A definition of free will

[Gord_in_Toronto]

The universal process is running all of reality so it's not possible to create a completely isolated system. Every particle is connected to all other particles via gravity for example. So to simulate a whole household would require a simulation of the whole universe since the change in direction of a single particle in another galaxy could affect the choices made by the members of that household (the so-called butterfly effect in chaos theory). And to simulate the entire universe would require more computing power than the universe itself.

In any case, no such simulation is possible because, intrinsically, radioactive decay is a stochastic process. Complete prediction is impossible.

 

[Anders Lindman]

In any case, no such simulation is possible because, intrinsically, radioactive decay is a stochastic process. Complete prediction is impossible.

Hmm... Yeah, that's the randomness coming into the picture. Very true. Such radioactive decay even happens in isotopes in the brain I think.

And then theorem 1 can be used which states that there is no way of distinguishing a real random process from a pseudorandom process, which means that even radioactive decay can be included in hypothesis 1 about reality being a deterministic process.

 

[Craig4]

Let's say that it's possible to look at a person's choices in isolation, totally separate from the rest of the world. I don't believe that's possible in reality, but just to make an extreme case just to cover all ground.

Then the question is: is the thinking activity which is the person's choice-making a computationally irreducible process in the physical body of that person? I haven't looked at that yet but I suspect that the case can easily be made that this is in fact the case, that the neural activities in a person is a computationally irreducible process, since even very simple physical processes can be computationally irreducible.

An example of an extremely simple physical process (such as the motion of only three particles) that is computationally irreducible is the three-body problem.

"Unfortunately, when we add a third body to our equations of motion, such as a spacecraft lost in space between the Earth and the sun, we can no longer find an analytical solution. The equations are unsolvable. This problem is known as the three body problem of celestial mechanics and remains the subject of research today." -- http://plus.maths.org/content/mathematical-mysteries-three-body-problem

But what if we had a very powerful computer simulating the entire nervous system for a person? Couldn't then the choices that person will make be predicted beforehand? I doubt it, but let's say that they can. Then it would only be possible to do so as long as the person remains totally isolated! Because if the person receives information from the outside world, such as reading a newspaper, then immediately the simulation becomes invalid.

Then let's say that we have an even more powerful computer that can simulate not only one person but the entire planet Earth. That would still not be enough since Earth is very much affected by the activity of the sun. And if we include the sun in the simulation then not even that is enough since the sun is affected by the activity in the Milky Way galaxy.

What's the application for all this?

 

[Jeff Corey]

Determinism is a working assumption for behavioral psychologists who are attempting to discover the causes of the behavior of animals. The assumption of free will is popular among the so-called humanist school of psychology, who apparently believe that behavior is controlled by some homunculus inside people that makes decisions on its own. Like Descartes, they don't believe nonhuman animals have that capability.
But it doesn't really matter. If we are sucessful in discovering more and more rules, or even laws like the law of intermittant reinforcement or Herrenstein's matching law, future behaviorists will be able to demonstrate that fewer and fewer domains of human behavior are determined and not free.

 

[Paulhoff]

How does someone knowing in advance what you're going to decide make your decision less "free"?

Because it is known, it is already done, if you don't understand, oh well.

And seeing there is no all-knowing god, that is mute anyway.

Also, there is not free-will anyway. You do not have unlimited actions, therefore you have limits and with that you also don't have free-will.

Paul

 

[yy2bggggs]

It's fun to try to create dry definitions, but an example is useful as an illustration. Let's say that I make a choice between A) having a sandwich before going to bed and B) not having a sandwich before going to bed.

How is that choice between A and B an act of my own free will? A choice is a transition from uncertainty to certainty.

Wrong. A choice is a selection of a behavior from at least two perceived potential behaviors (I wish there were a better way to phrase this; the first use of "behavior" in this sentence refers to an extension; the second refers to intensions, so don't be confused that they're the same word--they're entirely different kinds of things; it's only our relative skill at relating one to the other that makes this relationship useful, but that comprises a critical part of the mechanics of choice). A transition from uncertainty to (relative) certainty may happen before, during, or after the choice. It has nothing to do with the choice itself.

So what I'm doing is simply reducing the state A&B to only either A or B.

