Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Belz...]

They are both Avalon because of their striking similarity.

Yeah, clones and identical twins have striking similarities, too. They are separate entities. They can't be the same person, unless we're using different definitions of "person".

So you tried for decades to have these questions answered, but to no avail.

Decades ? How did you glean that from what I wrote ?

 

[Nick227]

Having seen countless other people enter the teleporter and coming back unscathed, your intuition and instincts would no longer make you resist but lead you back to the path of enlightenment (= materialism).

In all likelihood, yes. 'Specially if there's a bit of peer pressure - being the only guy in the gang not to travel, always arriving on holiday hours later than the others etc.

And a civilization that can copy, teleport or create individuals at will would have very different standards regarding the destruction of bodies than we have now.

Yes, teleportation should revolutionise how we think about and fear death. It might just save this planet. Bring it on!

These debates about ethics and survival instinct are based on false premises, me thinks.

Mostly they're based on fear, imo.

What I find interesting about the Teletransporter is that it seems to be a lot about how it's described. I watched Star Trek as a kid and it seemed a pretty cool way to travel. They kind of faded out and then faded in on the planet surface and I just assumed it was the same people. I think most people would be fine to travel if it seemed like this.

Then, of course, if you tell people well, we're going to make a copy of you and then kill the original, they're all freaking out all over the place! It's a lot about how it looks.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I agree with others here that it doesn't make much difference to the outside world, so long as at least one of me survives. Where we part ways is the notion that we can redefine this as not dying at all in this one particular instance, when even the slightest variation to the hypothetical (like the original surviving for some brief period of time) still counts as death. It's special pleading.

Well, under strict materialism, death is simply not what it seems. A body dies, that's indisputable. But what concerns most people is that "they" will die.

And by "they" or "me" or "I" what is meant is "this person who is seeing out from behind these eyes. Me. I will die!"

And this is the issue. Because there is actually no one seeing out from behind the eyes. It's a brain-generated simulation. There is actually no one there, seeing out from behind the eyes, so this no one cannot possibly die!

Nick

 

[Earthborn]

Then, of course, if you tell people well, we're going to make a copy of you and then kill the original, they're all freaking out all over the place! It's a lot about how it looks.

Personally I find the copy-and-deconstruct method a lot more comforting, assuming it is fast enough. In most stories about teleportation, the scanning and destruction happens first, and then the reconstruction begins. And in between something always goes horribly wrong; mixed up with a fly, turned inside out, becoming free flying radio waves, or failing to materialise. With copy-and-deconstruct if something goes wrong at the receiver end a signal can be send back to the sender to abort the deconstruction phase and there would be at any time at least one good me.

 

[Mijin]

If there's one bit of progress I would hope could be made in a thread like this, it's for more people to appreciate that materialism, in itself, does not lead to one obvious conclusion.

You have one side saying "Materialism...therefore since there is no physical difference between the copy and you, the copy *is* you" and the other saying "Materialism...therefore there is no magic link between the source and destination entities. They are no more the same person than two coins are the same coin".

We can take materialism as read but I don't think it solves the problem.

ETA: To clarify, I'm not saying materialism is false, or we need to look beyond it. I'm saying that on its own it doesn't give an obvious conclusion to the transporter hypothetical.

 

[Belz...]

I'd step into a wormhole transpoter, though.

 

[Myriad]

But if you want to alter the question to be: would I fear a process that turns off my brain for 1 second? Yes, and I would avoid such a process happening if possible.

And yet, if it did happen to you, your life insurance company would not pay out your death benefits.

The Insurance Industry: Practical Answers to Imponderable Philosophical Questions for Over Three Centuries™.

 

[Croc411]

What I find interesting about the Teletransporter is that it seems to be a lot about how it's described. I watched Star Trek as a kid and it seemed a pretty cool way to travel. They kind of faded out and then faded in on the planet surface and I just assumed it was the same people. I think most people would be fine to travel if it seemed like this.

Well, I don't think it will ever be like they described it in Star Trek. Mind uploading seems so much easier to achieve to me than creating exact physical copies of individuals.

Then people will most of the time live in virtual worlds and only rarely enter a physical body. And teleportation will boil down to just transmitting information (minds) between locations - much more mundane.

 

[Croc411]

Yeah, clones and identical twins have striking similarities, too. They are separate entities. They can't be the same person, unless we're using different definitions of "person".

I try to avoid using terms like "person" or "identity" if I can, because to me they are not clearly defined or dependent on context. Instead I try to base the discussion on "conscious states" (= snapshot of the informational content of your nervous system at space-time coordinate x), whose meaning should be clear and which are IMO everything that's needed to explain all the 'experience of self' / teleporting / copying issues.

Decades ? How did you glean that from what I wrote ?

Just exaggerating, never mind.

 

[blobru]

Not for me. This brain isn't bothered about location. It's been programmed for millenia to resist death and therefore it resists it. I accept the irrationality.

