The personal identity is a subjective matter. It cannot be determined by anybody else but the person herself. Even two persons that are identical right down to the particle level will still feel they are different persons, and seen from outside that is what they are: two persons. The brain is hard wired to think that everything it can feel and move is part of its body, and that is as far as it personal identity extends. It does not include a different body that it cannot feel or move in its identity, even if the other has exactly similar thoughts.
Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?
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Five programs didn't have any consciousness, that is the very issue of personal identity.
From a materialist point of view, if you think that each of us has his/her individual personal identity, you will imagine that there exists some physical factors that influences its definition. You say that it is a "dynamic process", but this is vague, and open to dualist conception, as I will try to show:
Imagine to live in a world where you and all the other living beings were generated by the machine that I described, as particle-per-particle perfect replica of the same "foetus template". Because you think that each of you should had a different personal identities, I imagine that you all could discuss about the nature of personal identity.
If I understood your position, you still might say: "Each of us is a different process, even if started initially in the same condition, so we have different personal identities". But in this case, a materialist could charge you of being dualist, because he could say: "At the very moment of the beginning of your process, there's nothing of material that would allow us to distinguish your start form the start of another one of us".
You might always say that the place and/or the time were different, but the measures of time and space are only conventions. You could say that the configuration of the outern world is different, and this could influence the personal identity, but in this case we should think that if you were born elsewhere, your personal identity would be different.
Maybe I am repeating the same words written before, so I will try to put it differently: I think that if we want to be strictly materialist, we have to acknowledge that our individual existence depends on a very huge number of factors, maybe on all the particles in our brain, or in our body, or in our observable cosmic horizon, but a finite number of factors. This is the only way to avoid dualism and mantain our individual existence possible.
But if my individual existence depends on a finite number of factors, I cannot exclude that it will be theoretically possible that such finite number of factors may happen more than once and even at the same time. This leaves the theoretical possibility of non-locality, i.e. the possibility that two different individuals shared the same personal identity at the same time. This is not Open Individualism yet, but just the theoretical premise for making the teleporter to work without the loss of personal identity.
From a materialist point of view, if you think that each of us has his/her individual personal identity, you will imagine that there exists some physical factors that influences its definition. You say that it is a "dynamic process", but this is vague, and open to dualist conception, as I will try to show:
Imagine to live in a world where you and all the other living beings were generated by the machine that I described, as particle-per-particle perfect replica of the same "foetus template". Because you think that each of you should had a different personal identities, I imagine that you all could discuss about the nature of personal identity.
If I understood your position, you still might say: "Each of us is a different process, even if started initially in the same condition, so we have different personal identities". But in this case, a materialist could charge you of being dualist, because he could say: "At the very moment of the beginning of your process, there's nothing of material that would allow us to distinguish your start form the start of another one of us".
You might always say that the place and/or the time were different, but the measures of time and space are only conventions. You could say that the configuration of the outern world is different, and this could influence the personal identity, but in this case we should think that if you were born elsewhere, your personal identity would be different.
Maybe I am repeating the same words written before, so I will try to put it differently: I think that if we want to be strictly materialist, we have to acknowledge that our individual existence depends on a very huge number of factors, maybe on all the particles in our brain, or in our body, or in our observable cosmic horizon, but a finite number of factors. This is the only way to avoid dualism and mantain our individual existence possible.
But if my individual existence depends on a finite number of factors, I cannot exclude that it will be theoretically possible that such finite number of factors may happen more than once and even at the same time. This leaves the theoretical possibility of non-locality, i.e. the possibility that two different individuals shared the same personal identity at the same time. This is not Open Individualism yet, but just the theoretical premise for making the teleporter to work without the loss of personal identity.
Beelzebuddy
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Do you think there is anything special involved in consciousness that cannot be theoretically duplicated by a computer program?
Complexity
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Complexity
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Complexity
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It wasn't a welcome message.
You have failed to interest me at all in your 'Open Individualism' and other views. What I heard from you sounds very silly. Take that as you will, but I was hoping that you would decide to abandon that path and learn something about reality instead.
