Explain consciousness to the layman.

[rocketdodger]

Yes, that thing on your lap or desktop is a Turing machine with many, many optimizations. Strip out all the optimizations, like word width and pipelining etc., and you can distill any computing machine into a one-bit Turing machine. Processor/memory -- they are functionally identical. That machine on you lap or desk just does it faster.

No, it isn't.

It is a machine that happens to be a Turing equivalent process.

It is not a Turing machine. Those are not real.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's clear that the specification for a Turing machine does not involve any kind of control or monitoring system. If the brain is primarily a control mechanism, then reasoning about Turing machines does not apply.

The tape is the program input. Just like binary data is the program input to all modern computers.

If you think the input given to real world digital "control or monitoring systems" is anything other than ... digital input ... you have been lying this whole time about your past in computing.

Not that this would surprise me.

 

[rocketdodger]

No, because a giant pebble sorting machine, working according to a predefined list, could produce the patterns.

I suppose you think the predefined list just popped into thin air.

Or I suppose you didn't even think about it at all, did you?

The person that programmed the Chinese room is the one that understands Chinese.

 

[rocketdodger]

For example, there aren't many chemical reactions happening in a computer.

You would fit right in at the U.S. GOP debates, westprog.

 

[Complexity]

Turing machines, algorithms, problems, and the like may not be 'real' in the same way that my cats are real, but they have properties that can be proven (relative to an axiom set and proof mechanism) and they have real-world consequences. They are as real as the natural numbers - indeed, possibly more so.

 

[AlBell]

The same way the Theory of Relativity doesn't exist except in a fantasy?

GR exists as math models.

Earlier in the thread it was mentioned neural nets can be trained without math models existing, so you probably don't think a similar math model for consciousness needs definition.

My understanding of neural nets is that parameters need to be set, and I suspect digital coding is needed to direct that process, but I could be wrong. It's certainly the case if the neural net is a simulation running on a universal computing device.

 

[westprog]

The description of Turing machines does have real life implications.

However, the fact that Turing machines are imaginary does not imply that Turing equivalent processes have no relation to physical reality.

Which is the entire point -- your rejection of the notion of mental processes being based on computation relies entirely upon this fallacy you have constructed that the "physical" is somehow fundamentally different from the "computational."

That fallacy stems from nothing but blind ignorance of facts, as multiple people have pointed out to you. There is no such thing as "non-physical" computation. All computation must occur using a physical process. Period. No exceptions.

This is easy to see. First, you can't actually compute on a Turing machine because they do not exist in reality. Second, even if they did -- and they don't, remember -- they would be just as physical as your brain.

Saying "consciousness is physical, not computational" is not valid. That's like saying a gumdrop is sugar, not candy.

All the biological processes in the body are connected with specific physical processes.

Of course computation has to be done with some kind of physical activity. However, it is not linked with any specific physical process. If the generation of consciousness is indeed a matter of computation, then it is unique as a biological function in that it is not tied to anything specific. In particular, it is entirely unfocused in time and space. There is no location for the computation. There is no physical definition of what, precisely, is going on. There is no practical way to determine what in fact constitutes a computation, and physically, either computations are happening all the time, everywhere, or they aren't happening at all.

If we are dealing with a well-defined, well-understood phenomenon like respiration, we know where it happens, how it happens, and we can duplicate all the processes artificially. There is a physical theory of what happens.

To claim that because something is associated with a set of events that happen somewhere in the universe, that it constitutes a physical theory seems to me to stretch the concept beyond the point of usefulness.

 

[westprog]

The tape is the program input. Just like binary data is the program input to all modern computers.

If you think the input given to real world digital "control or monitoring systems" is anything other than ... digital input ... you have been lying this whole time about your past in computing.

Not that this would surprise me.

And any digital system is equivalent to a Turing machine?*

Deliberate obfuscation, bluster, and an accusation of lying. SOP.

*The answer is no. But watch the wriggling.

 

[rocketdodger]

Turing machines, algorithms, problems, and the like may not be 'real' in the same way that my cats are real, but they have properties that can be proven (relative to an axiom set and proof mechanism) and they have real-world consequences. They are as real as the natural numbers - indeed, possibly more so.

