Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[AvalonXQ]

They can't be identical in physical location, or there wouldn't be separate particles to interact. But having established they are separate particles, the only thing relevant to their physical interaction is their physical properties, yes (although we do speak of a particle's or object's world line^WP, as relevant to distinguishing each particle before and after).

If two of the same kind of particle interact and then separate, it's not meaningful to ask which particle was which prior to the interaction. From a quantum physics point of view, these identical objects aren't just conceptually indistinguishable; they're actually physically interchangeable. Their "world lines" intersect, then which is which becomes a meaningless question.

 

[blobru]

If two of the same kind of particle interact and then separate, it's not meaningful to ask which particle was which prior to the interaction. From a quantum physics point of view, these identical objects aren't just conceptually indistinguishable; they're actually physically interchangeable. Their "world lines" intersect, then which is which becomes a meaningless question.

Yup, good ol' quantum entanglement. Are you suggesting the teleporter is a [massive, macroscopic] case of entanglement somehow?

 

[AvalonXQ]

Yup, good ol' quantum entanglement. Are you suggesting the teleporter is a [massive, macroscopic] case of entanglement somehow?

Well, I think it can work us into an interesting set of experiments for showing the problem with using "physical continuity" (rather than mental processes) as the cornerstone of identity.

 

[Belz...]

I don't see why being several people at the same time is a logical impossibility.

I've tried countless times to get an answer to my faulty teleporter scenario and NO ONE has ever given me an answer. At all. Let's try again, expanded:

1) Assuming the device malfunctions and creates two Avalons, do they share their experiences ? I assume you'll say no, but I'll let you answer that one.

2) Assuming you answered "no" to (1), then you recognise that both are not the same person since, if they coexist, they are two separate consciousnesses and two separate identities. So here's a second question, again assuming you said "no": Why are they the same person if the device works properly and the original is instead destroyed ?

3) If you answered "yes" to (1), explain.

Again, our current understanding of identity is based on the current reality of distinct thought processes and experiences. If it were possible to replicate those thought processes and experiences, I don't see any reason that all of the resulting beings would not meaningfully be "me," at least until they have enough different experiences to become effectively distinct.

Because, in the faulty teleporter scenario, both the copy and the original are refering to a different entity when they say "me". When the copy is saying "me", he isn't refering to the guy in the first pod, whether or not he is told that he survived the procedure. To argue so is to invent an insane definition of self.

 

[Belz...]

I disagree. Identity is a property of consciousness, which is an emergent property of the brain.

Of a brain. Two brains, two consciousnesses.

Whatever illusion of continuity you maintain about the material system is irrelevant

Except that the illusion only works for the copy. The original has no illusion anymore.

 

[blobru]

Well, I think it can work us into an interesting set of experiments for showing the problem with using "physical continuity" (rather than mental processes) as the cornerstone of identity.

I agree. It's not possible, afawk, in this universe, so might as well stick with my physicalist continuity [& integrity] peddling as long as I'm here absent new discoveries; but in a universe where it IS possible - yikes! - going to need some time to think that over (and talk it over with my clones; yours are invited if they're not too too busy: "AvalonXQ-113, blobru-477; blobru-477, AvalonXQ-113... maybe we'd better skip the introductions...").

 

[AvalonXQ]

I've tried countless times to get an answer to my faulty teleporter scenario and NO ONE has ever given me an answer. At all. Let's try again, expanded:

1) Assuming the device malfunctions and creates two Avalons, do they share their experiences ? I assume you'll say no, but I'll let you answer that one.

2) Assuming you answered "no" to (1), then you recognise that both are not the same person since, if they coexist, they are two separate consciousnesses and two separate identities. So here's a second question, again assuming you said "no": Why are they the same person if the device works properly and the original is instead destroyed ?

3) If you answered "yes" to (1), explain.



Because, in the faulty teleporter scenario, both the copy and the original are refering to a different entity when they say "me". When the copy is saying "me", he isn't refering to the guy in the first pod, whether or not he is told that he survived the procedure. To argue so is to invent an insane definition of self.

Okay, the problem here is with indistinct terminology.

Certainly if you create two Avalons, you have two Avalons and not one Avalon.

