Does the traditional atheistic worldview contradict materialism?

[IacopoV]

To Complexity:

You should justify your assumptions.

 

[A'isha]

I would say that it is impossible detect what is the original picture. But the abstract idea of the Mona Lisa picture is still one.

The "abstract idea" of a thing has no bearing whatsoever on its existence.

This seems to be a dualist view. Appealing to the difference of instantiations ("I am here, you are there") without any other self-state difference, means to appeal to something outside the subject, "something separate from the thing having that identity". But if the two things are perfectly equal, what still remain to save us from a dualist (non materialist) conception of "personal identity"?

Their location in spacetime. Even if the two brains are indistinguishable otherwise, they will have separate worldlines.

 

[Mark6]

To Complexity:

You should justify your assumptions.

He never did before.

 

[Croc411]

I am unsure of this one. It has been shown that people can perceive stuff outside their bodies as being part of themselves, and amputees can feel pain in limbs they no longer have. This pain can be removed by giving them mechanical contraptions that they perceive as being their missing limb.

You think that if you copied the whole body including the nervous system, the copy would not experience the phantom pain?

In short, the "self" is more complicated than what you outline here. Your transporter scenario fails because if you do not obliterate the original, you will have two copies, both of which feel that they are the original, but none of which feel that the other is themselves. Obliterating one of them is not the same as transporting a single self to another place.

I suppose you mean my suicide scenario. What I argue is that after those 5 minutes there is my current self (the one that has been transported) and there is another "almost"-me, that is maybe 99.9 % my current self. So when I commit suicide, this particular instance of my self vanishes. But there is nothing that must be transported. My "almost"-self was there all along.

I argue to get rid of that sharp distinction between subjective persons (this person is 100.0% me, that person is 0.0% me) and instead consider a continuum of similarities.

 

[IacopoV]

To ANTPogo:

Their location in spacetime. Even if the two brains are indistinguishable otherwise, they will have separate worldlines

But if the personal identity doesn't depend only by the intrinsic subject state, this would imply that if your parents would have travel around the world while you are in formation, your organism could have a different personal identity (supposing that there's a moment during the gestation in which the personal identity is defined). This doesn't seem very reasonable.

To all: I understand the welcome message of Complexity. Maybe I seem to be inopportune because I am a logorroic newbye here. I had other discussions like those in this thread in the past, so I propose what seemed to me the critical points about these issues. I declared my view but I am not trying to impose it, I just ask you details on your personal views. I am trying to follow another time with you the path that led me to Open Individualism, still remaining materialist ant atheist. I think that these problems are difficult and the solution, if one is possible, in any case is not obvious. Forgive me if I seem too pushing, today I had more free time than the usual...

 

[Beelzebuddy]

I argue to get rid of that sharp distinction between subjective persons (this person is 100.0% me, that person is 0.0% me) and instead consider a continuum of similarities.

Depends on what you mean by "persons." Do you mean me and you, or me and my clone? If the latter, I'd argue you're half right.

Consider my mind like a project in some software versioning system. Individual commits of experience change the software continuously, yet it is still the same repository. Now clone me - branch the code. The software and version history is the same in trunk and clone_branch, but the branches are distinct. Deleting a branch is still deleting a branch.

Like software, small changes to each branch of my mind could probably be merged without conflict. My clone and I may have very different minds, but as long as they can still be merged again they can still be thought of as two branches of the same repo. But like software, there is probably some threshold of conflicting circumstance beyond which the two branches can no longer be merged automatically (in software's case this is "any conflict," but the brain has a great deal of redundancy and homeostasis). I don't have the foggiest notion of what that threshold may be for my brain, but I suspect the ramifications are similar: either an elaborate manual merge takes place or the two branches just go their separate ways as different forks, sometimes passing patches between each other but basically taking unrelated paths.

Now consider your mind, a different project altogether. Our overall architecture may be very similar, but the devils' in the details: we have no common codebase whatsoever. What you and your branches might see as a useful and general commit is so much jibberish to me. Our similarity is 0%.

See where I'm coming from?

