Explain consciousness to the layman.

[PixyMisa]

Clearly, not everyone is using the word in that way.

In a scientific context, the use of the term is not unreasonable, because you've necessarily excluded the dualistic baggage by the very fact of it being in a scientific context.

In a philosophical context, the term carries so much baggage that its use in rational debate is quite untenable.

 

[Wowbagger]

In a philosophical context, the term carries so much baggage that its use in rational debate is quite untenable.

But, that's a problem with philosophy, not with words.

 

[yy2bggggs]

In a scientific context, the use of the term is not unreasonable, because you've necessarily excluded the dualistic baggage by the very fact of it being in a scientific context.

In a philosophical context, the term carries so much baggage that its use in rational debate is quite untenable.

So if someone mentions qualia, how do you know which context they are talking about?

 

[westprog]

So if someone mentions qualia, how do you know which context they are talking about?

I find that so much of these discussions gets wasted in discussing what "qualia" really means that I prefer not to use it that often. I prefer subjective experience.

Not that it matters. Anyone that talks about human beings and refers to what it's like to be a human being will be accused of believing in magic, regardless.

 

[Wowbagger]

So if someone mentions qualia, how do you know which context they are talking about?

If they are talking about empirical ways in which qualia emerges or is constructed, chances are, it is being used in scientific context.

If they are talking about how qualia is "separate" from the self or the body, and/or if they claim qualia is a "problem" for materialists... then chances are, it is being used in a philosophical context.

 

[PixyMisa]

I find that so much of these discussions gets wasted in discussing what "qualia" really means that I prefer not to use it that often. I prefer subjective experience.

Cats and dogs living together!

Not that it matters. Anyone that talks about human beings and refers to what it's like to be a human being will be accused of believing in magic, regardless.

Never mind.

 

[Jeff Corey]

I know a quale when I see one.

 

[Mr. Scott]

Have you noticed that in almost every discussion about the subjective experience of consciousness, the example of the red color is trotted out? Almost never green, blue, yellow, etc. It's always red.

Why do you think that is?

Here's a thought experiment I'd created of a long time ago:

Suppose we take an unborn child and rewire his retina so that the cones with the pigments assigned to red, and those for green, have their neuron connections swapped.

Now the person grows up seeing red objects with the green subjective experience, and green objects with the red subjective experience. (notice the Q word is perfect for this but I don't want to alienate PixyMisa. People who are not Q-phobic may translate. LOL). This person grows up with all the proper associations: the red look is associated with the word green, with cool grass, with lush trees, and traffic lights that mean "go." The green look is associated with the red word, with blood, delicious strawberries, and traffic lights that mean "stop."

Does this person, as an adult, really see (and feel) green as red and red as green? Does it matter?

Actually, a test of this sort can be performed by viewing the world for a time only through a camera/tv setup where these colors are so swapped. What do you suppose this would be like? Would the red "experience" turn into the green "experience" and vice versa? Or would we see the colors backwards always and just intellectually translate the look of red to cool grass, and the look of green as a delicious, ripe strawberry?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Here's a thought experiment I'd created of a long time ago:

Suppose we take an unborn child and rewire his retina so that the cones with the pigments assigned to red, and those for green, have their neuron connections swapped.

You can stop there. Your intuition is based on the cones in our eyes working somewhat like the pixels in an RGB camera. Your intuition is wrong; our eyes simply do not work that way.

The cone pigments are not assigned to red and green. L and M have erythrolabe and chlorolabe; those opsins are sensitive throughout the spectra, and their sensitivity curves actually look quite similar to each other. In fact, though chlorolabe is most sensitive in the green portion of the spectrum, erythrolabe's peak sensitivity is merely in a yellowish-green portion of the spectrum. The signals produced by these cones never make it past your retina.

Your sensation of red is a result of the red-green opponent color process, formed by ganglial cells that attempt to determine the difference between these two cones, as if computing a function L-M. This is why a deficiency along this path (either protanopia or deuteranopia) leads to red-green colorblindness; both sorts of deficiencies compromise the red-green opponent color process. So there's not even separate neurons responsible for red and green; there's merely a single channel for both.

Now, if you want to swap the L and the M cones in the eye, you can continue your "thought experiment" from there. However, if you do this, you need to take into account the developmental process of these ganglial cells. I'm not even sure your if your brain would register a difference; given a particular theory of ganglial development that I've seen before, it probably wouldn't.

I believe we need to take the actual physics of color vision into account when judging your thought experiment, in which case, these particulars become critical.

 

[Leumas]

Right, my robot does not have feelings. Describe feelings in a way that will give me ideas about how to add them to my robot.

BTW: My robot uses simple analog circuitry. No AD converters, databases, or any kind of digital processing, but I don't think the distinction addresses the phenomenon of qualia, unless you can convince me otherwise.