Yes I know.

However, when one is dealing with a certain type of person in a debate, they have to be very careful to specify exactly what everything means. Otherwise, the opposition jumps on even the simplest of concepts and uses them dishonestly to sell snake oil to the spectators.

In this case, somehow the idea that the "specification" of the idealized Turing machine -- which is by definition abstract -- doesn't include any "physical" link to the rest of the world is being used to argue that the processes of real world computers ( "control mechanisms" for example ) are somehow beyond the capability of Turing machines and similarly whatever happens in our heads is beyond description by any theory of computation.

Of course this is bollocks, but what can you do? My approach is to simply harp on the fact that a Turing machine is not real, is abstract, and obviously does not include a "physical" link because they are ... not real.

Yet, discounting computation theory across the board because the abstract specifications of the Turing machine do not directly reference reality is as stupid as discounting all of biological science because the peer reviewed articles in Nature don't include actual microscope slides complete with cells you can culture.

 

[Belz...]

Which is the entire point -- your rejection of the notion of mental processes being based on computation relies entirely upon this fallacy you have constructed that the "physical" is somehow fundamentally different from the "computational."

Which is interesting, coming from a poster who claims that the conclusion that consciousness is computational is circular.

 

[Belz...]

You would fit right in at the U.S. GOP debates, westprog.

That's a reality show, right ?

 

[Belz...]

Of course computation has to be done with some kind of physical activity. However, it is not linked with any specific physical process. If the generation of consciousness is indeed a matter of computation, then it is unique as a biological function in that it is not tied to anything specific.

Assertion. Evidence, please.

In particular, it is entirely unfocused in time and space. There is no location for the computation.

Same as above.

 

[dlorde]

It's clear that the specification for a Turing machine does not involve any kind of control or monitoring system. If the brain is primarily a control mechanism, then reasoning about Turing machines does not apply.

Huh? It's clear that the specification of a motor vehicle does not involve visiting my friend Ben in Surrey or taking junk to the council dump. If my car is primarily for visiting my friend Ben, then reasoning about motor vehicles does not apply...??

 

[rocketdodger]

All the biological processes in the body are connected with specific physical processes.

Oh? I was not aware that *your* consciousness was connected with *my* neurons.

The fact that both of us can be conscious, yet we do not share neurons, immediately confirms that consciousness is independent of a specific physical substrate.

Now that we have established this, it is just a matter of specifying exactly what constraints apply to a physical substrate in order for consciousness to be present.

Care to start? A scientific proof would be nice, as opposed to "we have only observed consciousness in one substrate thus far."

To claim that because something is associated with a set of events that happen somewhere in the universe, that it constitutes a physical theory seems to me to stretch the concept beyond the point of usefulness.

Yes, beyond the point of usefulness for your arguments, I agree.

 

[rocketdodger]

And any digital system is equivalent to a Turing machine?*

Deliberate obfuscation, bluster, and an accusation of lying. SOP.

*The answer is no. But watch the wriggling.

Who are you telling to "watch the wriggling?" All of the spectators here that you are selling snake oil to?

How is this for wriggling: All known digital systems are limited to Turing equivalence, that is, they cannot perform any sequence of computations I.E. "algorithm" that an idealized Turing machine could not also perform, assuming an idealized Turing machine existed.

That is what "Turing equivalence" means. It does not mean you can take an idealized Turing machine and hook it up to a sewage tank to monitor the level of ****. Mainly, because idealized Turing machines are not real.

 

[westprog]

Yes I know.

However, when one is dealing with a certain type of person in a debate, they have to be very careful to specify exactly what everything means. Otherwise, the opposition jumps on even the simplest of concepts and uses them dishonestly to sell snake oil to the spectators.

In this case, somehow the idea that the "specification" of the idealized Turing machine -- which is by definition abstract -- doesn't include any "physical" link to the rest of the world is being used to argue that the processes of real world computers ( "control mechanisms" for example ) are somehow beyond the capability of Turing machines and similarly whatever happens in our heads is beyond description by any theory of computation.

Of course this is bollocks, but what can you do? My approach is to simply harp on the fact that a Turing machine is not real, is abstract, and obviously does not include a "physical" link because they are ... not real.

