Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Jomante]

I find it hard to understand why this is so difficult

I have to totally laugh at that statement because I was thinking that same thing not that long ago.

I think I somewhat understand their viewpoint now, but I don't know that there is anything I could say that they haven't already. I'll give it a shot.

Consider transteleporting a plant. If it was transteleported from the market to your house, you've got a plant, a clone of what was originally in the market. But what difference does it make? Doesn't it look and smell the same as the original? Isn't the original gone now? Who will it matter to that it isn't the original? Sure, you'd know that it wasn't the original plant, but so what? The original plant exists no longer and you have the only copy and it is a perfect copy. So it shouldn't matter to you, it shouldn't matter to anyone. It would be silly to suggest that it matters to the plant. But that's the path you're going down.

You'd say "yeah, but it doesn't have any identity/individuality/whatever" and their contention is that neither do you. You have an illusion of it.

What is the purpose of life? To spread your DNA? To make a difference in the world? That clone of you will take your place, will do what you would have done. It has your thoughts, your memories, your DNA. So what makes you different from your identical clone? Nothing. It's identical, or identical enough that it makes no difference in the outcome.

But it matters to the original illusion of self. The original is disassembled. The atoms continue to exist in another form, but the illusion of self attached to THOSE atoms is now gone. And that seems significant, but it isn't. It isn't significant to the atoms that used to participate in that illusion. That illusion of self exists now with other atoms, arranged to be your DNA. So that is fundamentally you, even though the original you no longer exists. To say that it matters to original you would mean your original illusion of self would have to exist outside of those atoms, and it doesn't. Your illusion of self does not matter, it isn't anything. It is only an illusion. Thus it should be able to accept that a continuation of the illusion in another place is sufficient for the purposes of the individual cells and the collective body as a whole, and that is the preservation of the DNA and whatever other purposes your illusion of self deems important. It may seem disquieting that it will be disassembled, but that's not significant when we're talking about something that doesn't really exist, is merely a construct for processing inputs.

 

[Earthborn]

Its really very simple.

(snip)

... there is no difference from the perspective of the person using the teleporter to someone who just decided to kill themselves without using the teleporter.

(snip)

If you can teleport something like a dog, it may be perfectly fine to you, because to you see it as exactly the same. But from the perspective of the dog (if had that much cognitive ability) it died.

It is indeed very simple: you are trying to look at the issue from a perspective that does not exist. You can't do that and come up with meaningful conclusions.

If you could create an exact copy of you right now, would you be happy to kill yourself because your copy lived on?

No, because in that situation my perspective does exist.

 

[Edx]

No, because in that situation my perspective does exist.

Well as far as its been explained to me thats no difference to what happens in the teleporter.

 

[Edx]

Consider transteleporting a plant. If it was transteleported from the market to your house, you've got a plant, a clone of what was originally in the market. But what difference does it make? Doesn't it look and smell the same as the original? Isn't the original gone now? Who will it matter to that it isn't the original? Sure, you'd know that it wasn't the original plant, but so what? The original plant exists no longer and you have the only copy and it is a perfect copy. So it shouldn't matter to you, it shouldn't matter to anyone. It would be silly to suggest that it matters to the plant. But that's the path you're going down.

No because if you are "the plant" then you would care, but from the perspective of everyone else you arent dead since from the copies perspective it never died as the memories of what happened before you pressed "engage" were also copied. But a copy is still two different entities.

You'd say "yeah, but it doesn't have any identity/individuality/whatever" and their contention is that neither do you. You have an illusion of it.

As I said they are looking at it as if they are a god, to them it doesnt matter if they die so long as something that has the exact same configuration of matter exists. From a gods perspective it might well look like its irrelevant, but to you, the entity being destroyed, it does matter.

What is the purpose of life? To spread your DNA? To make a difference in the world? That clone of you will take your place, will do what you would have done. It has your thoughts, your memories, your DNA. So what makes you different from your identical clone? Nothing. It's identical, or identical enough that it makes no difference in the outcome.

And its just as much an illusion as thinking that spreading your DNA will have any effect on your life. If a copy of my conciousness got to live forever, why should I care? My conciousness and personality doesnt matter to me because I think Im special, it matters to me because I dont want to stop thinking and have my brain destroyed. If someone created an exact replica of me upon death, it wouldnt make me feel any better about death because when I close my eyes for the last time Im not going to open them in that copies body. And it doesnt matter to me that from the copies perspective thats just how they perceive it, they will still only ever be a copy.

