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The fine tuning argument

Basic chemistry. Life needs structures of a certian size to be able to exist in a fairly stable form. Most sets of fundimental constants won't allow for this.

The anthropic principle asserts, IIHUIC, that the universe is finely balanced so that a very little chemistry can happen. In different concentrations of matter, chemistry mostly doesn't occur.
 
You were asking why I included premisses that stipulate that there is only one agent and that the agent can produce only one universe.

I said that the probabilities would be different unless both these stipulations were met. You asked me how these stipulations affected the probability and I gave the analogy of the dice game
Ah...thank you. Now I see why you have included them.
Same thing goes for the universe - if the chances of a life producing universe were a gazillion to one for a particular cause producing one particular universe, the odds would be different if there were a gazillion causes all producing universes, or one cause producing gazillions of universes.
Okay, this is what I call the multiverse approach. You are correct, most people arguing the fine-tuning approach as evidence for a designer are assuming one creator and one universe. I don't find it necessary to limit it to one, some limitations on the of creators/created universes is assumed for that hypothesis.
Currently none of them are viable as hypotheses since there is no way of falsifying or testing any of them.
Okay, call them potential hypotheses then.
Whether the intelligent designer conjecture might at some future time become viable as a hypothesis will depend upon whether there can be empirical verification of an intelligent designer. This would only be possible, I suggest, if the intelligent designer in question were able and willing to participate in the experiments.
I think the intelligent designer hypothesis could be, well falsified probably isn't quite the right word. If physicists can develop good simulations or models that lead to universes like ours without the current need for 'fine-tuning', the intelligent designer hypothesis becomes superflous - like it has for the creation of all the different species of plants and animals on earth.
So we can only judge the plausibility of each conjecture at the moment. But I would point out that a mechanism that can produce the same effect twice is not significantly more complex than a mechanism that can produce that effect once.

A mechanism that can produce the same effect trillions of time is not significantly more complex than a mechanism that can produce that effect once.

On the other hand a mind that can design and operate that mechanism is significantly more complex than the mechanism itself.

So if the choices were really between a cause that produces many universes and a cause that is capable of intentionally designing and executing a universe, then the former would seem to be less extravagant.
Except, of course, for the problem of resources. Where does all the matter and energy for all those universes come from? Our universe seems a pretty extravagent thing all by itself in that regard. While the complexity of an intelligent creator is high, the resources required are much lower than that required for trillions of universes.
In other words it leaves open the possibility that the reason for the universe might be something non-temporal.

It does not in any way lock out the possibility of a intelligent designer.

Interesting. I've sometimes wondered if it would be possible for creatures like us, perhaps even our descendants, who live within our universe to attain the knowledge, understanding and technology to be capable of creating it. Not terribly plausible, but an interesting paradox IMO.
 
By definition it is capable of producing at least one universe. But if it is not limited to 1 or at least a small number then there is no fine tuning argument. I am not saying the premise is correct, but it is necessary for the FTA.


Not at all. The capacity to produce many universes merely puts an upper limit on the number actually produced.
 
It's not a non issue. "Why is the universe like it is?" is a valid question. "just because" which is what the "due to chance" argument boils down to is not a very useful answer. One attack line is to introduce the concept of more universes (sure it was very unlikely but with so many universes it was bound to happen sooner or later). Another attack line is to introduce a designer. Another is to argue that there is some law which forces physical constants to be the way they are (which then follows on by trying to work out why that should be the case).

If it's a non-question, then the multi-universe explanation is as unnecessary as the God made it up explanation.
 
The conditional(we exist) probability of us observing a universe which allows us to exist, is 1.

/argument over?

The probability of any event is either 0 or 1. It happens or it doesn't. That doesn't mean that probability is an entirely vacuous concept. We regularly estimate probabilities of events that have already happened. We know that since it happened, the probability must have been 1. That does not mean /argument over.
 
Before we had Newton's gravity and Galileo's and Copernicus' heliocentrism, there were elaborate and detailed explanations for the movement of the lights in the night sky.

