Explain consciousness to the layman.

[rocketdodger]

It seems to me that most of you dismissing the term "qualia" are sweeping the "problem" of private experiences under a rug, without explaining either: Where they come from and how they emerge; or if qualia isn't really real: then how the delusion of qualia comes about.

We want to understand the phenomena of private experiences. Not wave them off as a waste of time.

People are dismissing the idea that qualia are something distinct from experiences, not that experiences exist altogether, or even actually that qualia exist altogether.

Nobody denies that experiences exist -- that would be utterly stupid.

But the argument that qualia are distinct from experiences, and need their own explanation, or even an explanation above and beyond whatever the explanation for experiences is, just has no logical merit.

This is why:

Define experience as what it is like to be something.

Define qualia as the experience of an experience. So, a meta-experience.

Define meta-qualia as the experience of qualia, or the experience of the experience of an experience.

.
.
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Define meta-n-quala as the experience of n-1 experiences of experiences, or the experience of the experience of ... the experience of an experience.

Pretty pointless, huh?

So if the nth meta abstraction of qualia is pointless, why isn't the first meta abstraction pointless? Why isn't the notion of "the experience of an experience" pointless and redundant?

Well ... many people say it is. That's what they mean when they say qualia don't exist. Its the same as saying a circular circle doesn't exist.

 

[Wowbagger]

People are dismissing the idea that qualia are something distinct from experiences, not that experiences exist altogether, or even actually that qualia exist altogether.

Perhaps you're right, but when I read people saying "qualia ain't worth discussing" it sorta sounds like that, you know.

But the argument that qualia are distinct from experiences, and need their own explanation, or even an explanation above and beyond whatever the explanation for experiences is, just has no logical merit.

I guess that's the negative baggage associated with the word.

Define qualia as the experience of an experience. So, a meta-experience.

It's not impossible for experiences to be built up from layers of "sub-experiences", you know. An evolutionary pathway for the "sense of qualia" to emerge might include such things.

Antonio Damasio's models of "Self" being layered on top of other models of "Self" is something sorta like that. (Though, he might not like to use the word "qualia" either.)

"Meta-experiences" may be empirical, and if each layer does something different from the last it would not necessarily be redundant.

 

[rocketdodger]

"Meta-experiences" may be empirical, and if each layer does something different from the last it would not necessarily be redundant.

Not necessarily redundant in a pragmatic sense, I agree.

In a semantic sense, though, I think it is redundant. At least as far as the argument that qualia would be qualitatively different than the layer below them -- by definition meta-x can't be qualitatively different than x, else it wouldn't be meta-x.

Furthermore, pretty redundant in explanatory power. Once experience is explained, qualia would follow automatically -- just another layer, using the same mechanics, wrapped around the inner layer. It is actually explaining the first layer where the difficulty arises.

 

[Wowbagger]

Furthermore, pretty redundant in explanatory power. Once experience is explained, qualia would follow automatically -- just another layer, using the same mechanics, wrapped around the inner layer. It is actually explaining the first layer where the difficulty arises.

From what I understand, consciousness seems to arise through all of the layers, acting as an emergent system. I think it would be incorrect to assume that there is a single layer ("the first one" or otherwise) where consciousness happens.

That's how I see it, anyway.

 

[PixyMisa]

Perhaps you're right, but when I read people saying "qualia ain't worth discussing" it sorta sounds like that, you know.

He's right. Qualia are, as I keep pointing out, a dualistic concept deliberately inserted into the debate to hide the failings of the immaterialist side.

I guess that's the negative baggage associated with the word.

It's not baggage, it's what the term was created for.

 

[yy2bggggs]

But the argument that qualia are distinct from experiences, and need their own explanation, or even an explanation above and beyond whatever the explanation for experiences is, just has no logical merit.

This is why:

Define experience as what it is like to be something.

Define qualia as the experience of an experience. So, a meta-experience.

Do we define experience as what it is like to be something though?

 

[Mr. Scott]

I'm going to wear my thickest pair of asbestos pants while I'm suggesting that the testimony from people in the spectrum of autistic disorders, that qualia is nonexistent, be taken skeptically. Autism is very likely, at least in part, a disorder of consciousness.

