David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[Wowbagger]

Premise 1: Bob is proficient in ending lives.
Premise 2: Jim is alive.
Premise 3: Bob has an inclination to end Jim's life.
Premise 4: In philosophical terms, this inclination is thought of as an "ought".
Conclusion: Bob ought to kill Jim.

What westprog said is mostly on the spot.

In general, I would say Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way.

(Just like how historic Social Darwinists were actually wrong about Darwin's ideas. Or, how those warning of the apocalypse are wrong about the end of the world.)

The moral wrongness or rightness of an "ought" can be determined by looking at the facts of the matter, and seeing if the action takes the health and well-being of humans into consideration.

Sure, Bob may think killing Jim is in the best of such interests. But, he would be wrong, and we can prove it empirically.

 

[Wowbagger]

That 'oughts' are in a sense or can be treated as 'ises' is not in any way controversial. That fact does not imply that one can derive an ought from an is outside of a word game that one might play while ignoring the concept being expressed and equivocating over the use of the words in play.

What I am promoting is an attitude that would be useful in exploring a science of morality: a science that can determine (or help determine) human values.

It only looks like a word game from Attitude #3, and maybe Attitude #2.
But, from the point of view of Attitude #1, such concerns about equivocation are not relevant.

 

[the PC apeman]

What westprog said is mostly on the spot.

In general, I would say Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way.

(Just like how historic Social Darwinists were actually wrong about Darwin's ideas. Or, how those warning of the apocalypse are wrong about the end of the world.)

The moral wrongness or rightness of an "ought" can be determined by looking at the facts of the matter, and seeing if the action takes the health and well-being of humans into consideration.

Sure, Bob may think killing Jim is in the best of such interests. But, he would be wrong, and we can prove it empirically.

You're going in circles here. You have put yourself into the corner of having explain what oughts ought to be. Please insert the premises you think will produce the conclusions you can accept.

You can't just handwave away my counter-example by saying "Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way" with out undermining your project which is to explain what right and wrong is - aka what we ought and ought not do.

 

[Wowbagger]

I should emphasize, in case no one noticed, that my attitude in post #233 (where I describe the catalog of thoughts) is different from most of my other posts.

During the time I wrote post #40, about the "Miles", I was assuming (like most of you) that there was one proper way to think about these words.
But, I was assuming Hume was outdated for all intents and purposes, and most others were not.

When I asked the questions in #211, I wanted to know why two sets of smart people could still disagree on what seemed to be an easy case to me.

It took a while to write post #233, because it was dawning on me that the two groups are thinking of these things in ways that are useful to their own work, but not to the other's.

That is my stance on the topic, now. Hopefully, some of you will see this new light with me. If not, then perhaps after we get tired of this, we can bicker and argue about what the true length of a coastline is.

You're going in circles here. You have put yourself into the corner of having explain what oughts ought to be.

The intention was to explain what oughts ARE. The empirical nature of oughts. What I think "oughts ought to be" is irrelevant.

The facts I offered could be right or wrong, but this would be determined empirically, not ontologically.

This is different, and probably very alien, to what philosophers normally think about. So, try to think from the other's perspective a little, before responding further.

You can't just handwave away my counter-example by saying "Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way" with out undermining your project which is to explain what right and wrong is - aka what we ought and ought not do.

We can empirically determine what is wrong with Bob, in this example. We can explain why his ideas were distorted.

His oughts came from a distored reality, and we can determine the nature of that distortion empirically.

 

[the PC apeman]

The intention was to explain what oughts ARE. The empirical nature of oughts. What I think "oughts ought to be" is irrelevant.

The facts I offered could be right or wrong, but this would be determined empirically, not ontologically.

Okay, I'll try harder to understand your position. I'll need to ask you some clarifying questions.

1. Do you take the two oughts in "what oughts ought to be" to be in one case, an empirical ought and in the other, an ontological ought? Which is which?

2. In the present context, what does it mean for a fact to be right or wrong? Are you using fact and premise interchangeably here? If so, is a true premise the same as a right fact?