However, my point is that they are both Avalon. They are not "the same person" in the sense of only being one person, but they're "the same person" in that they share the same identity. It's not one Avalon and one non-Avalon; there's not one original who's "really Avalon" and one other who's "really someone else." Since Avalon is defined in terms of Avalon's memories and thought processes, both brains are running the Avalon process, not just one of them.

And that's what I mean when I say, from a materialist point of view, the only problem with disassembling Avalon here and reassembling him somewhere else is that he's moved. Nothing is lost. Because there's nothing special about the matter that makes Avalon up, or the particular instance of the process that runs first. Continuity of consciousness is illusory; any physical copy of the matter that runs the Avalon process is equivalent to any other.

 

[Mijin]

Okay, the problem here is with indistinct terminology.

I don't think so, and I think if you follow through and answer Belz' questions some of the issues with your position will become clear.

Certainly if you create two Avalons, you have two Avalons and not one Avalon.

However, my point is that they are both Avalon. They are not "the same person" in the sense of only being one person, but they're "the same person" in that they share the same identity.

OK, maybe there is an issue with terminology here, because there are multiple meanings of identity (qualitative, numerical and others).

If you were to clone me, no-one would dispute that the other clone has as much claim to being Mijin. However, he is not me. Because, when it comes to the crunch, I don't define myself by how I look (I could have plastic surgery and still be me), or my memories (I could get amnesia and still be me) or my DNA (I could discover I have an identical twin and still there is only one me).

Me is this single instance of consciousness. In a room containing 10 clones of Mijin, at most one is me.
If you were to stick a pin in one Mijin, and they all feel pain, then we can talk about them being one shared me. But that's not the scenario on the table here. We're talking about making a second instance of consciousness and then switching off the first.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

No, I wouldn't. You wouldn't catch me getting inside the transport pod either, as I wrote earlier in the thread.

However, as a materialist, I have to accept that this decision is entirely irrational.

How ironic, then. I actually would, even while considering it to be my own personal death.

However, as a materialist, I have to accept that this decision is entirely irrational.

Okay, the problem here is with indistinct terminology.

Certainly if you create two Avalons, you have two Avalons and not one Avalon.

However, my point is that they are both Avalon. They are not "the same person" in the sense of only being one person, but they're "the same person" in that they share the same identity. It's not one Avalon and one non-Avalon; there's not one original who's "really Avalon" and one other who's "really someone else." Since Avalon is defined in terms of Avalon's memories and thought processes, both brains are running the Avalon process, not just one of them.

And that's what I mean when I say, from a materialist point of view, the only problem with disassembling Avalon here and reassembling him somewhere else is that he's moved. Nothing is lost. Because there's nothing special about the matter that makes Avalon up, or the particular instance of the process that runs first. Continuity of consciousness is illusory; any physical copy of the matter that runs the Avalon process is equivalent to any other.

But when you kill either of the Avalons, you're killing an Avalon. You've got a spare now, so it's not the end of the world for Avalon, but an Avalon certainly did die in the process. Same as when you copy and delete a file, you're still deleting a file. The actual act of death/deletion is what we place the moral imperatives on, not "not existing anymore."

I agree that the problem is with terminology; that's what I was trying to shoot for with clades, but it doesn't seem to have caught on.

 

[AvalonXQ]

Me is this single instance of consciousness.

How long do you claim this single instance of consciousness has lasted?

Do you fear sleep?

 

[Belz...]

And that's what I mean when I say, from a materialist point of view, the only problem with disassembling Avalon here and reassembling him somewhere else is that he's moved. Nothing is lost. Because there's nothing special about the matter that makes Avalon up, or the particular instance of the process that runs first. Continuity of consciousness is illusory; any physical copy of the matter that runs the Avalon process is equivalent to any other.

He hasn't been reassembled, remember ? A copy has been made. The original is not the copy even if they are identical in every way. Again, fine for everybody except the original, assuming all goes according to plan.

 

[Belz...]

How long do you claim this single instance of consciousness has lasted?

Do you fear sleep?

Depends if I'll wake up or not.

 

[Mijin]

How long do you claim this single instance of consciousness has lasted?

