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Are Agnostics Welcome Here?

We'll have to wait for a bigger particle accelerator to discover that.

Yes, but even then we have a problem because if there is a single substance it is weirder than the particles we speak of.

Let's assume that string theory, about which I know far too little, is correct and that quarks are made of vibrating strings of energy. But we've also got space-time to deal with. Whatever is most fundamental is really weird since it must account for energy (the basis of all matter and so quarks) and space-time.

I have no idea what that could be.
 
Yes, but even then we have a problem because if there is a single substance it is weirder than the particles we speak of.

Let's assume that string theory, about which I know far too little, is correct and that quarks are made of vibrating strings of energy. But we've also got space-time to deal with. Whatever is most fundamental is really weird since it must account for energy (the basis of all matter and so quarks) and space-time.

I have no idea what that could be.

Me neither, but you can bet your bottom dollar that it will have nothing to do with gods or mysticism.
 
We are not using words in the same way I fear, but let me see if I can suss this out. The true mind of god would be the substance. The singularity is an action of the mind of god. If you want to produce something with the true mind of god it should have the same basic property as everything else or you'll end up with a slightly less worrisome but still very problematical kind of dualism which has been called property dualism. While you can say that the true mind of god creates the mind of god and the singularity, the mind of god and the singularity have completely different properties. How does that occur? And how do the different properties interact?

Yes this concept is difficult to explain. Let me start by suggesting a way of looking at the similarities between MG and SG.

MG is a two dimensional plane, this plane becomes projected into three dimensions as a sphere. It still has the properties of the plane on the surface of the sphere, but it now also has a 3D form. It is both MG and SG.

What we see as a 3D (existing thing) substance is a construct or precipitation of something actually in 2D (not an existing thing). However this construct is the only reality we know and we see it as the substance. Whereas in reality it is a mirage or projection of the underlying (apparently not existing) substance.

The true mind of God TMG is in 1D and inconceivable, while MG is a two dimensional projection of the 1D thing. The 1D thing is throughout this the only thing that actually exists, the others are projections of it. The 1D thing is a precursor of the one substance.
 
Maybe they're not made of anything. That's what I've been telling you. You're not playing devil's advocate: you believe in this ultimate substance business.

I am playing devil's advocate by not immediately assuming that gods are impossible. In other words, I don't assume what the ultimate substance is. That there is an ultimate substance or substances is true by definition. I don't know what there is to believe or disbelieve about it.
 
Yes this concept is difficult to explain. Let me start by suggesting a way of looking at the similarities between MG and SG.

MG is a two dimensional plane, this plane becomes projected into three dimensions as a sphere. It still has the properties of the plane on the surface of the sphere, but it now also has a 3D form. It is both MG and SG.

What we see as a 3D (existing thing) substance is a construct or precipitation of something actually in 2D (not an existing thing). However this construct is the only reality we know and we see it as the substance. Whereas in reality it is a mirage or projection of the underlying (apparently not existing) substance.

The true mind of God TMG is in 1D and inconceivable, while MG is a two dimensional projection of the 1D thing. The 1D thing is throughout this the only thing that actually exists, the others are projections of it. The 1D thing is a precursor of the one substance.


I'll need to think on that a bit. It sounds somewhat like the current view of space-time, though.
 
I am playing devil's advocate by not immediately assuming that gods are impossible. In other words, I don't assume what the ultimate substance is. That there is an ultimate substance or substances is true by definition. I don't know what there is to believe or disbelieve about it.

I disagree with that. Who made the definition and what evidence did they use?
 
I disagree with that. Who made the definition and what evidence did they use?

Many people throughout the history of philosophy. The evidence is that something exists. We know that something exists. The definition of substance refers to what actually exists, what its nature is. This isn't even a controversial point, so I don't understand the objection to existence.
 
Many people throughout the history of philosophy. The evidence is that something exists. We know that something exists. The definition of substance refers to what actually exists, what its nature is. This isn't even a controversial point, so I don't understand the objection to existence.

What evidence?
 
I would assume that the evidence is there by default: the mere act of asking for evidence about there being evidence for something (whatever that actually is), constitutes evidence of something in and of itself.

We can be sure that something exists, but we cannot be sure what that ultimately is.

I’m quite sure something/someone just asked for evidence.
 
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First of all, thank you for taking the time to express your thoughts in answer to my questions. It's been illuminating for me.

