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Air France Flight 447 report

Yes, I have read the entire document, not cherry picked and drawn to a conclusion.

I will wait for the final report next year before I disparage the pilots.;)
 
Yes. I don't see anything in the flight laws that would prevent the pilots from reducing AOA using the side stick controller. They didn't, though.

Just my opinion, but the first thing a pilot should learn is that there is no such thing as an aircraft that cannot be stalled. There are aircraft with limited pitch authority. The Ercoupe uses a stop on the elevator control cables. The Airbus uses a sophisticated computer algorithm. Both limit authority; neither can limit the aerodynamic reality that a wing will stall.

Even for someone who was fixated on climbing to the exclusion of all else, the junior pilot was behaving foolishly. The maximum rate of climb for an airplane happens when you have maximum excess power. This will be somewhere near the minimum sink AOA, which is still well above stall. If you're flying slower than this, even if you're above stall, you are not going to climb as fast as you would if you sped up a little.


Well, in theory, the A330 in normal law - barring a software malfunction - truly cannot stall. The flight computer not only limits authority, but also continuously monitors every aerodynamic element to ensure adequate lift and airflow over the wings. This means, for example, that even in the absence of any pilot input whatsoever, if the aircraft were to encounter a sudden violent tailwind, the flight computer would automatically add thrust and alter the attitude to maintain lift. Therefore it's a truism that if an aircraft like the A330 is flying in normal mode with a properly functioning flight computer, it's literally impossible for the aircraft to enter a stall (barring something like a total loss of available thrust, or a massive change to the aircraft's aerodynamics, or some other major mechanical/electrical failure).

But I've been trying to argue here that ultimately this was irrelevant when it came to this particular accident. I argue that even if the pilots had been indoctrinated into believing that this aircraft was "unstallable", the visual and audible indicators should have left them in absolutely no doubt that - contrary to any prior belief - the aircraft was indeed in a stall.

Other than that, I agree entirely with your post. The junior co-pilot disregarded basic airmanship skills in trying to climb to the limit of the aircraft's altitude envelope, while seemingly not even noticing that the aircraft was in fact starting to lose altitude in a nose-up attitude owing to its stall. And once this happened, both co-pilots (and latterly the captain) signally failed to recognise or diagnose the stall, let alone even attempt to correct it.
 
Yes, I have read the entire document, not cherry picked and drawn to a conclusion.

I will wait for the final report next year before I disparage the pilots.;)


In my opinion, your use of the word "disparage" is rather telling. It appears that you are looking at this in an emotive way, rather than a dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. Like I said before, I have zero agenda to apportion blame to human error - it just appears to me to be the inescapable conclusion based on the known evidence.

Just out of interest though, if you were speculating right now using the available evidence, what would you say might be the main cause of this accident if it wasn't pilot error. Call me Mr Tunnel Vision if you like, but I can't even see any other candidates for the primary cause of the eventual plunge into the Atlantic Ocean with the loss of all souls on board. And if it wasn't pilot error, then something else had to have been the primary cause. What do you think that primary cause might have been?
 
In one of the links it seems that AOA indicator is brought into question.

Does this change anything?

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/transcript29juillet2011.en.php
One recommendation concerns the aircraft certification and this is the problem of the angle of attack display. The angle of attack is not a piloting parameter but is important information to know what margins the airplane has in relation to stall. This angle of attack display is not directly presented to the pilot. He can find it somewhere in his computer but it's quite complicated and so we do not wish to recommend directly requiring it but we think that a study should be carried out to assess whether it is justified to integrate the presence of an angle of attack display which is directly accessible. We believe that in this particular case, in the case of this accident, if the pilots had had directly available an angle of attack display, they would probably have been in a better position to understand the situation.
 
My point is that it is not just the pilots. Pilot error is part of the equation but is not the only variable.

There are many aspects to consider. I am not qualified to make absolute pronouncements as to what went wrong.

I leave that to the dedicated investigators who know what they are talking about.

As for emotions, well according to my wife , I have none.;)
 
My point is that it is not just the pilots. Pilot error is part of the equation but is not the only variable.

There are many aspects to consider. I am not qualified to make absolute pronouncements as to what went wrong.

I leave that to the dedicated investigators who know what they are talking about.

As for emotions, well according to my wife , I have none.;)


Funnily enough, I agree with you! Firstly, I wouldn't suggest that the entire accident was due to pilot error - just that it was the primary factor. And secondly, of course the investigators (and their professional counterparts in other similar agencies) are clearly those most qualified to report on the accident and critique that report.

But surely what we're all doing on this forum is offering our own opinions on issues that others are actually going to decide. Why do you think there are threads about (for example) Palestine, the Euro or 9/11? If the stock answer to questions on these subjects was along your lines ("I'll leave this issue to the dedicated professionals who know what they are talking about"), there would be no point in having most of the threads in JREF. After all, why should anyone discuss the Palestinian issue here, when we should instead leave it for the Palestine/Israel governments and the UN and EU special envoys to decide? Why should anyone discuss the Euro crisis here, when we should instead leave it to national European governments, central bankers and the European commission to decide? Indeed, according to your principle, why should anyone ever even hold opinions on whether a certain sports team should buy/trade a certain player, when we should instead leave it for the team's management and owner to decide?
 
