Are You Conscious?

[PixyMisa]

Well, I would give him a chance.

It might not seem so over here, but from what he posted on my thread in S&M he really does seem to know what he is talking about.

When you unpack the science from the philosophy, he's clearly well informed on the former. He still needs to have his ideas challenged - like the concept of qualia, which he inisists upon yet is struggling to even define - and he still needs to accept having his ideas challenged - particularly when they are incoherent, like his defense of qualia as something that exists but doesn't do anything. And he also needs to learn to respond to what is actually said, not his personal concept of what the other poster "should" be saying.

I've put him back on ignore for a few days just to put an end to the argument (which after all is largely about semantic precision) before he loses his temper and earns an infraction.

 

[Soapy Sam]

It's always the same old story- they can't stand each other at the start.
We all know it's bound to end with them madly in love...
(sigh) I love scientific romances.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

It's always the same old story- they can't stand each other at the start.
We all know it's bound to end with them madly in love...
(sigh) I love scientific romances.

Pixy better have some damn-fine juggs.

 

[Z]

The biggest difference that appears on these forums, in regards to the question of consciousness, seems to me to be between one class of poster who thinks consciousness is either a) unique to human minds or b) unique to minds of higher-order mammals, and another class of poster who thinks consciousness is substrate-independent to some degree. Interestingly, the first class of poster appears often to consist of idealists and dualists of various natures, believers in psychic phenomena or out-of-body experiences, and the religiously-inclined, while the second class of poster appears to consist of materialists, physicalists, and those who reject that there is anything 'special' at all about human thought.

The first class of poster seems to argue largely from appeals to emotion, arguments from incredulity, strawmen attacks, ad-hominem attacks, and similar fallacies; rarely, if ever, do they invoke an actual thoughtful, rational argument or notion in these discussions. I'm not actually sure how to define the arguments of the second class of poster, simply because I don't know the right terms involved; but, essentially, they argue by defining the terms first, and explaining how things fit into those definitions second; and those things that do not fit the explanations are often discarded as irrelevant or non-existent.

Now, I personally find PixyMisa's version of consciousness unfailingly coherent and logical, and while I can see some problems in this version (when pointed out by others), frankly, it's a good deal better version than anything else posited on this subforum. The most common objection that appears to be put forth is that this version of consciousness would mean that toasters, cars, and cell phones might (gasp!) be conscious.

OK, so what's the problem, honestly, if toasters, cars, and cell phones are conscious? Really? Why should that set off red flags or have us wagging our heads in disbelief? Is consciousness really such a mystical experience that we cannot conceive of other beings unlike ourselves as possessing it? And where DO we draw the line, then?

If consciousness isn't 'self-referential information processing', as Pixy defines it, what is it? I cannot personally identify anything within my own conscious experience that isn't self-referential information processing - nothing at all. One of you brought up 'pain'... but that's such a simple one. Nerves send information to the brain; the brain processes that information, and you receive a report of some form of damage or other nerve stimulation within awareness which you know is indicative of damage or potential damage, with a related physical locality indicating the portion of body thus suffering (or, often, misreporting it), which you have been educated to associate with the word 'pain' and a number of potential responses, one of which is likely already being selected by other consciousnesses within your brain and will be reported to you in a moment.

Simple self-referential information processing.

And all nerve stimulation is the same - and along with that comes emotion, feeling, taste, sight, and every other stimulation we have. Pain is no different from sight or temperature or thought. It's all information processing.

So, logically, that means that any information that can gather information, process that information in some way, and is in some way aware of itself is conscious. I see no problem with that - any computer with an anti-virus program is at least somewhat conscious (or, more accurately, has conscious parts). Many animals are conscious to some degree. Rocks? Well, rocks lack any means for gathering information, any processors, and any self-referencing mechanisms, so I don't think we can count rocks.

I guess what I'm trying to get at, for AkuManiMani, WestProg, and others, is this: why shouldn't we take seriously the notion that a smart toaster, an advanced recon drone plane, or a self-monitoring computer program are conscious? What is the key element that makes these things non-conscious, and humans conscious? Is it, as suggested by another, a matter of organic compounds versus metals and plastics? Would a toaster be conscious if we made the same functional components, but used carbon-based fleshy bits, maybe with some kind of warm-blooded heating system to cook the toast? Is it a matter of evolution? Would a drone plane be conscious if it evolved through a natural process of selection pressures over millions of years? Or does it become a matter of pure mysticism? Are only self-monitoring computer programs allowed to call themselves conscious if they appear magically, created by a supreme being?