Let me begin with this: this is not an attempt to prove monism. We must necessarily begin with assumptions and the first assumption I make is monism. Everything else is simply explication of the underlying assumption.
Okay. That's cool when it's clear that it's an assumption you're making up front.
That has actually been my underlying point in this thread -- that the answer one arrives at depends on one's starting assumptions. Assume materialist monism and gods are not possible. Assume idealism and god is everything. Assume dualism and god is possible but not necessary. But there is no way to prove which monism is correct; I still don't know if it is possible to disprove dualism.
We are complete agreement here.
Yes, the symbols are considered objects. That is what I object to; the symbols only have existence by means of mental action. Yes, we can draw a 5 on a piece of paper, but that only serves as a 5 if someone interprets it mentally. The symbol has independent existence of humans, but it only works as a symbol within a context and with minds to interpret it.
I want to make sure we are discussing the same thing, because it's easy to become confused when discussing intangibles and the symbols that we use to represent them. I’m not talking about the symbol representing 5 being an intangible object. I’m talking about the concept that is being represented by the symbol. That is, I’m referring to the ‘object’ that the symbols 5, five, and V all refer to. I agree that the symbol representing 'five' has no meaning outside of minds to interpret it. Likewise, the word 'tree' has no meaning outside of human minds interpreting it. We agree that trees exist independent of the symbols we use to represent them and human minds thinking of them. Apparently we disagree regarding whether numbers also have an independent existence.

Yes, dualists do argue this. The problem is conceptual -- dualists don't supply a mechanism by which the non-physical can interact with the physical.
I don’t think a mechanism need be established; examples of such interactions would suffice. It seems to me that this is simply an extrapolation of the starting assumption of monism, not a conceptual error on the part of dualists.
Mechanism is a concept that works within a single system since it denotes the means by which things that can interact do interact. If things interact then they are necessarily made of the same substance. It was easy in the past to point to what looked like magic -- spooky action at a distance through unknown and presumably unknowable means. As we've learned more, however, most of those interactions have been explained, at least at some level. Some are still a bit mysterious -- gravity and how it bends space-time.
No disagreements there. It may be that monism is true and we simply don’t understand the mechanisms yet. It may be that monism is false.

The evidence against dualism, when it comes to mental concepts, is in the neural sciences. Stop a brain functioning and the concept of number disappears.
No, interaction between the concept and that particular brain stops. There is no more reason to think that the concept of number disappears when someone dies anymore than rocks disappear as a result of someone's brain stopping thinking about them. Other people can observe them and establish that they still exist.
Of course, this does not prove that dualism is wrong, but the fact that we can stimulate a certain area of the brain (left tempero-parietal junction) around the angular gyrus and create in someone the concept of a particular number provides a strong argument that it all arises in the brain.
Can we actually do this? That's pretty cool if it's true. But it's only an argument against dualism if we cannot do similar things to evoke thoughts of material objects. Can we stimulate a certain area of the brain and create thoughts about material objects, like food or other people?
It seems to me that numbers clearly interact with and affect our material world through the instantiation and manipulation of those concepts in human thought. I still don't understand why this doesn't qualify as interaction between the intangible concepts of numbers and the physical world.
I would answer that the way you have stated it is impossible. Numbers have to be neural action to affect other neural action.
This is really the key question for me. Since everything we interact with must first be ‘sensed’ – i.e. translated into neural action – before we can interact with it - this objection doesn't make sense to me without the assumption of monism. If I am understanding you correctly, you are saying that my question is impossible because your assumption of monism does not allow for two substances to exist and interact.
I don't think I stated my point earlier very clearly. The relationship between the circumference and diameter does exist independent of humans. Just as the five rocks exist independent of humans. But the concept of pi or the number 5 do not exist independent of some mind to think them. That mind doesn't have to be human.

You don’t presume rocks disappear when no one is observing them. You do make that assumption about non-physical things. It seems to me that this is a consequence of the assumption of materialism, not monism. Under the assumption of idealism, such concepts would remain in existence even when we are not thinking of them because the ‘mind’ of idealism can be considered to be thinking of them. Correct?
 
I am playing devil's advocate by not immediately assuming that gods are impossible.

That's not playing devil's advocate.

That there is an ultimate substance or substances is true by definition. I don't know what there is to believe or disbelieve about it.

That's a shame. Your statement is simply wrong, that's what there is to disbelieve about it.
 
I am playing devil's advocate by not immediately assuming that gods are impossible. In other words, I don't assume what the ultimate substance is. That there is an ultimate substance or substances is true by definition. I don't know what there is to believe or disbelieve about it.


Look, I didn't assume gods were impossible but came to that conclusion after many years of finding no evidence.

You must have a different definition of the universe than I do.

Your whole 'devils advocate' shtick is wearing a bit thin when you declare yourself a true believer in an 'ultimate substance'.


Once more, with feeling, there is no ultimate substance, it's an artifact of philosophy that has no correspondence with the real world and looks suspiciously like the 'ground of being' or god.
 
I would assume that the evidence is there by default: the mere act of asking for evidence about there being evidence for something (whatever that actually is), constitutes evidence of something in and of itself.

We can be sure that something exists, but we cannot be sure what that ultimately is.

I’m quite sure something/someone just asked for evidence.

And the only answer he's gotten so far is "you exist therefore ultimate substance exists" which is no answer at all.

bolded
ETA: Why would you assume the thing you're trying to prove?
 
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Many people throughout the history of philosophy. The evidence is that something exists. We know that something exists. The definition of substance refers to what actually exists, what its nature is. This isn't even a controversial point, so I don't understand the objection to existence.

You just make the leap from 'something exists' to 'an ultimate substance exists' with no reason given except 'it must be that way'.
 

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