Machiavelli: Given your positions on this case, I really find this to be a fascinating statement by you.
Let's imagine that you are the judge. Knox is charged with calunnia. The cops say the didn't hit her and the 1:45 and 5:45 statements were voluntary even though they are demonstrably false. On the other hand, Knox has written and testified that they did hit her. Looking at this evidence, you conclude that maybe the cops did hit her (which, BTW, means that you also believe that maybe the cops are lying). There are two scenarios:
1. If you believe that prosecution bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of Knox's statements, it seems to me that there is no way you can convict her. Nobody could believe that the prosecution can show that a statement ellicited in the context of hitting is beyond a reasonable doubt voluntary. Therefore, under this scenarios, since you believe that she might have been hit, you must have reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statement.
2. If you believe that coercion is an affirmative defense that Knox bears the burden of proving by a predominance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, or whatever standard you might choose, then Knox has to demonstrate by sufficient proof (i) that she was hit, and (ii) that the hitting made her make a false statement. Maybe under this approach you can stretch a little and say that even though you think that Knox might have been hit, she has still not demonstrated by sufficient proof that she actually was hit, and even if she was, that the accusation was caused by the hitting.
...
PS: The alleged "repeated accusation of innocents for weeks" don't matter because the calunnia conviction isn't based on any such alleged subsequent "accusations," at least according to Massei. Maybe this is relevant to damages, but not criminal liability for calunnia.
I think have explained already why my view is polarly different.
The last statement in your post, is false. The main argument of the prosecution has always been that, it is all what cames after the 05:54 statement, that is the key matter to determine the point.
The hand written note, and her subsequent position on the whole issue, is what nails Amanda.
And maybe you don't understand the argument in Massei's report.
The series of subsequent behaviours (and anyway don't forget the false accusation includes the hand written note), which include her silence for weeks, are not crimes that determine the calunnia, but they are considered evidence that what she did previously was willfull. Thye are not a crime per se, by they are evidence of a crime. The subsequent silence is not an accusation, it is evidence of the malice of the previous accusation. The logical mechanism by which this argument work is codified in Italian jurisprudence.
The alternative that you propose, your two points, are wrong; they constitute no real logical alternative. The point 1. is just false: she can be convicted. This is shown by the fact that she was convicted beyod reasonable doubt. Even by a court who thought she could be innocent of murder. And by the way, she was hit allegedly by police during interrogation, but not hit during the spontaneous statement released at 05:54 to the magistrate. For sure she was not hit during the writing of the hand written note.
Nor the point 2. is valid. It is not that Knox has the bearing of proof that coercion did occur. The issue is different: it is not just this, not about if there was or not an objective coercion, the issue is, if there was or was not malice. Malice consists in a will to have that statement as her position. This will is shown by her refusal to change it. She could have said "they hit me, I got scared, thus I lied in panic", but she should have said as soon as possible, possibly immediately, but anyway as soon as possible during the investigation. Instead of that, she wrote the hand written note and then refused to answer further for weeks. This determines malice.