This is very loose language. The "state" A&B is simply a state in which you are perceiving at least two potential behaviors for you to initiate and have not actually initiated one of the behaviors (in your case it's more complex because one of your behaviors is passive).

The actual outcome of a choice is a result of an action in the moment.

Not sure what you mean by in the moment. I'm going to guess that you mean that if I choose to pick up this cup, it is an in the moment action. But what kind of action is it if I choose to grow my hair out this winter?

And the choice is a true free will choice since not even the universe knows what the choice will be.

How do you know? I mean, it could just as easily never be true as be universally true. And what would it change anyway if it were one of these versus the other?

Only when I have made my choice is the outcome determined.

This is in direct contradiction to Hypothesis 1, which leads me to wonder what you're positing.

 

[Brian-M]

Because it is known, it is already done,

Just because someone knows what's about to happen, doesn't mean that it already has happened.

if you don't understand, oh well.

No, please explain it.

Assume, for the sake of argument, that there does exist an omniscient deistic god. In what way would it affect your capacity to make decisions and then act upon your decisions if it happened that prescience was a subset of this god's omniscience?

And seeing there is no all-knowing god, that is mute anyway.

The all-knowing god that doesn't exist is incapable of speech?
(Perhaps you meant moot.)

Also, there is not free-will anyway. You do not have unlimited actions, therefore you have limits and with that you also don't have free-will.

So your concept of free will would be omnipotence?

 

[Aridas]

Because it is known, it is already done, if you don't understand, oh well.

Nope. If it was an Omniscient Creator, you'd have more of an argument. Just an Omniscient God? Not quite, as there is at least one workaround. Either way, Omniscience and Free Will aren't conceptually incompatible. Any incompatibility lies, not in the concepts, but in the requirements for the concepts to actually exist.

That said, to more directly deal with what you said... no. "Because it is known, it is already done" is a nonsequitor. If you said "as good as done," that would be defensible. As it is? Just no.

Also, there is not free-will anyway. You do not have unlimited actions, therefore you have limits and with that you also don't have free-will.

As Brian-M touched on, Free Will and Omnipotence are generally not considered the same thing. Attempting to demand that they are is... setting up a strawman, really.

Assume, for the sake of argument, that there does exist an omniscient deistic god. In what way would it affect your capacity to make decisions and then act upon your decisions if it happened that prescience was a subset of this god's omniscience?

It doesn't. To take this back to why Determinism and Free Will aren't compatible... it's very simple. By the very nature of Determinism, if it is the case, choice does not and cannot exist, by the simple fact that there was, is, and will never be any other path that could be taken. Sure, there's an illusion of choice, but that's not the same thing as actually having multiple potential options that one could choose from. Holding back, for the moment, from dealing with the complexities of multiple completely theoretical dimensions, it comes to the base question "Is there anything fundamentally random or unpredictable that either is part of or affects our reality?" If not, Omniscience (using a simple test of "Is there any question where the answer is the conceptual equivalent of 'I don't know?'" to determine whether it qualifies as Omniscience) can exist, but Determinism is the case, ruling out actual Free Will. If there is some force or interaction that is or leads to something fundamentally random or unpredictable, even if one had all the relevant information? Free Will could potentially exist, if several more conditions are met, but Omniscience could not, given that there would be things that fundamentally couldn't be known, thereby removing the "All-knowing" claim for something that is, at best, not Omniscience, however close.

All that said, to answer your question in short format, there is no taking away of choice. The choice simply never existed in the first place under those conditions.

I believe it was your objection, earlier in the thread, that that difference between actual and illusory Free Will is irrelevant philosophy. For all practical purposes? Yes, given the absolute nature of the concepts. It's not like there's any way that we could actually distinguish between actual and illusory, in any case, nor any good argument for why knowing it was one or the other should change anything at all. I like Determinism, and think that it could very well be the case, but I recognize that, without all the information, one must live as if there was Free Will, regardless of whether or not it is the case.

ETA:

I don't see what any of this has to do with free will. I'd define free will as...

The capacity to act based on internal decision-making processes which are free from outside control or influence.

Just to make this clear, I tend to go by a rather different definition, one that at least attempts to take into account the moral arguments that are very often attached to the concepts.

To have a morally useful version of Free Will, a person must be able to consciously affect which one of multiple potentially selectable options is selected, with at least some knowledge of the consequences and some ability to comprehend the consequences that will result.

