Are Agnostics Welcome Here?

[SusanB-M1]

IchneumonWasp
I echo the compliment about your posts. I was going to say so a way back, but then there are so many other posters here and the whole thread has been very interesting, so it might not be fair!!

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It still doesn't imply some sort of substance. Unless you're using the word in a different way than the rest of us are.

Substance refers to that which exists. That is its definition and use withing philosophy. You can argue over what you think is most fundamental, but you can't doubt substance because the doubting proves that something exists from the cogito.

Saying there is no substance means there is no existence. It literally means 'nothing exists'. Why do I have to keep repeating this?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

IchneumonWasp
I echo the compliment about your posts. I was going to say so a way back, but then there are so many other posters here and the whole thread has been very interesting, so it might not be fair!!

Thank you. I do appreciate it.

 

[dafydd]

Substance refers to that which exists. That is its definition and use withing philosophy. You can argue over what you think is most fundamental, but you can't doubt substance because the doubting proves that something exists from the cogito.

Saying there is no substance means there is no existence. It literally means 'nothing exists'. Why do I have to keep repeating this?

Because you provide no proof. Bellman tactics do not work here.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

No. ACTION refers to that which exists. We've been through this, and the only thing you have been able to do is nay-say it.

How does action refer to that which exists? Actions can only occur if something exists to perform the action. The action of doubting certainly demonstrates that something that thinks exists, otherwise doubting couldn't occur. But even if you take that to be the case, that actions are primary, it doesn't change a whit of what has been discussed. In materialism that would make quarks an action and thinking brains would be actions based in quark action.

 

[Hokulele]

So let me be clear, I am not claiming that the concept of numbers has an existance independent of ourselves, only that it seems as if they do. If that appearance is an accurate reflection of reality, then it seems to me that materialism must be false as it is not capable of explaining the existance of non-physical things independent of the physical beings thinking about them. If the independent existance of numbers is considered an illusion rather than reality, then materialism can explain what we observe.

Just to muddy the water a bit, here is my take on numbers and whether they "exist" or not. As Ichneumonwasp mentioned earlier, the main problem seems to stem from the fact that "five" is a noun. I prefer to think of it as an adjective. In other words, instead of "five" being a thing unto itself, it is simply a property of things. For example, a rock is a thing, and I can describe it as having several properties. It is smaller than a breadbox, gray, and warm to the touch. "Small", "gray", and "warm" aren't things, they are properties of things. I can quantify the "smallness", "grayness", and "warmth", and those properties can change.

Similarly with "fiveness". If the rock is in a group with four other rocks, it has the property of being "five". If I remove a rock, its property changes. This is why mathematics are so powerful, in that they can more accurately describe the properties of things, and more importantly, describe how those properties change. If you treat "five", "equals", and "integrate from 0 to 17" as adjectives and verbs, rather than as nouns, it all makes more sense.

Much of this was made clear to me when I learned object-oriented computer programming, as the disctinction between objects, properties, and methods is critical, and that categorization makes for useful analogies in other modes of thought.

 

[dafydd]

How does action refer to that which exists? Actions can only occur if something exists to perform the action. The action of doubting certainly demonstrates that something that thinks exists, otherwise doubting couldn't occur. But even if you take that to be the case, that actions are primary, it doesn't change a whit of what has been discussed. In materialism that would make quarks an action and thinking brains would be actions based in quark action.

i thought we were discussing matter. How can matter doubt? Elementary particles carry out actions all the time but do not go around doubting.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Because you provide no proof. Bellman tactics do not work here.

If you're just going to troll there is no point.


First, I've given you the argument; if you don't understand it, then fine. You don't accept that the cogito demonstrates that something exists or you think that there is an infinite regress. I can't stop you from believing that.

Second, I'm not trying to prove anything here.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

i thought we were discussing matter. How can matter doubt? Elementary particles carry out actions all the time but do not go around doubting.

We are discussing substance. Substance refers to that which exists. The cogito tells us that something that thinks exists. That's all it tells us. It doesn't tell us what the substance is, only that there must be one. There is no way out of subsance existing. I can't fathom why anyone would even try such a ploy.

 

[dafydd]

Something exists. Why can't it be an infinite regress?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Something exists. Why can't it be an infinite regress?