3. Do you consider the conclusion in my counter-example to be sound (ie. premises are true and logic is valid) as far as it goes? If so, I take it there is more to be considered. Perhaps the ought in my conclusion is one of the varieties mentioned above. Which?

This is different, and probably very alien, to what philosophers normally think about. So, try to think from the other's perspective a little, before responding further.

We can empirically determine what is wrong with Bob, in this example. We can explain why his ideas were distorted.

His oughts came from a distored reality, and we can determine the nature of that distortion empirically.

4. How can we determine what is wrong with Bob? Can it be formalized? That is, what are the premises and logic to be considered here that were not included in the original examples?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What I am promoting is an attitude that would be useful in exploring a science of morality: a science that can determine (or help determine) human values.

It only looks like a word game from Attitude #3, and maybe Attitude #2.
But, from the point of view of Attitude #1, such concerns about equivocation are not relevant.

Right, but that is not being argued; that is not the issue being discussed. I seriously doubt that Hume would have had a problem with that viewpoint. The issue being discussed is whether or not one could derive an ought from an is at a fundamental level. No one can do that because we have to start somewhere, we have to decide on some value that is the basis from which to examine human values.

I'm not sure what you mean by attitudes 1,2, and 3.

 

[Wowbagger]

1. Do you take the two oughts in "what oughts ought to be" to be in one case, an empirical ought and in the other, an ontological ought? Which is which?

Thinking as a philosopher: The first "oughts" would be empirical, and the second "ought" would be ontological.

Though, I am not sure if it is fair to pick apart the phrase "what oughts ought to be", because it sounds like it could lead to a bunch of semantic traps. It is more important to emphasize that all oughts reduce to a type of is, at some point. Even the ontological ones.

2. In the present context, what does it mean for a fact to be right or wrong?

It is objectively true, preferably from a scientific perspective (experimental results bare it out).

Are you using fact and premise interchangeably here?

I suppose I could be. I did not think about that very much. Perhaps a premise is a special example of fact, in some way?

If so, is a true premise the same as a right fact?

A 'true premise' would be an 'objectively correct fact'. So, the short answer, I guess, is "Yes".

3. Do you consider the conclusion in my counter-example to be sound (ie. premises are true and logic is valid) as far as it goes?

Actually, one of the premises does look faulty. Sorry I did not notice this, before. But, I took "proficient at killing" to mean something like "enjoys killing" instead of "good at killing".

I suppose the logic would be more sound like this:

Premise 1: Bob is takes enjoyment from ending lives*.
Premise 2: Jim is alive.
Premise 3: Bob has an inclination to end Jim's life**.
Premise 4: In philosophical terms, this inclination is thought of as an "ought".
Conclusion: Bob ought to kill Jim.

(* The sources for that enjoyment would be facts in the matter: Perhaps a mental disorder, or he was brainwashed. In this case, proficiency would be largely irrelevant.)
(** Premise #3 now looks a little redundant in there, but I kept it in for completeness of the decision making process.)

Of course, a typical layperson would find this unsound, but more for reasons of disgust at its conclusion, rather than the logic or accuracy of the premises. The sources of that disgust would be a separate issue.

The science of morality would probably find out why Bob's view of reality is so distorted that he would enjoy killing people, and feels he ought to do so. And, from the perspective of well-being, his Conclusion would be a wrong one to have.

Of course: Science and well-being are things we have to value. But science can ALSO tell us how and why we generally value these things (perhaps from an evolutionary perspective).
So, in one way: those values also become facts of the matter, in the end.
And, in another: The existence of the "covert ought" is not relevant to determining the facts of Bob's brain.

4. How can we determine what is wrong with Bob? Can it be formalized? That is, what are the premises and logic to be considered here that were not included in the original examples?

I hope I covered this in the previous answer. In short, it can be formalized just as effectively as neuroscience and psychology can be formalized. Though, of course, we are now talking about my altered Premise #1.

In your original counter-example, it was implied that one should kill people simply because one is good at doing so. But the conclusion really did not follow from it: It lacked "motivation".