The preceding answer was for ANTPogo.
To answer to steenkh and go further with other considerations:
Obviously while two brains mantain the same configuration at particle level, they must have the same thoughts and the same feelings (and the same convincement about theirselves and their personal identity). It's difficult to imagine a meeting between them, anyway it would be like meet our image in the mirror (placed in a mirrored world, to manitain the same input for each of them), so no real communication is possible until the synchronization is lost.
But at this point there is interesting to imagine the thought experiment of Derek Parfit in "Reasons and persons" (Parfit is an Empty Individualist, so he thinks we have separated personal identities but during our life we gradually change it so we are not the same persona that we are at birth).
We must imagine that we could separate the two halves of our brain using a switch, and then rejoin them resetting the switch. This is plausible because there are clinic cases of brain scissions to cure serious hepilexia diseases, and even clinic cases of person with only half brain active. I saw a study about this also in Roger Penrose book "The Emperor's new mind".
While the two halves were separated, each of them would control only half of the body, and would wonder about "who" is controlling the other half of the body. After rejoin, the whole self could not even discern if the experience of left half has been lived before or after the one of the right half. The question cannot even be posed, it would be as the time itself were split in two. But he/she could be aware to have lived both the experiences of the two halves.
I think that in the case of perfect brain replicas, as even in the teleporting, we can figure something similar, even if there's no final rejoint. To imagine non-locality somehow, we need to imagine that is the time as perceived by our consciousness that has been splitted in two.
To answer to steenkh and go further with other considerations:
Obviously while two brains mantain the same configuration at particle level, they must have the same thoughts and the same feelings (and the same convincement about theirselves and their personal identity). It's difficult to imagine a meeting between them, anyway it would be like meet our image in the mirror (placed in a mirrored world, to manitain the same input for each of them), so no real communication is possible until the synchronization is lost.
But at this point there is interesting to imagine the thought experiment of Derek Parfit in "Reasons and persons" (Parfit is an Empty Individualist, so he thinks we have separated personal identities but during our life we gradually change it so we are not the same persona that we are at birth).
We must imagine that we could separate the two halves of our brain using a switch, and then rejoin them resetting the switch. This is plausible because there are clinic cases of brain scissions to cure serious hepilexia diseases, and even clinic cases of person with only half brain active. I saw a study about this also in Roger Penrose book "The Emperor's new mind".
While the two halves were separated, each of them would control only half of the body, and would wonder about "who" is controlling the other half of the body. After rejoin, the whole self could not even discern if the experience of left half has been lived before or after the one of the right half. The question cannot even be posed, it would be as the time itself were split in two. But he/she could be aware to have lived both the experiences of the two halves.
I think that in the case of perfect brain replicas, as even in the teleporting, we can figure something similar, even if there's no final rejoint. To imagine non-locality somehow, we need to imagine that is the time as perceived by our consciousness that has been splitted in two.
Yes, the consciousness itself and the personal identity, at least with the programs that runs today. I think that consciousness require a special hardware, like some studies about consciousness and the brain suggests. (Schwartz, Stapp and Beauregard 2004, Roger Penrose 1989)
Not necessarily. Because the Universe is constrained as well. So, for example, if you had a finite number of sand grains on a beach, with a finite number of types of sand grains, it is unreasonable to expect (for some moderately large number of each of the previous) that the entire beach would be duplicated if you shook it up repeatedly.
It isn't that the factors are infinite, but that they interact and the possible number of arrangements is tremendously huge, perhaps too huge to expect any repetitions in the entire universe over a gazillion years.
A'isha
Miss Schoolteacher
It's only an analogy, to illustrate there's nothing metaphysical or special about consciousness. If you have the "hardware" capable of running the consciousness program, then you will get consciousness.
If you run the same program on identical hardware platforms, you will get multiple instances of the same program running.