How can an infinite regress be a something? And if you want to say that it's an infinite regress, that is your answer to the most fundamental -- that it's an infinite regress. But that doesn't change this argument in any way shape or form. It just means you rely on an infinite regress. You can call it an infinite regress of matter, or of mind, whatever.

But an infinite regress doesn't make sense.

 

[dafydd]

How can an infinite regress be a something? And if you want to say that it's an infinite regress, that is your answer to the most fundamental -- that it's an infinite regress. But that doesn't change this argument in any way shape or form. It just means you rely on an infinite regress. You can call it an infinite regress of matter, or of mind, whatever.

But an infinite regress doesn't make sense.

I'm not saying that it is an infinite regress. I just want to know how you know it. Lot's of things don't make sense. My own viewpoint is that strings are at the bottom of it but that will be very hard to prove.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm not saying that it is an infinite regress. I just want to know how you know it. Lot's of things don't make sense. My own viewpoint is that strings are at the bottom of it but that will be very hard to prove.

I don't know it. And that's part of the point. Know one can know what the bottom tier is. I can tell you that strings are not the bottom of it because we also have to deal with space-time. Whatever is at the bottom has to account for both strings and space-time. And I can tell you that an infinite regress when it comes to what is doesn't make sense.

There is no way to prove what is, at its most basic level. We can understand how it works but we can't describe it fully at its most basic level. I've already left the argument as to why I think that more than once throughout this thread.

 

[dafydd]

What is the problem with strings and space-time? I speak as an interested layman.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What is the problem with strings and space-time? I speak as an interested layman.

They have different properties. If there is a single substance, then there must be something more fundamental to account for these different properties. String theory might already have some sort of an explanation, but I don't know enough about it to say.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

We are complete agreement here. I want to make sure we are discussing the same thing, because it's easy to become confused when discussing intangibles and the symbols that we use to represent them. I’m not talking about the symbol representing 5 being an intangible object. I’m talking about the concept that is being represented by the symbol. That is, I’m referring to the ‘object’ that the symbols 5, five, and V all refer to. I agree that the symbol representing 'five' has no meaning outside of minds to interpret it. Likewise, the word 'tree' has no meaning outside of human minds interpreting it. We agree that trees exist independent of the symbols we use to represent them and human minds thinking of them. Apparently we disagree regarding whether numbers also have an independent existence.

I think we are on the same page.

I don’t think a mechanism need be established; examples of such interactions would suffice. It seems to me that this is simply an extrapolation of the starting assumption of monism, not a conceptual error on the part of dualists.

It would if we want to say that we understand it. If we can't speak in terms of a mechanism, then we don't understand what is going on and we might be wrong.

Can we actually do this? That's pretty cool if it's true. But it's only an argument against dualism if we cannot do similar things to evoke thoughts of material objects. Can we stimulate a certain area of the brain and create thoughts about material objects, like food or other people?

Yes. I don't see why it is only an argument against dualism if we cannot do similar things to evoke thoughts of material objects. And yes, we can evoke thoughts of different material objects, even hallucinations. It isn't that easy to do, though, since most of the stimulation intensities that we use on epileptics preparing for cortical resections are kept relatively low (because they might provoke seizures and that messes up the whole procedure to map function in the region). Much of the work that has been done to show complex processing has not included stimulation studies but rather recordings of individual and groups of cells to a particular stimulus. One of the weirder ones apparently was that someone had a cell or small group of cells that responded to a picture of Bill Clinton and to no one else that they showed this person.

This is really the key question for me. Since everything we interact with must first be ‘sensed’ – i.e. translated into neural action – before we can interact with it - this objection doesn't make sense to me without the assumption of monism. If I am understanding you correctly, you are saying that my question is impossible because your assumption of monism does not allow for two substances to exist and interact.

It isn't actually the assumption of monism but relates back to the definition of substance as it is used in Spinoza's philosophy, or at least as I understand it. Interaction implies that two things are made of the same substance. You can always argue that different substances can interact, but then you'd need to provide some means how that might be possible. How does the immaterial interact with the material? How does the non-spatial interact with the spatial? It might be easiest to think about it by asking 'where does this interaction occur?' Wouldn't we need something half-way between spatial and non-spatial for this interaction to occur? What would that be, a third substance? Would we need another half-way substance to allow the first transaction to occur?

