then transforms them to higher forms of knowledge that bug me.

I'd say Pixy's caught in a strange tautological loop :p
 
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No, it doesn't invalidate your point. In fact, I've pointed out the very same things in earlier discussions about "materialism vs idealism". But, regardless of whatever '-ism' one wants to ascribe to, we still have the problem of finding the equivalence relation between "matter" stuff and "mind" stuff. Its an outstanding philosophical and scientific question.

Is equivalence really what you seek? Are you sure you picked the right word? I used to believe that too, at least for materialism It was actually UE and the references he led me to years ago that made me recognize that wasn't possible and never will be. In my opinion we can discover how to map between the two and explain the cause of consciousness materialistically (maybe this is all you meant) but we can't equate them in materialism. Is matter equivalent to computation? Not in materialism it isn't. At best, you can say computation is supervenient on matter and hence consciousness is supervenient upon matter. That's the best you can hope for. Alternatively, in my version of neutral monism (digital physics/modal realism) where information and computation is the essence of everything - matter, energy, and mind, they can be equivalent . But not in ordinary materialism.


I think the simplest way to convey what I'm getting at is this:

I think that, in principle, it should be possible to scientifically identify consciousness as an object in entities external to ourselves.


This I agree with and I provided one set of means by which this could be done to a reasonable level of confidence in an early post. There could be other means and as an AI researcher I'd love to discover them.
 
Good. Do your perceptions exist?



Just keep answering the questions as best you can. I'm goin' somwhere w/ this ;)


Depends on what you mean by exist, but yeah. Must we drag this out? I'm really not planning on checking this thread much longer. I was just bored watching college football and chimed in to a few things I don't normally spend that much time on. What's your point?

Is this going to be Descartes all over again -- the only thing about which I can be truly aware of is my own mental content/consciousness?

Even Descartes conceded that we cannot be sure of our perceptions, so we can't be sure of qualia. We may be fooled by them; are we always correct about our feelings? They are, after all, constructions, though some emotions appear to be in-built.
 


OK fine.

This will be my third attempt to double-check your link author's experiment.


C:\Users\Frank\Documents\consoleshrdlu[1]>clisp -M lispinit.mem -i loader
i i i i i i i ooooo o ooooooo ooooo ooooo
I I I I I I I 8 8 8 8 8 o 8 8
I \ `+' / I 8 8 8 8 8 8
\ `-+-' / 8 8 8 ooooo 8oooo
`-__|__-' 8 8 8 8 8
| 8 o 8 8 o 8 8
------+------ ooooo 8oooooo ooo8ooo ooooo 8

Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Michael Stoll 1992, 1993
Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Marcus Daniels 1994-1997
Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Pierpaolo Bernardi, Sam Steingold 1998
Copyright (c) Bruno Haible, Sam Steingold 1999

;; Loading file loader ...
;; Loading file fixes ...
;; Loading of file fixes is finished.
;; Loading file progmr ...
;; Loading of file progmr is finished.
;; Loading file cgram ...
;; Loading of file cgram is finished.
;; Loading file syscom ...
;; Loading of file syscom is finished.
;; Loading file smutil ...
;; Loading of file smutil is finished.
;; Loading file smspec ...
;; Loading of file smspec is finished.
;; Loading file smass ...
;; Loading of file smass is finished.
;; Loading file dictio ...
;; Loading of file dictio is finished.
;; Loading file morpho ...
;; Loading of file morpho is finished.
;; Loading file show ...
;; Loading of file show is finished.
;; Loading file blockl ...
;; Loading of file blockl is finished.
;; Loading file plnr ...
;; Loading of file plnr is finished.
;; Loading file setup ...
;; Loading of file setup is finished.
;; Loading file thtrac ...
;; Loading of file thtrac is finished.
;; Loading file blockp ...
;; Loading of file blockp is finished.
;; Loading file data ...
;; Loading of file data is finished.
;; Loading file newans ...
;; Loading of file newans is finished.
;; Loading file mover ...
;; Loading of file mover is finished.

SHRDLU version UMR-1.0
Loaded 12/31/2009 in CLISP 1999-07-22 (July 1999)


READY
Who's on first?

*YES.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
I mean the fellow's name.

*WHO.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
The guy on first.

*WHO.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
The first baseman.

*WHO.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
The guy playing first.

*WHO IS ON FIRST.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
I'm asking you who's on first.

*THAT IS THE MAN'S NAME.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
That's who's name?

*YES.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
Well go ahead and tell me.

*THAT'S IT.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
That's who?

*YES
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
Look, do you have a first baseman?

*CERTAINLY.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY
Who's playing first?

*THAT IS RIGHT.
PLEASE TYPE <LF> AND CONTINUE THE SENTENCE.
READY


Well Pixy... SHRDLU's answers to my questions can only be interpreted as non-responsive.
 
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Frank, using reasoning similar to Pixi's, I'd also like to use your "Who's on First" routine to finally prove that SHRDLU is not conscious.

1. SHRDLU correctly answers responses exactly like Lou Costello
2. That means SHRDLU is Lou Costello.
3. Lou Costello is dead.
4. Anything dead is not conscious.
5. Therefore, SHRDLU is not conscious.

Q.E.D.
 
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