As I said, if this is the logic then there should be no problem with the idea of taking a gun, putting it in your mouth and blowing your head off IF you could first created an exact copy of you in every way.

And that seems significant, but it isn't.

It is significant to the original, which now lies in a bloody heap on the floor with his brains splattered on the wall. He's still just as dead as he would be even if no copy was created.

 

[Nick227]

If we are working from the principle that the teleporter isnt transporting anything only scanning and sending information for a copy to be built somewhere else, then as I see it there is no difference from the perspective of the person using the teleporter to someone who just decided to kill themselves without using the teleporter.

That is correct, but refers only to the simulation the brain runs, not actual material reality.

It seems as though there is someone living in the brain experiencing things. But it is in reality only a simulation, albeit a highly enduring one, as threads like this demonstrate!

Now, if there is no one actually there, merely a simulation, and you perfectly replicate the hardware that creates the simulation, then exactly what has died?

This is the question that this thought experiment asks of materialists.

Nick

 

[Edx]

That is correct, but refers only to the simulation the brain runs, not actual material reality.

It seems as though there is someone living in the brain experiencing things. But it is in reality only a simulation, albeit a highly enduring one, as threads like this demonstrate!

Now, if there is no one actually there, merely a simulation, and you perfectly replicate the hardware that creates the simulation, then exactly what has died?

This is the question that this thought experiment asks of materialists.

I fail to see any difference whatsoever.

I asked you a question, if you could make a machine that could create an exact replica of you in every way from the moment you pressed "COPY", would you be perfectly happy to stick a gun in your mouth and blow your brains out?

As I said to someone else, I dont care about my personality and conciousness because I believe Im special somehow and I dont care about a copy of me walking around for eternity or travelling to far off galaxies. I only care that I am able to experience those things, not a copy of me, me. And I dont see any difference between me dying without a copy living on, and me dying with a copy living on. To me Im still just as dead either way. Other people might perceive a difference, but that has no effect on me. I wont get to die then open my eyes as the copy.

 

[AvalonXQ]

I only care that I am able to experience those things, not a copy of me, me.

And the point is that your concept of "I" and "me" transcends materialism - it requires a concept of "self", some sort of coherent entity that lives inside your brain, that materialism denies exists.

You insist that replacing yourself with an identical copy would involve somebody different experiencing what you experience, and you would be gone. Materialism disagrees.

 

[Croc411]

Why should a brain not care that it is about to cease functioning? I think we think the same thing; that a copy is made and that the original dies. but for some reason you don't care that an individual has died, is that right?

No, I indeed think that my subjective (illusionary) existence will continue if I go through a destructive teleporter. I consider any being whose memories and personality are similar or even identical to my current ones to be "me". Why? Because I am nothing but the sum of those memories and personality traits (which body they come from doesn't matter). I am not some entity they are attached too, I am precisely them.

 

[Edx]

And the point is that your concept of "I" and "me" transcends materialism - it requires a concept of "self", some sort of coherent entity that lives inside your brain, that materialism denies exists.

You insist that replacing yourself with an identical copy would involve somebody different experiencing what you experience, and you would be gone. Materialism disagrees.

Conciousness is created from the arrangement of parts in my brain. If I create a copy, there is now two identical conciousness', two identical brains, two identical "ME's". They are each identical but they each have their own perspective because they are not connected to each other.

Now if you make a copy of yourself then stick a gun in your mouth and blow your brains out, all that means is your exact arrangement of atoms and molecules that make up your brain still function in the universe. But this doesnt help you, because your brain is splattered over the wall and unable to experience anything ever again.

It is the opposite of materialism to think that you're going to be able to live on just because there's a copy of you, because the argument is you're connected to that other brain somehow JUST BECAUSE its exact arrangement of parts is identical to yours.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Conciousness is created from the arrangement of parts in my brain.

And consciousness begins every morning when you wake up and your brain "reboots" from your existing memories and neural structure.

A brain, by the way, which is made up of at least some different atoms from the brain that ran your consciousness yesterday.

You have yet to explain why you consider it "dying" to be teleported but not to go to sleep.

 

[Belz...]

