Explain consciousness to the layman.

[Leumas]

Every ontological materalist will tell you none of us are anything but programming which begins at conception and continues until death.

Not programming as it is known in computer science (save for neural net programming see below).


Programming as it is traditionally accomplished is PLANNING. A computer program is a PLAN OF ACTION.


Our brains did not EVOLVE into the way they are as part of any plan by anything… not even by nature.


Our brains are "programmed "by systematic CONDITIONING. That is a process of honing in response to environmental selections and constraints.


The only thing that comes close to this process in the computer science field is Neural Networks.

How any programmer will ever manage to write code that accomplishes that for a robot is unknown. If the substrate is biological it may be easier than for silicon chips or pebbles in sand. Pixy & Wowbagger seem to think it's possible in any substrate that supports computing.

It is not going to be possible by someone writing code.

The only way to approach the human brain artificially is to actually do it the way the brain does it.....that is by a systematic process of CONDITIONING of some matrix of neuron-like nodes and interconnections with a feedback mechanism.

This is called neural network programming. It is not in fact writing code of any form. There is no code involved in the programming of neural networks (unless they are simulated neural nets).

In neural networking parlance it is called learning or training. Which is what happens with human brains.


So if you mean programming in the sense of PLANS of action to be followed…. then no we are not programmed. But of you mean programming in the sense of CONDITIONING then yes we are "programmed" in that sense from birth....but in fact even before that...ever since we started evolving any form of brain.

 

[westprog]

And, I do think a Turing system could emerge a conscious state, if it was running the right algorithm.

It might - but if it did, it would be the only biological process that could ever possibly emerge from running the right algorithm on a Turing system.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm not aware of any biological process that has been created by evolution to consist of a computing system.

Are you now claiming that the human brain cannot compute?

Certainly not a Turing-type computing system.

What exactly is a "turing-type" computing system, westprog?

 

[Leumas]

[snip]

Semi-Conscious States: Consciousness uses glucose (energy). And, it is reasonable to think that the mind will try to find shortcuts in how we think, and shutdown parts of itself when not needed, to conserve glucose usage. Thus, there could be moments where you are awake, but not fully and completely conscious. If such states exist, you might not experience actual, genuine qualia, though your mind will "experience" something else.

I can give an example of this, that Antonio Damasio seems to like, though Daniel Dennett might disagree with it: Driving down a long stretch of road, and suddenly realizing you don't remember the last 15 minutes of the drive. I realize Dennett would argue that this is a trick of memory: He would say you probably were fully conscious while driving those 15 minutes, but you simply don't remember it.Damasio seems to think that this is indicative of a conscious shortcutting. You probably weren't fully conscious. But, you weren't unconscious, either. Some part of your mind was alert enough to respond if sudden action was necessary: for example if an animal walked in front of the car, you would still be able to stomp on the brakes. (This would use the automatic stimulus/response systems, not conscious thinking, at least not for the first microseconds.) But, little to no genuine qualia was seeping through your conscious apparatus during that time. According to theory, anyway.

Which of the two hypotheses is more in keeping with the Occam's Razor principle?

Which one is postulating things outside of the normal everyday occurrences in what we do?

This example in fact demonstrates how actions can become so conditioned that the brain can do them on the LOWER LEVELS of the factory without a need for upper management supervision.

In a factory if things are routine then a laborer trained to do them can do them without the foreman actually interfering let alone the intermediate management or upper management.

So if a manager goes absent for a few days the worker can still keep working despite the management not being there.

This is how a heart keeps beating and we keep breathing. In the case of the heart there is not even an upper management level to control it.

I have on numerous occasions closed the garage door with the remote control after exiting and then way down the street realize that I had no recollection of whether I did close or not. I always go back to invariably find that I in fact did it….not a single time did I return to find that I forgot it open.

The action has become so automatic that doing it no longer requires a delibrate level of work. And having done it in an automatic way my brain did not register the action in short term memory. The required control just shunted the short term memory process altogether.

Since the short term memory did not get involved, there was no way to recall if the action was taken or not.

All this goes to demonstrate that the brain can function in certain ways without involving other parts. But there is nothing mysterious about that. It is a result of the fact that the brain IS INDEED a conglomeration of parts. This is also demonstrated by the way the brain can develop new pathways to replace damaged ones to perform the action that used to be accomplished by the now damaged parts. Such as after a stroke.

 

[rocketdodger]

Things that the mind experiences do not necessarily have to be presented as quale.

Well, no, but if you want to present them differently, you need a coherent explanation of why they are actually different.

That has never been given. Anyone who actually defines qualia invariably gives a definition that reduces to ... experience.

I can name at least three, though I admit they are controversial:

Most forms of Dreaming: <snip>

Semi-Conscious States: <snip>

Certain forms of Mental Disorders: <snip>

I don't understand -- you aren't conscious in your dreams? I didn't ask if there were experiences that weren't qualia, I asked if there were non-conscious experiences. I don't think these 3 satisfy that request, even the semi-conscious states, because semi-conscious is not non-conscious.

Of course, this does not rule out the idea that worms could have a model of Autobiographical Self that happens to be modeled in a very different way from ours. But, given how much we already know about the functions of areas in the neural networks of worms (which might not be much, but it is not in the direction an Autobio model would need to go in), this seems unlikely.