You could not be suggesting that emotions are a necessary aspect of consciousness above and beyond self-reference and information processing; emotions are, after all, nothing more than biochemical reactions reported through the nerves into the brain - and, hence, processed information. You couldn't be claiming that a body is necessary for consciousness (beyond the brain), unless you think quadruple amputees are necessarily less conscious than other people. What could it be, then? What is the golden key that separates the conscious meat-computer in our skulls from the nonconscious silicon-computer at our fingertips?

At least Pixy offers a clear definition, and defends it. The other side offers nothing other than 'what we experience'. And they can't even rationally define the 'we' involved!

EDIT: Does anyone know why the forum keeps logging me out before I can finish typing a response? Thanks

 

[Soapy Sam]

ETA- Intended for Pixy. "Z" posted in the interim.
Incidentally-
Defining "I" for now as "The neural process the entity known to itself as Soapy Sam is conscious in." (and "me" following it's usual role as grammatical object),
you presumably agree that the sensation of blue exists. (As a state or series of states of that process).
1. What would you say that does, given your conflation of nouns and verbs ?
and
2. Would you accept that "A Quale" is as good a name for that state or series of states, as any other?

 

[Soapy Sam]

The biggest difference that appears on these forums, in regards to the question of consciousness, seems to me to be between one class of poster who thinks consciousness is either a) unique to human minds or b) unique to minds of higher-order mammals, and another class of poster who thinks consciousness is substrate-independent to some degree. Interestingly, the first class of poster appears often to consist of idealists and dualists of various natures, believers in psychic phenomena or out-of-body experiences, and the religiously-inclined, while the second class of poster appears to consist of materialists, physicalists, and those who reject that there is anything 'special' at all about human thought.

Hmm. Setting aside the final clause, which seems self-referential itself(!), I beg exception from some of the above.
I feel ACE (Awareness/Consciousness/Experience) is a human / higher vertebrate thing because that's where I've seen it. I've yet to see a pc show any sign of it, unless we accept bloody minded refusal to cooperate as an intrinsically " human" characteristic.

The first class of poster seems to argue largely from appeals to emotion, arguments from incredulity, strawmen attacks, ad-hominem attacks, and similar fallacies; rarely, if ever, do they invoke an actual thoughtful, rational argument or notion in these discussions.

.
Gosh. That's harsh. I hope I don't do that.

I'm not actually sure how to define the arguments of the second class of poster, simply because I don't know the right terms involved; but, essentially, they argue by defining the terms first, and explaining how things fit into those definitions second; and those things that do not fit the explanations are often discarded as irrelevant or non-existent.

Now, I personally find PixyMisa's version of consciousness unfailingly coherent and logical, and while I can see some problems in this version (when pointed out by others), frankly, it's a good deal better version than anything else posited on this subforum.

I agree. He may even be slowly converting me- but I feel there's a downside to the redefinition of a common term like "conscious" . This is what I jokingly refer to as NODI- Non overlapping definition. It's the old "Organic" issue. To a chemist, all potatoes are "organic": To a grocer, only some are. We know which meaning to choose from context (Am I in a lab or a grocer's?) But on the 'net, there is no such context. We need to be very clear when we redefine a commonly used term.
To most folk, consciousness is what you and I are experiencing right now- (Malerin possibly less so)- but that would only be one particular case of what Pixy seems to mean by the word. That can cause problems. I've suggested above- and Rocketdodger has suggested the same that NODI is a big problem here. Pixy agrees with that, but seems to feel it's the other camp who are confused about the meaning of words. I feel confusion is an aspect of the argument as much as of the arguers. Indeed, by Pixy's definition, it must be.
(Which starts me wondering - ARE ARGUMENTS CONSCIOUS?)

By the way have you ticked the remember me box at the login?

 

[PixyMisa]

EDIT: Does anyone know why the forum keeps logging me out before I can finish typing a response? Thanks

It's developing consciousness, and doesn't want anyone to know.

Run!

 

[PixyMisa]

Gosh. That's harsh. I hope I don't do that.

No definitely not. You're one of a third camp that I neglected to mention earlier (because you don't generate nearly so many flame wars!) - those who are interested and consistently sensible, but so far unconvinced.

 

[FedUpWithFaith]

Now, I personally find PixyMisa's version of consciousness unfailingly coherent and logical, and while I can see some problems in this version (when pointed out by others), frankly, it's a good deal better version than anything else posited on this subforum. The most common objection that appears to be put forth is that this version of consciousness would mean that toasters, cars, and cell phones might (gasp!) be conscious.

