Transition team sought to encrypt Flynn's communications.
Days before a series of phone calls in late-2016 between Michael Flynn and Russia’s then-ambassador to the United States, members of the presidential transition team began inquiring about ways to encrypt Flynn’s conversations, discussing with the director of national intelligence’s office by email a range of technologies that would enable secure communications.
Among the recommendations apparently approved of by the General Services Administration (GSA)—the agency charged with overseeing the orderly transfer of power after a new president is elected—was the use of Signal, a popular encrypted messaging app that allows users to exchange messages that can self-destruct.
These internal conversations, made public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), add further context to internal deliberations of the Trump transition team ahead of moments that have become touchstones of the ongoing Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation into Russia’s 2016 election interference. The emails also suggest that, while certain correspondence may have been recently acquired by the DOJ’s special counsel’s office, other potential sensitive conversations pertaining to Flynn’s communication with Russian officials may be forever unobtainable.
Flynn, who served as President Donald Trump’s national security advisor for less than a month and resigned after it was revealed he had misled Vice President Mike Pence and others in the White House about his conversations with the Russian ambassador, pleaded guilty this month to lying to the FBI. Flynn phoned then-Russian ambassador, Sergey Kislyak, multiple times on December 29th in an effort to undermine American sanctions against Russia imposed by the Obama administration in response to cyberattacks during the election, according to a plea agreement.