 

[Wowbagger]

The issue being discussed is whether or not one could derive an ought from an is at a fundamental level. No one can do that because we have to start somewhere, we have to decide on some value that is the basis from which to examine human values.

That decision would, itself, be based on facts of the matter. The values we "start" with do not pop out of some separate Realm of Values.

The "covert ought" we are starting with is not a relevant concern to those who take brain states as more fundamental.

I'm not sure what you mean by attitudes 1,2, and 3.

Please read Post #233:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=7757048#post7757048

 

[the PC apeman]

Actually, one of the premises does look faulty. Sorry I did not notice this, before. But, I took "proficient at killing" to mean something like "enjoys killing" instead of "good at killing".

I suppose the logic would be more sound like this:

Premise 1: Bob is takes enjoyment from ending lives*.
Premise 2: Jim is alive.
Premise 3: Bob has an inclination to end Jim's life**.
Premise 4: In philosophical terms, this inclination is thought of as an "ought".
Conclusion: Bob ought to kill Jim.

(* The sources for that enjoyment would be facts in the matter: Perhaps a mental disorder, or he was brainwashed. In this case, proficiency would be largely irrelevant.)
(** Premise #3 now looks a little redundant in there, but I kept it in for completeness of the decision making process.)

I don't understand how a premise can be faulty. Either it is true or it is not true. In both examples (proficient in, takes enjoyment from) can we not assume they are objectively true in Bob's case? In either example the conclusion seems to be that Bob ought to do what he is both inclined toward and capable of doing, no matter what the act is. I don't see why you term this an ought. It provides no useful prescriptive differentiation as my counter-example demonstrates.

And, from the perspective of well-being, his Conclusion would be a wrong one to have.

So there are right oughts and wrong oughts? (NB. These are not the same as oughts and ought nots.) Then what we'd like to see are some premises and logic that differentiate a right ought from a wrong ought.

In your original counter-example, it was implied that one should kill people simply because one is good at doing so. But the conclusion really did not follow from it: It lacked "motivation".

No, my counter-example also had inclination as a premise which is motivation.

 

[westprog]

What westprog said is mostly on the spot.

In general, I would say Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way.

And that's how it works. The game is rigged from the start. We know what right and wrong is because when Bob is healthy and his brain isn't distorted or inaccurate, Bob chooses the right thing. How do we know that Bob's brain is working accurately? Because of his behaviour.

(Just like how historic Social Darwinists were actually wrong about Darwin's ideas. Or, how those warning of the apocalypse are wrong about the end of the world.)

The moral wrongness or rightness of an "ought" can be determined by looking at the facts of the matter, and seeing if the action takes the health and well-being of humans into consideration.

Sure, Bob may think killing Jim is in the best of such interests. But, he would be wrong, and we can prove it empirically.

"Taking the health and well-being of humans into consideration". We can call that a simple "is" but the "ought" is showing..

 

[westprog]

You're going in circles here. You have put yourself into the corner of having explain what oughts ought to be. Please insert the premises you think will produce the conclusions you can accept.

You can't just handwave away my counter-example by saying "Bob's sense of right and wrong would be distorted or inaccurate in some way" with out undermining your project which is to explain what right and wrong is - aka what we ought and ought not do.

If there were some objective, measurable way in which we could determine Bob's mental fitness, then hypothetically we could derive our "oughts" from that. But the only way we have to unambiguously deduce Bob's moral health is by the things he does. If he does the things we approve of, we call him healthy. That's a distortion of psychology much like what the Soviets did when they imprisonded dissidents, or when Freudians labelled homosexuality a disorder.

 

[the PC apeman]

If there were some objective, measurable way in which we could determine Bob's mental fitness, then hypothetically we could derive our "oughts" from that. But the only way we have to unambiguously deduce Bob's moral health is by the things he does. If he does the things we approve of, we call him healthy. That's a distortion of psychology much like what the Soviets did when they imprisonded dissidents, or when Freudians labelled homosexuality a disorder.