You don’t presume rocks disappear when no one is observing them. You do make that assumption about non-physical things. It seems to me that this is a consequence of the assumption of materialism, not monism. Under the assumption of idealism, such concepts would remain in existence even when we are not thinking of them because the ‘mind’ of idealism can be considered to be thinking of them. Correct?

Correct. But the issue was whether or not concepts could persist withouth a mind to think them. In Idealism there is always a mind to think concepts, so no concepts disappear. We don't need to be involved. As I said earlier, the mind does not need to be human.

 

[Belz...]

Substance refers to that which exists. That is its definition and use withing philosophy. You can argue over what you think is most fundamental, but you can't doubt substance because the doubting proves that something exists from the cogito.

Let's get rid of the philosophical nonsense and word salad:

Substance refers to that which exists. You can argue over what you think is most fundamental, but you can't doubt substance because the doubting proves that something exists.

Right. So when you are saying "substance", you mean "action" or "behaviour". I don't know why you prefer to use that word. I do hope it's not some devil's advocate thing.

Saying there is no substance means there is no existence. It literally means 'nothing exists'. Why do I have to keep repeating this?

Because you don't understand what I'm telling you.

 

[Belz...]

How does action refer to that which exists?

Because behaviour implies existence. Nothing that is non-existant can act and thus something exists if it acts. Ago ergo sum.

Actions can only occur if something exists to perform the action.

This is where we disagree. Something exists IF it performs an action. "Substance" doesn't factor into it.

But even if you take that to be the case, that actions are primary, it doesn't change a whit of what has been discussed.

It does because it removes the need for substance. Parsimony, if you will.

But an infinite regress doesn't make sense.

Why not ?

 

[dafydd]

Yes, why not?

 

[Beth]

Just to muddy the water a bit, here is my take on numbers and whether they "exist" or not. As Ichneumonwasp mentioned earlier, the main problem seems to stem from the fact that "five" is a noun. I prefer to think of it as an adjective. In other words, instead of "five" being a thing unto itself, it is simply a property of things.

Certainly, numbers can function as adjectives. But like many other adjectives, such as colors, they also function as nouns. While this approach is one way to avoid the dilemma, it doesn't solve it. All intangible nouns can be reclassified as adjectives or actions, but that doesn't resolve the dilemma of whether concepts exist independent of our thinking about them.

The reason I choose to use numbers as an example is because the concept that is being referred to by symbols like '5' is very very consistent from one human to the next.

It would if we want to say that we understand it. If we can't speak in terms of a mechanism, then we don't understand what is going on and we might be wrong.

Okay, that's a valid point. Before we can attempt to understand something, we have to first establish what it is. Since we can't do that with the fundamental substance you are referring to, the lack of understanding and possibility of error are problems that are appicable to both monism and dualism. Dualism does have the complication of two substances but it also has the advantage of providing explanations for our observations of non-material things that seems a better fit than the explanations monism provides.

Yes. I don't see why it is only an argument against dualism if we cannot do similar things to evoke thoughts of material objects. And yes, we can evoke thoughts of different material objects, even hallucinations.

Because we were discussing whether numbers exist independently of brains. Since we can do similar things for material objects that do exist independently of the brain that is thinking of it, we cannot conclude that being able to evoke thoughts of something, like numbers, implies that they exist only in our brains.

It isn't actually the assumption of monism but relates back to the definition of substance as it is used in Spinoza's philosophy, or at least as I understand it. Interaction implies that two things are made of the same substance.

I've not read Spinoza, so I can't comment much. From what's been said here, it still seems to me to be an assumption of the nature of substances, not necessarily a property of such substances if more than one substance exists.

You can always argue that different substances can interact, but then you'd need to provide some means how that might be possible. How does the immaterial interact with the material?

We interact with other material objects through our neural system. I don't see why we cannot also interact with immaterial objects through our neural system.

I'm afraid I really don't understand this objection that either everything must be composed of a single fundamental substance in order to interact. Why the insistance that different fundamental substances could not interact?

How does the non-spatial interact with the spatial? It might be easiest to think about it by asking 'where does this interaction occur?'

The only place we are currently aware of such interactions occuring are within our thoughts. That is, of course, the example I gave and asked why it didn't count as an interaction between the physical and non-physical.

It still seems to me that the reason that this is rejected as an example of an interaction between two substances is due to the assumption of either monism or, if you aren't assuming monism, the assumption that interactions between two different substances cannot occur.

Thanks for the conversation. You've provided me a great deal of food for thought.