BTBTW Thanks for the video link. I'll watch it when I have more time. Dennett is awesome.

You are welcome about the video.... I see you have watched it intently. Good. Maybe now I do not have to explain any further.

Regarding feelings.....I will give below a description that may be useful when applied to robotics.

But first....remember that I said that robotic intelligence is an entirely different process to human intelligence. Most importantly in a robot someone put a PROGRAM to do what it does. In animals there are no programs.

Your analog robot is more akin to human intelligence than the robot that I described.

Remember in the worm there are DIRECT PATHWAYS between receptors and muscles. The electrical signals that are generated as a result of receptors are directly routed to muscles to actuate them. There is no analysis and SECONDARY actions as a result of analysis.

Your analog robot if it is what I think, has receptors (two) that generate a voltage level that is directly wired to motors (two) which when activated will make the robot move either towards or away from the light. There is no logic or programs. This is very much like the worm.

Now here is an explanation for feelings...it is a lot simpler than you might think.....

Feelings are increased or decreased secretions of chemical cocktails.​

See it is a very simple thing.

It is like theists who keep harping on about love not being real or not being possible to understand or quantify or explain. RUBBISH..... love has been identified, quantified, analyzed and explained.....it is hormones and pheromones.

So are feelings....they are hormones and pheromones.

So if you want to give a robot feelings make it have mechanisms that apply variable voltage levels to certain parts depending on voltage levels from certain other parts.

That is all there is to it....that is what happens in us.... certain parts react to something which will cause them to trigger the release of chemicals that affect the FIRINGS OF OUR NEURONS in a certain way.

That is how drugs work. If a drug can induce FEELINGS of whatever they induce or even REDUCE feelings or cut them out altogether......then there you have it....FEELINGS are drug induced effects on the firings of neurons.

Remember..... there is big community of worms in our body.... it is called the brain.

Just like a worm may wriggle away from some light or acid due to electrical signals between its receptors and its muscles so does the brain.

What appears to be consciousness is nothing but a result of extremely complex set of numerous worms wriggling in one way or another in response to signals from receptors.

 

[PixyMisa]

It is like theists who keep harping on about love not being real or not being possible to understand or quantify or explain. RUBBISH..... love has been identified, quantified, analyzed and explained.....it is hormones and pheromones.

So are feelings....they are hormones and pheromones.

Weeeeell.... Those hormones and pheromones introduce a computational bias, which is what I think is the key. You're not wrong, but I think you have only part of it.

That is all there is to it....that is what happens in us.... certain parts react to something which will cause them to trigger the release of chemicals that affect the FIRINGS OF OUR NEURONS in a certain way.

Ah, then yes. We agree.

 

[rocketdodger]

From what I understand, consciousness seems to arise through all of the layers, acting as an emergent system. I think it would be incorrect to assume that there is a single layer ("the first one" or otherwise) where consciousness happens.

That's how I see it, anyway.

But I am not talking about consciousness, I am specifically talking about qualia, and even more specifically whether there is utility in referring to meta-layers.

Again, I will ask the question in terms of mathematics -- is there any utility in referring to how round roundness is? Or even the roundness of a circle? What is the "roundness" of a circle, anyway?

 

[rocketdodger]

Do we define experience as what it is like to be something though?

Yes, absolutely. That is the only logical definition that holds water.

 

[rocketdodger]

We now have nearly complete schematics of the nervous systems of tiny worms. They have circuits just like my robot's: sensory organs linked to motor neurons. Do they experience qualia? Not likely. We evolved from these creatures. We experience qualia. Why?

First, you haven't asked the worms if they experience anything. Since worms don't talk, you would have to find some other way to communicate with them. Perhaps poking them with a needle would elicit a response -- oops, worms curl up when poked. So I guess they feel something, in their limited circuits.

Second, you make the mistake of assuming that what is in your head is something besides circuits -- there is zero evidence of this.

It is much more logical to just assume that experience is simply "what it is like to be X" and because you have a ton of circuitry your experience is much more rich than that of a worm. For example, you can see in very high resolution, you can see in color, you can hear a number of sounds, you have a body filled with sensory neurons, you have a very large memory, and perhaps most importantly you have a very large cortex that allows much more recurrent processing than a worm could dream of.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's interesting that this thread has developed into descriptions of what it's like to be other things. I have no idea what it's like to be a worm, say, or a robot. I know what it's like to be a person. I strongly suspect that being a rock is not like anything.

Well, being a rock is like being a rock. By definition.

If you want to know what it is like to be a rock, hit yourself in the head with a rock -- really hard. When you wake up, try to remember what it was like when you were unconscious.

Can't remember anything, eh? That's what it is like to be a rock.