Yep. Another way to put this is simply that rightness is a function of majority opinion aka the way the majority of brains are wired. But I doubt that would sit well with Wowbagger or Harris.

 

[Wowbagger]

No, my counter-example also had inclination as a premise which is motivation.

In that case, your original Premise #1, about proficiency, seems to be a non-sequitor.

I don't understand how a premise can be faulty. Either it is true or it is not true.

Or irrelevant, as it is in your original case.

I don't see why you term this an ought. It provides no useful prescriptive differentiation as my counter-example demonstrates.

From Bob's perspective, it WOULD be an ought. It would be something he thinks he should do.

From ours, we would disagree: Ontologically, we would think he ought not do that.

Whose oughts are morally correct? That is a question science could answer, if we allow it to.

So there are right oughts and wrong oughts? (NB. These are not the same as oughts and ought nots.)

I am saying that different people will have different views on what they ought to do, and ought not to do.

Who is right or wrong could be determined scientifically, when there is a dispute.

 

[Wowbagger]

Another way to put this is simply that rightness is a function of majority opinion aka the way the majority of brains are wired.

No, it is possible (though unlikely) that majority opinion could be wrong about what is best for their own health and well-being.

The fact that science is coming up with non-intuitive ideas about our physiology demonstrates that such a thing can be possible, in some ways.

Coming up with clearer examples would send us into preposterous thought experiments. But, perhaps a brief aside might be worth the trip:

Imagine a Universe in which our lives were being judged by superior aliens we can never be able to see or touch or otherwise empirically deduce. But, these aliens are a bunch of sadists, scoring the most points to humans who induce suffering the most. And, in this hypothetical Universe, we get to spend an eternity in a "heaven like world" where any pleasure is ours, if we score lots and lots of points. And, a "hell like world" where we will be miserable for eternity, if we were on the low end of the points scale.

ETA: We could also add a provision that the victims of misery would also be rewarded in some way, by the aliens, above and beyond any suffering they had. I suppose we would also have to modify who goes to "hell" in the above scenario. But, we can let the aliens sort that one out.

If THAT was the case (and could be proven ), we would then be forced to agree that most of us were entirely wrong about morality, this entire time!

In theory: Rightness of a function can be determined scientifically, independantly of majority opinion.
I agree that in practice this is difficult, but that is another issue, entirely.

 

[the PC apeman]

In that case, your original Premise #1, about proficiency, seems to be a non-sequitor.

Or irrelevant, as it is in your original case.

Premises cannot be non-sequitors (does not follow) as they are not intended to follow from anything. They are starting points. My original premise #1 is as relevant as your original premise #1. They both introduce capability which you seem to be saying is a necessary ingredient for an ought.

From Bob's perspective, it WOULD be an ought. It would be something he thinks he should do.

From ours, we would disagree: Ontologically, we would think he ought not do that.

Could you define ontologically as you are using it here. I'm not sure your are using it in a standard way. That's okay with me. I'm just trying to understand.

Whose oughts are morally correct? That is a question science could answer, if we allow it to.

How? Please show your work so that we may understand your position. This is the sort of ought, the morally correct ought, that is in contention. (For the record though, a morally incorrect ought strikes me as self-contradictory. But I'm willing to go along with your usage in hopes of understanding your position.)

 

[the PC apeman]

No, it is possible (though unlikely) that majority opinion could be wrong about what is best for their own health and well-being.

I agree. Are you saying that "what is best for their own health and well-being" is identical to objective moral rightness? I wouldn't think so. But if not, then your rebuttal is a non-sequitor. It does not follow from what you are responding to.

In theory: Rightness of a function can be determined scientifically, independantly of majority opinion.
I agree that in practice this is difficult, but that is another issue, entirely.

But this is the rug under which you are sweeping the hard questions. We want to see how science determines objective rightness without relying on a foundation of subjective value. This is the criticism of Harris' work.

