Are You Conscious?

[AlBell]

Nope. Of course the only way I know I'm not a chat bot depends on private behavior that I can't share with you.

So what you're saying is that your private behaviour is different from the private behaviour of a chat bot?

On what facts do you base your assertion that a chat bot has private behavior?

Different how, exactly?

Unknown, at least until a chat bot's private behavior is established as existing.

So far as you'll ever know, I may be a chat bot.

Well, if you tell me what the functional difference is between you and a chat bot, then I'll be able to tell the difference between you and a chat bot.

Why would a chat bot's private behavior, if such exists, be considered functional?

Enter Wittgenstein.

Thanks, I'll pass.

Good choice, but irrelevant in any case regarding that which cannot be discussed.

 

[Mercutio]

On what facts do you base your assertion that a chat bot has private behavior?

Pretty much the same evidence as your own, for anyone but you.

Unknown, at least until a chat bot's private behavior is established as existing.

As unknown as the differences among people, perhaps. There are very good odds, for instance, that my perception of color is different from yours, although "seeing red" is private. (Reporting seeing red, is, of course, public.)

Why would a chat bot's private behavior, if such exists, be considered functional?

Again, for the same reason yours is. Why would it not be?

 

[PixyMisa]

What Mercutio said.

 

[AlBell]

On what facts do you base your assertion that a chat bot has private behavior?

Pretty much the same evidence as your own, for anyone but you.

I have no evidence chat bots, or toasters, or computers, have private behavior.

Unknown, at least until a chat bot's private behavior is established as existing.

As unknown as the differences among people, perhaps. There are very good odds, for instance, that my perception of color is different from yours, although "seeing red" is private. (Reporting seeing red, is, of course, public.)

My perception of my private behavior is of a different quality than my perception of red.

Why would a chat bot's private behavior, if such exists, be considered functional?

Again, for the same reason yours is. Why would it not be?

I'd say functional implies public behavior.

 

[Piggy]

If you think this thread is bad, take a look at Deeper than primes. Or better yet, don't.

I tried taking a look at that thread, but it was like watching op art. I get the vertigo.

 

[Mercutio]

I have no evidence chat bots, or toasters, or computers, have private behavior.

Thus the word "private". Same for other people. Thus P-Zombies.

My perception of my private behavior is of a different quality than my perception of red.

Perceiving red is an example of private behavior, not the definition of private behavior. Please. My public behavior is of a different quality than my running.

I'd say functional implies public behavior.

Interesting. Would you call your private behavior irrelevant?

 

[Piggy]

What makes you ask that question?

Just wondering if the post I was responding to was relevant.

 

[Piggy]

If I may, radical behaviorists term thinking as a "private event" in that it cannot be reliably observed by others.

That's changing, tho.

 

[Piggy]

The point is, if we define conscious as "self-aware", then "yes". All too often "consciousness" is used to mean something with much more... mystical attributes; and the fact that sometimes my consciousness feels "fuzzy", even when I'm completely sober, tells me that the answer is not always so clear-cut.

Yeah, agreed. My only difference with you appears to be strategic. I can still answer "Are you conscious?" with "Yes" (because it's true) despite any ancillary woo-woo notions about consciousness the questioner may hold.

No. Why don't you answer my question ?

Because it appears to be irrelevant.

 

[Mercutio]

I tried taking a look at that thread, but it was like watching op art. I get the vertigo.

How many remember this thread? At one point it was the longest-running thread in the forum. Just the first few posts give a bit of a warning--after that, just randomly click on pages. Wonderful stuff.

 

[Doctor Evil]

Jet lagged and tired means no, at least for now.

 

[Mercutio]

That's changing, tho.

Well, sorta. The new neurological tools we have are simply ways of making something that was private, now public. They do not change their fundamental nature, as "public vs. private" is defined purely by the number of observers. (Indeed, the new tools allow us to make public some events that were formerly hidden not only to other observers, but to the actor as well!)

You are quite right that the things or events we call public or private are changing. Corey, however, is right about the definition. If only one observer can observe, it is private. If more than one, public. (I know you already know this; this is for other readers.) Fortunately, there is no problem with this. If it were a "subjective/objective" difference rather than a "private/public", the definitions are enough different that it becomes worrisome (less so for "subjective/intersubjective", but nobody really uses that.)

 

[AlBell]

Thus the word "private". Same for other people. Thus P-Zombies.

P-zombies are a red herring. I do infer other humans have private behaviors as I do, but it is only an inference. I infer no similar 'behaviors' for non-living systems.