 

[rocketdodger]

If "Qualia" is used to mean "conscious experience" rather generically, it's a perfectly valid word; and more specific than "experience", which would include things that were not part of consciousness (most dreams, for example).

I challenge you to provide even a single experience that is not conscious.

I think this will be difficult, since for someone to even realize they had an experience they must become conscious of that experience at some point.

And if you mean "conscious of the experience at the same time the experience is occurring" then I have to ask why the phrase "conscious of the experience at the same time the experience is occurring " can't just be the definition to begin with. And in that case, what is all the fuss about.

 

[rocketdodger]

Maybe I could use argument from authority and say, if the Q word is good enough for Ramachandran, then it's good enough for me. Slap me why don't you.

I've watched Dennett's lecture for the third time now, and it seems he spends more time (almost all the time) telling us what consciousness isn't than what it is. He never uses the Q word. It's still a terrific lecture BTW.

Something odd happened to me once regarding tooth pain, surely one of the most intense pains commonly experienced.

Ordinarily, pain is accompanied by an extreme desire and struggle to be free of the pain. It can be ruinous to the enjoyment of life.

What I experienced once or twice was the sensation of tooth pain with the complete absence of it's uncomfortableness and imperative to be relieved. It was a very matter-of-fact "hmmm, that's some intense tooth pain. I suppose a dentist ought to see if something needs fixing." But absolutely no discomfort or misery. Just it's matter-of-fact presence. I've heard laughing gass has this effect: you still feel the pain, but it doesn't bother you.

So, why can't we call the pain qualia? Or the agonizing imperative to be free of pain? Before I learned the Q word I called it "sensation." It just seems like "experience" is a flaccid word for it. I think "experience" is too general, while "qualia" is more specific.

Do you think there could be such a thing as experience without qualia?

I'm not sure I see the difficulty here, since you have already spelled it out for yourself.

You have pain -- the experience of set of neurons firing, that your body really does not approve of. You have all the stuff that may or may not be associated with pain -- fear, desire to be rid of it, whatever -- each of those experiences in their own right. And .... ?

I don't understand why the experience of pain, coupled with the experience of fear regarding what that pain might mean, coupled with the experience of desire to be rid of the pain, is anything more than the experience of pain, fear, and desire. I mean, the logic seems pretty simple, right?

Now if you want to call qualia something like "a bunch of experiences put together" or "an experience is a bunch of qualia put together" then fine, but then I don't see the utility of term since by definition "experience" can be as simple or as complex as you want. "experience" is the cognitive analog of the mathematical term "value," or even "number." People don't say "we need to define something that is made of numbers yet is qualitatively different from numbers." That makes no sense in fact -- kind of like how people say qualia make no sense.

 

[rocketdodger]

What do you suppose this would be like? Would the red "experience" turn into the green "experience" and vice versa? Or would we see the colors backwards always and just intellectually translate the look of red to cool grass, and the look of green as a delicious, ripe strawberry?

If you phrase the question properly, the answer appears.

The proper question is "what would it be like for a person to perceive both <color x> and <color of grass> as the same?"

 

[westprog]

What appears to be consciousness

How can something appear to be consciousness without being consciousness?

 

[Leumas]

I think we can identify at least one significant difference between us and a mere conglomeration of "billions of worms": We typical humans have managed to develop an Autobiographical Self, which builds models from memories sufficiently sophisticated to anticipate future needs more effectively. Worms don't have that, but it did evolve out of precursors that worms do have.

Reducing our brains to those of "conglomerations of worms" doesn't tell us anything about what makes our mind "special". Thinking in terms of the fundamental functions of emergent systems does. Our brain cells are doing things, from a higher level point of view, that worm brains cells are not doing. At least not yet.

Think about traffic dynamics in a bustling metropolis. The human brain is a similar but much more complicated set of constraint dynamics.

The conglomeration of neurons all firing through and adjacent to each other in a bundle called the brain imposes numerous constraints and effects on the various individual “worms” of the brain that constrain and affect each other in such a manner so as to proceed to GENERATE even further constraints and effects.

Consciousness emerges due to these constraints and side-effects causing further constraint dynamics and producing more side-effects which are evermore self-regenerating.

This in turn results in effects upon the environment due to muscular movement, which in turn generates more side-effects and further constraints external to the bundle but that nevertheless are entwined with it and just as important to the whole entangled dynamics which eventually result in an illusion we call the Self.

Also please watch this video.

Also have a look at these books

1. The Compass of Pleasure: How Our Brains Make Fatty Foods, Orgasm, Exercise, Marijuana, Generosity, Vodka, Learning, and Gambling Feel So Good
2. The Accidental Mind: How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory, Dreams, and God
3. Brain Bugs: How the Brain's Flaws Shape Our Lives
4. Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality
5. Who's in Charge?: Free Will and the Science of the Brain