Nick

What a brain is bothered by, due to its evolutionary programming (among other things), is relevant to psychology, not rationality. Rationality is logic based on facts. If location is a physical fact for objects in space-time, then it's rational to reject any process which ignores it. Teleportation (claiming copies in different locations are identical) ignores it, therefore it's rational to reject it. One may reject or accept it on other bases of course, but, at least from a physicalist-materialist point-of-view, unless these other bases rely strictly on physicalism, they aren't "rational" (or as rational - this is a tricky point [pardon the digression]: physicalism is just a philosophical system, of course, and can't, or at least shouldn't, claim a monopoly on 'rationality' [which is probably best thought of as a continuum and not an either-or]; however, it can demand that any opposing system be as consistent with respect to facts and logic; historically, physicalism's competitors have had a hard time matching its standards [nevertheless, there are some, arguably, decent alternatives out there hanging about in idea-land, collars turned up and trying to look cool]).

So, while I agree rejecting the transporter on the basis of some, arguably, evolved psychological trait is irrational, if the implication is there's no rational basis according to physicalism for rejection, I disagree; physicalism, incorporating our current physical understanding of the universe, seems to me the most rational basis we have, and it, afaict, rejects human teleportation as physically impossible.

 

[Nick227]

So, while I agree rejecting the transporter on the basis of some, arguably, evolved psychological trait is irrational, if the implication is there's no rational basis according to physicalism for rejection, I disagree; physicalism, incorporating our current physical understanding of the universe, seems to me the most rational basis we have, and it, afaict, rejects human teleportation as physically impossible.

Well, personally, I see this as more of a "get out" clause.

Are you clear you're not in the illusion that there is "someone looking out from behind your eyes" that's going to die if you push the button?

Nick

 

[blobru]

Well, personally, I see this as more of a "get out" clause.

You see physics as a "get out" clause? Hmm... To me, physics is exactly the opposite: a can't escape-clause (so to speak - no getting away from physics).

Are you clear you're not in the illusion that there is "someone looking out from behind your eyes" that's going to die if you push the button?

Nick

Yes, very clear (i think). Each individual "someone", according to physicalism, is a local spatiotemporally continuous physical and live biological system, the activity of parts of which are "conscious" sometimes (and which consciousness may create the illusion of "someone looking out from behind your eyes", as you put it; afawk from contemporary physics and psychology, that is an illusion; moreover, its isolated cessation/destruction doesn't concern me a bit [else I would be terrified to go to sleep]). The cessation/destruction I'm concerned about is the aforementioned local spatiotemporally continuous physical and live biological system's. Afawk, according to physicalism, that's death, the one you don't wake up from (not just the illusion of 'death' [so to speak] when consciousness is interrupted).

 

[Mijin]

the activity of parts of which are "conscious" sometimes (and which consciousness may create the illusion of "someone looking out from behind your eyes", as you put it; afawk from contemporary physics and psychology, that is an illusion

I still don't see the distinction between "the illusion of consciousness", and consciousness.
Essentially it would mean the experience of thinking you're having an experience, which seems to me a pointless semantic game.

moreover, its cessation/destruction doesn't concern me [else I would be terrified to go to sleep]

As has been pointed out in this thread several times, and many other threads, you aren't completely "unconscious" at any point in the sleep cycle.

Or, to clarify, there are multiple meanings of the word conscious. One is "unresponsive to external stimuli", and in that sense we are unconscious in all but the lightest phases of sleep.
But in the current context, where we're talking about consciousness as subjective states, all indications are that you are conscious, in this sense, throughout sleep.

So you needn't fear going to sleep

 

[blobru]

I still don't see the distinction between "the illusion of consciousness", and consciousness.
Essentially it would mean the experience of thinking you're having an experience, which seems to me a pointless semantic game.

Not the illusion of consciousness; the illusion there's "someone looking out from behind your eyes" that Nick227 refers to; I think illusion's a fair description for that (especially where it tends to usurp all of personhood for itself as if the local physical system, whose activity the consciousness is, were just an inconvenient detail).

With respect to consciousness somehow being in and of itself an illusion, I agree, that doesn't make much sense to me either.

As has been pointed out in this thread several times, and many other threads here, you aren't completely "unconscious" at any point in the sleep cycle.

Or, to clarify, there are multiple meanings of the word conscious. One is "unresponsive to external stimuli", and in that sense we are unconscious in all but the lightest phases of sleep.
But in the current context, where we're talking about consciousness as subjective states, all indications are that you are conscious, in this sense, throughout sleep.

Very good points. "Consciousness" is a very dodgy term with several senses. Under the definition you propose for it, which seems sensible enough, one might think of sleep as the interruption of self-consciousness: 'un-self-consciousness' perhaps, rather than "unconsciousness", as it's often referred to, the source of a lot of our confusion, perhaps. The main thing is to be clear, consistent and practical with one's definitions; I think philosophical definitions like yours make practical and useful distinctions and help give us a much clearer picture of real "consciousness" than everyday language ones.

So you needn't fear going to sleep

 

[Mijin]

Not the illusion of consciousness; the illusion there's "someone looking out from behind your eyes" that Nick227 refers to; I think illusion's a fair description for that (especially where it tends to usurp all of personhood for itself as if the local physical system whose activity the consciousness is were just an inconvenient detail).