 

[marplots]

To answer to yy2bggggs, marplots, steenkh: If we suppose that the two brains have exactly the same state, the corresponding two (or one) mind(s) would have exactly the same memories etc. The surrounding world could be actually different if they are brains in two vats, but their subjective world(s) recreated in their mind (a la Matrix), should be perfectly equal (I suppose that they receive the same input). Maybe that the synchronization lasts only few seconds, but even after then, they would behave like two copies of you, one being you and one being you if you would have done something different than what you did a second ago. The memories would begin to be different only from that point. The differences existing before the syncronization time would have no influence at all (at least, inside the brain).

Here's the problem I have with that. The only way I know of to duplicate in the manner you'd like is to have a shared history. In other words, I cannot conceive of a brain created in situ without having been grown to be in that state. Of course, that would imply some parallel history, which, from uncertainty and complexity, we know can't happen.

But, even so, how would you check? For example, say you meet a man who tells you he is Napoleon circa 1810. He answers as Napoleon and seems quite authentically to identify with the man. As far as we could determine, from his "identity perspective" he is Napoleon.

We don't need identical brains after all, we just want an identical sense of who I am. I have no problem with this at all. One, two or a hundred Napoleons is fine with me. Furthermore, I don't see why the brains of these individuals have to be carbon copies. Surely, the loss of a neuron or two in my own brain wouldn't kill or alter "me," would it?

Still, if we had before us 15 ex-Emperors, would it be reasonable to kill 14 of them off?

 

[A'isha]

But if the personal identity doesn't depend only by the intrinsic subject state, this would imply that if your parents would have travel around the world while you are in formation, your organism could have a different personal identity (supposing that there's a moment during the gestation in which the personal identity is defined). This doesn't seem very reasonable.

What? Personal identity is a dynamic thing, influenced by a person's knowledge and experience. Why do you think it would be established at any single moment, much less a moment during gestation?

 

[yy2bggggs]

But if the personal identity doesn't depend only by the intrinsic subject state, this would imply that if your parents would have travel around the world while you are in formation, your organism could have a different personal identity (supposing that there's a moment during the gestation in which the personal identity is defined). This doesn't seem very reasonable.

I'm sorry, but different from what exactly? Take an official US penny that is in my pocket. Were certain exchanges different, it could be in France instead of in my pocket.

If this were the case, would it be a different penny? Would it, perhaps, turn into a counterfeit?

It appears you're drawing a comparison to nothing in this sort of fashion.

 

[Croc411]

Croc411, you seem to be under the impression that "continuity of self" is something that exists independently from the physical structure (ie, brain) housing that "self".

No, the physical structure hosts the processes that create the continuity. Is that a correct definition for you?

All three of your scenarios have the same thing in common: from the point of view of the person involved, they would all subjectively have the same sense of "continuity of self".

At states A and E, yes.

That is, the person in scenario 1 chronologically experienced every moment of his 70 years of life, so as far as he's aware he's had the same "continuity of self" all that time. In each of your other two scenarios, the person is forcibly altered to be identical to a version of themselves that experienced those 70 years, but without actually physically going through those 70 years. However, if you ask any of them, all of them - scenario 1, 2, or 3, will report the exact same subjective "continuity of self". As far as all three of them are concerned, they've all been continuously alive for 70 years, and have the memories and experiences which shaped them to prove it.

Even though from an outside perspective, you know that only one of those persons lived a chronological 70 years, as far as each of them is concerned, they all lived a chronological 70 years. To the point where if you mix up those three individuals, so that you don't know which person was put through which scenario, you will never be able to tell them apart.

Yes.

But even though each of these persons experiences the same subjective "continuity of self", they're still individual entities, and their objective existence can be ended. Because if there's no way to either subjectively objectively to figure out which person is a "copy" and which is the "original", killing one of them is still killing one of them, and will end that person's subjective "continuity of self".

This might not seem obvious if you're killing one of them instantly at the moment of creation, but what happens if you delay the killing for a while? Each of the versions, "original" and "copy" alike, will be undergoing different subjective experiences and creating new memories, diverging ever more into separate "selves".