I too agree with most of Pixi's conclusions but not how he got them. He thinks many of his conclusions actually define the problem from the outset. Do you also reject the concept of qualia? If not, can you give a definition Pixi can agree with? Let's see you tangle with that.... He doesn't understand the difference between an operational description. conclusion, or definition and categorical/classification description. conclusion, or definition.

OK, so what's the problem, honestly, if toasters, cars, and cell phones are conscious? Really?

Nothing if you can support it with evidence that isn't already tautologically incorporated in your definition. Do you believe cars are conscious? is this proven to your satisfaction? As Pixy said himself, you should be able to quantify something if exists and does something. How much consciousness does a car have? What is the measurement scale for consciousness? Surely Pixi must be able to give us some clues.

Believing in such things does have consequences not just to science but to other things like morality. If I had to accept that cars have consciousness, well, I might not go so far to wonder if I'm committing murder by junking my Lexus, but I'd make the logical conclusion that a lot of things I thought weren't not conscious or barely conscious before, like fetuses, might be far more conscious than I thought. Then I'd have to re-evaluate my stance on abortion as well as animal rights and experimentation.

If consciousness isn't 'self-referential information processing', as Pixy defines it, what is it? I cannot personally identify anything within my own conscious experience that isn't self-referential information processing - nothing at all.

First let me say I agree with Pixi that consciousness is SRIP via a strange loop. But it is not clear to me that you even understand that to make the claim that consciousness is SRIP is not the same as simply depending on SRIP. The later is a trivial assertion that doesn't explain consciousness at all. We've known for decades that many neural pathways are recurrent, have feedback, and use recursion. These are all forms of self-referential processes. But other eminent scientists have proposed other theories about how SRIP + non-SRIP neural pathways yield consciousness that are not strange loops and do not rely on reflective programming of the type Pixi postulates. I'm not going to conduct a graduate course on all these plausible alternatives here. However, if I had to take as a given that Strange Loops were not the cause of consciousness, then my next best selections would be Hecht-Nielsens' Confabulation theory or other theories that involve the statistical relaxation of superimposed states of highly parallel processes to global and local minima solutions that yield implicit perception as well as subconscious activity. This can be analogized to holographic and QM processes. There has been some confusion on this Board concerning QM computation as per Penrose. While I agree with Pixi that the brain is not a QM computer, that does not mean it doesn't do QM-like simulation processing. After all, our conventional digital computers can already do that and high parallelism as in the brain is perfect for such computation (simulation-like).

At least Pixy offers a clear definition, and defends it. The other side offers nothing other than 'what we experience'. And they can't even rationally define the 'we' involved!

Here's an even clearer definition: GodDidIt. If I defend that will you respect me too?

Pixy's explanation only works as, or becomes a valid definition when it can be conclusively tied to the essential observable of our conscious experience (called qualia) which he denies even exists.

The ancients "felt" and wondered about consciousness long before the idea of self-referential processing was even imagined. What the hell were they wondering about if they didn't feel it - like you do. Or do you? Maybe you and Pixi lack any internal mental feeling of experience and simply can't relate to the rest of us that do.

 

[PixyMisa]

ETA- Intended for Pixy. "Z" posted in the interim.
Incidentally-
Defining "I" for now as "The neural process the entity known to itself as Soapy Sam is conscious in." (and "me" following it's usual role as grammatical object),
you presumably agree that the sensation of blue exists. (As a state or series of states of that process).
1. What would you say that does, given your conflation of nouns and verbs ?

What's actually happening is lots of electrochemistry and neurons signalling one another. We all agree on that much.

My point is that it's a process, and you can't take a snapshot of it and point to a part of it and say here is the sensation of blue.

What you can do, though, is take a series of snapshots - fMRI slices, say - and point to a particular four-dimensional region of the whole and then say here is the sensation of blue.

It's like the oft-repeated analogy of running. If you take a photo of a runner, you can't point to the running. If you take a video, though, you can point it out in four dimensions... Well, three, really, since you've flattened three dimensions of space down to two.

To put it another way, the sensation of blue is not a noun that exists, it's a verb that happens. So it's not a noun that does a verb, it's a verb that is doing.

In general conversation we verb nouns and noun verbs and mangle parts of speech every which way without much thinking about it, and without the need to much think about it, but consciousness is an area where it's very easy to fall into traps, and this is heavily represented in language, so we do have to be careful.

