a_unique_person
Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning
Quick. Cheap. Quality.More on behind-the-scene machinations at Boeing:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi...droom-amid-max-crisis/?utm_term=.a61770d2acde
Pick any two.
Quick. Cheap. Quality.More on behind-the-scene machinations at Boeing:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi...droom-amid-max-crisis/?utm_term=.a61770d2acde
Nope.Anyone here still doubting that MCAS was the root cause of both crashes?
More on behind-the-scene machinations at Boeing:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi...droom-amid-max-crisis/?utm_term=.a61770d2acde
In U.S. business culture, governance is a far distant second to management.More on behind-the-scene machinations at Boeing:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi...droom-amid-max-crisis/?utm_term=.a61770d2acde
In U.S. business culture, governance is a far distant second to management.
The shareholders control the board, the shareholders want value, board members have a fiduciary duty to maximize said value, and most failures of any kind of ethical nature (oversight, compliance, safety of the public) are blips on the accounting registers. In short: nobody in a position to personally take on the governance role or implement a system for taking that responsibility has any incentive to do so.
Until that changes, nothing else will.
Same general thrust, different words :9.Without going too far off topic, the functions of corporations are set by law. The idea that they exist only to maximize returns to shareholders is a relatively new development. There is nothing that would prevent revising the laws to require that line workers and community members get seats on the boards, that executive compensation would be limited by a formula related to average employee pay or some other metric, that executives would be criminally liable for gross negligence, etc., etc.
Nope.
Drummed into me at Boeing: No single failure, or combination of failures more probable than one in a billion flight hours, may cause a catastrophic accident. This was a single failure of a sensor in combination with a badly designed system. In a way, I wish I still had some contacts there. In another way, I'm glad I don't.
I requested a change to the thread title, by the way. Trump's responsible for a lot of bad stuff, but this isn't one of them.
What I don't get is why anyone designing MCAS system would even consider that it was anything but a terrible idea to rely on a single sensor to provide critical information to a critical system? I mean, they have TWO AoA transmitters (one on either side at the front) but they chose to only take information from the pilot's side.
ETA: As a former Boeing employee, this might interest you, and if you were there at this time (late 1990s, early 2000's) you'll probably find a lot of this familiar.
Its about 30 min long, but you might find it worth the time spent to watch (there is a block of ads from 14:33 to 17:10)
Some of the stuff being described here by the whistleblowers is just shocking
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vWxxtzBTxGU
The Verge has a new article summarizing events. It covers ground that most who have been following the story closely are familiar with, but includes some interviews and documentation which may be new to some.
Fairly complete and succinct.
It's worth a read.
Anyone here still doubting that MCAS was the root cause of both crashes?
Not me. (Back in post #65 of this thread you predicted the cause would be "pilot error". I take it you've changed your mind?)
The Verge has a new article summarizing events. It covers ground that most who have been following the story closely are familiar with, but includes some interviews and documentation which may be new to some.
Fairly complete and succinct.
It's worth a read.
Oh dear, it looks like Boeing committed another unforgivable blunder; they changed the functionality of the stab trim switches on the 737 Max without telling anyone.
Those following the story will recall these two switches on the back right of the centre console...
[qimg]https://www.dropbox.com/s/yntgr47fa9ihlzt/MCAS-Disable.jpg?raw=1[/qimg]
On previous versions of the 737 such as the 737 NG the left switch only deactivates the yoke trim switches that pilots use to control the horizontal stabilizer, and the right switch only deactivates autopilot control of the horizontal stabiliser.
However, on the 737 MAX , this was changed so that both switches performed the same function - setting either one to cut-out would disable the yoke trim switches and the autopilot functions, such as MCAS.
This means that, in the case of a runaway trim problem, a pilot flying the 737 NG could set the right switch to cutout, to turn off autopilot trim inputs, and still have manual electrical control of the horizontal stabiliser with the trim switches on the yoke. However, if they were flying the 737 MAX, this would not work - setting either switch to cut-out turned the whole stab trim system off!
Boeing made this change without informing pilots, and without including it in the iPad "Differences Training" course or any of the training documentation.
https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...ax-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/
It's an excellent summary. Greed, complacency, corner cutting and lack of regulation. 346 people died to save Boeing and airlines money.The Verge has a new article summarizing events. It covers ground that most who have been following the story closely are familiar with, but includes some interviews and documentation which may be new to some.
Fairly complete and succinct.
It's worth a read.
New York (CNN Business)Boeing's future rides on the success of the 737 Max. But all of those planes remain grounded, waiting for the world's aviation regulators to approve a software fix that will make them safer to fly.
The 737 Max does not appear close to flying again. Aviation experts doubt global regulators will act in concert to approve the 737 Max for flight, because serious questions remain about how and why the FAA approved the 737 Max for flight and whether it rushed the certification process.
The world's aviation authorities have lost confidence in the US Federal Aviation Administration. In the past when planes were grounded, other regulators followed the FAA's lead. When the FAA approved grounded planes to fly again, regulators around the world similarly let them fly too. That's what happened when the Boeing 787 Dreamliner was grounded because of battery problems in 2013.
It's an excellent summary. Greed, complacency, corner cutting and lack of regulation. 346 people died to save Boeing and airlines money.