If I create a robot that has a photo-receptor that detects only red light, and a motor in a circuit that drives the robot away from red light, how is that different from a very simple creature who sees redness and feels fear and desire to run away from that terrifying light? The redness the creature experiences, and the fear of redness, are qualia. I don't believe the robot experiences qualia. It just has a red light detector wired to a motor.

We now have nearly complete schematics of the nervous systems of tiny worms. They have circuits just like my robot's: sensory organs linked to motor neurons. Do they experience qualia? Not likely. We evolved from these creatures. We experience qualia. Why?

 

[Leumas]

I'm going to wear my thickest pair of asbestos pants while I'm suggesting that the testimony from people in the spectrum of autistic disorders, that qualia is nonexistent, be taken skeptically. Autism is very likely, at least in part, a disorder of consciousness.

It is a brain "disorder". So you are right it is a disorder in consciousness since that is what the brain is. See this video.

If I create a robot that has a photo-receptor that detects only red light, and a motor in a circuit that drives the robot away from red light, how is that different from a very simple creature who sees redness and feels fear and desire to run away from that terrifying light? The redness the creature experiences, and the fear of redness, are qualia. I don't believe the robot experiences qualia. It just has a red light detector wired to a motor.


We now have nearly complete schematics of the nervous systems of tiny worms. They have circuits just like my robot's: sensory organs linked to motor neurons. Do they experience qualia? Not likely. We evolved from these creatures. We experience qualia. Why?

There is a slight problem here.... the Robot does not feel anything. It has a program that

• Reads transducers to obtain some sensory input as electrical signals.
• Translates the voltage levels into digital data (which are electrical signals too).
• Does some logical analysis to decide how to act upon the input. This is just binary bifurcations to a particular state.
• Once a particular state is arrived at... a database of actions to be taken are activated.
• The actions are translated into electrical signals to be transmitted along wires.
• These electrical signals activate actuators that cause movement according to how the actuators are set up.

All the above will accordingly cause the robot to move away from the red light as programmed.


A creatures as in the worm has receptors that cause electrical signals. These electrical signals are then transmitted along nerve fibers directly to muscles that when activated make the worm move.

So the worm is actually simpler than the above robot. There are in fact robots that have been designed along the lines of worms.

We are more akin to the worm than we are to the robot.....yes that is not a statement that most people want to admit.

We are nothing but billions of worms put together. Our brain is in fact nothing more than a conglomeration of mechanisms much like the worm.

So you are right...we evolved from the worm and it shows.

Consciousness is nothing but the result of complexity arising from multiplicity. It is nothing but an illusion... a magic trick.

See this video.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I'm going to wear my thickest pair of asbestos pants while I'm suggesting that the testimony from people in the spectrum of autistic disorders, that qualia is nonexistent, be taken skeptically. Autism is very likely, at least in part, a disorder of consciousness.

What a ridiculous suggestion. Is this based on anything other than an attempt to dehumanize your opposition?

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm going to wear my thickest pair of asbestos pants while I'm suggesting that the testimony from people in the spectrum of autistic disorders, that qualia is nonexistent, be taken skeptically.

Errrrr.... Is there such testimony?

Or rather, is there testimony that experiences are nonexistent (the very concept of qualia being incoherent)?

Autism is very likely, at least in part, a disorder of consciousness.

You're saying that it's a metacognitive disability as much as a cognitive disability?

That doesn't seem to be the case for the high-function end of the autistic spectrum, at least, not in my reading and my interactions; high-function autistic adults often get by in life precisely by applying metacognition to substitute for missing cognitive faculties. (That is, consciously thinking through social interactions that "normal" people handle subconsciously.)

If I create a robot that has a photo-receptor that detects only red light, and a motor in a circuit that drives the robot away from red light, how is that different from a very simple creature who sees redness and feels fear and desire to run away from that terrifying light? The redness the creature experiences, and the fear of redness, are qualia. I don't believe the robot experiences qualia. It just has a red light detector wired to a motor.