 

[Dani]

Wowbagger:

Either you're engaging in a sophisticated form of the use-mention error when you say that values reduce to facts about brain states, or you think that someone is disputing this. Any concept arises from facts about brain states. The fact that the concepts "good" or "ought" objectively exist is not only uncontroversial, but also trivial. For that matter, any concept is an "is", and in this sense, "God" and "The Invisible Pink Unicorn" exist, and "oughts" are reducible to "ises" in a similar way "God" arises in human brains and can be found in a dictionary. That doesn't tell us anything about whether the concepts that arise in our brains accurately describe reality.

When you treat brain states as "more fundamental", you're analyzing something completely different from whether there are moral claims that are objectively true or whether an ought can be derived from an is. As you might well know, the thoughts that arise in human brains are not reliable sources for determining scientific, mind-independent facts (hint: God).

However, since you think that the fact that oughts are indistinguishable from ises at the level of the brain is more than a vague hypothesis, I'd like to see the available data. Not even Sam Harris is claiming that the is/ought distinction disappears at the level of the brain. He said this:

[...]beliefs about facts and beliefs about values seem to arise from similar processes at the level of the brain: it appears that we have a common system for judging truth and falsity in both domains.[...]

And, to tell you the truth, I'm not the least surprised with the similarities observed by Harris. In fact, throughout history, many people have thought there are absolute moral truths, via religion. Why would this similarity surprise us now? It's not like we're comparing logic thinking with boxing.

Also, the fact that neuroscience is still in its infancy means that we expect to find more accurate ways of finding neural correlates. To conclude that ises are indistinguishable from oughts at the level of the brain at this stage is like concluding that all swans are white after seeing a bunch of white swans, when it's not even clear that they were white (see Harris' quote).

 

[Wowbagger]

But this is the rug under which you are sweeping the hard questions. We want to see how science determines objective rightness without relying on a foundation of subjective value. This is the criticism of Harris' work.

But, this is NOT what Sam Harris is claiming to do!

Sam Harris agrees that science cannot tell us we ought to value well-being or science. If we agree to value those things, all the rest of this stuff follows. The "rug" is of no concern, here.

The Attitude he takes, though strange, is one that is probably useful for making innovations in the science of morality. It might sound completely useless to those who are not inclined to make such things. Like I said, this is a very alien perspective to many people. That is why I am trying to see things from different Attitudes, myself.

I agree. Are you saying that "what is best for their own health and well-being" is identical to objective moral rightness? I wouldn't think so. But if not, then your rebuttal is a non-sequitor. It does not follow from what you are responding to.

Technically, they are not identical. But, I would argue that there is no other reasonable way to measure moral rightness.

Premises cannot be non-sequitors (does not follow) as they are not intended to follow from anything. They are starting points. My original premise #1 is as relevant as your original premise #1. They both introduce capability which you seem to be saying is a necessary ingredient for an ought.

I suppose you are correct in that capability is a factor.

Of course, someone could be really bad at killing people. If the inclination to do so is the same, they would still try to do so, even if success is going to be elusive.

Could you define ontologically as you are using it here. I'm not sure your are using it in a standard way. That's okay with me. I'm just trying to understand.

If we (temporarily) ignore everything I said in this thread, and go with our average-person instincts: We would say Bob ought not to do that. We could recognize all the premises, if we saw them, but still feel the conclusion would be wrong.

And, to reiterate the other side:
Bob, obviously, feels he ought to kill Jim, in spite of our opinions. Though, he may or may not be aware of all the premises behind that feeling.

How?

I think you could pretty much gather what I mean. There are objective ways one can measure the health and well-being of an individual, and of a society. Science can find ways to take us to higher peaks of well-being, and warn us of ways that would send us towards the valleys.

Your example offers no objectively sound reason why Bob killing Jim would help raise anyone's well being. Without further information, we would be inclined to think it would even detract from Bob's well being, in the long run.

Every "ought" has reasons behind it. No one would think "I believe kicking puppies is wrong. Therefore, I ought to kick some puppies." The brain does not work this way. If some cruel bastard was going to go on a puppy kicking spree, there would be some reason behind it. Either: "I believe kicking puppies is good for them..." or "I realize kicking puppies is bad, but I am motivated to be a bad person.", etc.

