Are You Conscious?

Are you concious?

  • Of course, what a stupid question

    Votes: 89 61.8%
  • Maybe

    Votes: 40 27.8%
  • No

    Votes: 15 10.4%

  • Total voters
    144
The difference between our views is shown in your second sentence here. While you seem to say that there are other differences than the number of observers I'm saying that the number of observers is the difference between public and private behaviour. Then you almost hit the nail in the head when you say: "Attaching the word "private" to it would normally just mean exactly the same sort of observation but restricted to only one or a few individuals..." I say 'almost' because I'm using private behaviour the same way as behaviorists. Private is observed by one individual, not one or few individuals. In general I think you've interpreted my position pretty accurately.

Wether my consciousness can not be observed by others in principle or if the observations are limited by lack of technology does not matter. It only matters wether it can be currently observed by one or more individuals. If only one: it's private. If by more than one: it's public. I think we can agree on this.

But here's where I predict we will disagree:
The way I see it is that not even I can observe my own consciousness. Atleast I don't think I have done that yet. Ofcourse I have observed my own private behaviour and the world around me and then inferred that I'm conscious because I have learned from other people how to use that word. But I haven't observed anything that is just my consciousness, there has always been some other observations that has lead me to conclude that I'm conscious.

But isn't it the case that as long as you've been aware of anything at all - that is that you have observed anything at all - that you were observing your consciousness? Consciousness is not a thing you observe. It is the fact that you observe anything at all.


I disagree. I'm using the word 'observe' to mean exactly one thing. Only difference being the number of observers.

I don't really understand. I'm currently observing a computer screen. There's nobody else here. If somebody else was here then they could observe it too. I am also currently observing my consciousness and at the moment it contains, among other things, a computer screen. If somone else was here then they could observe the computer screen, but not my consciousness. At this point we need two definitions of "observe", don't we?

But just to be clear: I don't view consciousness as a thing, physical or non-physical. But if it does exist as a thing then my view is that the only difference between observing the consciousness and other things is the number of observers. I'm interested to hear what other differences you see, though.

I can't accept the context of the question, because I'm still unsure of exactly what the word "observe" means to you.

We have no option but to learn the word from other people from their public behaviour and they can only confirm our understanding through our own public behaviour. That creates some uncertainty and fuzzines.

Imagine we build a computer which can pretty accurately replicate all the cognitive functions of a human brain - that is it can carry out all of the "computations" and does it in roughly the same way. The computer is not conscious. It has no internal awareness of anything. But it is perfectly capable of learning language and ends up with a complex set of concepts based on an internal model it has built of physical reality. So it knows what atoms and stars and humans are, and it can understand verbs concerning behaviour.

Can this machine, which is capable of learning from the behaviour of humans it picks up with its various sensors (but does not "observe" them, because "there's nobody home"), learn the meaning of the word "consciousness"?


The only way I can think of to define 'being conscious' objectively, is through public behaviour. But if I remember correctly what you've posted in other threads is that you disagree with that way of defining it. You are talking about the private side of things. Right?

I'm not sure I've ever offered an opinion on the definition of "being conscious". Trying to defining the verb "be" is even more treacherous than "consciousness." For some people they end up having the same meaning.

What is the Being of being?
 
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And as I ask each time you make this claim - what precisely is the problem?

Again, I am not stating that there is no problem - I am again pointing out that you claim there is a problem without actually stating what the problem is.

You seem to be saying that consciousness is a dreadful problem for Materialism but we will just have to take your word for it.

So you have no recollection whatsoever of any explanation I've ever given as to what the problem is? Funny, that. I seem to remember making several hundred quite detailed posts explaining it.
 
Cannot be directly observed by anyone else. We cannot observe the conditions a few moments after the beginning of the Universe, we cannot observe the conditions in the middle of a star. Yet we still consider these things physical and we study them.

Why should the practical problems of observation pose a problem for Materialism?

They aren't practical problems. They are conceptual problems.

The problem for materialism, in one sentence, is that consciousness shouldn't exist, but clearly does.
 
What are the alternatives? What questions do they answer? What problems do they solve?

Why precisely is consciousness a problem for Materialism?

I will not know whether I like the look of them or not unless you are prepared to specify what these alternatives are and what problem they allegedly solve.

