As I've pointed out before, any proposed theory of consciousness that cannot meaningfully distinguish between my own conscious and unconscious processing, or provide a coherent predictive model for the mechanism of subjective states and their rules of variation, is rubbish. I really don't care how 'coherent' it sounds on paper if it can't even answer basic questions about the phenomena is alleges to explain.
Then any theory of consciousness at all will be rubbish, because the only distinguishing method between your own conscious and unconscious processing is the same as the distinguishing method between your conscious processes and those of another being, and so on. The subjective state is not somehow special or unique or defining; it simply is. There's nothing to predict. It's a simple, tautological fact: experiences are.
What is the 'mechanism of subjective states'? Sensation and the mental ability to process the information gathered by those sensations. If these are present, so is consciousness. Simple.
If you choose to deny this simple observable truth, then you must also deny that other people are, reasonably speaking, conscious. You don't have access to anyone else's experiences, so you cannot believe they are conscious, unless you state a series of behaviors or constants that you share with them that, you believe, renders them conscious. In this case, we're stating those as being SRIP, which results in conscious people, animals, and things. If you choose to use a different definition, you need to give a clear, concised definition, and either a set of behaviors or constants that match that definition, or the acceptance that there's no way for you to know if anyone else is conscious at all.
The latter is useless.
Theres is nothing about our biology that -doesn't- involve SRIPs and it never stops performing SRIPs, yet we're only conscious for limited periods of time. Doesn't that raise any red flags for you indicating that maybe -- just maybe -- SRIP is not an adequate definition?
Absolutely not. There's plenty about our biology that doesn't involve self-reference or information processing, unless you extend the definitions of both terms to meaningless levels (which, reading further in your post, you are choosing to do). As for being 'conscious' for limited periods of time, I suggest you're not using the term the same way here. We're conscious nearly non-stop, barring serious illness or injury. We're not awake the whole time, but we're continually conscious. And we're not the only consciousness within our meatsacks. It's just that this particular consciousness is connected to our language centers and is the primary one responsible for interacting with the world - and given current advances in the state of research, we may not even be responsible for actions we believe ourselves to be in conscious control over!
Defining consciousness as SRIP is like defining electrical current as energy transference. Well, no shi[p], Sherlock. I'm rejecting Pixy's definition not out of some offence to my 'special dignity' as a human being, but because it is a glib non-answer. I'd rather say "I don't know" than deceive myself into believing I do -- which is exactly what Pixy, et al, are doing.
Well, if you agree with that definition, but claim it's a glib non-answer, then I'm not sure what exactly you're looking for, unless, like a small child, you're simply looking for the ultimate 'why'. You can't get there from here, my friend.
The brain processes a lot of "information" and not all of it is translated into the sensation of pain. Of course pain is 'information' thats 'reported' to the brain which 'indicates' damage. The problem with your 'definition' is that it abstracts the phenomenon to such an extent that it has no explanatory power.
What 'explanatory power' are you looking for? That's exactly what pain is, that's exactly what its purpose is, that's exactly how it works. We feel pain because our bodies need a means of determining when it's either damaged or about to be damaged; beings without a sense of pain died from injuries they were unaware of, and never reproduced. What more is required of the definition? What more are you looking for?
Saying pain is "information conveyed by neurons" is about as useful as saying a photon is "stuff emitted by the sun". What is needed is a more concrete definition of the sensation of pain, and every other subjective experience, and an explanation of how those experiences relate to physics in general.
More concrete than the actual physical process involved? How can you get more concrete than that? The problem I see with you, Aku, is that the more someone relates a subjective experience to physics, the LESS you like their answer.
ALL sensation is information transfer via neurons. ALL of it. Every vision, every sound, every smell; every thought, every dream, every fleeting fancy of the human spirit; it's all chemo-electrical transfer of signals among neurons. It's a process that can be duplicated via other forms of computational device, which means all sensation can be recreated artificially.
In the end, even if we created an artificial being with every bit of complexity of a human, with every single physical process duplicated artificially, someone (like you) would still say, 'but we don't KNOW that it's conscious!' At which point, I'd be forced to reply, 'and you don't KNOW that I'm conscious, either'. At some point, you either have to accept a definition that allows you to determine conscious from non-conscious, or you have to admit the possibility, however inane, that you are the only truly conscious being. in fact, I'd argue that you have to even consider the idea that you aren't yourself conscious after all, even though the idea seems utterly absurd at face value.