That said, as well, "free from outside control or influence" leaves the matter in a place where... it's quite infeasible for use for anyone who has ever interacted with another thing and been affected by the encounter.

 

[Anders Lindman]

What's the application for all this?

One application is that there is a difference between simple Laplacian determinism and determinism with computational irreducibility. In the Laplacian case the future is fully known, at least in theory for someone able to calculate the future. In the case of determinism with computational irreducibility the future is in general unknown.

This means that in the Laplacian case, making choices would feel quite pointless, since the future can be known without making those choices, whereas with computational irreducibility it's the choices that make the future known. So computational irreducibility makes the choices needed as a part of creation which we can call free will.

 

[Anders Lindman]

Wrong. A choice is a selection of a behavior from at least two perceived potential behaviors (I wish there were a better way to phrase this; the first use of "behavior" in this sentence refers to an extension; the second refers to intensions, so don't be confused that they're the same word--they're entirely different kinds of things; it's only our relative skill at relating one to the other that makes this relationship useful, but that comprises a critical part of the mechanics of choice). A transition from uncertainty to (relative) certainty may happen before, during, or after the choice. It has nothing to do with the choice itself.
This is very loose language. The "state" A&B is simply a state in which you are perceiving at least two potential behaviors for you to initiate and have not actually initiated one of the behaviors (in your case it's more complex because one of your behaviors is passive).
Not sure what you mean by in the moment. I'm going to guess that you mean that if I choose to pick up this cup, it is an in the moment action. But what kind of action is it if I choose to grow my hair out this winter?
How do you know? I mean, it could just as easily never be true as be universally true. And what would it change anyway if it were one of these versus the other?This is in direct contradiction to Hypothesis 1, which leads me to wonder what you're positing.

A more general case is that a choice is the outcome of picking a subset C out of a set S of possible choices. Picking the empty set as the subset C may also be a choice depending on how we look at it.

By in the moment I mean that the choice-making is the process of actually selecting the subset C. And that is an act of free will as I have defined it, since without the process of the choice-making the future will not be known. The future becomes determined in part by the choices we make, so even though reality is deterministic it's generally unknown until the outcomes of the choices are made manifest.

The removal of uncertainty comes from the process of choice-making itself. The outcome isn't known until the choice actually has been made.

Growing your hair is not a conscious choice unless you are some sage who can regulate his or her bodily functions to that degree.

The future is unknown in the total sense, even for the universe, because of hypothesis 2 which says that reality is computationally irreducible.

"While many computations admit shortcuts that allow them to be performed more rapidly, others cannot be sped up. Computations that cannot be sped up by means of any shortcut are called computationally irreducible. The principle of computational irreducibility says that the only way to determine the answer to a computationally irreducible question is to perform, or simulate, the computation." -- http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ComputationalIrreducibility.html

 

[Anders Lindman]

By the very nature of Determinism, if it is the case, choice does not and cannot exist, by the simple fact that there was, is, and will never be any other path that could be taken.

The trick with computational irreducibility is that the single future path does NOT exist. Only by actually performing our choices is the path into the future determined.

Some may argue that the single path into the future does exist in theory, if reality is a deterministic process (where even randomness is deterministic according to theorem 1). I claim that the future consists of countless of possible paths and it's only when the 'computation' of reality is made in the moment that one of those paths becomes realized. The future is unknown in the strict sense, which means that no single path into the future exists.

 

[Craig4]

One application is that there is a difference between simple Laplacian determinism and determinism with computational irreducibility. In the Laplacian case the future is fully known, at least in theory for someone able to calculate the future. In the case of determinism with computational irreducibility the future is in general unknown.

This means that in the Laplacian case, making choices would feel quite pointless, since the future can be known without making those choices, whereas with computational irreducibility it's the choices that make the future known. So computational irreducibility makes the choices needed as a part of creation which we can call free will.

So what do you do with it?

 

[Brian-M]

It doesn't. To take this back to why Determinism and Free Will aren't compatible... it's very simple. By the very nature of Determinism, if it is the case, choice does not and cannot exist, by the simple fact that there was, is, and will never be any other path that could be taken. Sure, there's an illusion of choice, but that's not the same thing as actually having multiple potential options that one could choose from.