Ah OK. I thought he might be referring to "the illusion of consciousness" because that has come up earlier in the thread, but I see it was my misreading in this case.

I would agree that our intuitive notions such as the ghost in the machine or whatever don't stand up to scrutiny, and in fact may be largely why we haven't licked the concept of consciousness yet.

I'm still not sure exactly what's meant by the illusion there's someone looking out from behind your eyes, so I can't say if I agree with that yet.

I think philosophical definitions like yours make practical and useful distinctions and give us a much clearer picture of real "consciousness" than everyday language ones.

Thanks; especially since my last post was a little snarky

 

[blobru]

I wasn't conscious of it if it was (but then I'm a wee bit dim).

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Well, under strict materialism, death is simply not what it seems. A body dies, that's indisputable. But what concerns most people is that "they" will die.

And by "they" or "me" or "I" what is meant is "this person who is seeing out from behind these eyes. Me. I will die!"

And this is the issue. Because there is actually no one seeing out from behind the eyes. It's a brain-generated simulation. There is actually no one there, seeing out from behind the eyes, so this no one cannot possibly die!

Nick

There's no one behind the eyes because it's the eyes themselves seeing out. There's no one generated by the brain because it's the brain itself doing the thinking. You still seem to be half holding on to your duality. You don't believe in a soul, but you haven't thought farther than "there isn't one," so you're still in the same mindset. "If souls don't exist, that means there's nothing piloting our brains so people don't exist either. Whee!"

I'll do you one better. Self-consciousness not even a simulation, it's a fiction. Half post-hoc rationalization and half narrative embellishment.

In actuality, you are your brain. You're not a simulation, you're not a soul. You're a brain. The brain is an analog computer, so in its function the line between "a program running on the brain" and "the physical material of the brain" is necessarily blurry. Some would argue, myself included, that any duplication of the information contained in a person's brain would require duplication (or emulation) of the entire thing.

But that's beside the point. The point is you've just cloned a brain. Now you have two. There's no soul linking them. No spirits jumping from lobe to lobe. Two brains, with exactly the same content, but two brains. Two people. If you kill one and tell the other he just had a nasty fall and you barely caught him with that chloroform rag, the world may never know. It would be the perfect murder. But it would still be murder.

And yet, if it did happen to you, your life insurance company would not pay out your death benefits.

The Insurance Industry: Practical Answers to Imponderable Philosophical Questions for Over Three Centuries™.

Okay, first off? The insurance industry thinks it can dictate reality quite enough already without us providing them with more ammunition.

Also, I think "acts of God" still exists as insurance terminology, if we're accepting contractual epistemology.

 

[Nick227]

You see physics as a "get out" clause? Hmm... To me, physics is exactly the opposite: a can't escape-clause (so to speak - no getting away from physics).

Fair enough. For me, what I like about this thought experiment is that it does confront face-on those materialists who prefer to pontificate about the outside world but are less willing to subject their inner concept of self to the same scrutiny. So, if physicalism does really back up what you propose, then I find it a bit of a shame!

Yes, very clear (i think).

OK

Each individual "someone", according to physicalism, is a local spatiotemporally continuous physical and live biological system, the activity of parts of which are "conscious" sometimes

Have to say that feels a little like drifting towards dualism... maybe. How do you propose a system is "conscious sometimes?"

Nick

 

[Nick227]

I would agree that our intuitive notions such as the ghost in the machine or whatever don't stand up to scrutiny, and in fact may be largely why we haven't licked the concept of consciousness yet.

I would agree that there is stuff still to be understood, but I'm intrigued, given your past comments, as to exactly what you believe hasn't been "licked?" Would you care to get specific?

I'm still not sure exactly what's meant by the illusion there's someone looking out from behind your eyes, so I can't say if I agree with that yet.

As you say, ghost in the machine, if you like it that way. The eyes and the brain are processing information. The illusion is that there is someone experiencing something. That is psychology, not materialist science. And that's not a denigration of psyche, just pointing out the difference.

Nick

 

[Mijin]

I would agree that there is stuff still to be understood, but I'm intrigued, given your past comments, as to exactly what you believe hasn't been "licked?" Would you care to get specific?

Well, there are several aspects of consciousness that remain unsolved, but the big one for me is qualia.
I know some people dislike this word, but call it what you will, we have no model yet for how a machine can have an experience.

The eyes and the brain are processing information. The illusion is that there is someone experiencing something.

I might be quite dense but I still don't quite follow. What are you saying is the illusion: that there's an experience or that there's a someone?

As I said upthread, I think that the illusion of an experience is meaningless, as an illusion *is* an experience.
(Or, more accurately, an illusion is an interpretation of subjective states that is found to be less consistent with the totality of experiences than another, better, interpretation. But either way, it implies an experience)

But if you mean illusion of a someone, then I'd agree with you for some definitions of "someone", and disagree for others.
The brain may be lots of separate "programs" running largely independently, and including programs such as awareness of our physical body and time which collectively give this feeling of "self". But I wouldn't call it an illusion, as such, because ultimately these collective elements are packaged together and can make one body do one thing.