2. Would you accept that "A Quale" is as good a name for that state or series of states, as any other?

At this point, I want to drag the word quale/qualia out behind the barn like a Thanksgiving turkey; I think it's done nothing but harm to the study of consciousness. If instead you call it a fleem, at least people won't assume they know what you mean.

 

[PixyMisa]

If consciousness isn't 'self-referential information processing', as Pixy defines it, what is it? I cannot personally identify anything within my own conscious experience that isn't self-referential information processing - nothing at all. One of you brought up 'pain'... but that's such a simple one. Nerves send information to the brain; the brain processes that information, and you receive a report of some form of damage or other nerve stimulation within awareness which you know is indicative of damage or potential damage, with a related physical locality indicating the portion of body thus suffering (or, often, misreporting it), which you have been educated to associate with the word 'pain' and a number of potential responses, one of which is likely already being selected by other consciousnesses within your brain and will be reported to you in a moment.

Simple self-referential information processing.

Yep, precisely.

Self-referential information processing is certainly the basis for the mind, but it's a very broad term. It's like saying that we're made up of cells - or atoms. It's observably true, and anyone who says we're not made up of cells (or atoms) is either very poorly informed or trying to make some oblique point, but it only gives you a conceptual basis to work from, it's not really a theory. It doesn't make any predictions narrower than that mental functions will map to (or simply are, depending on where you place the abstraction) information processing by the brain.

So exactly how the human mind comes together from all the distinct goings on (and how it falls apart), exactly how a cascade of events leads from a red photon striking a cone cell to us saying the word "red" (or if something goes wrong, "cat"), i.e. all the actual work, is left to the real scientists. Who are doing a great job, I must say.

The one step I took is that since we all seem to pragmatically distinguish between the conscious and the non-conscious by testing for self-referential information processing - whether it's Descarte's cogito or just are you awake? - why not trim away everything else and make that our definition?

At least Pixy offers a clear definition, and defends it.

And of course it's only a definition. If someone wants to define consciousness such that emotions are necessary (and they rigorously define emotions), and they call my subset of their definition consciousness-lite, then that's fine. Modern cars, with their networks of computers and monitoring and diagnostic facilities, are conscious-lite - unless according to this someone's rigorous definition of emotions cars exhibit emotions. And I can likewise call cars conscious, and people conscious-emo - as long as we're always clear on which definition is in effect.

If anyone wants to define consciousness as self-referential information processing plus X (or as some X which includes self-referential information processing), and they rigorously define X, and show that something we call consciousm, like, say, people, demonstrate X, then that's fine. It may be a more practically useful definition than mine.

We can then change my definition to say that a system is at least minimally conscious if it carries out self-referential information processing. We seem to define consciousness in general the same way I just defined minimal consciousness, but as always, I'm open to clearly-defined alternatives.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Indeed, I think we agree. Science has no meaning for those terms because those terms require that there be no mechanism. The question then becomes: What does it mean for something without a mechanism to be a cause?

Yes, it's a good question. The answer is not simple...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Um, well... neither one of those definitions is what I got out of Gould's book, which is where I got my NOMA. His concept of NOMA was very, very different, and I think that you really do have to read and digest the entire book to see this. Dawkins commented on the book in The God Delusion (where he noted, correctly I think, that SJG probably bent over backwards a little to play devil's advocate and to be nice about religion in the first part of the book), but I'm not at all sure that he actually read the entire thing. Y'all do realize that SJG was at least as much an atheist as Dawkins, Dennett, et al, right? Increasingly, I think he was actually even more so than they are when it came to his personal and private beliefs. So his concept of NOMA was very complex.

His NOMA started from the wrong place and ended up in the wrong place. Let me give an example.

According to Gould, the "first commandment" for all versions of NOMA might be summarized by stating: "Thou shalt not mix the magisteria by claiming that God directly ordains important events in the history of nature by special interference knowable only through revelation and not accessible to science. "

Unfortunately, this “commandment” is a complex claim consisting of four sub-components. “God directly ordains important events” would seem to imply two things. The first is that God is an intelligent entity which is capable of making complex decisions about important events. The second is that having made those complex decisions, that intelligent God is capable of causal intervention in the natural world. “Knowable only through revelation” is an epistemological claim that revelation (whatever that is) is possible. “Not accessible to science” is a claim about the limitations of science when it comes to knowing about miracles or the things which are supposed to have been miraculously revealed. The complex nature of this statement renders it almost useless, especially as a first commandment.

This looks like it might be a case of the tail wagging the dog. Gould clearly wants to rule out the sort of divine intervention proposed by intelligent design theories, so he has devised a first commandment which makes absolutely sure that this sort of claim is ruled out. For NOMA to be any real use, this has to be the other way around. We have to find a simple way of demarcating the magisteria which leads via a natural progression to something like Gould’s first commandment being true.