Choice is an abstract concept, and even in a non-deterministic (ie, partially random) universe, it does not exist when the universe is considered from a purely physical perspective.

That said, as well, "free from outside control or influence" leaves the matter in a place where... it's quite infeasible for use for anyone who has ever interacted with another thing and been affected by the encounter.

You don't seem to have understood what I meant, maybe I put it badly.

The best way to put may be to view the mind from an abstract black-box perspective. Since it's practically impossible for us to know exactly what's going on inside a mind, we're forced to treat it as a black-box in normal circumstances anyway. You can interact with the person, but the specifics of the internal processes are unknown.

Yes, interacting with other people and things can affect the mind, cause the states of the processes in the mind to change in some manner. But the processes themselves aren't being controlled or tampered with (which would normally require opening up the "black box" and directly altering the mind/brain), and so free-will is maintained.

As for the matter of choice, the black-box point of view also works.

The output of the black-box (mind) represents a choice. Sure, if you looked inside the black-box and figured out exactly how it works, there would only be one possible output at any given time.

But if you don't know what's going on inside a mind, if it's to all intents and purposes a black-box, then there are a vast number of outputs/actions possible, depending on the exact nature/state of the internal processes at any given time.

The concept of "choice" represents exactly which possible output/action is produced out of all possible outputs/actions that could have been produced depending on the possible specific internal states and processes at the time.

I hope this makes sense. I'm rambling on a bit, it's getting late and I haven't had much sleep lately, so this post may not be completely coherent.

 

[Anders Lindman]

So what do you do with it?

I use it to improve the quality of my choices. It's in the present moment where the rubber meets the road so to speak. By paying attention to the choice-making process itself, moment to moment, I can improve how the choices are made. And the recognition of myself as a process within the larger universal process opens up my ability of making choices to include the bigger picture. Something like that. I'm not sure yet.

 

[Beerina]

This is what is known as "affirming the consequent". Determinism states that "everything, including one's choice of action, is the necessary result of a sequence of causes". Thus, determinism is the opposite of free will so we need go no further if one accepts hypothesis 1. I don't. I think it is unknown and unknowable. The only way to know if everything in the universe has a cause is to know everything in the universe.

I don't even know if determinism is the opposite of free will.

When we say "free will", we usually mean someone analyzing a situation and making a decision. What is this, if not a deterministic process?

Indeed, threats of punishment or promises of reward in an afterlife are all assuming a deterministic effect.

There could, of course, be true random influences, and that affects determinism, but it doesn't expose a mechanism for "spiritual" free will to exist.

I have yet to see a definition of free will that isn't ultimately either deterministic in nature or deterministic with random influences. I.e. "spiritual" free will doesn't exist -- there is no definition for it.

 

[Beerina]

In post #12 I show why this is not possible. And you mention prediction here. Hypothesis 2 says that reality is a computationally irreducible process which means that it cannot per definition be fully predicted.

Well, it cannot be predicted without essentially accurately simulating the situation and "running it in fast forward".

Trivially, as computers can run such simulations, therefore reality itself inherits that property as you could not predict the outcome of a said computer running a said simulation without simulating that computer simulating that simulation.


However, one could, in theory, simulate a human (assuming you can figure out how consciousness arises, or at least works, in such a way that you could simulate it) and presto! You're back to determinism.

That, perhaps, for the sake of argument, you could only predict what someone would think by doing a full and proper simulation, doesn't really affect the free will argument. And a priori, I have no reason to think we couldn't come up with a clever way to short-circuit the prediction of what people will think.

Indeed, it often seems all too easy.

 

[Anders Lindman]

Well, it cannot be predicted without essentially accurately simulating the situation and "running it in fast forward".

Trivially, as computers can run such simulations, therefore reality itself inherits that property as you could not predict the outcome of a said computer running a said simulation without simulating that computer simulating that simulation.


However, one could, in theory, simulate a human (assuming you can figure out how consciousness arises, or at least works, in such a way that you could simulate it) and presto! You're back to determinism.

That, perhaps, for the sake of argument, you could only predict what someone would think by doing a full and proper simulation, doesn't really affect the free will argument. And a priori, I have no reason to think we couldn't come up with a clever way to short-circuit the prediction of what people will think.

Indeed, it often seems all too easy.