I'm unsure to which scenario you refer to here. Is it the one with the three persons or the transporter suicide one?

 

[A'isha]

No, the physical structure hosts the processes that create the continuity. Is that a correct definition for you?

Good enough for now, yes.

At states A and E, yes.

At any of your described states, actually. And artificially-constructed copy of a physical structure at any of those states will have the exact same "continuity of self" as the original physical structure, such as subjectively each will have an identical yet independent "continuity of self".

I'm unsure to which scenario you refer to here. Is it the one with the three persons or the transporter suicide one?

Sorry. This was a reference to your statement in this post: "If somewhere there is someone you consider similar enough to your current self, it doesn't matter that much if you die. So in the aforementioned case, "I" would only loose 5 minutes of my life."

I'm saying that's not true, because what's being created is not one continuous being with a single "continuity of self", but two separate beings, each with a separate albeit indistinguishable "continuity of self". If one of those beings dies (whether by suicide or other means), then one of those selves (a completely independent being capable of living its own unique life separate from its twin) will end.

 

[Croc411]

I also object that leaving out spacetime considerations seriously damages the exactness of the copies. After all, two particles may be indistinguishable, but the one I have here is different in what it can do and who it can dance with, than the other on Mars.

What it can do and who it can dance with cannot be ingrained in its properties, absolutely not.

 

[Croc411]

I'm saying that's not true, because what's being created is not one continuous being with a single "continuity of self", but two separate beings, each with a separate albeit indistinguishable "continuity of self".

Agreed so far.

If one of those beings dies (whether by suicide or other means), then one of those selves (a completely independent being capable of living its own unique life separate from its twin) will end.

Yes, but only 0.1% (made-up number, see post above) of its subjective existence will be lost. I disagree with the sharp on-/off-distinction.

 

[Croc411]

IMO, atheism is illogical unless it fully accepts materialism as the ontology of choice, and vice-versa.

I heartily agree! The reason why I put the word 'atheistic' in the thread title is because religious people do not share this worldview anyway as opposed to atheists.

 

[Darat]

In this case, to avoid a dualist methaphysics, you must think that personal identity depends by some external facts that not involve only the brain state. But what? gravitational forces or another kind of physical force that may influence "who is who"? I think that you may agree that it's no easy to solve this problem. Just constating that "I am here, you are there" may seem an explication, but it's not. It would imply that if your parents would have travel around the world while you are in formation, your organism would have a different personal identity.

There is no problem because there are two brains, that they have the same personality or in your parlance identity does not remove the fact that there are ,two brains.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Yes, but only 0.1% (made-up number, see post above) of its subjective existence will be lost. I disagree with the sharp on-/off-distinction.

This argument is only valid from a dualist perspective. That he has a 99.9% similar clone is cold comfort for the one who dies. From his perspective, 100% of his subjective experience is ending.

 

[A'isha]

Yes, but only 0.1% (made-up number, see post above) of its subjective existence will be lost.

Wait, back up...what do you mean by that? What's being lost, and who's losing it?

Remember, whichever copy loses the coin toss you talk about will lose its entire lifetime of subjective experience, because both copies have the exact same "continuity of self", and as far as either of them is concerned they've been alive and around for that entire time.

And because the two copies are now separate beings that are already starting to diverge in terms of experiences and memories (one will now have the experience and memory of appearing at the "destination", while the other will have the experience and memory of staying at the "starting point"), each copy will now be a separate "self" that knows it will not continue on after its own "death".

For instance, call the one who stays at the start point Copy A, and the one who appears at the end point Copy B. Each teleport station has a television set, each of which is broadcasting a different murder mystery movie. The teleport happens five minutes before the identity of the murderer finally is revealed in the movie.

As a result, after the teleport happens, Copy A knows who the murderer is in the movie shown at the start point teleport station (and laughed when he saw it), while Copy B knows who the murderer is in the movie shown at the end point teleport station (and cried when he saw it). Neither copy, however, knows what happened in the other movie.