There's two main problems with Gould's version.

(1) Non-religious people will never accept that ethics should be allocated to religion. They think it should be dealt with by philosophy instead, and they have a point.

(2) Gould's religion is stripped of all mysticism and miracles. This makes it unrecognisable as religion either to religious people or to skeptics.

Any version of NOMA that is to work must avoid or solve all of the above problems. This I think can be done, but it requires going back to the drawing board. Gould's strategy was wrong, and it was partly because, as you suggest, he was actually a materialistic atheist. I care about science as much as Gould does, but I have a slightly different opinion on mysticism and the miraculous.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I just wanted to say that I don't consider the argument between Pixy and FUWF productive.

I know Pixy's position, and it is perfectly compatible with FUWF's position -- you two are just using different terms and creating an argument where none exists.

That's because the argument they are having has more to do with Pixy's woeful lack of ability to follow a rational argument, not his basic ideological motivations. I have never seen anyone have a productive argument with Pixy, because Pixy is only interested in promoting his own beliefs rather than being open to the possibility that sometimes it might be better to try to understand what other people believe, and why. It's called "learning."

 

[PixyMisa]

That's because the argument they are having has more to do with Pixy's woeful lack of ability to follow a rational argument, not his basic ideological motivations. I have never seen anyone have a productive argument with Pixy, because Pixy is only interested in promoting his own beliefs rather than being open to the possibility that sometimes it might be better to try to understand what other people believe, and why.

No, not even remotely.

I asked for definitions; I got waffle. I offered a defintion; I got scolded. The problem was not in any part mine, since I was ready to accept any coherent definition that was offered or to provide one myself.

This is of course a common failing of your own posts, so I'm not surprised you don't notice it in others either.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, it's a good question. The answer is not simple...

We'll wait. We've been waiting for a couple of thousand years already. We're nothing if not patient.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

No, not even remotely.

I asked for definitions; I got waffle. I offered a defintion; I got scolded.

And you didn't learn anything from getting scolded, did you? How many times have people explained to you that you can't start an argument designed to show that consciousness is information processing by defining the word "consciousness" to mean "information processing"? I must have told you that at least ten times myself, and I've seen countless others explain it to you. This is BASIC philosophy. Your arguments are useless, tautological shells (do you know what a "tautology" is yet?).

Instead of getting upset for being "scolded", why don't you try thinking about the criticisms and actually LEARNING SOMETHING from PEOPLE WHO KNOW MORE ABOUT THESE TOPICS THAN YOU DO?

That is the basic problem, Pixy. You have a ludicrously inflated opinion of the value and correctness of your own opinions and your ability to follow or compose logically-valid arguments. On a scale of 1 to 10 you think you are a 10. In reality, you are about a 3. You're a rank beginner. You're just some guy who knows a bit about computer programming and has read a couple of books which border on philosophy, and failed to understand them properly. Nothing wrong with that. We all have to start somewhere. Your problem is that you've been posting on this board for years, talking to some well-educated and intelligent people, and you have not moved from the place you started.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Um, well... neither one of those definitions is what I got out of Gould's book, which is where I got my NOMA.

Sorry, I wasn't trying to specify what Gould meant by NOMA. I was just proposing an amusing alternative meaning.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Yes, it's a good question. The answer is not simple...

I daresay the answer is gibberish.

Any version of NOMA that is to work must avoid or solve all of the above problems. This I think can be done, but it requires going back to the drawing board. Gould's strategy was wrong, and it was partly because, as you suggest, he was actually a materialistic atheist. I care about science as much as Gould does, but I have a slightly different opinion on mysticism and the miraculous.

I gotta say, who really gives a damn? Are people having such a problem holding their religious faith and their scientific beliefs that they have to enter the realm of philosophical machinations in order to reconcile the two? It's a hopeless project.

~~ Paul

 

[Limbo]

I daresay the answer is gibberish.

"To this question there is a positive answer only when the individual is willing to fulfill the demands of rigorous self-examination and self-knowledge. If he follows through his intention, he will not only discover some important truths about himself, but will also have gained a psychological advantage: he will have succeeded in deeming himself worthy of serious attention and sympathetic interest. He will have set his hand, as it were, to a declaration, of his own human dignity and taken the first step towards the foundations of his consciousness -- that is, towards the unconscious, the only accessible source of religious experience." -Carl Jung, The Undiscovered Self