On "100% innocence" and highly confident beliefs
I would agree that people who assert that Knox and Sollecito are "100% innocent" (who I would say are in the minority here)
I have a sense that I am among those being referred to here, so I'll make an attempt to inject some clarity into this discussion so we can avoid setting up strawmen. First of all, the expression "100% innocent" is confusing in this context, because it mixes up two distinct concepts: (1) a defendant's
degree of culpability (someone who was only peripherally involved or complicit in a crime would be "more innocent" than someone who was directly involved; someone who is "100% innocent" would be completely uninvolved and not culpable in any way) and (2) one's own
degree of belief or
confidence level in one's opinion about the defendant's culpability (for example, I might think a defendant is entirely "100%" innocent, in the sense of being totally uninvolved in the crime and not complicit or part of a conspiracy, but only believe
that conclusion with 90% confidence, say).
It seems to me that what LondonJohn (and others who have made similar statements) are mainly talking about is the second concept, confidence level. I think what is meant here is "I'm not 100% sure of their innocence, and only a few people here are".
The first thing to point out is that there is no such thing as
literal 100% certainty about anything -- so if that is what is meant, then of course this is a strawman. However, one could reasonably be
approximately 100% certain about some things -- for example, I'm approximately 100% certain that homeopathy does not work as claimed, and I suspect most readers here are similarly confident in this conclusion.
Now, on the Knox/Sollecito case, I have been explicit about what my confidence level is: it is about 999 on a scale of 0 to 1000, or, if you like 99.9%. So,
rounded to the nearest tenth of a percent, you could say I am "100% sure" that Knox and Sollecito are innocent (completely uninvolved). But I would like to stress that this is far from the most confident belief I have. For example, the belief I have about homeopathy I mentioned above is several orders of magnitude stronger -- there would be several more nines after the decimal point.
So it's important to understand that I'm not claiming omniscience. I'm putting my degree of belief on a scale, for comparison purposes, and I'm saying that my belief in Knox and Sollecito's innocence is pretty far to one end of that scale. Needless to say, not all my beliefs about all subjects are this confident. There are many things that I am far less sure about (and, as mentioned above, some things that I am even more sure about). If you took 1000 of my beliefs that were equally strong as my belief about this case, I would expect to be wrong about approximately one of them. The main point I am trying to illustrate by stating my confidence level is that I think believing that Knox and Sollecito are guilty is a pretty severe error. Although I would readily concede that being a guilter is not as big of a mistake as being a homeopath or creationist, my disagreement with such people is nevertheless not small, but rather quite large.
Unfortunately, one thing I have learned over time is that most people -- even on a forum such as this -- are not particularly intellectually curious about this kind of thing. That is, they don't react to an expression of high confidence by being
intrigued, as I would. Instead, they react with something like
offense. They don't say "Hmm, I wonder what makes this guy so confident -- let me try to get him to tell me what information he thinks he has that I don't, or what mistake he thinks I'm making". Rather, they say something more like "Who does this guy think he is, making such a claim? I'd better show him that he's not the authority he thinks he is" -- as if, you'll note, a highly confident belief were in itself some kind of aggressive status signal, a claim to be some kind of high-ranking figure in the tribe. As strange as it is to me, few people seem to actually understand that your
degree of belief is not regulated by your status in the tribe, it's regulated by the amount of information you think you have.
This, by the way, explains some of the bizarre behavior that we witness here, such as people apparently clinging to the idea that there must be secret information that the court had that the rest of us don't, which would prevent us from being able to confidently claim they were wrong. They don't really believe such an obviously absurd proposition, even though they may think they do. Rather, what's actually going on is that they're trying to enforce what they perceive as the tribal hierarchy -- specifically the "fact" that the judges in Perugia
outrank the mere internet commenters here. Massei and Cristiani were the judges in the case, you see, so they're the ones who are
entitled to decide whether Knox and Sollecito are guilty. We here do not have that
authority -- because in the minds of these people, the distinction between the question of what is
actually true and the question of what
the court decided is true doesn't really exist. It's just too abstract for them to grasp. Their minds process status transactions, not Bayesian probability flows. (And I'd better watch out now, because by criticizing them in this way, I've implicitly claimed higher status than them, so you know how they'll react...)
But even setting aside the guilt-believers (or really, guilt-asserters, since as noted they don't really think in terms of
belief), I think something similar is going on with people "on my side" not wanting to confidently assert innocence -- such as when people say things like "only the people who were there actually know the truth". Because that's ridiculous -- it would be like saying that only animals alive during the Mesozoic era could know that dinosaurs existed. There are all kinds of ways to know what happened somewhere at some time without actually being present. This is what we call "evidence". And sometimes (as in the case of dinosaurs) the evidence is so strong that there's nothing wrong with saying we know what happened, even if we weren't there.
LondonJohn can correct me if I'm wrong, but I find it hard to believe his analysis of the Kercher case is really all that different from mine. I find it hard to imagine that (as his wording implies) he sees significant room for the possibility that Knox and Sollecito are guilty where I don't. How would that work? What would be the most plausible scenario? How would one get around the stomach evidence, for example? I think that if you start to actually think about what the most plausible guilt scenarios are, you'll realize that, though they may not be literally impossible, they're around as statistically improbable as my stated confidence level indicates they should be.