And there were probably people who said "That's just the way they move, there's no need to look for an explanation."
 
Wait what?

The parameters within our own models must be fine-tuned by us to fit reality, so that they are accurate descriptions of what we observe.


But most physical models do not need to be fine tuned. If we wish to examine the path of a thrown brick, we get proportionately more accurate depending on what values we put in for gravity, initial force, weight and shape of brick, effects of air and so on. The cosmological models don't work like this. They need to have very precise values input in order to predict a universe anything like the one we have.
 
:/
Y'know, I'm pretty sure you're right. But the fact is that neither of us can prove either side of the argument. We can't know what the other universes would be like, or whether they would support life, or if that life would even be recognized as "life" in our universe.
But it's cool to think about!

Why can't we know what the other universes would be like? We know how gravity works. What is difficult about putting a different value for g into the equations?
 
Um really?

The chance that a single outcome of the set occurs is exactly teh same in both cases.

(1/2)55
Just because you have that one run of 55 that comes up all heads does not mean that the coin is biased. While it seems likely, you have to do what?

You have to have another trial. If over numerous trials you ascertain that the coin always lands H up then you have a probability argument. You can not determine a frequency distribution of single trial.

So you toss a coin 55 times and say that randomly (unbiased coin) you get all HHHHHH, what is the probability for the unbiased coin that the 56th toss will be an H?

Is it (1/2)56 or is it 1/2?

The way you establish whether a coin is unbiased is by tossing it. If you toss a coin and get nothing but heads, then you can, after a while, start to assign a probability that the coin is biased.
 
Someone,accidentally dropped an apple behind a shelving unit in my house.

Let's say he put it down, was distracted by a note on the counter just at the moment the cat ran through. The cat werved around a chair that was pulled out and bumped the shelf just enough to make the fruit fall. Then my housemate's phone rang and he had to leave the room and forgot about the apple.

If any of those things had been different. If he had placed the fruit an inch differently, if the chair hadn't made the cat swerve, if the phone had rung two seconds early or later, the fruit couldn't have ended up there. If he had been a little bit hungrier and the apple more important to him, he would have looked for it after the phone call etc etc.

Things like this happen every day.

That fruit begins to sprout life, and from the perspective of this mold, it is the only mold in the universe, it only was able to grow because the apple was lodged in this forgotten spot which was due to all those actions listed above. Surely all those actions were fine tuned on purpose by a being that loved mold and wanted it to thrive, after all, if any of those parameters had been a little bit off, the apple behind the shelves, and the mold, couldn't be there at all.
 
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No it is not semantic, you made a claim you can't support.

David, forgive me, but you must be somewhat, dillusioned and misplaced.

Did i note recite a reference? A rhetorical question of course, but one inexorably due, since what is generally-considered to provide a proof, is by such an action. So you are making yourself look more and more foolish when you confabulate the extremities of your assertions impying that i have not given any proof, or cannot back it up.
 
Someone,accidentally dropped an apple behind a shelving unit in my house.

Let's say he put it down, was distracted by a note on the counter just at the moment the cat ran through. The cat werved around a chair that was pulled out and bumped the shelf just enough to make the fruit fall. Then my housemate's phone rang and he had to leave the room and forgot about the apple.

If any of those things had been different. If he had placed the fruit an inch differently, if the chair hadn't made the cat swerve, if the phone had rung two seconds early or later, the fruit couldn't have ended up there. If he had been a little bit hungrier and the apple more important to him, he would have looked for it after the phone call etc etc.

Things like this happen every day.

That fruit begins to sprout life, and from the perspective of this mold, it is the only mold in the universe, it only was able to grow because the apple was lodged in this forgotten spot which was due to all those actions listed above. Surely all those actions were fine tuned on purpose by a being that loved mold and wanted it to thrive, after all, if any of those parameters had been a little bit off, the apple behind the shelves, and the mold, couldn't be there at all.

If this is a model, then it assumes the cat and the shelf and the phone. We only have the apple.