Perceiving red is an example of private behavior, not the definition of private behavior. Please. My public behavior is of a different quality than my running.

Yes.

Interesting. Would you call your private behavior irrelevant?

To all of reality except my 'awareness of awareness', yes.

 

[Mercutio]

P-zombies are a red herring. I do infer other humans have private behaviors as I do, but it is only an inference. I infer no similar 'behaviors' for non-living systems.

Thank you for admitting this. For the record, psychophysical tests have revealed that I very probably have different private behavior from you (I'm abnormal), when it comes to perceiving color. Just thought I'd let you know, since the odds are you would not know it from our public behavior, save for those very specific tests. Your inference may inform your beliefs, but it need not be based in reality.

Yes.

So, then, what was your previous problem?

To all of reality except my 'awareness of awareness', yes.

Which you cannot describe, nor tell if it is the same as the phenomenon Piggy labels with the same phrase. Could you explain how this one is relevant?

 

[PixyMisa]

I have no evidence chat bots, or toasters, or computers, have private behavior.

Then you can't have looked. Take SHRDLU for example. How do you propose that to work without private behaviour?

Indeed, we know without question that computers have private behaviour, because we code that private behaviour and can see it running, as well as observing the public results. It's like having a perfect FMRI scanner, an unlimited supply of electrodes, and no ethics committee.

I'd say functional implies public behavior.

Does private behaviour have no function then?

 

[PixyMisa]

P-zombies are a red herring.

Yes they are. They are conceptually incoherent.

I do infer other humans have private behaviors as I do, but it is only an inference. I infer no similar 'behaviors' for non-living systems.

You know you have private behaviours.

You can observe other people exhibiting the same types of public behaviour as you, and you reasonably infer that it is accompanied by the same types of private behaviour. Indeed, it must be so, at least broadly, because many of those public behaviours require complex cognitive processing to be going on behind the scenes. The public behaviour proves the existence of the private behaviour.

My point is that you can't do this for people and then decide it doesn't apply to computers. People aren't magic. They're physical systems just as computers are. So computers have private behaviours too. (And as I noted above, we know that computers have private behaviours, because we put them there.)

 

[.13.]

I'm not a chatbot

I know I'm not a chatbot. Not because of my private behaviour but because of public behaviours of other people (they treat me as if I'm one of them), from my own public behaviours and from a chatbots public behaviours (there are things I do that I've never observed a chatbot doing). From the differences between my public behaviours and those of a chatbots I can confidently say that our private behaviours differ.

Just so that there won't be any misunderstandings:
I'm treating the chatbot as a blackbox and ignoring the computer behind the curtain. It's actually the computer running a chatbot software that has public and private behaviours not the software itself. For simplicitys sake I have no quarrels with treating the software as if it was the one behaving.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I have no idea what you lot are talking about. What on Earth do you think the term "private behaviour" is supposed to mean? There's no such thing. All there is is behaviour.

It's a lame attempt at a parlour trick. All you are doing is attaching the word "behaviour" to the word "private" in an attempt to make it appear somehow that consciousness and subjectivity is just another form of the behaviour of material objects. You are trying to use nonsensical terminology to mask a genuine problem to which you have no solution but don't want to admit you have no solution.

This problem is not going away, is it? Week after week, year after year, one subject dominates this part of the forum. You'd think the materialists would eventually realise that the problem is not going to go away, but no...

 

[westprog]

Pretty much the same evidence as your own, for anyone but you.
As unknown as the differences among people, perhaps. There are very good odds, for instance, that my perception of color is different from yours, although "seeing red" is private. (Reporting seeing red, is, of course, public.)
Again, for the same reason yours is. Why would it not be?

The only reasons to assume that another person might have personal experience are that they look like I do, and I have it - and they claim to have it. Neither of these apply to chat-bots, computers or microwaves, so there is no reason to assume that personal experience applies to these in any way whatsoever, except for philosophical reassurance.

 

[westprog]

Thank you for admitting this. For the record, psychophysical tests have revealed that I very probably have different private behavior from you (I'm abnormal), when it comes to perceiving color. Just thought I'd let you know, since the odds are you would not know it from our public behavior, save for those very specific tests. Your inference may inform your beliefs, but it need not be based in reality.
So, then, what was your previous problem?

Which you cannot describe, nor tell if it is the same as the phenomenon Piggy labels with the same phrase. Could you explain how this one is relevant?

It's interesting to consider whether the experience of other people is like mine, or is entirely qualitatively different. However, even if the only instance of personal experience in the entire universe was mine, it would still require explaining.