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But surely what we're all doing on this forum is offering our own opinions on issues that others are actually going to decide.

Certainly, and we are all entitled to our opinions. I am not suggesting that you or anyone else should cease and desist from discussing the accident.

I try to express my opinion without calling pilots with thousands of flight hours incompetent, suicidal, guilty of gross fundamental errors and investigative agencies party to cover up.

Especially when they are not present to defend themselves.

This topic has been discussed to death by many forums and interested parties and still opinions are divided as to the root cause.
 
The author of Erreurs de Pilotage (as mentioned in the Popular Mechanics article) talks about why he released the full CVR transcript and his opinion on what happened:

http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2011/10/14/qmb-jean-pierre-otelli-airfrance.cnn


I think that Otelli has it absolutely spot on. I recommend that people listen to this interview. It also brings into further relief the way in which the BEA operates. Oteli is in no doubt whatsoever that the root cause of the accident was the failure of the pilots (collectively) to fly the aircraft correctly. As he explicitly says, it's basic airmanship to identify and correct a stall, and it's something that demonstrably was never even attempted properly in this instance.
 
Certainly, and we are all entitled to our opinions. I am not suggesting that you or anyone else should cease and desist from discussing the accident.

I try to express my opinion without calling pilots with thousands of flight hours incompetent, suicidal, guilty of gross fundamental errors and investigative agencies party to cover up.

Especially when they are not present to defend themselves.

This topic has been discussed to death by many forums and interested parties and still opinions are divided as to the root cause.


Well, I'd argue that in the light of all the evidence available now (most notably the FDR and CVR data), the only way in which "opinions are still divided" is in the same way that "opinions are still divided" on whether the Moon landings were a hoax.

I might be so bold as to suggest that anyone who has some flight training and who has had access to the critical data from the CVR and FDR (plus the notable lack of radio ground communication) can be highly confident that this accident was caused primarily by significant and multiple pilot errors.
 
I might be so bold as to suggest that anyone who has some flight training and who has had access to the critical data from the CVR and FDR (plus the notable lack of radio ground communication) can be highly confident that this accident was caused primarily by significant and multiple pilot errors.

Pilot error which would not have occurred (or would have been immediately detected and corrected) had the control yokes been electronically linked, as they are on the aircraft of that other, US-based aircraft manufacturer. I forget the name.
 
How much did flying at night have to do with things? Had the flight been in daylight, the pilots could have simply looked out the windscreen and seen whether they were in a nose up or nose down attitude, whether they were banking or not. But at night over the featureless ocean they have no such visual cues, and then, for whatever reason, they didn't seem to want to trust what their basic instruments—the artificial horizon and vertical speed indicator—were telling them.
 
How much did flying at night have to do with things? Had the flight been in daylight, the pilots could have simply looked out the windscreen and seen whether they were in a nose up or nose down attitude, whether they were banking or not. But at night over the featureless ocean they have no such visual cues, and then, for whatever reason, they didn't seem to want to trust what their basic instruments—the artificial horizon and vertical speed indicator—were telling them.

This class of pilots should be able to fly without any 'visual cues'. If they can't, then they shouldn't be flying.
 
This class of pilots should be able to fly without any 'visual cues'. If they can't, then they shouldn't be flying.


Agreed. But there have been other cases involving night flying and some apparent level of distrust—unconscious or otherwise— of the instruments.
 
And here’s where the pundits really don’t get it. A so-called Transport Category airplane like an Airbus is not required to be recoverable from deep stalls like the one that may have occurred with AF447. They’re supposed to be difficult to stall, and pilots are trained to avoid stalls. In fact, we train to recover from “approaches to stalls,” not “full stalls” or “deep stalls.” So even if the pilots did everything they were supposed to do to recover from a stall, the airplane still may not have been recoverable once it entered a deep stall and exceeded the critical angle of attack.



Only aircraft with a t-tail configuration can enter a deep stall, and even then only certain aircraft. An Airbus A330 cannot enter a deep stall.
 
How much did flying at night have to do with things? Had the flight been in daylight, the pilots could have simply looked out the windscreen and seen whether they were in a nose up or nose down attitude, whether they were banking or not. But at night over the featureless ocean they have no such visual cues, and then, for whatever reason, they didn't seem to want to trust what their basic instruments—the artificial horizon and vertical speed indicator—were telling them.



This seems unlikely for consideration. At cruising altitude all flying is essentially IFR, and no pilot would ever get near flying a commercial airliner without being highly proficient in IFR flying. Hell, you can't even get a basic CPL without comprehensive IFR ability.
 
If an Airbus 330 is incapable of stalling, and if Airbus 330 pilots are not expected to know how to recover from a stall, one has to wonder why they bothered including stall warnings in the aircraft.

The idea that pilots are "not expected to perform a stall recovery" is nonsense. It's one of the most basic skills any pilot learns, and stall recovery is essentially the same for every single fixed wing aircraft on the planet.

I would never ever knowingly get in an aircraft with a pilot who didn't know something as fundamental as how to recognise or recover from a stall. That's like getting in a car with a driver who doesn't know how to perform an emergency brake.
 
Only aircraft with a t-tail configuration can enter a deep stall, and even then only certain aircraft. An Airbus A330 cannot enter a deep stall.

Citation please.





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