Now, if you install and run a single copy of the same program on five different versions of the same hardware platform, do you get one running program, or five running programs?
yy2bggggs
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IacopoV:
I think you may be confusing equivalence with identity. In particular, when you discuss two brains in the same state, you're talking about two brains that are equivalent. But if you're talking about two brains at all, then you're automatically not talking about identical brains. In a lot of your setups, you're establishing two brains as equivalent, and then treating them as if they are therefore identical; as if, given X is equivalent to Y, everything true of X is true of Y.
That's not exactly how it works.
Let me illustrate. Suppose I clone you this time. To alleviate confusion, I'll clone you twice, making both clones simultaneously, and then will destroy the original. This way, we remove all arbitrary reference points such that we can't possibly label one more authentic than the other. So let's suppose these two clones start out as equivalent as you would like to make them, and I put them each into respective laboratories that are antipodal to each other, located on the equator. Let's call one of these clones W. The other, we'll call E.
Now we'll carry out an experiment. I'll grant W a subjective experience; let's say, I give W a chocolate brownie. Meanwhile, in the other lab, I'll use exactly the same environmental conditions, giving E exactly the same chocolate brownie experience. Maybe. Or, perhaps I won't. It'll just have to depend on my mood that day.
So let's focus on W. While W is enjoying my chocolate brownie, I'll pose a few questions to W.
1. Do you know you are eating a brownie?
2. What does it taste like? Is it good?
3. Do you know if your clone is also enjoying the brownie? (Or hating it, as the case may be?)
Now, here is what I would expect. I want to know if you would expect the same thing. To question 1, W knows that W is eating a brownie. To question 2, W probably enjoys the brownie (I really do make a killer brownie); though I leave open the possibility that brownies just aren't W's thing.
But to question 3, W has no clue if E is enjoying the brownie. So now we have to talk about two possibilities.
Possibility A: E is being subjected to the same exact questions the same way, and is equally unsure that W is enjoying a brownie.
Possibility B: E is experiencing different brain states. No brownie. Possibly E's enjoying a nice scone instead.
Here's the problem. On the off chance that possibility A is correct, W's brain state is equivalent to E's brain state. Nevertheless, W cannot tell the difference between possibility A or possibility B, because W is not privy to E's experiences. However, W does know what W is experiencing.
So even though W and E's brain states may be equivalent, W and E are not identical. E knows something W doesn't know (namely, E knows what E is eating), and all it takes is for there to be a break in the causal chain between E's brain states and W's.
I think you may be confusing equivalence with identity. In particular, when you discuss two brains in the same state, you're talking about two brains that are equivalent. But if you're talking about two brains at all, then you're automatically not talking about identical brains. In a lot of your setups, you're establishing two brains as equivalent, and then treating them as if they are therefore identical; as if, given X is equivalent to Y, everything true of X is true of Y.
That's not exactly how it works.
Let me illustrate. Suppose I clone you this time. To alleviate confusion, I'll clone you twice, making both clones simultaneously, and then will destroy the original. This way, we remove all arbitrary reference points such that we can't possibly label one more authentic than the other. So let's suppose these two clones start out as equivalent as you would like to make them, and I put them each into respective laboratories that are antipodal to each other, located on the equator. Let's call one of these clones W. The other, we'll call E.
Now we'll carry out an experiment. I'll grant W a subjective experience; let's say, I give W a chocolate brownie. Meanwhile, in the other lab, I'll use exactly the same environmental conditions, giving E exactly the same chocolate brownie experience. Maybe. Or, perhaps I won't. It'll just have to depend on my mood that day.
So let's focus on W. While W is enjoying my chocolate brownie, I'll pose a few questions to W.
1. Do you know you are eating a brownie?
2. What does it taste like? Is it good?
3. Do you know if your clone is also enjoying the brownie? (Or hating it, as the case may be?)
Now, here is what I would expect. I want to know if you would expect the same thing. To question 1, W knows that W is eating a brownie. To question 2, W probably enjoys the brownie (I really do make a killer brownie); though I leave open the possibility that brownies just aren't W's thing.
But to question 3, W has no clue if E is enjoying the brownie. So now we have to talk about two possibilities.
Possibility A: E is being subjected to the same exact questions the same way, and is equally unsure that W is enjoying a brownie.