Now, no matter which one of the copies is selected to die, they both know that their own personal "continuity of self" will end at the moment of death and not continue on in the person of their duplicate. Because each of them knows that the other knows something that he "personally" does not know...their "continuities of self" have diverged, and they are no longer experiencing the same thing.

In other words, each of them remembers being the exact same person all this time, and yet they are not the same person - one of them saw the ending to one movie and was saddened by it, while the other saw the ending to the other movie and laughed at it. So if Copy A dies, he knows he won't live on in Copy B's "continuity of self", because things have happened in B's continuity that A has no idea about.

I disagree with the sharp on-/off-distinction.

Which on/off distinction is this again?

 

[IacopoV]

To marplots:

But, even so, how would you check?

That's the problem of this post. In a materialist world, how can be determined the personal identity? In a dualist methaphysics, we could say that the soul is what matters. But if we are materialists, this solution is not viable. This is what made Parfit to propose the Empty Individualism, i.e. our original self vanishes as our brain changes in time.

I become Open Individualist because I think that there's nothing that might define and distinguish our personal identity, so the personal identity itself is something illusory. This doesn't mean that exists something like a super-soul. This means that the consciousness is a phenomenon that is always the same each time that emerge from some complex structured matter, even if each time has its different set of memories and capabilities, that anyway are changing during lifetime.


To ANTPogo, yy2bggggs and Darat:

I dont' think that personal identity

would be established at any single moment

(I think it is an illusory concept), but, what I am saying that:

1 - If we think that each of us has his/her individual personal identity, we must presuppose that he/she acquired it at a certain moment between conception and birth (or after the birth, this doesn't matter), probably in the same moment when we became a conscious being instead of an agglomerate of cell (choose you the moment you prefer).

2 - If we think that two identical brains placed side to side have different identities because located in different places, then, for the preceding point we should also think that the location where my personal identity began to exist had a role to define it.

I agree that these two seems unreasonable. But in your opinion, why?


Let's think that there's a machine that develop clones with the same DNA, following a precise project and giving each time the same feed input, and it's so sophisticated that could reach the quantum level (like the teleporter). In a materialist view, the only possible differences able to define that the generated replicas have a different personal identity is that they are constitued by different elementary particles and are build in different places (or in different times in the same place).

Both these alternatives don't seem more "atheist and materialist" than suppose that in this particular case, the two replicas could have the same personal identity, at least until they continue to be perfect replicas. This is not Open Individualism, because it imposes some rigid conditions for two individuals to have the same personal identity.

This implies to delegate the personal identity to some logic structure in the brain, not to the physical instantiation of it. This is the assumption that make the teleporter a viable option for many persons. But this require to allow, in some exceptional circumstance, i.e. when that logical structure is istantiated more than once in the physical world, that the personal identity could be considered "non-local", i.e. it is the same in two numerically different physical structure that have the same logical structure.

 

[Paulhoff]

What "atheistic worldview" it is a view on if there is a god or not.

Paul

 

[A'isha]

I dont' think that personal identity (I think it is an illusory concept), but, what I am saying that:

1 - If we think that each of us has his/her individual personal identity, we must presuppose that he/she acquired it at a certain moment between conception and birth (or after the birth, this doesn't matter), probably in the same moment when we became a conscious being instead of an agglomerate of cell (choose you the moment you prefer).

No, we don't have to presuppose that. Because "personal identity" is not a static attribute, but a dynamic process.

2 - If we think that two identical brains placed side to side have different identities because located in different places, then, for the preceding point we should also think that the location where my personal identity began to exist had a role to define it.

They're not different identities because they're located in different places, per se, but because they have separate physical existences. If, from a materialist perspective, human consciousness and personal identity are a result of the electrochemical processes and physical structure of the human brain, then each consciousness has to be tied to a brain. It's a bottom-up process, not a top-down process.

As a basic analogy, think of a computer program. A computer program can't run without a computer to run it on. If I have one program, and install that exact same program on five different identical computers and start running them simultaneously, how many programs are running. One? Or five?