Only if a human was an completely closed and finite system without randomness in it, could the choices be simulated. In reality the person takes in new information from all over the place, which affects the outcomes of the choices.

 

[Anders Lindman]

J. Krishnamurti talked about choice being confusion. That's an interesting take on it I think. And many mystics have talked about choiceless awareness.

Is it possible to make the choice of not choosing? Perhaps. Then the life for that person would be a kind of spontaneous unfolding without any personal choices involved (except the choice of not making any choice).

What the mystics talk about is a step even further than that I think, that they talk about how the dropping of making choices comes as a consequence of realizing the truth of individual choices being an illusion, appearing because of a false belief, and when that belief is corrected, the person enters choiceless awareness.

 

[Anders Lindman]

I may have to correct myself about claiming that the future is uncertain. Is the future uncertain? No. Why? Because the future doesn't exist yet. An IDEA about the future is not the same as an actual future. If you claim the future exists, then show it to me.

 

[yy2bggggs]

A more general case is that a choice is the outcome of picking a subset C out of a set S of possible choices. Picking the empty set as the subset C may also be a choice depending on how we look at it.

Oh, it's more general alright. The problem is, it's now so general that it's not describing a choice; and, it's also so general that it loses meaning (what is a "possibility" in your description?)

Let's consider your sandwich example. To resolve ambiguity in such a way as to describe this scenario, I'm going to presume it is a particular sandwich we're talking about (as opposed to making and eating a sandwich).

Case 1a: Let's presume the sandwich isn't actually there; I somehow got a mistaken notion that it was. But as it so happens, I decided not to have the sandwich.

Case 1b: Again the sandwich isn't actually there. But as it happens, I decided I want to eat the sandwich. So I go to where it was supposed to be (say, the fridge), and look for it, discovering that it's not there.

Case 2: Let's presume the sandwich is there. However, in this case, I do not know that the sandwich is there. Furthermore, let's say that I go to bed without eating the sandwich (just to explicitly rule out the possibility that I discovered it and ate it before bed).

Was there a choice in case 1a? Case 1b? Case 2? I say yes, yes, and no respectively.

By in the moment I mean that the choice-making is the process of actually selecting the subset C.

Sure.

And that is an act of free will as I have defined it, since without the process of the choice-making the future will not be known.

You're begging the question. Suppose I'm in a highly precise MRI machine while I "make the choice". You're claiming that it would be impossible for a person looking at the MRI machine to know which choice I'm going to make before it is made.

And I'm claiming you have exactly no legitimate reason from an epistemic standpoint to make this claim. Furthermore, there's reason not to make this claim; even without an MRI machine, I can predict what thing I choose, and what thing friends of mine would choose, to a surprising degree of accuracy for certain classes of choice presentations. This sort of prediction is the basis for folk concepts such as "preference", "habit", etc.

The future becomes determined in part by the choices we make, so even though reality is deterministic it's generally unknown until the outcomes of the choices are made manifest.

Since choice is a behavior with duration, and since we so happen to be flexible in this way, we can change the choice even during the initiation of the action. I could start my march to the fridge and then suddenly stop, change my mind, and just go to bed.

So just as it's not necessarily unpredictable which choice I will make, it's not necessarily predictable what would happen even after having made a choice. And it's entirely possible that for some choices whether I stick to it or not is less predictable than for other choices whether or not I select a particular option.

The predictability aspect is a red herring that unfortunately too many fall for.

Growing your hair is not a conscious choice unless you are some sage who can regulate his or her bodily functions to that degree.

Be it known that hair grows anyway, and the conscious choice is about whether or not you want to exploit that to make your hair longer as opposed to getting haircuts or shaving your head. "Grow my hair out" doesn't mean to make my hair grow; it means to let it grow long.

So now that I clarified this for you, what about the question? Do you think you can point to the action in the moment when I made the choice to grow my hair out?

The future is unknown in the total sense, even for the universe, because of hypothesis 2 which says that reality is computationally irreducible.

You cannot derive a fact from a hypothesis. Furthermore, you're committing a fallacy of division here anyway; even if I grant that reality is computationally irreducible, that does not imply that choices are.

The principle of computational irreducibility says that ...

Just so you know, I'm not going to accept Wolfram as a valid authority in this area.