jeremyp
Philosopher
Well the official reason is to make it handle like the older Boeing 737. However, I've read elsewhere that, with the larger engines mounted further forwards, the extra lift generated by the engine nacelles causes a kind of positive feedback at high angles of attack, which means the aircraft does not behave linearly with stick pressure. MCAS is needed to fix that so that the aircraft can be certified.OK, so "technically" MCAS is not an anti-stall system; its a system that alters the aircraft's handing characteristics so that the pilots don't inadvertently put it into a stall.
MCAS is disabled when the flaps are deployed.Frankly, I don't see any thing here that could not be accomplished by the regular method of the pilot (or in more complex A/C, the FMS) calculating the necessary take off trim setting. In most flight management systems I have ever encountered, the pilot can input the zero fuel weight, the fuel on board, the take-off flap settings, V1, Vr, V2 and well as the C of G from the load sheet, and the FMS will calculate the trim setting required. The pilots preset that manually. IMO, there is no reason why the aircraft's tendency to nose up at TOGA could not also be a factor that the FMS takes into account to reach the correct trim setting.
These crashes were not low speed incidents. In fact, for the second, it appears that the crew re-engaged the electronic trim, probably because the airspeed was too high to let them trim manually.I have a real issue with A/C systems that take autonomous control from the pilot in low speed/low altitude flight modes and then actively making control inputs. Pointing the nose down at 450 AGL and V2+15 is a really, really, really BAD idea!
It seems obvious to me (with my 20/20 hindsight) that a means of disabling MCAS was needed that didn't also disable the normal electronic trim.