It is not so much as "solving" the problem as not setting it up in the first place. The problem is that if materialism is true, consciousness shouldn't exist. The solution is to not assume that materialism is true. Why should anyone have to defend a specific alternative in order for a criticism of materialism to be valid? If something is wrong then it's wrong. What else might or might not be right is actually another question, and leads to a completely new branch of the debate e.g. "what are the merits/problems of neutral monism?" or "are all metaphysical statements literally nonsensical?" or "what is truth, anyway?" It's not that I'm not interesting in discussion these issues, but that I don't think that possible problems with the alternatives are irrelevant to the problems with materialism. You can't defend materialism as some sort of "default" position which we return to if there is a problem with everything else. Not if the problem with materialism is equally as serious.
 
Okay, so you're saying that private behaviour is private behaviour only so long as we don't understand it?

We've used an FMRI to read images straight out of the subject's visual cortex - as in, we could display on a computer screen an image of what the subject was looking at. That seems to demonstrate a hell of a lot more than "meaningless, undecodable, indecipherable activity".
You may have a cite for that. I know that computer code can be trained by observing fMRI imaging to the point that storage of color, orientation and the like can be inferred from current fMRI data. And what was private has become public in a very limited sense. We are discussing human consciousness,

At a risk of repeating myself, I just introduced faulty hardware, epoxied the computer shut and forgot the root password. Now it is, by your definition, exactly like a human.
Burn your own strawman on that one. I stipulate "in principle", and with all working as intended, do-able.

And yet again, we know for certain that computers have private behaviour because we put it there. We may have better tools with which to study this private behaviour than an FMRI gives us for humans, but is that really a point on which you want to hang your entire theory of mind?
Sure, other than i/o operations what a computer is doing is "private", yet is subject to inspection and duplication in ways that humans will never be.
 
Excuse me, but what? "stopped and restarted with no loss of output", are you sure? I don't think that is what you meant to say.

Try crashing your machine after working on a project without saving. Temp files that are not IE cache files should be gone when you shut down, that is data loss as well.

Private behavior and private awareness are two sperate issues, you can deconstruct a human as easily as a computer.
Try all registers, memory, etc captured, loaded on a duplicate machine, and restarted. Better?


Private Behavior: re consciousness, that which can only be inspected subjectively.
 
Try all registers, memory, etc captured, loaded on a duplicate machine, and restarted. Better?
that isa different statement than what you said, now isn't it. There will still be ongoing cpomutation and temp files, which was my point.
Private Behavior: re consciousness, that which can only be inspected subjectively.

Then you should call it something else.
 
that isa different statement than what you said, now isn't it.
No.

There will still be ongoing cpomutation and temp files, which was my point.
Never so intended.


Then you should call it something else.
What do you suggest?

What is your favorite definition of private behavior as it applies to consciousness?

What is your favorite definition of private behavior per se?
 
It's interesting to consider whether the experience of other people is like mine, or is entirely qualitatively different. However, even if the only instance of personal experience in the entire universe was mine, it would still require explaining.

At the end of the day, we all have a human body, and we know that being conscious is something the body does, via the organ of the brain.

Human bodies are pretty much the same. Some are radically different (e.g., 3 legs and other such mutations) but that need not concern us here.

Since we all share a common mechanism, and this mechanism does consciousness (just as it does sweating, blinking, digestion, etc etc etc) there is no reason to doubt that the fundamentals of our conscious experience are the same.

In fact, we know that doing consciousness requires quite a bit of resources, not only to build the apparatus but also to perform the act, so we know it must be extremely important to the survival of creatures that have it.

(My favorite theory is that it is required for making many kinds of complex decisions.)

So it would be odd indeed if consciousness were something whimsical, which was significantly different from individual to individual.
 
Likely different since people's brain and senses are different.

Unlikely, in fact, since these differences -- barring major malfunctions like schizophrenia -- tend to be relatively superficial, or to differ in statistically regular ways (e.g., women can see more colors than men can).

The idea that the fundamentals of conscious experience are highly variable among individuals doesn't hold much water.

And if that were the case, it's difficult to imagine how we could be so successful as a social species whose social bonds are so heavily dependent on complex communication.

Plus, I'm not aware of any experimental evidence that reveals any such differences.
 
You may have a cite for that.
Yep.

I know that computer code can be trained by observing fMRI imaging to the point that storage of color, orientation and the like can be inferred from current fMRI data. And what was private has become public in a very limited sense. We are discussing human consciousness.
And exactly the same thing applies. Human consciousness is more complicated and less direct than the primary visual cortex, but it's neurons all the way down and it can be studied using exactly the same analytical process.

Where is the point that you are suggesting that magic happens and science stops?


Burn your own strawman on that one. I stipulate "in principle", and with all working as intended, do-able.
So what? In principle we can examine the workings of the human brain in exactly the same way. Your objections consist solely of insisting on in principle for computers while insisting on in practice for humans. This is simply equivocation.