I agree it is unlikely, in fact I would say with certainty that it is not the case. However, saying so requires a knowledge of computing and neural networks ! I don't want people just dismissing the idea since you most likely *can* construct a network that satisfies the constraints with less than 300 neurons. It just so happens that the worms don't have such a topology.

 

[PixyMisa]

Every ontological materalist will tell you none of us are anything but programming which begins at conception and continues until death.

Programming?

How any programmer will ever manage to write code that accomplishes that for a robot is unknown.

Reflection.

If the substrate is biological it may be easier than for silicon chips or pebbles in sand. Pixy & Wowbagger seem to think it's possible in any substrate that supports computing.

Those pebbles do not support computing - they merely represent state.

 

[westprog]

So I guess

My italics.

they feel something, in their limited circuits.

Second, you make the mistake of assuming that what is in your head is something besides circuits -- there is zero evidence of this.

We know that there is more in the brain than circuits. Whether the contents of the brain that aren't circuits are critical elements of consciousness we don't know, because we don't have an alternative conscious being to compare with.

 

[Complexity]

We know that there is more in the brain than circuits.

Nonsense.

 

[Belz...]

I know that. 'Qualia' is a word we can us describe what needs to be explained. As long as we leave out the "it's unexplainable!" part.

It might be a synonymn of "subjective experience", but I think it is more likely an emergent property of various aspects of the brain that generate different types subjective experiences.

1) Then why not just call it "subjective experience", since we already have this non-loaded term ?

2) Assuming an ant sees in colour (I don't know, but for the sake of argument), does it have qualia even if it's not conscious ? The problem with qualia is that they seem to be so vague as to be sometimes unrelated to consciousness. Computers interpret stuff, we interpret stuff. Why assume it has some real existence ?

 

[Belz...]

He's right. Qualia are, as I keep pointing out, a dualistic concept deliberately inserted into the debate to hide the failings of the immaterialist side.

That may be a bit harsh. It's just a consciousness of the gaps.

 

[Belz...]

I have vivid experiences of qualia

You have experiences of experience of experience ? How do you know ?

I prefer the one level.

but take it on faith

I take it on science.

 

[Belz...]

But I am not talking about consciousness, I am specifically talking about qualia, and even more specifically whether there is utility in referring to meta-layers.

Again, I will ask the question in terms of mathematics -- is there any utility in referring to how round roundness is? Or even the roundness of a circle? What is the "roundness" of a circle, anyway?

Interesting point.

and perhaps most importantly you have a very large cortex that allows much more recurrent processing than a worm could dream of.

...assuming it can dream.

And if you mean "conscious of the experience at the same time the experience is occurring" then I have to ask why the phrase "conscious of the experience at the same time the experience is occurring " can't just be the definition to begin with. And in that case, what is all the fuss about.

We are never conscious of an experience as it is occuring, as I understand. It's always at least a bit after the fact.

Now if you want to call qualia something like "a bunch of experiences put together" or "an experience is a bunch of qualia put together" then fine, but then I don't see the utility of term since by definition "experience" can be as simple or as complex as you want. "experience" is the cognitive analog of the mathematical term "value," or even "number." People don't say "we need to define something that is made of numbers yet is qualitatively different from numbers." That makes no sense in fact -- kind of like how people say qualia make no sense.

Again, eloquently put.

 

[Belz...]

How can something appear to be consciousness without being consciousness?

How can something appear to be a ghost without being a ghost ?

 

[Belz...]

You are assuming qualia, if it exists, is an all-or-nothing thing. Qualia could, very well, come about in layers, and in different forms.

Which brings us back to "why use this term ?"

Let's take pain, for instance. Is it a quality of the experience ? Or a behaviour of your nervous system and body ? Some people can build up quite a resistance to pain, I hear. The experience of pain (flight behaviour, etc.) is modified through behavioural control. Seems like the quality of the thing is dependent on it. Indeed, it may be it, quite simply. So why the two terms ?

 

[PixyMisa]

How can something appear to be consciousness without being consciousness?

That is precisely what I have been asking you all this time.

 

[PixyMisa]

Though consciousness is, of course, a process, and not an object as your phrasing would suggest.

 

[westprog]

Why assume it has some real existence ?

This is actually funny.

 

[westprog]

How can something appear to be a ghost without being a ghost ?

There are times when substituting different words doesn't actually work. The reason that consciousness cannot disguise itself is that the only way we experience consciousness is by being conscious. We experience an illusion of consciousness in exactly the same way as consciousness, because the illusion of consciousness requires us to be conscious.

 

[westprog]

Which brings us back to "why use this term ?"

Let's take pain, for instance. Is it a quality of the experience ? Or a behaviour of your nervous system and body ? Some people can build up quite a resistance to pain, I hear. The experience of pain (flight behaviour, etc.) is modified through behavioural control. Seems like the quality of the thing is dependent on it. Indeed, it may be it, quite simply. So why the two terms ?

I could demonstrate this to you, but it would involve slamming your hand in a drawer.

 

[PixyMisa]

There are times when substituting different words doesn't actually work.

But not this time.

The reason that consciousness cannot disguise itself is that the only way we experience consciousness is by being conscious. We experience an illusion of consciousness in exactly the same way as consciousness, because the illusion of consciousness requires us to be conscious.

Sure. But the illusion of consciousness may well suggest attributes that it does not in fact possess, such that our intuition is entirely misleading.

And indeed, we find this to be the case.