That's true as far as it goes. There is a minimum degree of complexity required to represent an experience that we can recognise as such (though this minimum degree is quite low), and your robot in this example is below that threshold.

We now have nearly complete schematics of the nervous systems of tiny worms. They have circuits just like my robot's: sensory organs linked to motor neurons.

And so, of course, do we. Just much, much more complicated.

Do they experience qualia? Not likely. We evolved from these creatures. We experience qualia. Why?

Two things: More neurons and feedback loops.

That's all.

More neurons allow for more complex computations - and for the feedback loops.

Feedback loops allow for the neurons to reflect on the results of their own computations.

And that's what an experience is.

 

[Mr. Scott]

What a ridiculous suggestion. Is this based on anything other than an attempt to dehumanize your opposition?

I have no interest in "dehumanizing my opposition," but when I read "there's no such thing as qualia" written by someone who's also mentioned he's autistic, it makes me wonder. I know many autistic people. I directed a documentary on the treatment of an autistic child. They often seem a little mechanical, so it's not ridiculous to hypothesize that their experience of qualia might be different, or reduced, from the norm.

This reminds me of an article by Oliver Sacks about 3D vision in which he mentioned the claim by someone who was born with only 2D vision that 3D vision was useless and unimportant. Part of this may come from ego (people don't like to admit they are missing anything important) but there's something like Dunning-Kruger involved: plain ignorance of what they're missing.

If I'm wrong, I'm wrong, so explain exactly how I'm wrong. Accusing me of a personal attack is a red herring.

 

[Mr. Scott]

There is a slight problem here.... the Robot does not feel anything. It has a program that

• Reads transducers to obtain some sensory input as electrical signals.
• Translates the voltage levels into digital data (which are electrical signals too).
• Does some logical analysis to decide how to act upon the input. This is just binary bifurcations to a particular state.
• Once a particular state is arrived at... a database of actions to be taken are activated.
• The actions are translated into electrical signals to be transmitted along wires.
• These electrical signals activate actuators that cause movement according to how the actuators are set up.

Right, my robot does not have feelings. Describe feelings in a way that will give me ideas about how to add them to my robot.

BTW: My robot uses simple analog circuitry. No AD converters, databases, or any kind of digital processing, but I don't think the distinction addresses the phenomenon of qualia, unless you can convince me otherwise.

BTBTW Thanks for the video link. I'll watch it when I have more time. Dennett is awesome.

 

[PixyMisa]

I have no interest in "dehumanizing my opposition," but when I read "there's no such thing as qualia" written by someone who's also mentioned he's autistic, it makes me wonder. I know many autistic people. I directed a documentary on the treatment of an autistic child. They often seem a little mechanical, so it's not ridiculous to hypothesize that their experience of qualia might be different, or reduced, from the norm.

I'm not sure that even makes sense.

First, let's throw out the word qualia, because the word doesn't make any sense, and replace it with experience, which is a word for the same physical process without the metaphysical baggage:

I have no interest in "dehumanizing my opposition," but when I read "there's no such thing as experience" written by someone who's also mentioned he's autistic, it makes me wonder. I know many autistic people. I directed a documentary on the treatment of an autistic child. They often seem a little mechanical, so it's not ridiculous to hypothesize that their experience of experience might be different, or reduced, from the norm.

Erm...

Anyway, that aside, yes, their experiences are different. Much much stronger in some ways - patterns of colour or shape or sound can be profoundly powerful to autistic-spectrum people when "normal" people don't even notice them. Much weaker in other ways - subconscious social cues are often missed entirely.

Different, certainly. But absent? How is that even meaningful?

 

[PixyMisa]

Right, my robot does not have feelings. Describe feelings in a way that will give me ideas about how to add them to my robot.

Feelings are computational processes.

BTW: My robot uses simple analog circuitry. No AD converters, databases, or any kind of digital processing, but I don't think the distinction addresses the phenomenon of qualia, unless you can convince me otherwise.

In other words, the worm and the human contain computers, and the robot does not, and you are wondering why they have different mental abilities?