Yet, discounting computation theory across the board because the abstract specifications of the Turing machine do not directly reference reality is as stupid as discounting all of biological science because the peer reviewed articles in Nature don't include actual microscope slides complete with cells you can culture.

Yes, I was wondering why the derail. The inability of the Turing model to deal with real world asynchronous event driven programs is a bit of a stumbling block. The best way round is to try to contrast the model with the implementations of the model.

Naturally, a real computer has to deal with considerations of timing and interaction. However, it can produce an environment in which Turing type processes run and perform computations. If, however, we wish to model the operation of the computer in terms of its interactions in real time, the Turing model is not applicable, and we can't draw conclusions on the behaviour of the real time systems by using the Turing model. It is possible to model the behaviour of real time systems, using different models.

Since the functionality of the brain is clearly very dependent on real time interactions with the environment, the Turing model does not and cannot reflect its activity successfully. The principle of equivalence by which the simulation of a computation will give the same results as the computation does not apply when the correct operation of the system requires it to respond to external events within a given timeframe.

One might hope that rational people might be able to discuss issues relating to the applicability of mathematical models without becoming hysterical and abusive, but Rocketdodger has never been able to manage this. He cannot discuss this issue politely, and exactly as I predicted at the start of the thread, he wants to make the argument about personalities and agendas. Well, I knew it would happen, so I'm not going to get upset about it. His speculations about the kind of person I am say more about him than me.

 

[westprog]

Who are you telling to "watch the wriggling?" All of the spectators here that you are selling snake oil to?

How is this for wriggling: All known digital systems are limited to Turing equivalence, that is, they cannot perform any sequence of computations I.E. "algorithm" that an idealized Turing machine could not also perform, assuming an idealized Turing machine existed.

That is what "Turing equivalence" means. It does not mean you can take an idealized Turing machine and hook it up to a sewage tank to monitor the level of ****. Mainly, because idealized Turing machines are not real.

Of course if you are only interested in the computations that digital systems perform, then you can reason about those computations using the theory of an idealised Turing machine.

This leaves aside the issue of whether all digital systems are restricted to perorming calculations only. They aren't. Digital systems, and digital/analogue systems, and pure analogue systems are used for control and monitoring purposes. It's often possible to replace an analogue system with a digital system without any change in functionality.

No real time system performing monitoring and control can be modelled as a Turing machine. (That is not to say that it cannot be emulated as a computation - an entirely different matter). What is going on is not computation, and treating it as such is not useful or helpful. Many real time control systems have a negligible compuational element. Sometimes the response required is a simple as opening a valve when an indicator exceeds a particular value. Modelling such an interaction with a programming language - like PASCAL, say - which uses the Turing model is not possible. In order to perform such operations, languages need to add in features such as interrupts and pauses which are extraneous to that model. This also means - and this is the critical, essential element - that it is not possible to make assumptions about the behaviour of the realtime system based on reasoning using the Turing model.

 

[AlBell]

A control mechanism can be emulated on a computing machine.

...

I'll join westprog in pointing out that emulation on a computer does not equal, or even imply, replication vis-a-vis consciousness or any IRL event.

It's also getting laughable that the claim any Turing machine can do it, then admitting Turing machines do not and cannot exist; yes, universal computing machines are an IRL implementation of a theoretical Turing machine.

 

[Belz...]

I'll join westprog in pointing out that emulation on a computer does not equal, or even imply, replication vis-a-vis consciousness or any IRL event.

I'll join myself in pointing out that, if the thing you are emulating is computation, then in fact the emulation is the real thing.

 

[westprog]

A scientific proof would be nice

Is this a joke? I hope so, because if it's a serious demand, that's just sad.

You see, if A is putting forward a specific claim, and B is saying that it's not well founded, then it's not - really, really not - an option for A to demand that B provide a scientific proof of an alternative to that specific claim. At the very least, the burden of scientific proof lies with the person putting forward a specific claim, not the person saying that a particular claim is unproven, and presenting alternatives as possibilities.

I note, in passing, that there hasn't been the slightest indication of a scientific proof of the computational nature of consciousness.