Sure, other than i/o operations what a computer is doing is "private", yet is subject to inspection and duplication in ways that humans will never be.
Begging the question.

We can, of course, apply exactly the same techniques to study humans. Just wire up an electrode to each and every neuron and axon and monitor all that activity.
 
Since we all share a common mechanism, and this mechanism does consciousness (just as it does sweating, blinking, digestion, etc etc etc) there is no reason to doubt that the fundamentals of our conscious experience are the same.
Well, there's the entire field of abnormal psychology which tells us there is very good reason to doubt that.

(My favorite theory is that it is required for making many kinds of complex decisions.)
Complex adaptive behaviour, yeah. The two go together like... two things that go together.

And complex adaptive behaviour has obvious evolutionary advantages.

So it would be odd indeed if consciousness were something whimsical, which was significantly different from individual to individual.
It is indeed odd, but it does happen.
 
So you have no recollection whatsoever of any explanation I've ever given as to what the problem is? Funny, that. I seem to remember making several hundred quite detailed posts explaining it.
I can recollect that many times you have claimed that you have already explained what the problem is.

But over the many years I have been asking you I cannot recall that you have actually answered the question.

Still - since you claim to have said this many hundreds of times over then it should not be difficult for you to state it again here.
 
They aren't practical problems. They are conceptual problems.

The problem for materialism, in one sentence, is that consciousness shouldn't exist, but clearly does.
Umm...

And why shouldn't consiousness exist if Materialism is true????
 
Well, there's the entire field of abnormal psychology which tells us there is very good reason to doubt that.

No, it doesn't. Because that's why they call it abnormal psychology.

If it weren't abnormal to differ in those ways, it would simply be called psychology.

As I mentioned above, the fact that some folks are born with 3 legs doesn't mean that the normal human body doesn't have 2 legs.
 
It is not so much as "solving" the problem as not setting it up in the first place. The problem is that if materialism is true, consciousness shouldn't exist.
And the reasoning behind this assertion is....????
The solution is to not assume that materialism is true.
Immaterialist cliche #1

Nobody has for a moment suggested that we should assume that materialism is true.
Why should anyone have to defend a specific alternative in order for a criticism of materialism to be valid?
You brought up the subject of alternatives in the first place not me.
If something is wrong then it's wrong.
But you still have to demonstrate that it is wrong.
It's not that I'm not interesting in discussion these issues, but that I don't think that possible problems with the alternatives are irrelevant to the problems with materialism.
So why did you bring the subject up in the first place?
You can't defend materialism as some sort of "default" position which we return to if there is a problem with everything else.
I didn't. You brought up the subject of alternatives, not me.

If you are going to accuse us of ignoring alternatives then you should expect to be asked to back up that claim.
Not if the problem with materialism is equally as serious.
So this great argument you have against Materialism is:
1. If Materialism were true consciousness does not exist
2. Consciousness exists.
________________________
C: Materialism is false

Yes? That is it?

If so then I will bookmark this for future reference, so that I do not need to ask you again.

So again - what is the specific contradiction between being conscious and Materialism?

By "consciousness exists" are you claiming that consciousness is some sort of substance?
 
I'll repeat a question...

Imagine we build a computer which can pretty accurately replicate all the cognitive functions of a human brain - that is it can carry out all of the computations and does it in roughly the same way. The computer is not conscious. It has no internal awareness of anything. But it is perfectly capable of learning language and ends up with a complex set of concepts based on an internal model it has built of physical reality. So it knows what atoms and stars and humans are, and it can understand verbs concerning behaviour.

Can this machine, which is capable of learning from the behaviour of humans it picks up with its various sensors (but does not "observe" them, because "there's nobody home"), learn the meaning of the word "consciousness"?
 
<adam savage>Well, there's your problem.</adam savage>

There's no such thing.
If you had no sense of taste, could you know what a peach tasted like simply by inspecting a scan of someone's brain?
 
I'll repeat a question...

Imagine we build a computer which can pretty accurately replicate all the cognitive functions of a human brain - that is it can carry out all of the computations and does it in roughly the same way. The computer is not conscious. It has no internal awareness of anything. But it is perfectly capable of learning language and ends up with a complex set of concepts based on an internal model it has built of physical reality. So it knows what atoms and stars and humans are, and it can understand verbs concerning behaviour.

Can this machine, which is capable of learning from the behaviour of humans it picks up with its various sensors (but does not "observe" them, because "there's nobody home"), learn the meaning of the word "consciousness"?
Can we?

What is the meaning of the word consciousness?

The question is, could this computer devise an experiment which tested the efficacy of various methods of alleviating depression in humans?

I would say it could.
 
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