One answer springs readily to mind...

 

[Mr. Scott]

Errrrr.... Is there such testimony?

Or rather, is there testimony that experiences are nonexistent (the very concept of qualia being incoherent)?

Let me say it this way: An autistic's intuition that qualia does not existent is suspect.

You're saying that it's a metacognitive disability as much as a cognitive disability?

That doesn't seem to be the case for the high-function end of the autistic spectrum, at least, not in my reading and my interactions; high-function autistic adults often get by in life precisely by applying metacognition to substitute for missing cognitive faculties. (That is, consciously thinking through social interactions that "normal" people handle subconsciously.)

I like that analysis, though it could be restated this way: normal people feel the meanings (via qualia) of social interactions, while high functioning autistics dissect them mechanically (sans qualia).

That's true as far as it goes. There is a minimum degree of complexity required to represent an experience that we can recognise as such (though this minimum degree is quite low), and your robot in this example is below that threshold.

Explain that threshold in a way that will give me ideas on how to add that to my robot.

Two things: More neurons and feedback loops.

That's all.

Feedback loops are in lots of mechanical and electrical devices, with many nodes comparable to neurons. As more are added to my robot, will it experience more qualia?

 

[Mr. Scott]

Feelings are computational processes.

How do you know that?

I once programmed an AI game that had a face graphic that showed feelings. When it detected it was winning, it smiled. It frowned when it was losing. It laughed when it won, and cried when it lost. The program had a happiness variable: 5 was neutral, 10 was very happy, and 0 was very sad. Did it experience feelings? If not, what kind of additional functions would I need to program to add them?

 

[Wowbagger]

We are nothing but billions of worms put together. Our brain is in fact nothing more than a conglomeration of mechanisms much like the worm.

So you are right...we evolved from the worm and it shows.

Consciousness is nothing but the result of complexity arising from multiplicity. It is nothing but an illusion... a magic trick.

I think we can identify at least one significant difference between us and a mere conglomeration of "billions of worms": We typical humans have managed to develop an Autobiographical Self, which builds models from memories sufficiently sophisticated to anticipate future needs more effectively. Worms don't have that, but it did evolve out of precursors that worms do have.

Reducing our brains to those of "conglomerations of worms" doesn't tell us anything about what makes our mind "special". Thinking in terms of the fundamental functions of emergent systems does. Our brain cells are doing things, from a higher level point of view, that worm brains cells are not doing. At least not yet.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Despite C. Elegans' limitation of 302 neurons, these worms have feelings. They shy away from gradients of harmful chemicals, like salt. They can learn to associate neutral cues with these dangers and avoid them too. If you want to argue that these are not feelings, or qualia, or whatever, you're going to have to define your terms better. Pointing to the worm and asserting it doesn't feel would probably be hurtful if it had a few more neurons to spare for crap like that.

Incidentally, it's only the hermaphroditic worm with 302 neurons. Male-only worms have an additional ~300, which are entirely focused on one thing.

 

[!Kaggen]

How do you know that?

Easy, define feelings as computational processes, voila.

 

[Complexity]

I'm going to wear my thickest pair of asbestos pants while I'm suggesting that the testimony from people in the spectrum of autistic disorders, that qualia is nonexistent, be taken skeptically. Autism is very likely, at least in part, a disorder of consciousness.

If I create a robot that has a photo-receptor that detects only red light, and a motor in a circuit that drives the robot away from red light, how is that different from a very simple creature who sees redness and feels fear and desire to run away from that terrifying light? The redness the creature experiences, and the fear of redness, are qualia. I don't believe the robot experiences qualia. It just has a red light detector wired to a motor.

We now have nearly complete schematics of the nervous systems of tiny worms. They have circuits just like my robot's: sensory organs linked to motor neurons. Do they experience qualia? Not likely. We evolved from these creatures. We experience qualia. Why?

I would argue that not every form of autism should be regarded as a disorder. I also suggest that your sweeping generalization and the conclusions that you draw from it are incorrect.

Your understanding of 'qualia' and how some people (incorrectly) think that qualia are inherent in objects is inadequate.