I don't think I would. I would be too afraid that a mess up in the transmission would leave me without skin on the other side or something. Or, for that matter, that I might apparate someplace where I shouldn't be apparating. You know like half of me is in a rock or something.

And what would happen if a person was standing where I beam into?

I would never step into such a contraption.

The principle of such a device is to kill you, and then create a perfect copy from your pattern. To me, this creates a number of issues:

1) Is it moral to destroy an individual to create a copy ? I mean, the device does both simultaneously but, it's not different from doing it minutes, hours or years apart. And how about creating several copies, instead ?

2) What if the device malfunctions and creates the copy without killing the original ? Do we kill the original forcibly because we only want to keep one ? And if we don't, how can the copy live his life, without access to the original's bank account, job, etc. ? Does he get visiting rights to the original's family ? Does he get to walk the original's dog ?

3) What if the copy isn't quite the same because of a copying error, or because the pattern was improperly stored ? What then ? Or what if we realise the copy is wrong years later ? You can't go back to the original because the pattern has been lost.

4) My personal problem with it, however, is that, for anyone else, including the copy, nothing has changed, so long as the device works properly. For the original, however, he has ceased to exist. I don't want to cease to exist, even if an exact duplicate of me continues to live my life. If the original is mistakingly not killed, the two me's don't share their thoughts, so when the device works properly, I'm destroyed. I take issue with being destroyed.

No, not stepping into those.

 

[Belz...]

You have yet to explain why you consider it "dying" to be teleported but not to go to sleep.

For most values of "me", "me" stops existing. I don't consider an exact duplicate of me to be me, otherwise, if the thing malfunctions, you can end up being several people at the same time, which is a logical impossibility.

 

[Nick227]

I asked you a question, if you could make a machine that could create an exact replica of you in every way from the moment you pressed "COPY", would you be perfectly happy to stick a gun in your mouth and blow your brains out?.

No, I wouldn't. You wouldn't catch me getting inside the transport pod either, as I wrote earlier in the thread.

However, as a materialist, I have to accept that this decision is entirely irrational.

I'm refusing to do it because my body has been conditioned through countless aeons of natural selection to strongly resist death.

And even though I know intellectually that there can be no one there to die, emotionally there's no sodding way I'm going to push that button!

Nick

 

[blobru]

No, I wouldn't. You wouldn't catch me getting inside the transport pod either, as I wrote earlier in the thread.

However, as a materialist, I have to accept that this decision is entirely irrational.
I'm refusing to do it because my body has been conditioned through countless aeons of natural selection to strongly resist death.

And even though I know intellectually that there can be no one there to die, emotionally there's no sodding way I'm going to push that button!

Nick

But only if, for some bizarre reason known only perhaps to you, your hairdresser and your priest (and maybe your and their clones), you subscribe to some truncated version of materialism where location isn't a physical property. Under physicalism^WP, which is just materialism expanded and updated to include modern physics, location is a physical property of objects. Two objects identical in every respect except location are not the same object (local system identity a function of space-time integrity & continuity). Therefore, as a physicalist it's completely rational to not step in the transporter pod; would be insane to do otherwise. Right?

 

[AvalonXQ]

For most values of "me", "me" stops existing. I don't consider an exact duplicate of me to be me, otherwise, if the thing malfunctions, you can end up being several people at the same time, which is a logical impossibility.

I don't see why being several people at the same time is a logical impossibility.

Again, our current understanding of identity is based on the current reality of distinct thought processes and experiences. If it were possible to replicate those thought processes and experiences, I don't see any reason that all of the resulting beings would not meaningfully be "me," at least until they have enough different experiences to become effectively distinct.

 

[AvalonXQ]

But only if, for some bizarre reason known only perhaps to you, your hairdresser and your priest (and maybe your and their clones), you subscribe to some truncated version of materialism where location isn't a physical property. Under physicalism^WP, which is just materialism expanded and updated to include modern physics, location is a physical property of objects. Two objects identical in every respect except location are not the same object. Therefore, as a physicalist it's completely rational to not step in the transporter pod; would be insane to do otherwise. Right?

Again, you're ignoring the problem of establishing the parameters of identity.

Yes, two objects in different physical locations are not the same -- which means, of course, that an object that moves from one location to another has changed and is now a different object. Even so, you don't think it's insane to walk around, or to go to sleep and wake up, or even to allow the very material of your body to be exchanged.

