I think we're getting off the main track of trying to explain things to laymans. But, whatever. I can roll with this sort of discussion. I suppose qualia is worth talking about, since the layman is likely to hear the word, and perhaps it is easy to misconstrue the context of it.
Then you'd need to better elucidate the difference between the two.
That is not easy to do, especially in a forum post. But, in general, we could say the following: There are certain, specific parts of the brain, that are required for qualia to be sensed. (See also my comments on topology, below.)
If we can demonstrate that there are moments when some of those parts can be in a suspend mode, and others not: Then it would
not be so inaccurate to say that some parts of the brain are experiencing something, but whatever that is, it would not qualify as qualia.
It might - but if it did, it would be the only biological process that could ever possibly emerge from running the right algorithm on a Turing system.
That's not true, at all! Other biological systems, such as reproduction with modification, predator/prey relationships, flocking, homeostasis in a general form, other types of brain computation, etc. have all successfully emerged from a Turing system.
We could simulate specific organs and processes that exist in living entities, but I suspect you would claim those were simulations and not something that emerged from an algorithm. The other examples emerged from an algorithm or two.
Which of the two hypotheses is more in keeping with the Occam's Razor principle?
I agree that Dennett's explanation would seem to win Occam's Razor, at first. But, what if there was specific, direct evidence of parts of the conscious mind going into "suspend mode"? I believe Damasio may have identified some such evidence, but I would have to look it up, to be sure.
That has never been given. Anyone who actually defines qualia invariably gives a definition that reduces to ... experience.
Not everyone uses the word in that way. Some people are investigating the "sense of qualia": What is it in our minds that make us think qualia is going on, whether it is real or not? Many of those folks are simply using the word "qualia" to describe the goal they are trying to find.
I don't understand -- you aren't conscious in your dreams?
In a sense you are conscious during dreaming, but it is not the conventionally recognized form of waking consciousness.
I didn't ask if there were experiences that weren't qualia, I asked if there were non-conscious experiences.
The mind goes through a lot of experiences you are not conscious of, called sub-consciousness. But, I assume that is not what you want from me. You want examples of conscious experiences that would not qualify as qualia. The best examples I have to offer, for now, deal with alternate states of consciousness, I'm afraid.
But, I am not the sort of person who would assert that "all conscious experiences must be qualia." Especially if we unravel how the "sense of qualia" comes about, empirically, only to discover that
not all of our experiences go through that particular pathway. I suspect that will end up being the case, though it is hard to be more specific, right now.
1) Then why not just call it "subjective experience", since we already have this non-loaded term ?
YOU do NOT have to use the loaded term, if YOU do not want to! However, it should be recognized that other people do.
Let me give you an example of another "dirty word" in the field of consciousness: The Cartesian Theater!
I think we can all agree that the Cartesian Theater is problematic concept: it invokes infinite regression, among other things. And, it carries a lot of baggage because of that, so the term is best avoided, when talking about the brain in any productive manner.
HOWEVER, in Steven Pinker's book
How the Mind Works, he deliberately chooses to describe a "good kind of Cartesian Theater", one that is divided up into processing specific tasks.
One might say "Yeah, but if you are breaking it up into specific tasks, you are no longer talking about a Cartesian Theater", and even I would even agree with that.
The point, however, is context. Pinker's context in using the word, to describe concepts of how different parts of the mind work, is legitimate. You and I might cringe that choice of wording, but the concepts behind it are sound.
In a similar way, I hope we recognize that the word "Qualia", even with all of its baggage, can still be used, by SOME people, to describe legitimate concepts in the science of how consciousness works.
That is all.
2) Assuming an ant sees in colour (I don't know, but for the sake of argument), does it have qualia even if it's not conscious ? The problem with qualia is that they seem to be so vague as to be sometimes unrelated to consciousness. Computers interpret stuff, we interpret stuff. Why assume it has some real existence ?
An ant could react to a specific color (assuming, for the sake of argument, that it has the biology to sense color), and
not be conscious of it, since it would not have a topology capable of generating a consciousness.
So, in theory, one could identify "qualia" as a specific quality of a neural topology. If the results of the mental processing produce this quality, it is qualia. If not, it is not qualia. If it produces some of it part-way, then it would be semi-qualia, or something.
The same would apply to pain. Though, pain would likely have more primitive roots in the older parts of the brain, than vision would. And, I suspect this would have an impact on the potential strength of the quality of that classification of qualia.
, you need both computing and evolution to do it. Not merely 'computing'.