(For the record though, a morally incorrect ought strikes me as self-contradictory. But I'm willing to go along with your usage in hopes of understanding your position.)

I agree the words are ugly. But, they would be faster to type than "an idea about what a person thinks they should do, but that would change if only their views were more accurate".

 

[Wowbagger]

Either you're engaging in a sophisticated form of the use-mention error when you say that values reduce to facts about brain states, or you think that someone is disputing this.

From Attitude #1's perspective: People are acting like values are somehow belonging to a different realm of reality than facts.

Oh sure, they will say "Of course values reduce to facts about brain states! No one is refuting that!"

But, their actions betray this claim of non-refutation, everytime they then go on to say "one can not derive an ought from an is!" Right there, they are assigning oughts to some other realm that ises do not belong to!

THAT is all from the perspective of Attitude #1.

Perhaps your Attitude sees it differently. Like I keep saying: This is going to be very stange and alien to most of you.

However, since you think that the fact that oughts are indistinguishable from ises at the level of the brain is more than a vague hypothesis, I'd like to see the available data.

I accept that it is an early, and incomplete, (vague, if you like) hypothesis. But, I do not think the argument of Attitude #1 depends on it. Even if the brain treated oughts/values/ises/ and facts in very distinguished ways from each other: You still agree that they all reduce to brain states, anyway. And, brain states are facts.

 

[the PC apeman]

But, this is NOT what Sam Harris is claiming to do!

Sam Harris agrees that science cannot tell us we ought to value well-being or science. If we agree to value those things, all the rest of this stuff follows. The "rug" is of no concern, here.

The Attitude he takes, though strange, is one that is probably useful for making innovations in the science of morality. It might sound completely useless to those who are not inclined to make such things. Like I said, this is a very alien perspective to many people. That is why I am trying to see things from different Attitudes, myself.

Okay, I think I'm making progress here. Please bear with me. I'll refer to people who value well-being (yet to be defined) and science as Harris' Club. (Sam's Club was already taken.) We all here agree that science cannot tell us that anyone ought to be in that club ie. ought to have those values, yes? By "the rest" I take you to mean that given the way the world objectively works, science as a tool can evaluate possible actions in light of those two values (and no other values smuggled in). An act that maximize satisfying those values is objectively morally right ie. something we ought to do. Do I understand Harris correctly? I think this part is only minimally controversial.

Now let's consider that there are clubs other than Harris' Club, ie. there are people who value some other thing more than well-being (still undefined) but they do value science just as much as Harris' Club members, okay? Given the way the world objectively works such a Club X can also use science as a tool to evaluate possible actions in light of their two values. Is an act that maximizes the satisfation of those values objectively morally right also, ie. something they ought to do?

Technically, they are not identical. But, I would argue that there is no other reasonable way to measure moral rightness.

This implies that your answer to my previous question is no, Club X's science-validated actions are not necessarily objectively morally right. Do I read you correctly? If so, I'm going to need to see the argument you mention here.

Is it fair to summarize Harris' position as If we have the values we ought to have, then science can tell us what we ought to do?

And, to reiterate the other side:
Bob, obviously, feels he ought to kill Jim, in spite of our opinions. Though, he may or may not be aware of all the premises behind that feeling.

If there are more premises that are to be considered in order to reach a sound conclusion then please include them when you outline an argument. It really helps your readers.

I think you could pretty much gather what I mean. There are objective ways one can measure the health and well-being of an individual, and of a society.

There are objective ways? Plural? Do these multiple objective measures all act as the same value to be maximized? I don't think so. We could, in theory, have 7 billion different conceptions of well-being on this planet right now. Isn't this problematic for Harris? I hope he doesn't resolve it by an appeal to the majority as many do.

Your example offers no objectively sound reason why Bob killing Jim would help raise anyone's well being.

Neither does your charity example, explicitly. If an argument requires a premise please include it or it will not be considered. This sort of after-the-fact patching up of an argument isn't persuasive.