What that means is that we establish parameters for our identity that are significantly broader than "this object right here as defined by physicalism." There is, in fact, a infinite set of objects, one in every instant of time, that you have decided is "you."

So, with that in mind, you need to justify why, under physicalism, it is reasonable for each of those infinitely-many different objects to be called "you" but unreasonable for this other object, this materially identical brain that has all the same memories and thoughts as you were having before, to be called "you." What property distinguishes this object from all of those other objects, and why does moving from one to another of those still count as "you" but moving from one of those to this counts as "somebody else"?

 

[The Greater Fool]

"I think, therefore I am... an illusion"

 

[blobru]

Again, you're ignoring the problem of establishing the parameters of identity.

Yes, two objects in different physical locations are not the same -- which means, of course, that an object that moves from one location to another has changed and is now a different object. Even so, you don't think it's insane to walk around, or to go to sleep and wake up, or even to allow the very material of your body to be exchanged.

What that means is that we establish parameters for our identity that are significantly broader than "this object right here as defined by physicalism." There is, in fact, a infinite set of objects, one in every instant of time, that you have decided is "you."

So, with that in mind, you need to justify why, under physicalism, it is reasonable for each of those infinitely-many different objects to be called "you" but unreasonable for this other object, this materially identical brain that has all the same memories and thoughts as you were having before, to be called "you." What property distinguishes this object from all of those other objects, and why does moving from one to another of those still count as "you" but moving from one of those to this counts as "somebody else"?

Sorry for the late edit (above). The integrity and continuity of the material system changing location physically (under physical law) is "identity". Physicalism doesn't deny objects change location. Only that they can do so without a continuous physical history of change in the location property (or where that change violates integrity).

 

[AvalonXQ]

The integrity and continuity of the material system changing location physically (under physical law) is identity.

I disagree. Identity is a property of consciousness, which is an emergent property of the brain. Whatever illusion of continuity you maintain about the material system is irrelevant; if the brain wakes up in a similar state to the one it fell asleep in, it's the same person. If it doesn't, it's not. This is the only meaningful materialist way to describe identity.

And by the way, "physicalism" is supposed to accept modern physics, which means it also accepts the physical principle that particles are not physically distinct - identical particles are actually identical and it's not meaningful to ask, for instance, which one had which history prior to an interaction. Which I think blows this whole metaphysical idea of "continuity" you're trying to peddle out of the water.

 

[blobru]

I disagree. Identity is a property of consciousness, which is an emergent property of the brain.

That's a common notion of identity, yes (all kinds of kinds and definitions).

Whatever illusion of continuity you maintain about the material system is irrelevant; if the brain wakes up in a similar state to the one it fell asleep in, it's the same person. If it doesn't, it's not. This is the only meaningful materialist way to describe identity.

Why would the continuity of the material system be irrelevant? If, according to physicalism, consciousness is a physical activity some parts of a living body are engaged in sometimes, then establishing the identity of the living body would seem not only meaningful but fundamental, a necessary condition for the identity of any of its activities (though not sufficient, mind you: if the structure of the living body, the nervous system in particular, is altered so suddenly and/or radically it violates some limit for "integrity" (what limit very much open to debate, but the structures whose activation associate reflection with memories and embodiment, present thoughts with narrative awareness and physical awareness, seem crucial; ongoing research, however, and not a case where one could ever hope to draw a hard line anyway, I don't think)).

And by the way, "physicalism" is supposed to accept modern physics, which means it also accepts the physical principle that particles are not physically distinct - identical particles are actually identical and it's not meaningful to ask, for instance, which one had which history prior to an interaction.

They can't be identical in physical location, or there wouldn't be separate particles to interact. But having established they are separate particles, the only thing relevant to their physical interaction is their physical properties, yes (although we do speak of a particle's or object's world line^WP, as relevant to distinguishing each particle before and after).

Which I think blows this whole metaphysical idea of "continuity" you're trying to peddle out of the water.

If that's the case, physicists can just quit worrying about those silly world lines, I guess. (Good objections, btw; enjoy the challenge to the metaphysical ideas I'm trying to peddle; will either learn something more by defending them, refining, revising, or abandoning them [should their peddler's market-value drop to $0].)