slimshady2357
But Ian, I claim Materialism would predict this:
Statement 'M'
"Two distinct but identical brains which are indistinguishable
I believe that distinct might necessarily mean they are not indistinguishable
Simshady
except for location in space-time should produce two distinct but identical consciousness' which are indistinguishable except for location in space-time."
As an aside to Loki, it really doesn't matter if materialism holds there is a possibility of another Universe or not. I was simply introducing a thought experiemt to illustrate a point.
But to make everyone happy, suppose that
our Universe contained only 2 objects, perhaps 2 spheres. Suppose they are separated by some distance, say 10 light seconds, and they are revolving around each other, and both travelling in a direction perpendicular to their plane of revolution at half the speed of light. But hold on a sec here. There is no absolute space. There being no other perspective in the Universe, we cannot distinguish between the 2 spheres between being in the state of affairs outlined, and the spheres simply being "stationary" (not revolving or moving). In other words it is meaningless to assign a particular state to them whether we assign them to be revolving, moving off in a certain direction, or "stationary".
One objection to this would be that we could tell if they were revolving around each other by virtue of the centrafugal "force" generated, or the centrapetal force required to keep the 2 spheres revolving around each other. A good point, but I would say this thought experiment demonstates that centrafugal force only arises because the rest of the Universe exists. This also of course applies to Newtons first law of motion.
So we cannot say that each sphere has a particular location in space. The
only thing we can say about their "location" is that they reside at a distance of 10 light seconds away from each other. Crucially it should be noted that from the perspective of sphere "A" we
cannot say that sphere B is 10 light seconds away in a
certain direction. The same applies from the perspective of B. The concept of direction is just as meaningless as that of ascribing to them a certain motion or the idea that they are revolving around each other.
Now it might be thought that we can at least say that from the perspective of sphere A that sphere B must lie in the precise opposite direction that spere A would reside from the perspective of B. But this would be an error. There is an absolute equivalence between sphere A and sphere B. Whichever sphere we happened to be on, we could never in principle tell which sphere we were on because everything is absolutely identical in all ways. In brief then we can say that both spheres reside in different locations, but this cannot possible have any conceivable consequences since there is an absolute equivalence between them.
Now imagine a Universe with just 2 objects in it, this time 2 rooms. The inside of both rooms are absolutely identical. Moreover in each room there is an Ian (post duplication) with each Ian only experiencing out of his particular body. So in effect we have 2 different streams of consciousnesses. In other words *I*, that is one particular stream of consciousness, experience from one body in one room. Although the other Ian acts identically to me, the other Ian, experiencing out of a different body, might as well be a different person as far as I care about his fate. So we have 2 streams of consciousness which in all ways are identical, but which are neverless still 2
different streams of consciousnesses. And imagine I could be duplicated more than once. In principle I could be duplicated an unlimited number of times. But even if there were a trillion of me, *I*, that is to say one particular stream of consciousness, would only experience out of one single body.
Now materialism maintains that what completely determines a person's selfhood is the totality of physical facts. I mentioned before that this would amount to the totality of physical facts constituing our bodies (in particular the physical processes occurring in the brain) and our environment. Both Slimshady and Loki suggest location is also crucial. But I have just above demonstrated that this cannot possibly be a factor. So in both rooms the totality of physical facts are absolutely identical and therefore materialism must hold that there is only one unique stream of consciousness!
Another way of thinking about this is that if my particular stream of consciousness is only associated with the body of one Ian, out of an unlimited number of Ian's, then clearly the totality of physical facts is insufficient to determine my self. Indeed given that there could be an infinite number of Ians with an infinite number of streams of consciousnesses, then the probability of my particular stream of consciousness having actually come into existence at birth, or conception, or whenever, would be 1/infinity or zero! But this is clearly nonsensical as I do find myself existing!
So a materialist cannot maintain that his body could be duplicated, and then for it to subsequently transpire that there are 2 selves, but with each self experiencing their own stream of consciousness. The only way that materialism can possibly be saved is to suppose that if you duplicate a body you would experience out of both bodies simultaneously.
Hmmmm . . I was going to further demonstrate the logically incoherence of 2 identical selves experiencing 2 streams of consciousnesses by considering the duplication experiment itself, but haven't really got time now.
Pity it's gone. I think I may have been arguing about it with Stimp on another thread as well. Can you remember Stimpy? You know, I think I was talking about the replica appearing in an absolutely identical environment. I outargued you comprehensively if you remember?