Clearly, it is different since we experience it differently than all the other sensations we have. Are you not in the least bit curious as to the science of how 'information' becomes a sensation or what it is about particular tissue types that produces the capacity to experience them in the first place? Are you that willing to accept a non-answer just because its simple and 'coherent'?
I don't see it as a 'non-answer'. Yes, I am curious about the science. And I'm watching eagerly as various branches of science peel away the layers of mystery. But I don't see how pain is different from sight or sound or taste. Pain is NOT 'clearly different'; it is absolutely the same as all other physical sensations. Pain is a sensation of touch. How on earth is it 'clearly different'???
If a rock is heated by EM radiation from the sun it is gathering information
WP and re-emitting it in a different form. Every physical process processes information -- its how we're even able to observe and model the world mathematically. "Information processing" -- even "self-referential IP" -- is too broad a definition for a phenomenon as specific as consciousness.
Only if you broaden the definition into utter absurdity. Atoms stimulated by radiation and emitting another form of radiation are processing information, yes; but without any form of information storage and retrieval (memory), cross reference, or controlled output. It's far too broad a definition for 'information processing'.
Narrowing the definition to include information storage and retrieval, for example, would help quite a bit, too; but at some point, you have to accept a definition, or you have to accept that we're never going to get anywhere, because we can't even define 'is'.
Because the hand-waving definition being proposed can't even explain our own consciousness
Sure it can. We take in information, and we process it; we're also aware of our self (body), and capable of distinguishing, to varying degrees, between 'self' and 'not-self'.
or make falsifiable predictions concerning it.
No definition of 'consciousness' will ever, ever make falsifiable predictions concerning consciousness, period. So what?
\ The difference between you and I is that I can at least acknowledge this ignorance and not be content to fill it in with a God-Of-The-Gaps platitude just because it has the trappings of logic.
No, the difference between you and I is that you cannot be content with a logical explanation that also includes things you personally choose to not believe are conscious, even though you are utterly unable to define why you choose to believe this way.
The problem is that we have no -objective- way of discerning -subjective experiences- in any entities other than ourselves. Nor do we have any knowledge of the physical rules of variation that determine the shades of our own experiences. The fact that we don't even know if systems other than carbon based organisms can support consciousness says volumes about our ignorance in this area.
Rather, it speaks volumes about how poorly defined consciousness really is. Actually, we don't even know if other carbon based organisms can support consciousness. I don't even know if you can support consciousness. Nor you, I.
What does that speak volumes about? Lack of a good definition.
A living body is required to grow and support a consciousness producing brain.
Really? How do you know this?
Severely compromise or destroy the viscera, and consciousness will be lost.
Again, how do you know? You don't. You yourself just admitted we have no objective way of discerning subjective experiences. It might well be that consciousness is NOT lost, but merely loses its ability to control the body or communicate. It might well be that consciousness changes, or leaves the body and wanders around free, or that consciousness dies every second to be replaced with a newborn consciousness, or that it never existed in the first place.
You contradict yourself within your own post.
The question you should asking yourself is: Whats the "golden key" that separates conscious from unconscious processing in the very same meat-computer?
I think 'unconscious processing' is a poorly defined term, as well; it may well be that what we perceive as 'unconscious processing' is, simply, another conscious process which lacks the ability to communicate its consciousness.
If one doesn't know what the key property is that allows our own biology to produce consciousness they cannot seriously propose knowledge of how to produce it in another substrate.
But first, we have to define consciousness. My own experience is that consciousness is self-referential sensation processing, and absolutely nothing else. Hence, if a thing has senses, the means to process them, and an awareness of self, it has consciousness. The medium is meaningless. As I've said before, and read from Pixy's posts, if you have a clear, concise, and solid definition of consciousness that varies from this, please, offer it for discussion.
Who gives a flying **** how clear his definition is if it sidesteps the phenomena it alleges to explain? Which is, namely, subjective experience.
There's nothing to sidestep. It's experience. Period.
There is no operational definition of it because we don't yet know its exact mechanism or its rules of variation. Being content with a cargo cult theory of consciousness is not only asinine, its downright counter productive.
You can't discover how something works, and THEN define what it is. That's backwards and silly. You have to start by defining consciousness; THEN try to figure out how it works.
I'm content with 'self-referential sensation processing' (I choose 'sensation' over 'information' because you seem to want to broaden 'information' to include 'all physical reactions') because that's what I experience. That's ALL I experience. That's the sum total of my consciousness - sensation processing in a self-referential framework.
ymmv.
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