Possibility B: E is experiencing different brain states. No brownie. Possibly E's enjoying a nice scone instead.
Here's the problem. On the off chance that possibility A is correct, W's brain state is equivalent to E's brain state. Nevertheless, W cannot tell the difference between possibility A or possibility B, because W is not privy to E's experiences. However, W does know what W is experiencing.
So even though W and E's brain states may be equivalent, W and E are not identical. E knows something W doesn't know (namely, E knows what E is eating), and all it takes is for there to be a break in the causal chain between E's brain states and W's.
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Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
That is very silly, what? There is the contingent history of the bodies and there location, So what philosophical point just went whoosh over my head?
I have two calculators (for example, but you could use identical watches), they are alike in every detail and constructions down to the atoms. I even have a quantum synchronizer which will set all the QM states between the watches to exactly the same states. The only difference is that they are translocated in space. And they have two separate contingent histories (remember one of teh duplicate bodies just poofs into existence, the other doesn't).
The personal identity comes about from the translocation and space and the contingent history of the particles in the watches.
Excuse me, what? My identity is based upon my body and its contingent history, and shifts in gravitational gradients are part of that history.
So make that another whoosh as your point went past me.
What?
As a collection of atoms with contingent history , yes. You seem to really have some strangely conflated notions.
YOU are the atoms you are made out of, some of them in your bones stay with you for up to seven years. that is part of WHAT your body is.
You are using some bizarre abstracted notions of 'personal identity' without sharing your idiomatic usage.
Now the impact on visible behaviors from an in utero trip around the world may vary, especially if you mother had a severe fever. If she ate a meal with traces of calcium from sources in asia or africa, that she would not have eaten wherever she would have been at home, then obviously those material atoms would be different.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Says who, give us a physics source for that shall you?
I mean really, you think that protons are just swapping around withe each other all the time.?
said who where and in what context?
Said who?
Are you really telling me that that Silicone Oxide in the quartz in a piece of granite , is busy swapping places in another piece of quartz halfway around the world?
Really?
Except they are not perfectly equal, they are translocated in space and have different contingent histories.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Uh huh, and maybe it is your vague undefined usage of a term 'personal identity'.
The atoms that are not passed out of the fetus went around the world, do you deny that? If a bit of oxygen inhaled over asia gets incorporated into the fetus, does that not make that oxygen atom different from one in the home country.
You have just created a huge strawman, you have made false assumptions about a materialist POV and then attacked those false notions.
You are imposing false attributes upon the materialist POV.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Excuse me, there is no instant transportation in the universe. now there is some variance for leptons under QM, and it gets really weird.
BUT one of the ingrained properties of a large particle is its position in space (as expressed by the HUP or Schrodinger's equations) and time.
The second thing is that it can not travel at a velocity greater than c the speed of light, therefore within the small margins of HUP, the main constrains is that a particle can not just magically appear from mars here on earth.
It has to travel here, and contingent history is an intrinsic property.
Now the history is not encoded, but given mass, velocity, momentum and composition , those are constrained within HUP to a space time location. That particle on mars is constrained to travel at much less than the speed of light to get from there to earth.
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Um no, it has a subjective identity of 100%, it does not care that there is another of itself.
This is you false dichotomy and fallacy of construction.
If the universe was much larger and complex than it is, there would be a high likelihood that somewhere in the space time continuum, there would be an exact replica of you at some other point in space/time.
Are you going to kill yourself for that possibility?
Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Sorry, AlBell forgets a simple principle, from inside the universe there is no way to tell the ontologies apart.
A idealistic, theistic or materialistic ontology will be indistinguishable.
If you feel that they can be distinguished, then please explain. It is a moot point, we could be butterfly dreams, BIVs, godthought or dancing energy.
All exactly the same.
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
Now, with sufficiently controlled computational environments, you can have two identical identities. This trick has been used for years for high-availability computing: If one identity fails, the other continues on, and outwardly nothing has changed at all.
Can't do it with human brains though.
Can't do it with human brains though.
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
Arithmetic.