It is precisely to deduce whether the cat and the shelf and the phone exist that we consider these issues. Clearly we can't deduce them from the mould. We can guess though.
 
Here's a better one. The numbers in a lottery come out in this order:

314159265358979323846264338

A fair lottery, or was it rigged? Hmmmmmmmm...

I think that gets right to the heart of the matter. A run of all heads or all tails looks significant to anyone, and immediately one starts thinking, "what are the odds of such a rare thing?" even if the odds, strictly speaking, are the same for every possible string of numbers or heads/tails.

However, in the example above, if you know that pi has great significance in mathematics, a typical reaction would be the same as seeing a coin getting all heads. But if you don't know pi, you'd think, eh, looks like a string of random numbers to me.

The response depends on our subjective reaction to the significance of the results, and not on the actual probability of predicting the results, which is still one out of however many total possibilities.

Our universe is significant to us, because we're here to observe it. Doesn't change the actual probability of it, though.
 
The way you establish whether a coin is unbiased is by tossing it. If you toss a coin and get nothing but heads, then you can, after a while, start to assign a probability that the coin is biased.

But not from a single run. Yes if you have two sets of 55 tosses that are all HHHHH that is more likely an unbiased coins, and so one. But a single run is not indicative, it is suspicious.
 
But not from a single run. Yes if you have two sets of 55 tosses that are all HHHHH that is more likely an unbiased coins, and so one. But a single run is not indicative, it is suspicious.

There is no difference between a single run of 110 and two runs of 55, or 110 runs of 1. It's merely a matter of how we consider them.

What we are interested in the case of the universe is to decide whether the coin is unbiased, in effect.
 
David, forgive me, but you must be somewhat, dillusioned and misplaced.

Did i note recite a reference? A rhetorical question of course, but one inexorably due, since what is generally-considered to provide a proof, is by such an action. So you are making yourself look more and more foolish when you confabulate the extremities of your assertions impying that i have not given any proof, or cannot back it up.

No your source can not state that the initial wave function of the universe was anything. That is my point, you can ignore it, that is your choice.

Your source can speculate as to the initial wave function, but please that is on them.

If you meant that I delusional, that is an insult.

You are avoidning the issue, and I can spell it out for you.

No one knows or can model teh intial state of the universe with and effective model at this time. therefore all statements about the initial conditions of the universe are speculative. Until GUT unifies QM and relativity or another thoery comes up, there is no way to state with knowledge verified through testing and observation, what the initial state os the universe is.

Your source and you are speculating and you have contradicted yourself as well.

You rudeness will not cover your speculation.
 
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If this is a model, then it assumes the cat and the shelf and the phone. We only have the apple.

It is precisely to deduce whether the cat and the shelf and the phone exist that we consider these issues. Clearly we can't deduce them from the mould. We can guess though.

You miss the point, the cat, the shelf and the phone are analagous to those constants that must be "fine tuned".

The model is meant to show that "perfect conditions" in no way imply intelligence.
 
Actually I don't think Malerin is actually pushing the God hypothesis in this case - in fact from his point of view the Big Bang never actually happened.

Like hell he isn't! Just because he hasn't explicitly said it yet doesn't mean that isn't his intent -- especially given the fact that he has eventually admitted it in every other thread.

Malerin could be the poster boy for the approach outlined in the Discovery Institute's "wedge" document.
 
There is no difference between a single run of 110 and two runs of 55, or 110 runs of 1. It's merely a matter of how we consider them.

What we are interested in the case of the universe is to decide whether the coin is unbiased, in effect.

The number of trials is crucial in determining a frequency of occurance. the more you toss teh coin, the better the ferquency. And a run of ten is less certain than a run of a hundred, and much less certain than a run of ten thousand. The larger the data set the more likely the inference that it is a biased coin.

Which is irrelevant to the fine tuning argument, you can not state probabilities on the unknown.
 
What we are interested in the case of the universe is to decide whether the coin is unbiased, in effect.

Since Malerin is content to be silent on the issue -- which we expected, given his history -- would you care to explain how one would go about deciding that?
 

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