I don't know.

I'm 33 years old, so approximately that would be my first guess, but I am not fully sold on the idea of continuity of consciousness. I just don't think there is sufficient grounds to say the opposite either.

Do you fear sleep?

I have studied the neuroscience of sleep, and contrary to popular belief your consciousness does not switch off during sleep.
e.g. You can wake people at any point in the sleep cycle, even deep non-REM sleep, and if you're quick and know how to ask the question they will often recall scattered thoughts they were just having.

So no, I don't fear sleep.

But if you want to alter the question to be: would I fear a process that turns off my brain for 1 second? Yes, and I would avoid such a process happening if possible.

 

[Belz...]

I have studied the neuroscience of sleep, and contrary to popular belief your consciousness does not switch off during sleep.

I thought that was obvious, but apparently not.

 

[Nick227]

Therefore, as a physicalist it's completely rational to not step in the transporter pod; would be insane to do otherwise. Right?

Not for me. This brain isn't bothered about location. It's been programmed for millenia to resist death and therefore it resists it. I accept the irrationality.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

How ironic, then. I actually would, even while considering it to be my own personal death.

However, as a materialist, I have to accept that this decision is entirely irrational.

You're saying you have an irrational desire to die?

Nick

 

[Belz...]

Not for me. This brain isn't bothered about location. It's been programmed for millenia to resist death and therefore it resists it. I accept the irrationality.

Indeed. There's no rational reason not to die, but we try not to. The teleporter, for me, is no different than stepping in front of a bus after a visit to the intant-cloning-and-copying-your-mind factory.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

You're saying you have an irrational desire to die?

Nick

No: an irrational notion to not mind dying so long as I have extant clones. Five or six of us should do fine, I'm not that paranoid. And so long as the teleport accomplishes something, of course. I wouldn't take it down to the grocery store, but it might be worth it to put a member of the clade on Mars. Or to make the first batch of clones.

I agree with others here that it doesn't make much difference to the outside world, so long as at least one of me survives. Where we part ways is the notion that we can redefine this as not dying at all in this one particular instance, when even the slightest variation to the hypothetical (like the original surviving for some brief period of time) still counts as death. It's special pleading.

You walk into a teleporter, you are disassembled piecemeal. You die. That's the sort of thing that happens when you're disassembled piecemeal.

A body is (possibly) assembled elsewhere, you walk out. It's really you (well, a member of your clade - your clone), but you still died.

Therefore, I can't fault anyone who refuses to take the plunge, nor do I think that implies anything about their materialistic beliefs.

 

[Croc411]

Not for me. This brain isn't bothered about location. It's been programmed for millenia to resist death and therefore it resists it. I accept the irrationality.

Nick

Having seen countless other people enter the teleporter and coming back unscathed, your intuition and instincts would no longer make you resist but lead you back to the path of enlightenment (= materialism).

And a civilization that can copy, teleport or create individuals at will would have very different standards regarding the destruction of bodies than we have now.

These debates about ethics and survival instinct are based on false premises, me thinks.

 

[Croc411]

I've tried countless times to get an answer to my faulty teleporter scenario and NO ONE has ever given me an answer. At all. Let's try again, expanded:

1) Assuming the device malfunctions and creates two Avalons, do they share their experiences ? I assume you'll say no, but I'll let you answer that one.

They will share the same conscious state the moment they are created but will diverge immediately. Since a single state is not an experience, they will not share their experiences.

2) Assuming you answered "no" to (1), then you recognise that both are not the same person since, if they coexist, they are two separate consciousnesses and two separate identities.

They are both Avalon because of their striking similarity. For the same reason that Avalon in everyday life thinks of the person he was 20 seconds ago being "him". It doesn't matter if the two Avalons exist simultaneously or separated in time.

Both Avalons can now assume having a back-up copy. Since their consciousnesses will diverge more and more, the value of the back-up copy will degrade over time.

So here's a second question, again assuming you said "no": Why are they the same person if the device works properly and the original is instead destroyed ?

See above and subtract one Avalon.


So you tried for decades to have these questions answered, but to no avail. Now you got them answered even twice! Do AvalonXQ and me get a cookie now?